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FRANCES A. YATES

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A CONFUTATION OF ATHEISM.

CHAP. V.

HAving in the ſecond chapter revealed all the dark myſteries of atheiſm, and produced the utmoſt ſtrength of that cauſe; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of thoſe atheiſtick grounds, by repreſenting all the ſeveral forms and ſchemes of atheiſm, and ſhewing both their diſagreements amongſt themſelves, and wherein they all agree together againſt Theiſts; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them, intended by us, by reaſon of that large account given of the Pagan polytheiſm: which yet was no impertinent digreſſion neither, it removing the grand objection againſt the naturality of the idea of God, as including one lineſs in it; as alſo preparing a way for that defence of Chriſtianity, deſigned by us againſt Atheiſts. Wherefore that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we ſhall ſubjoin a contracted and compendious conſutation of all the premiſed atheiſtick principles. The FIRST whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or elſe none but ſuch as is compounded and made up of impoſſible and contradictious notions; from whence theſe Atheiſts would infer him to be an *unconceiveable Nothing*. In anſwer whereunto, there hath been ſomething done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, *viz.* a perfect underſtanding nature, neceſſarily ſelf-exiſtent, and the cauſe of all other things. And as there is nothing either unconceiveable, or contradictious in this idea, ſo have we ſhewed, that theſe confounded Atheiſts do not only, at the ſame time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confeſs it, for as much as otherwiſe, denying his exiſtence, they ſhould deny the exiſtence of nothing; but alſo that they agree with Theiſts in this very idea; it being the only thing, which Atheiſts contend for, that the

the firſt original and head of all things is no perfect underſtanding nature, but that all ſprung from *Tohu* and *Bohu*, or dark and ſenſeleſs matter fortuitouſly moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but alſo largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepſis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the real and actual exiſtence of ſuch a being; the Pagans themſelves, beſides their other many Gods (which were underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men,) acknowledging one chief and ſovereign *Numen*, the *Maker* of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that thoſe few Atheiſts, that formerly have been, and ſtill are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monſters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be ſufficient to repel the firſt atheiſtick aſſault, made againſt the idea of God.

Nevertheleſs, that we may not ſeem to diſſemble any of the Atheiſts ſtrength, we ſhall here particularly declare all their moſt colourable pretences againſt the idea of God, and then ſhow the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow; firſt, *That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not ſubject to corporeal ſenſe; nor the leaſt evidence of the exiſtence of any thing, but from the ſame.* Secondly, *That Theiſts themſelves acknowledging God to be incomprehenſible, he may be from thence inferred to be a non-entity.* Thirdly, *That the Theiſts idea of God including infinity in it, is therefore abſolutely unconceivable and impoſſible.* Fourthly, *That Theology is an arbitrarious compilement of inconſiſtent and contradictious notions.* And laſtly, *That the idea and exiſtence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded non-ſenſe of aſtoniſh'd minds, or elſe to the fiction and impoſture of politicians.*

We begin with the firſt; That we can have no idea, conception, or thought of any thing, not ſubject to ſenſe; nor the leaſt evidence of the exiſtence of any thing, but from the ſame. Thus a modern atheiſtick writer[1]; *Whatſoever we can conceive, hath been perceived firſt by ſenſe, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought repreſenting any thing not ſubject to ſenſe.* From whence it follows, that whatſoever is not ſenſible and imaginable, is utterly unconceiveable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the ſame writer adds, *That the only evidence, which we have of the exiſtence of any thing, is from ſenſe*; the conſequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal ſenſe of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of his exiſtence. Wherefore, according to the tenour of the atheiſtick philoſophy, all is reſolved into ſenſe, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as *Protagoras* in *Plato*'s *Theætetus*[2] concludes *knowledge to be ſenſe*; and a late writer of our own determines *ſenſe to be original knowledge.* Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we muſt contract our ſails. Were ſenſe knowledge and underſtanding; then he, that ſees light and colours, and feels heat and cold, would underſtand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other ſenſible things: neither would there be any philoſophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unſatisfied, concerning the nature

[1] *Hobbes*'s Leviathan, Part I. cap. I. [2] P. 118.

nature of theſe corporeal things, even after the ſtrongeſt ſenſations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philoſophick inquiry and ſearch about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, *&c.* really ſhould be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantaſms and ſenſations in our ſelves. Now it is certain, that there could be no ſuſpicion of any ſuch thing as this, were ſenſe the higheſt faculty in us; neither can ſenſe it ſelf ever decide this controverſy; ſince one ſenſe cannot judge of another, or correct the error of it; all ſenſe as ſuch, (that is, as phancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not theſe Atheiſts been notorious dunces in that atomick philoſophy, which they ſo much pretend to, they would clearly have learn'd ſom thence, that ſenſe is not knowledge and underſtanding, nor the criterion of truth as to ſenſible things themſelves; it reaching not to the eſſence or abſolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outſide, and perceiving its own paſſions from them, rather than the things themſelves: and that there is a higher faculty in the ſoul, of reaſon and underſtanding, which judges of ſenſe; detects the phantaſtry and impoſture of it; diſcovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themſelves like to thoſe forementioned ſenſible ideas; and reſolves all ſenſible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and meer paſſive impreſſions upon the ſoul from without, but native and domeſtick to it, or actively exerted from the ſoul it ſelf; no paſſion being able to make a judgment either of it ſelf, or other things. This is a thing ſo evident, that *Democritus* himſelf could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right uſe thereof; he, in all probability, continuing notwithſtanding a confounded and beſotted Atheiſt; *Sextus Empiricus* having recorded this of him [1]: Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναί γνώσεις, τὴν μέν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας· ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τῶν ἀληθῶς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· ἧς σκοτίης μέν, τάδε σύμπασα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὀδμή, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης· Democritus *in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges, one by the ſenſes, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witneſs to the faithfulneſs and firmneſs thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the ſenſes he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and meaſure of truth. His own words are theſe: There are two ſpecies of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obſcure. The dark and obſcure knowledge is ſeeing, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondit.* To which purpoſe there is another fragment alſo of this *Democritus* preſerved by the ſame *Sextus* [2]; Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν· νόμῳ χροιή· ἀτόμα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα· *Bitter and ſweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or phancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms and* vacuum *alone in truth and reality. That*

[1] Lib. VII. adverſ. Mathemat. §. CXXXVIII, CXXXIX. p. 400.

[2] Id. ibid. §. CXXXV. p. 399.

That which is thought to be, are ſenſibles ; but theſe are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only. Now the chief ground of this rational diſcovery of the antient Atomiſts, that ſenſible things, as heat and cold, bitter and ſweet, red and green, are no real qualities in the objects without, but only our own phancies, was becauſe in body there are no ſuch things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, ſite, motion and reſt. Of which we have not only ſenſible ideas, paſſively impreſſed upon us from without, but alſo intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind it ſelf. Which latter notwithſtanding, becauſe they are not unaccompanied with ſenſible phantaſms, are by many unſkilfully confounded with them. But beſides theſe, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas alſo, which have no genuine phantaſms at all belonging to them. Of which whoſoever doubts, may eaſily be ſatisfied and convinced, by reading but a ſentence or two, that he underſtands, in any book almoſt, that ſhall come next to his hand ; and reflexively examining himſelf, whether he have a phantaſm, or ſenſible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is modeſt and ingenuous, will quickly be forced to confeſs, that he meets with many words, which though they have a ſenſe or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantaſm belonging to them. And we have known ſome, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of *Tully*'s Offices, preſently non-plus'd and confounded in that firſt word *quanquam* ; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a ſenſe belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantaſm thereof, ſave only of the ſound or letters. But to prove, that there are cogitations not ſubject to corporeal ſenſe, we need go no further than this very idea or deſcription of God ; a ſubſtance abſolutely perfect, infinitely good, wiſe and powerful, neceſſarily ſelf-exiſtent, and the cauſe of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any underſtanding in him, and yet no conſiderative and ingenuous perſon can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantaſm, or ſenſible idea, anſwering to any one of thoſe words, either to *ſubſtance*, or to *abſolutely perfect*, or to *infinitely*, or to *good*, or to *wiſe*, or to *powerful*, or to *neceſſity*, or to *ſelf-exiſtence*, or to *cauſe* ; or indeed to *all*, or *other*, or *things*. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and ſottiſh dotage upon corporeal ſenſe, which hath ſo far impoſed upon ſome, as to make them believe, that they have not the leaſt cogitation of any thing not ſubject to corporeal ſenſe ; or that there is nothing in human underſtanding, or conception, which was not firſt in bodily ſenſe ; a doctrine highly favourable to atheiſm. But ſince it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts, not ſubject to ſenſe, it is manifeſt, that whatſoever falls not under external ſenſe, is not therefore unconceivable, and nothing. Which whoſoever aſſerts, muſt needs affirm life and cogitation it ſelf, knowledge or underſtanding, reaſon and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greateſt moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any ſignification. Nay, fancy and ſenſe it ſelf, upon this hypotheſis, could hardly 'ſcape from becoming non-entities too, foraſmuch as neither fancy nor ſenſe falls under ſenſe, but only the objects of them ; we neither ſeeing viſion, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much

Leſs

leſs, hearing ſight, or ſeeing taſte, or the like. Wherefore though God ſhould be never ſo much corporeal, as ſome Theiſts have conceived him to be; yet ſince the chief of his eſſence, and as it were his inſide, muſt by theſe be acknowledged to conſiſt in mind, wiſdom, and underſtanding, he could not poſſibly, as to this, fall under corporeal ſenſe (ſight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is ſubſtance incorporeal alſo, and therefore in itſelf altogether inſenſible, and that the Deity is ſuch, is demonſtrated elſewhere.

We grant indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, exiſting *hîc & nunc*, without us, doth neceſſarily depend upon the information of ſenſe; but yet nevertheleſs, the certainty of this very evidence is not from ſenſe alone, but from a complication of reaſon and underſtanding together with it. Were ſenſe the only evidence of things, there could be no abſolute truth and falſhood, nor certainty at all of any thing; ſenſe, as ſuch, being only relative to particular perſons, ſeeming and phantaſtical, and obnoxious to much deluſion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly ſo moved, and affected, as they would be by ſuch an object preſent, when indeed it is abſent, and no other motion or ſenſation in the mean time prevail againſt it and obliterate it; then muſt that object of neceſſity ſeem to us preſent. Moreover, thoſe imaginations, that ſpring and bubble from the ſoul itſelf, are commonly taken for ſenſations by us when aſleep, and ſometimes in melancholick and fanciful perſons alſo, when awake. That atheiſtick principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as exiſting, but only from corporeal ſenſe, is plainly contradicted by the Atomick Atheiſts themſelves, when they aſſert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvious images of bodies to be the cauſes both of ſight and cogitation: for ſingle atoms, and thoſe exuvious images, were never ſeen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty ſpace, is ſo far from being ſenſible, that theſe Atheiſts themſelves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they muſt here go beyond the ken of ſenſe, and appeal to reaſon only for the exiſtence of theſe principles: as *Protagoras*, one of them, in *Plato*, profeſſedly doth; ἄθρει περισκοπῶν μήτις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ· εἰσὶ δὲ ἕτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ ἅ ἂν δύνωνται ἁπτῇ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει· *Have a care, that none of the profane and uninitiated in the myſteries over-hear you. By the profane I mean* (ſaith he) *thoſe, who think nothing to exiſt, but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is inviſible out of the rank of being.* Were exiſtence to be allow'd to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal ſenſe, then muſt we deny the exiſtence of ſoul and mind in our ſelves and others, becauſe we can neither feel nor ſee any ſuch thing. Whereas we are certain of the exiſtence of our own ſouls, partly from an inward conſciouſneſs of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reaſon, that nothing cannot act. And the exiſtence of other individual ſouls is manifeſt to us, from their effects upon their reſpective bodies, their motions, actions, and diſcourſe. Wherefore ſince the Atheiſts cannot deny the exiſtence of ſoul or mind in men, though no

Theæt. p. 155. *Steph.*

ſuch thing fall under external ſenſe, they have as little reaſon to deny the exiſtence of a perfect mind, preſiding over the univerſe, without which it cannot be conceived, whence our imperfect ones ſhould be derived. The exiſtence of that God, whom no eye hath ſeen nor can ſee, is plainly proved by reaſon from his effects, in the viſible phænomena of the univerſe, and from what we are conſcious of within ourſelves.

The ſecond pretence of Atheiſts againſt the idea of God, and conſequently his exiſtence, is, becauſe Theiſts themſelves acknowledging God to be incomprehenſible, it may be from thence inferred, that he is a non-entity. Which argumentation of the Atheiſts ſuppoſes theſe two things, firſt, that what is incomprehenſible is altogether unconceivable; and then, that what is unconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is ſo utterly unconceivable, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itſelf, or at leaſt to us, nothing. Becauſe though that of *Protagoras* be not true, in his ſenſe, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· *That man is the meaſure of all things, either as exiſting or not exiſting*; he meaning indeed nothing elſe thereby, but that there was no abſolute truth or falſhood of any thing, but all was relative to particular perſons, and phantaſtical or ſeeming only. And though it muſt not be granted, that whatſoever any man's ſhallow underſtanding cannot eaſily and fully comprehend, is therefore preſently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reaſon, or rather infidelity of the Anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithſtanding ſome truth in that of *Ariſtotle*, that ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα, *the rational ſoul or mind is in a manner all things*; it being able to frame ſome idea and conception or other of whatſoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or poſſible exiſtence, from the very higheſt to the loweſt. Mind and Underſtanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and cryſtalline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath ſome reflex image, and correſpondent ray, or repreſentation in it, to whatſoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be ſaid, that whatſoever is in its own nature abſolutely unconceivable, is indeed a non-entity.

Plato Theæt. [p. 118.]

But the former is abſolutely denied by us, that whatſoever is incomprehenſible is unconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehenſible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have ſuch a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly maſter, conquer, and ſubdue that vaſt object under it; or at leaſt is ſo fully adequate and commenſurate to the ſame, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, becauſe God is thus incomprehenſible to our finite and narrow underſtandings, that he is utterly unconceivable by them, ſo that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity. For it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourſelves, and that we have not ſuch an adequate and comprehenſive knowledge of the eſſence of any ſubſtantial thing, as that

that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the Scepticks, that there is ἀκατάληπτόν τι, *something incomprehensible* in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance, that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite thorough the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis, agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling*; as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely unconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness; but, for the very same reason, may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though, by reason of its excessive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet is it notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the *nebulosæ stellæ, the small misty stars.* Where there is more of light, there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light, and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent æther, hath to us the apparition

of an azure obſcurity; which yet is not an abſolute thing in itſelf, but only relative to our ſenſe, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehenſibility of the Deity is ſo far from being an argument againſt the reality of its exiſtence, as that it is moſt certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehenſible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and ſmall atoms of the univerſe; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect underſtandings could ſpan or fathom, and encompaſs round about, look thorough and thorough, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and ſubdue under them; then could there be nothing abſolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of *Empedocles* be not true in a literal ſenſe; as it ſeems to have been taken by *Ariſtotle*[1], γαίᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. *That by earth we ſee earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and underſtand every thing by ſomething of the ſame within ourſelves:* yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by ſome internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the ſenſe intended by that noble philoſophick poet. Wherefore it cannot poſſibly otherwiſe be, but that the finiteneſs, ſcantneſs, and imperfection of our narrow underſtandings muſt make them aſymmetral, or incommenſurate, to that, which is abſolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itſelf plainly intimates to us, that there is ſome ſuch abſolutely perfect Being, which, though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehenſible to our finite underſtandings, by certain paſſions, which it hath implanted in us, that otherwiſe would want an object to diſplay themſelves upon; namely thoſe of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecſtaſy, and pleaſing horror; which, in the ſilent language of nature, ſeem to ſpeak thus much to us, that there is ſome object in the world, ſo much bigger and vaſter than our mind and thoughts, that it is the very ſame to them, that the ocean is to narrow veſſels; ſo that when they have taken into themſelves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is ſtill an immenſity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore muſt be apprehended after ſome other ſtrange and more myſterious manner, *viz.* by their being as it were plunged into it, and ſwallowed up or loſt in it. To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehenſible to our finite and imperfect underſtandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheiſtick pretence, to make it a non-entity.

We come to the third atheiſtick argumentation; That becauſe infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly unconceivable, the Deity itſelf is therefore an impoſſibility, and non-entity. To this ſenſe found ſundry paſſages of a modern writer; as, *Whatſoever we know, we learn from our phantaſms; but there is no phantaſm of Infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it.* Again,

[1] De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 3. Tom. II. Oper.

Again, *Whatſoever we imagine is finite, and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is uſed not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him.* The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other paſſages of the ſame writer) is thus to be interpreted; that there is nothing of philoſophick truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other ſenſe in thoſe words, but only to ſignify the veneration and aſtoniſhment of men's own confounded minds. And accordingly the word *infinite* is declared to ſignify nothing at all in that which is ſo called, (there being no ſuch thing really exiſting) but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their ruſtick aſtoniſhment and admiration. Wherefore when the ſame writer determines, that God muſt not be ſaid to be finite, this being no good courtſhip nor compliment; and yet the word *infinite* ſignifieth nothing in the thing itſelf, nor hath any conception at all anſwering to it; he either does plainly abuſe his reader, or elſe he leaves him to make up this concluſion, that ſince God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an unconceivable nothing. In like manner, another learned well-willer to atheiſm declareth, that he, who calleth any thing infinite, doth but *rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit; attribute an unintelligible name to a thing unconceivable; becauſe all conception is finite, and it is impoſſible to conceive any thing, that hath no bounds or limits. But that, which is miſtaken for infinite, is nothing but a confuſed chaos of the mind, or an unſhapen embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progreſs, without ſeeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endleſs journey, they ſit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite.* And from hence does he alſo infer, that becauſe we can have no idea of infinite, as to ſignify any thing in that, which is ſo called; we therefore cannot poſſibly have *germanam ideam Dei, any true and genuine idea or notion of God.* Of which, they who underſtand the language of Atheiſts, know very well the meaning to be this; that there is indeed no ſuch thing, or that he is a non-entity.

Now ſince this exception againſt the idea of God, and conſequently his exiſtence, is made by our modern and neoterick Atheiſts; we ſhall, in the firſt place, ſhew, how contradictious they are herein to their predeceſſors, the old philoſophick Atheiſts; and conſequently how inconſiſtent and diſagreeing Atheiſts in ſeveral ages have been with one another. For whereas theſe modern Atheiſts would have this thought a ſufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philoſophick Atheiſts were ſo far from being of this perſuaſion, that ſome of them, as *Anaximander* expreſly, made Ἄπειρον, or *infinite*, the *principle* of all things; that is *infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and underſtanding.* For though *Meliſſus* his Ἄπειρον or *infinite*, which he made the firſt principle, was a moſt perfect being, eminently containing all things (as hath been already ſhewed) and therefore the true Deity; *Anaxi-*

mander's

mander's Ἄπειρον, or Infinite, yet however called Θεῖον, or divine by him, (it being the only divinity, which he acknowledged) was nothing but ſenſeleſs matter, an atheiſtick Infinite. Wherefore both Theiſts and Atheiſts in thoſe former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was ſomething or other infinite, as the firſt principle of all things; either infinite mind, or infinite matter; though this latter atheiſtick infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as ſhall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only *Anaximander*, but alſo, after him, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, and many others of that atheiſtick gang, heretofore aſſerted likewiſe a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were alſo unconceivable and impoſſible; yet does it ſufficiently appear from hence, that theſe ancient philoſophick Atheiſts were ſo far from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impoſſible, and a nonentity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to diſprove a Deity after this manner, *becauſe there can be nothing infinite*.

But, in the next place, we ſhall make it manifeſt, that theſe modern Atheiſts do no leſs contradict plain reaſon and their very ſelves alſo, than they do their predeceſſors in that impiety, when they thus go about to diſprove the exiſtence of a God, becauſe there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For firſt, though it ſhould be doubted, whether there be a God or no; yet muſt it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable, as any thing in all geometry, that there was ſomething or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: becauſe, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common notion, or principle of reaſon, having here an irreſiſtible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always ſomething, then muſt there of neceſſity be ſomething infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted leſs than extreme ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity of mind in theſe modern Atheiſts, thus to impugn a Deity from the impoſſibility of infinite duration without beginning. But in the next place, we muſt confeſs it ſeems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheiſt whatſoever could poſſibly be ſo prodigiouſly ſottiſh, or ſo monſtrouſly infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards ſenſeleſs matter happened (no body knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypotheſis it would follow alſo, that matter might as well ſome time or other happen again to ceaſe to be, and ſo all things vaniſh into nothing. To conclude therefore, theſe Atheiſts muſt of neceſſity be guilty of one or other of theſe two things; either of extreme ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity, in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have exiſted infinitely from eternity without beginning; or elſe, if they do acknowledge the pre-

pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite paſt-duration without beginning, then, of the moſt notorious impudence, in making that an argument againſt the exiſtence of a God, which themſelves acknowledge to matter.

Nevertheleſs we ſhall here readily comply with theſe modern Atheiſts thus far, as to grant them theſe two following things; *Firſt*, That we can have no proper and genuine phantaſm of any Infinite whatſoever, becauſe we never had corporeal ſenſe of any, neither of infinite number, nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much leſs of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; theſe two latter things, time and power, themſelves not falling under corporeal ſenſe. *Secondly*, That as we have no phantaſm of any infinite, ſo neither is infinity fully comprehenſible by our human underſtandings, that are but finite. But ſince it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was ſomething infinite in duration, or without beginning, inſomuch that no intelligent Atheiſt, upon mature conſideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we ſhall from hence extort from theſe Atheiſts an acknowledgment of the falſeneſs of theſe two theorems of theirs, that whatſoever we have no phantaſm or ſenſible idea of, as alſo whatſoever is not fully comprehenſible by us, is therefore a pure non-entity or nothing; and enforce them to confeſs, that there is ſomething really exiſting in nature, which we have neither any phantaſm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect underſtandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewiſe, that as for thoſe infinities, of number, of corporeal magnitude, and of time or ſucceſſive duration, we have not only no phantaſm, nor full intellectual comprehenſion of them, but alſo no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be ſomewhere ſaid by *Ariſtotle* [1] to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in ſuch a negative ſenſe as this, that we can never poſſibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds ſtill add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he ſhould indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and poſitively infinite, according to *Ariſtotle*'s own definition of Infinite, elſewhere given [2], namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever ſo great, but that one or more may ſtill be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, ſo neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only becauſe if there were, the parts thereof muſt needs be infinite in number, but alſo becauſe, as no number can be ſo great, but that more may be added to it; ſo neither can any body or magnitude be ever ſo vaſt, but that more body or magnitude may be ſuppoſed ſtill further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed infinite ſpace, beyond the finite world, is a thing, which hath been much talked of; and it is by ſome ſuppoſed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whoſe actual diſtance notwithſtanding (menſurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll and

[1] Metaphyſ. Lib. XI. Cap. XI. p. 434. Tom. IV. Oper. & Phyſ. Auſcultat. Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 486. Tom. I. Oper. & Cap. VIII. p. 491.

[2] Phyſ. Auſcultat. Lib. III. Cap. IX. p. 493. Tom. I. Oper.

and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonſtrated here, is no more than this, that how vaſt ſoever the finite world ſhould be, yet is there a poſſibility of more and more magnitude and body, ſtill to be added to it, further and further, by divine power, infinitely; or that the world could never be made ſo great, no not by God himſelf, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater. Which potential infinity, or indefinite increaſableneſs of corporeal magnitude, ſeems to have been miſtaken for an actual infinity of ſpace. Whereas, for this very reaſon, becauſe more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impoſſible, that it ſhould ever be poſitively and actually infinite; that is, ſuch, as to which nothing more can poſſibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no abſolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaſter ſoever the world may be, than according to the ſuppoſition of vulgar aſtronomers, who make the ſtarry ſphere the utmoſt wall thereof; yet is it not abſolutely infinite, ſuch as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by divine power, be added. *Laſtly*, We affirm likewiſe, concerning time, or ſucceſſive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only, becauſe there would then be an actual infinity, and more than an infinity of number; but alſo becauſe, upon this ſuppoſition, there would always have been an infinity of time paſt, and conſequently an infinity of time paſt, which was never preſent. Whereas all the moments of paſt time muſt needs have been once preſent; and if ſo, then all of them, at leaſt ſave one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a firſt moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reaſon conclude, neither the world, nor time itſelf, to have been infinite in their paſt duration, nor eternal without beginning.

Here will the Atheiſt think preſently, he hath got a great advantage to diſprove the exiſtence of a God; *Nonne, qui æternitatem mundi ſic tollunt, eâdem operâ etiam mundi conditori æternitatem tollunt? Do not they, who thus deſtroy the eternity of the world, at the ſame time deſtroy alſo the eternity of the Creator? For if time itſelf were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be ſo?* the Atheiſt ſecurely taking it for granted, that God himſelf could not be otherwiſe eternal, than by a ſucceſſive flux of infinite time; but we ſay, that this will, on the contrary, afford us a plain demonſtration of the exiſtence of a Deity. For ſince the world and time itſelf were not infinite in their paſt duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by ſome other being, who is, in order of nature, ſenior to time, and ſo without time, before time; he being above that ſucceſſive flux, and comprehending in the ſtability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yeſterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus; Something was of neceſſity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no ſucceſſive being was ſuch; therefore is there ſomething elſe, whoſe being and duration is not ſucceſſive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheiſts

Atheiſts here can only ſmile, or make faces, and ſhow their little wit in quibbling upon *nunc-ſtans*, or a *ſtanding Now* of eternity; as if that ſtanding eternity of the Deity (which with ſo much reaſon hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theiſts) were nothing but a pitiful ſmall moment of time ſtanding ſtill, and as if the duration of all beings whatſoever muſt needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing muſt, of neceſſity, be agreeable to its nature: and therefore, as that, whoſe imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and conſiſts in continual motion and changes one after another, muſt needs have accordingly a ſucceſſive and flowing duration, ſliding perpetually from preſent into paſt, and always poſting on towards the future, expecting ſomething of itſelf, which is not yet in being, but to come; ſo muſt that, whoſe perfect nature is eſſentially immutable, and always the ſame, and neceſſarily exiſtent, have a permanent duration, never loſing any thing of itſelf once preſent, as ſliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet ſomething of itſelf before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictious for it ever to have begun, as ever to ceaſe to be.

Now whereas the modern Atheiſts pretend to have proved, that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwiſe, and conſequently no Deity, merely becauſe we have no ſenſe nor phantaſm of Infinite, nor can fully comprehend the ſame; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words *infinite* and *eternal* ſignify nothing in the thing itſelf, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive, when, or whether, that, which is called *eternal*, began; together with the confounded nonſenſe of their aſtoniſh'd minds, and their ſtupid veneration of that, which their own fear and fancy has raiſed up as a bug-bear to themſelves; or elſe the progreſs of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely, (tho' they plainly confute themſelves in all this, by ſometimes acknowledging *matter* and *motion* infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme ſottiſhneſs or impudence:) we have ſhewed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really ſomething infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonſenſe of their devotion, nor yet the idle progreſs of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itſelf, namely this, that it *never was not*, nor had any *beginning*. Moreover, having demonſtrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot poſſibly belong to any ſucceſſive being, we confidently conclude againſt theſe Atheiſts alſo, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane ſyſtem, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration, (that is, *a God)* to whom it belonged. To ſum up all therefore, we ſay, that *infinite* and *eternal* are not words, that ſignify nothing in the thing itſelf, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonſenſe, error and falſhood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the moſt philoſophick truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehenſion and adequate

underſtanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity) yet can we not be without ſome notion, conception and apprehenſion thereof, ſo long as we can thus demonſtrate concerning it, that it belongs to ſomething, and yet to nothing neither, but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheiſts principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly unconceivable and impoſſible, and ſubjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheiſtick writer concludes, that ſince *no man can conceive infinite power, this is alſo but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonſenſe of aſtoniſh'd minds beſtows upon the object of their devotion, without any philoſophick truth and reality.* And here have our modern Atheiſts indeed the ſuffrage and agreement of the ancient philoſophick Atheiſts alſo with them, who, as appears from the verſes before cited out of *Lucretius*, concern'd themſelves in nothing more, than aſſerting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

Firſt, therefore, it is here obſervable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, aſſerted by Theiſts, has been commonly either ignorantly miſtaken, or wilfully miſrepreſented by theſe Atheiſts, out of deſign to make it ſeem impoſſible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatſoever, without exception, though never ſo contradictious; as a late atheiſtick perſon, ſeeming to aſſert this divine omnipotence and infinite power, really and deſignedly, notwithſtanding, abuſed the ſame, with this ſceptick irony, *That God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a ſyllogiſm.* Children indeed have ſometimes ſuch childiſh apprehenſions of the divine omnipotence; and *Ren. Carteſius* [a], (though otherwiſe an acute philoſopher) was here no leſs childiſh, in affirming, that all things whatſoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falſhood, do ſo depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleaſed, *twice two ſhould not have been four*, nor the *three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones*, and the like; he only adding, that all theſe things, notwithſtanding, when they were once ſettled by the divine decree, became immutable; that is, I ſuppoſe, not in themſelves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philoſopher was ever more abſurd and irrational. And, certainly, if any one did deſire to perſuade the world, that *Carteſius*, notwithſtanding all his pretences to demonſtrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theiſt, or perſonated and diſguiſed Atheiſt, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings, than from hence; this being plainly to deſtroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and ſwallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite underſtanding and wiſdom. For to ſuppoſe God to underſtand, and to be wiſe only by his will, is all one as to ſuppoſe him to have really no underſtanding at all. Wherefore we

[a] Vide Reſponſ. ad Objectiones ſextas, §. VI. p. 160. Edit. Amſtel. 1685. in 4to.

we do not affirm God to be ſo omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to deſtroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleaſure; this being all one as to ſay, that God is ſo omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to deſtroy, or to baffle and befool his own wiſdom and underſtanding, which is the very rule and meaſure of his power. We ſay not therefore, that God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a ſyllogiſm; but we ſay, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can produce and do all whatſoever is poſſible, that is, whatſoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very eſſence of poſſibility being no other than conceptibility. And thus has the point been ſtated all along, not only by Chriſtian Theiſts, but even the ancient Pagan theologers themſelves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that, which can do all things, that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not unconceivable. This appearing from that of *Agatho*, cited before out of *Ariſtotle*[1], *That nothing is exempted from the divine power, but only to make* πεπραγμένα ἀγένητα, *what hath been done to be undone*, or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing elſe but a power of doing whatſoever is conceivable, it is plainly abſurd to ſay, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable.

But, becauſe the Atheiſts look upon infinity as ſuch a deſperate and affrightful thing, we ſhall here render it ſomething more eaſy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes it ſeem ſuch a *mormo*, or bugbear to them, by declaring, in the *next* place, that infinity is really nothing elſe but perfection. For infinite underſtanding and knowledge is nothing elſe but perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it, or the knowledge of whatſoever is knowable. So in like manner, infinite power is nothing elſe but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatſoever is poſſible, that is, whatſoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatſoever infinite underſtanding can conceive, and nothing elſe; conception being the meaſure of power, and its extent, and whatſoever is in itſelf unconceivable being therefore impoſſible. *Laſtly*, Infinity of duration, or eternity, is really nothing elſe but perfection, as including neceſſary exiſtence and immutability in it: ſo that it is not only contradictious to ſuch a being to ceaſe to be, or exiſt, but alſo to have had a newneſs or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the preſent, and acquiring ſomething new to itſelf, which was not before. Notwithſtanding which, this being comprehends the differences of paſt, preſent, and future, or the ſucceſſive priority and poſteriority of all temporary things: and becauſe infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection, in the very idea and eſſence of it, be ever truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and ſucceſſive duration. All which can only, *mentiri infinitatem*, *counterfeit and imitate infinity*, in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithſtanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is

[1] Lib. VI. ad Nicomach. Cap. II. p. 98. Tom. III. Oper.

nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one abſolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect being, is evident from the notion, that we have of imperfection, ſo familiar to us; perfection being the rule and meaſure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection; as a ſtraight line is the rule and meaſure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a ſtraight: ſo that perfection is firſt conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkneſs, a poſitive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the eſſences of things, and conſequently a ſcale or ladder of perfections, in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above ſenſeleſs and inanimate, of rational things above ſenſitive; and this by reaſon of that notion or idea, which we firſt have of that, which is abſolutely perfect, as the ſtandard; by comparing of things with which, and meaſuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or leſs near thereunto. Nor indeed could theſe gradual aſcents be infinite, or without end, but they muſt come at laſt to that, which is abſolutely perfect, as the top of them all. *Laſtly*, We could not perceive imperfection in the moſt perfect of all thoſe things, which we ever had ſenſe or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that, which is abſolutely perfect, which ſecretly comparing the ſame with, we perceive it to come ſhort thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there ſhould be any leſſer perfection exiſtent in any kind, were there not firſt ſomething perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived; this of *Boetius* [1] being the very ſenſe and language of nature in rational beings; *Omne, quod imperfectum eſſe dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum eſſe perhibetur. Quò fit, ut ſi in quolibet genere imperfectum quid eſſe videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid eſſe, neceſſe ſit. Etenim ſublata perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, exſtiterit, ne fingi quidem poteſt. Neque enim a diminutis inconſummatiſque natura rerum cepit exordium; ſed ab integris abſolutiſque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effœta dilabitur. Whatſoever is ſaid to be imperfect, is accounted ſuch by the diminution of that, which is perfect; from whence it comes to paſs, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething alſo, in that kind, perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined, from whence that which is accounted imperfect ſhould have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconſummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things abſolute and complete, thence deſcend down to theſe lower, effete, and languid things.* But of this more elſewhere.

Wherefore ſince *infinite* is the ſame with *abſolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter, muſt needs have of the former. From whence

[1] De Conſolat. Philoſ. Lib. III. p. 69, 70. Edit. Vallini.

whence we learn alſo, that though the word *infinite* be in the form thereof negative, yet is the ſenſe of it, in thoſe things which are really capable of the ſame, poſitive, it being all one with abſolutely perfect; as likewiſe the ſenſe of the word *finite* is negative, it being the ſame with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite. However, in thoſe things which are capable of no true infinity, becauſe they are eſſentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we alſo conceive nothing, by the negation of ſomething; that is, we can have no poſitive conception thereof.

We conclude, to aſſert an infinite Being, is nothing elſe but to aſſert a Being abſolutely perfect, ſuch as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things poſſible and conceivable, and upon which all other things muſt depend. And this is to aſſert a God; one abſolutely perfect Being, the original of all things: God, and Infinite, and Abſolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the ſame thing.

We come now to the fourth atheiſtick objection, That theology is nothing but an arbitrarious compilement of inconſiſtent and contradictious notions. Where, firſt, we deny not, but that as ſome theologers (or bigotical religioniſts) of later times extend the divine omnipotence to things contradictious and impoſſible, as to the making of one and the ſame body, to be all of it, in ſeveral diſtant places at once; ſo may others ſometimes unſkilfully attribute to the Deity things inconſiſtent or contradictious to one another, becauſe ſeeming to them to be all perfections. As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural juſtice and ſanctity in the Deity, yet do ſome notwithſtanding contend, that the will of God is not determined by any antecedent rule or nature of juſtice, but that whatſoever he could be ſuppoſed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be *ipſo facto* juſt; which is called by them the divine ſovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that theſe two things are directly contradictious to one another, *viz.* That there is ſomething φύσει, in its own nature juſt and unjuſt, or a natural ſanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of juſtice and injuſtice. Again, ſome theologers determining, That whatſoever is in God, is God, or eſſential to the Deity; they conceiving ſuch an immutability to be a neceſſary perfection thereof, ſeem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the Deity, which themſelves notwithſtanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by divine decree; but alſo to take away from it all power of acting *ad extra*, and of perceiving or animadverting things done ſucceſſively here in the world. But it will not follow from theſe and the like contradictions of miſtaken theologers, that therefore theology itſelf is contradictious, and hath nothing of philoſophick truth at all in it; no more than becauſe philoſophers

ſophers alſo hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philoſophy itſelf is contradictious, and that there is nothing abſolutely true or falſe, but (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all ſeeming and phantaſtical.

But in the next place we add, that though it be true, that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictious, and that whatſoever plainly implies a contradiction, muſt therefore of neceſſity be a non-entity; yet is this rule, notwithſtanding, obnoxious to be much abuſed, when whatſoever mens ſhallow and groſs underſtandings cannot reach to, they will therefore preſently conclude to be contradictious and impoſſible. As for example, the Atheiſts and Materialiſts cannot conceive of any other ſubſtance beſides body, and therefore do they determine preſently, that incorporeal ſubſtance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to ſay, incorporeal body [1]: wherefore when God is ſaid by theologers to be an incorporeal ſubſtance, this is to them an abſolute impoſſibility. Thus a modern writer; *The univerſe, that is, the whole maſs of all things, is corporeal; that is to ſay, body. Now every part of body is body, and conſequently every part of the univerſe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And becauſe the univerſe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Therefore when ſpirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himſelf, in whom we conſider, not what attribute beſt expreſſeth his nature, which is incomprehenſible, but what beſt expreſſeth our deſire to honour him.* Where, *incorporeal* is ſaid to be an attribute of honour; that is, ſuch an attribute, as expreſſeth only the veneration of men's minds, but ſignifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philoſophick truth and reality under it; a ſubſtance incorporeal being as contradictious as ſomething and nothing. Notwithſtanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakneſs and childiſhneſs of theſe mens underſtandings, and not the thing itſelf; it being demonſtrable, that there is ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But becauſe this miſtake is not proper to Atheiſts only, there being ſome Theiſts alſo, who labour under this ſame infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other ſubſtance beſides body, and who therefore aſſert a corporeal Deity; we ſhall in the next place ſhew, from a paſſage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are, which theſe Atheiſts impute to all theology; namely, ſuch as theſe, that it ſuppoſes God *to perceive things ſenſible, without any organs of ſenſe; and to underſtand and be wiſe without any brains. Pious men* (ſaith he) *attribute to God Almighty, for honour's ſake, whatſoever they ſee honourable in the world, as ſeeing, hearing, willing, knowing, juſtice, wiſdom,* &c. *But they deny him ſuch poor things, as eyes, ears and brains, and other organs, without which we worms, neither have, nor can conceive, ſuch faculties to be: and ſo far they do well. But when they diſpute of God's actions philoſophically, then do they conſider them again, as if he had indeed ſuch faculties. This is not well, and thence it is, that they fall into ſo many difficulties. We ought not to diſpute of God's nature. He is no fit ſubject of our philoſophy.* True

[1] Hobbes's Leviath. Cap. XXXIV.

True religion conſiſteth in obedience to Chriſt's lieutenants, and in giving God ſuch honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their ſeveral lieutenancies ſhall ordain. Where the plain and undiſguiſed meaning of the author ſeems to be this; That God is no ſubject of philoſophy, as all real things are; (accordingly as he declareth elſewhere, that [1] *Religio non eſt philoſophia, ſed lex; Religion is not a matter of philoſophy, but only of law and arbitrary conſtitution*) he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghoſts and ſpirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a meer political ſcare-crow. And therefore ſuch attributes are to be given to him, without any ſcrupuloſity, as the civil law of every country ſhall appoint, and no other; the wiſe and naſute very well underſtanding, that all this buſineſs of religion is nothing but meer pageantry, and that the attributes of the Deity indeed ſignify neither true nor falſe, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear; the manner of expreſſing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to ſay, that God ſees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he underſtands, and is wiſe, and yet hath no brains; and whatſoever elſe you will pleaſe to ſay of him, as attributes of honour, and only as ſignifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not underſtanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they miſtaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philoſophick truth, and making them premiſes to infer abſolute truth, and convince falſhood from, or matters to diſpute and reaſon upon; that is, when they will needs ſuppoſe ſuch a thing as a God really to exiſt in the world, then do they involve themſelves in all manner of contradiction, nonſenſe, and abſurdity; as for example, to affirm ſeriouſly, that this God really ſees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and laſtly, that he underſtands and is wiſe, and yet hath no brains, which things are all abſolutely contradictious, unconceivable and impoſſible. The ſum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and phantaſtry, is made philoſophy, then is it all meer jargon and inſignificant nonſenſe. And now we ſee what thoſe contradictions are, which the Atheiſts charge upon theology; ſuch as owe all their being only to the groſsneſs, ſottiſhneſs, and brutiſhneſs of theſe men's own apprehenſions. From whence proceedeth likewiſe, this following definition of knowledge and underſtanding [2], That it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raiſed by external things, preſſing the organical parts of man's body. *O ye brutiſh among the people, when will ye underſtand? and ye fools, when will ye be wiſe? He that planted the ear,* (and gave man's ſoul a power of hearing thereby) *ſhall not he* (though himſelf have no ears) *hear? He that formed the eye* (and gave the human ſoul a power of ſeeing, by it as an inſtrument) *ſhall not he* (though himſelf have no eyes) *ſee?* Laſtly, *he that teacheth man knowledge,* (or gave him an underſtanding mind, beſides brains) *ſhall not he* (though himſelf be without brains) *know and underſtand?*

It

[1] De Homine, Cap. XIV. [2] Leviathan, Cap. XXXI. & Elementa de Cive, Cap. XV.

It is certain, that no ſimple idea, as that of a triangle or a ſquare, of a cube or ſphere, can poſſibly be contradictious to itſelf; and therefore much leſs can the idea of a perfect being (which is the compendious idea of God) it being more ſimple than any of the other. Indeed this ſimple idea of a perfect being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore the idea of God, more fully declared by them all, may ſeem to be in this reſpect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, conſiſting or made up of many; which if they were really contradictious, would render the whole a non-entity. As for example, this, a plain triangle, whoſe three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictious and unconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a non-entity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonſtrable of a perfect being, as the properties of a triangle or a ſquare are of thoſe ideas reſpectively, and therefore cannot they poſſibly be contradictious, neither to it, nor to one another, becauſe thoſe things, which agree in one third, muſt needs agree together amongſt themſelves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely, ſuch as are demonſtrable of an abſolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictious, but alſo neceſſarily connected together, and inſeparable from one another. For there could not poſſibly be one thing infinite in wiſdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very ſame thing, which is infinite in wiſdom, muſt needs be alſo infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and ſo *vice verſâ*. That, which is infinite in any one perfection, muſt of neceſſity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictious, but alſo inſeparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of diſagreeing things; or elſe of ſuch, as are unneceſſarily connected, with one another.

In very truth, all the ſeveral attributes of the Deity are nothing elſe but ſo many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame ſimple perfect being, taken in as it were by piece-meal, by reaſon of the imperfection of our human underſtandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one ſimple light of the ſun, diverſly refracted and reflected from a rorid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impoſſibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonſenſe of aſtoniſhed minds, expreſſing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of moſt ſevere philoſophick truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrarious compilement of things unneceſſarily connected, and ſeparable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any

any feigning power of the ſoul, but it is a natural and moſt ſimple uncompounded idea; ſuch as to which nothing can be arbitrariouſly added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithſtanding which, by reaſon of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, and are, different apprehenſions concerning it. For as every one, that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general, doth not therefore know, that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one, who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, preſently underſtand, that the ſquare of the ſubtenſe is equal to the ſquares of both the ſides; ſo neither doth every one, who hath a conception of a perfect being, therefore preſently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may eaſily miſtake things for abſolute perfections, which are not ſuch, as hath been partly already ſhewed.

And now, whereas the Atheiſts pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that ſuppoſed contradictiouſneſs in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonſenſe of men's aſtoniſhed minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtſhip and compliment, without any philoſophick truth, ſenſe, or ſignification; as alſo, in part, from the fiction and impoſture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our ſhewing, that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonſtrable of a perfect Being, and that there cannot be the leaſt either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to, or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a ſquare. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot poſſibly be any thing either contradictious or arbitrarious in the divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of neceſſary philoſophick truth; namely, ſuch as do not only ſpeak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itſelf. Wherefore, when a modern atheiſtick writer affirmeth of all thoſe, who reaſon and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, *That, loſing their underſtanding in the very firſt attempt, they fall from one inconvenience* (or abſurdity) *to another, without end; after the ſame manner, as when one, ignorant of court-ceremonies, coming into the preſence of a greater perſon than he was wont to ſpeak to, and ſtumbling at his entrance, to ſave himſelf from falling, lets ſlip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and ſo, with one diſorder after another, diſcovers his ruſticity and aſtoniſhment*: we ſay, that, though there be ſomething of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology, and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the leaſt of philoſophick truth. However, we deny not but that ſome, either out of ſuperſtition, or elſe out of flattery, (for thus are they ſtyled by St. *Jerome*[a], *ſtulti adulatores Dei, fooliſh flatterers of God Almighty*) have ſometimes attributed ſuch things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honouring him, by magnifying his power and ſovereignty, do indeed moſt highly

[a] Comment. in Habacuc. Lib. I. p. 148. Tom. VI. Oper.

diſhonour him; they repreſenting him to be ſuch a Being as is no way amiable or deſirable.

But the Atheiſts are moſt of all concerned to give an account of that unqueſtionable phænomenon, the *general perſuaſion of the exiſtence of a God* in the minds of men, and their *propenſity to religion* in all ages and places of the world; whence this ſhould come, if there be really no ſuch thing in nature: and this they think to do in the laſt place alſo, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of cauſes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil ſubjection under them; where we ſhall firſt plainly and nakedly declare the Atheiſt's meaning, and then manifeſt the invalidity and foolery of theſe pretences to ſolve the forementioned phænomenon.

Firſt, therefore, theſe Atheiſts affirm, That mankind, by reaſon of their natural imbecillity, are in perpetual ſolicitude, anxiety and fear, concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this paſſion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to ſuſpect or believe the exiſtence of what really is not; I ſay, that this diſtruſtful fear and jealouſy in the minds of men, concerning their future condition, raiſes up to them the phantaſm of a moſt *affrightful ſpectre, an inviſible underſtanding Being, arbitrarily governing and ſwaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleaſure tyrannizing over mankind.* And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raiſed up to itſelf ſuch a *Mormo*, or bug-bear, ſuch an affrightful ſpectre as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward ſtand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worſhip this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really exiſting without them, or a God; deviſing all manner of expreſſions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiouſly endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the ſame. And thus have they brought upon themſelves a moſt heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterneſs and miſery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheiſts add alſo *ignorance of cauſes*, as a further account of this phænomenon of religion, ſo generally entertained in the world. For mankind (ſay they) are naturally inquiſitive into the cauſes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but alſo of the phænomena of the world, and the effects of nature: and ſuch is their curioſity, that whereſoever they can diſcover no viſible and natural cauſes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other cauſes, inviſible and ſupernatural. As it was obſerved of the tragick dramatiſts, that, whenever they could not well extricate themſelves, they were wont to bring in a God upon the ſtage: and as *Ariſtotle*[1] recordeth of *Anaxagoras*, that he never betook himſelf to *Mind*, or *Underſtanding*, that is, to God for a cauſe, but only then when he was at a loſs for other natural and neceſſary cauſes. From whence theſe Atheiſts would infer, that nothing but ignorance of cauſes made *Anaxagoras* to aſſert a Deity. Wherefore

[1] Metaphyſ. Lib. I. Cap. IV. p. 267. Tom. IV. Oper.

fore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phænomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer: *Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible.* Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations) but also men's taking things casual for prognosticks, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same phantastick supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person [2].

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phænomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians: Who perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dextrously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publickly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer [3], *Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publickly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition.* And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that

[1] Hobbes, Leviath. Cap. XII.

[2] This is levelled against *Hobbes* de Homine, Cap. XIII. and Leviathan, Cap. XII.

[3] Leviathan. Cap. VI.

their laws were not meerly their own inventions, but that themſelves were only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the ſame things were really diſpleaſing to the gods, which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwiſe, than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that aſſertion of a late writer, *Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, niſi per eos, qui imperium tenent*, *that God reigneth over men, only in the civil ſovereigns.* This is therefore another atheiſtick account of religion's ſo generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of ſtate, and politicians generally looking upon it as an *arcanum imperii*, *a myſtery of government*, to poſſeſs the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them buſily imployed in the exerciſes of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, ſubjection, peace, and civil ſociety.

Tract. Theol. Poli. [Ben. Spinozæ Cap. IX. p. 214]

Neither is all this the meer invention of modern Atheiſts, but indeed the old atheiſtick cabal, as may appear partly from that known paſſage of the poet[1], *That the gods were firſt made by fear*; and from *Lucretius* his ſo frequently inſiſting upon the ſame, according to the mind of *Epicurus*. For in his firſt book he makes *terrorem animi, & tenebras, terrour of mind, and darkneſs*, the chief cauſes of theiſm; and in his ſixth, he further purſues the ſame grounds, eſpecially the latter of them, after this manner;

Lamb. 528. [Verſ. 49.]

Cætera quæ fieri in terris cæloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu' ſæpe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divûm;
Depreſſoſque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res; & concedere regnum, &,
Quorum operum cauſas nulla ratione videre
Poſſunt, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

To this ſenſe; *Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depreſſed and ſunk down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of cauſes ſetting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural cauſes of theſe things, they ſuppoſe them, preſently, to have been done by a divine power.*

And this ignorance of cauſes is alſo elſewhere inſiſted upon by the ſame poet, as the chief ſource of religion, or the belief of a God.

Lib. 5. *Lamb.* p. 500. [Verſ. 1182.]

Præterea cæli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoſcere cauſis.
Ergo PERFUGIUM ſibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, & ipſorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghoſts to be one of thoſe things, in which conſiſteth the natural ſeeds of religion: as

[1] Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. Edit. Burman.

as alſo that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to diſtinguiſh dreams, and other ſtrong fancies, from viſion and ſenſe; he ſeemeth herein to have trod likewiſe in the footſteps of *Lucretius*, giving, not obſcurely, the ſame account of religion in his fifth book [1]:

Nunc quæ cauſa deûm per magnas numina gentes
Pervolgarit, & ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile eſt rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divûm mortalia ſecla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in ſomnis, mirando corporis auctu.
His igitur ſenſum tribuebant, &c.

That is, *How the noiſe of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding firſt from mens fearful dreams, and their phantaſms when awake, taken by them for viſions and ſenſations. Whereupon they attributed not only ſenſe to theſe things as really exiſting, but alſo immortality and great power.* For though this were properly an account only of thoſe inferiour and plebeian gods, called dæmons and genii, yet was it ſuppoſed, that the belief of theſe things did eaſily diſpoſe the minds of men alſo to the perſuaſion of one ſupreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Laſtly, that the ancient Atheiſts, as well as the modern, pretended, the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of *Cicero* [2], *Ii, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam eſſe ab hominibus ſapientibus, reipublicæ cauſa, ut quos ratio non poſſet, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus ſuſtulerunt? They, who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wiſe men for the ſake of the commonwealth; that ſo religion might engage thoſe to their duty, whom reaſon could not, did they not utterly deſtroy all religion?* And the ſenſe of the ancient Atheiſts is thus repreſented by *Plato*; Θεὸς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασὶν ἔτοι τέχνῃ, ὁ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισὶ νόμοις, καὶ τάυτας ἄλλας ἄλλοις, ὅπη ἕκαστος συνομολόγησαν νομοθετέμενοι· *They firſt of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to paſs, that they are different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the ſeveral humours of their lawmakers did chance to determine.* And before *Plato*, *Critias*, one of the thirty tyrants of *Athens*, plainly declared religion at firſt to have been a political intrigue, in thoſe verſes of his recorded by *Sextus* [3] the philoſopher, beginning to this purpoſe; *That there was a time at firſt, when men's life was diſorderly and brutiſh, and the will of the ſtronger was the only law: after which, they conſented and agreed together to make civil laws*; that ſo the diſorderly might be puniſhed. Notwithſtanding which, it was ſtill found, that men were only hindred from open, but not from ſecret injuſtices: whereupon ſome ſagacious and witty perſon was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from ſecret, as from open injuries:

De Leg. l. 10. [p. 666]

Ἐντεῦθεν

[1] Verſ. 1160.
[2] De Nat Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XLII. p. 2945. p. 562. Tom. IX. Oper.
[3] Lib. VIII. adverſ. Mathemat. §. LIV.

Ἐντεῦθεν ἤν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο·
Ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
Νόῳ τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶντε·
Ὑφ' ἅ πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούειν,
Δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.

Namely, *by introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and ſees, and takes notice of all things.* *Critias* then concluding his Poem in theſe words;

Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶμαι πεῖσαι τινὰ
Θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

And in this manner do I conceive, ſome one at firſt to have perſuaded mortals to believe, that there is a kind of gods [1].

Thus have we fully declared the ſenſe of the Atheiſts, in their account of the phænomenon of religion and the belief of a God; namely, that they derive it principally from theſe three ſprings or originals: *Firſt*, from mens own fear and ſolicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. *Secondly*, from their ignorance of the cauſes both of thoſe events, and the phænomena of nature; together with their curioſity. And, *Laſtly*, from the fiction of civil ſovereigns, law-makers, and politicians. The weakneſs and foolery of all which, we ſhall now briefly manifeſt. *Firſt*, therefore, it is certain, that ſuch an exceſs of fear, as makes any one conſtantly and obſtinately to believe the exiſtence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from ſenſe nor reaſon for, tending alſo to the great diſquiet of mens own lives, and the terrour of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedneſs or diſtraction. Wherefore, the Atheiſts themſelves acknowledging, the generality of mankind to be poſſeſſed with ſuch a belief of a Deity, when they reſolve this into ſuch an exceſs of fear; it is all one, as if they ſhould affirm the generality of mankind to be frighted out of their wits, or crazed and diſtemper'd in their brains: none but a few Atheiſts, who being undaunted and undiſmay'd have eſcaped this panick terrour, remaining ſober and in their right ſenſes. But, whereas the Atheiſts thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantaſtry, but alſo ſuch an exceſs of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedneſs and diſtraction or madneſs; we affirm, on the contrary, that their ſuppoſed courage, ſtayedneſs and ſobriety, is really nothing elſe but the dull and ſottiſh ſtupidity of their minds; dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or diſtruſt; by reaſon whereof, they will believe nothing but what they can feel or ſee.

Theiſts indeed have a religious fear of God, which is conſequent from him, or their belief of him, (of which more afterwards;) but the Deity itſelf, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by

[1] To theſe paſſages of the antients, wherein the origin of all religion is aſcribed to ſtate-policy, add *Seneca, Quæſt. Natur.* Lib. II. Cap. XLII. p. 536. Tom. II. Oper. and *Sextus Empiric.* Lib. VIII. *adverſ. Mathemat.* p. 551.

by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are leſs ſolicitous concerning ſuch events, than they who are moſt truly religious. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe theſe place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, *aliene* or *in another's power*, and expoſed to the ſtrokes of fortune; but in that which is moſt truly their own, namely, the right uſe of their own will. As the Atheiſts, on the contrary, muſt needs, for this very reaſon, be liable to great fears and ſolicitudes concerning outward events, becauſe they place their good and evil in the πάθῳ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, *the paſſion of pleaſure and pain*; or at leaſt, denying natural honeſty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and ſo is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheiſts are indeed generally timorous and fearful, ſuſpicious and diſtruſtful things, ſeems to appear plainly from their building all their politicks, civil ſocieties, and juſtice, (improperly ſo called) upon that only foundation of fear and diſtruſt.

But the grand error of the Atheiſts here is this, that they ſuppoſe the Deity, according to the ſenſe of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a *Mormo*, *Bug-bear*, or *Terriculum*, an *affrightful*, *hurtful*, and *moſt undeſirable thing*: whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their ſtraits and difficulties for aid and aſſiſtance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their truſt and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodneſs and benignity. *Syneſius* affirms, that though men were otherwiſe much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἁπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι; *They all every where, both wiſe and unwiſe, agree in this, that God is to be praiſed, as one who is good and benign.* *De Regno*, p. 9. [Oper. Edit. Petavii.]

If among the Pagans there were any, who underſtood that proverbial ſpeech, φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worſt ſenſe, as if God Almighty were of an *envious and ſpiteful nature*; theſe were certainly but a few ill-natur'd men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeneſs. For the proverb, in that ſenſe, was diſclaimed and cried down by all the wiſer Pagans; as *Ariſtotle*, who affirmed the *Poets to have lyed in this, as well as they did in many other things*; and *Plutarch*, who taxeth *Herodotus* for inſinuating, τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες; *the Deity univerſally*, (that is, all the gods) *to be of an envious and vexatious or ſpiteful diſpoſition*; whereas himſelf appropriated this only to that evil dæmon or principle aſſerted by him, as appeareth from the life of *P. Æmilius* [1], written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν, *the Deity univerſally was of an envious nature*; but, *that there is a certain deity or dæmon, whoſe proper taſk it is, to bring down all great and over-ſwelling human proſperity, and ſo to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, ſincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adverſity*; which is, as if a Chriſtian ſhould aſcribe it to the devil. And *Plato* [2] plainly declares the reaſon of God's making the world at firſt, to have been no other than this, ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος; *Becauſe he was good, and there is* *Metaph. l. 1. c. 2.* [P. 263. Tom. IV. Oper.] ὅτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. *c. de Herod. Malign.* [P. 857. Tom II. Oper.]

no

[1] Tom. II. Oper. p. 273. [2] In Timæo, Cap. XIV. p. 237. Edit. Fabricii.

no manner of envy in that which is good. From whence he alſo concluded, πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ; *That God therefore willed all things ſhould be made the moſt like himſelf*; that is, after the beſt manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb ſeems, at firſt, to have been no other, than what, beſides *Heſiod*, the Scripture itſelf alſo attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abaſe the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering, and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themſelves, or as in ſome ſenſe invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no fleſh to glory before him. And there hath been ſo much experience of ſuch a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himſelf could not but confeſs, that there was ſome hidden force or power, which ſeemed to have a ſpite to all over-ſwelling greatneſſes, and affect to caſt contempt and ſcorn upon the pride of men;

Lamb. 503. [Lib. V. Verſ. 1232]

Uſque adeò res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, & pulchros faſces, ſævaſque ſecures,
Proculcare, ac ludibrio ſibi habere videtur.

Where he plainly reel'd and ſtagger'd in his atheiſm, or elſe was indeed a Theiſt, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no ſuch force as this, *in regno atomorum, in the reign or empire of ſenſleſs atoms.* And as for thoſe among Chriſtians, who make ſuch a horrid repreſentation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greateſt part of mankind, for no other end or deſign, but only this, that he might recreate and delight himſelf in their eternal torments; theſe alſo do but tranſcribe or copy out their own ill nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheleſs theſe very perſons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themſelves; he having faſtned his affections upon their very perſons, without any conſideration of their diſpoſitions or qualifications.

It is true indeed, that religion is often expreſſed in the Scripture by the *fear of God*, and fear hath been ſaid to be *prima menſura Deitatis, the firſt meaſure of the Divinity in us*, or the firſt impreſſion, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty ſtate, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteouſneſs. But this religious fear is not a fear of God, as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much leſs as hurtful and miſchievous, (which could not be disjoined from hatred;) but an aweful regard of him, as of one who is eſſentially juſt, and as well a puniſher of vice and wickedneſs, as a rewarder of virtue; *Lucretius* himſelf, when he deſcribes this religious fear of men, confeſſing it to be conjoined with a conſcience of their duty, or to include the ſame within itſelf;

P. 503. [Lib. V. Verſ. 1223.]

Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c.
Ne quod ob admiſſum fœdè dictumve ſuperbè,
Pœnarum grave ſit ſolvendi tempus adactum.

And

And this is the ſenſe of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial juſtice in the Deity, which preſideth over the ſame, and inclines it as well to puniſh the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: *Epicurus* himſelf acknowledging thus much, ἔνθεν καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται, τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, *Theiſts ſuppoſe, that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and alſo great rewards by them beſtowed upon the good.* And this fear of God, is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repreſſing the growth of wickedneſs, but alſo wholeſome and ſalutary to thoſe very perſons themſelves, that are thus religiouſly affected, it being preſervative of them both from moral evils, and likewiſe from the evils of puniſhment conſequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which, when it degenerates into a dark kind, of jealous and ſuſpicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a meer arbitrary and tyrannical being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and diſtinguiſhed from it by that name of δεισιδαιμονία, *ſuperſtition.* Thus is the character of a ſuperſtitious man given by *Plutarch*, οἴεται· θεὸς εἶναι, λυπηρὸς δὲ καὶ βλαβερὸς, *That he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful*; and ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεούς, *a ſuperſtitious man muſt needs hate God, as well as fear him. The true fear of God* (as the ſon of *Sirach* ſpeaks) *is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him.* As if he ſhould have ſaid, the firſt entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the puniſher of vice; the ſecond ſtep forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the moſt amiable being. Chriſtianity, the beſt of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for *he that cometh to God, muſt not only believe, that he is, but alſo that he is a rewarder of thoſe that ſeek him.* Which faith is better defined in the Scripture, than by any ſcholaſtick, to be the ſubſtance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not ſeen; that is, a confident perſuaſion of things, that fall not under ſight, (becauſe they are either inviſible or future) and which alſo are to be hoped for. So that religious fear conſiſteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the reſult of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope and love, do all ſuppoſe an eſſential goodneſs in the Deity. God is ſuch a Being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatſoever moſt to be wiſhed for; it being indeed no way deſirable (as that noble emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world, void of a God and providence. He, that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the univerſe, which his heart can poſſibly wiſh or deſire. It is the intereſt of none, that there ſhould be no God, but only of ſuch wretched perſons, as have abandoned their firſt and only true intereſt of being good, and friends to God, and are deſperately reſolved upon ways of wickedneſs.

Ep. ad Memoec. P. 46. Gaſſ. [Tom. V. Oper. Vide etiam Diog. Laert. Lib. X. §. 124. p. 665.]

περὶ δεισιδαιμ. P. 165. Tom. II. Oper.]

Cap. xxv. 12.

Hebr. c. xi. 1.

The reaſon, why the Atheiſts do thus groſly miſtake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing,

which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think, that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, (which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint:) as they cannot but really hate that, which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, That there is *nulla naturalis charitas, no natural charity*, but that *omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate & metu, all benevolence ariseth only from imbecillity and fear*; that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all, that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these, really nothing, but either a crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else *Mercatura quædam utilitatum, a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities.* And thus does *Cotta* in *Cicero* declare their sense; *Ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos aut benignos; You conceive that no man would be any way benificent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecillity or indigence.* But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude, that upon the supposition of his existence, there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned *Cotta. Quid est præstantius bonitate & beneficentiâ? Quâ cum carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines à diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur. What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose, that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another.* Accordingly a late pretender to politicks, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God [1], *Regnandi & puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse à solâ potentiâ irresistibili; That he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those, who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power.* Which indeed is all one as to say, *That God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them*, but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no *jus* or *right* without natural justice; so that the word *right* is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds [2]; *Si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentia sua, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem; That if God's right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then*

Cic. de N. D. L. 1. 213. Lamb. [Cap. XLIII. p. 2948. Oper.]

Cic. Ibid.

Cic. Ibid.

[1] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, Cap. XV. §. IV. p. 212. & alias. [2] Ibid. §. VII. p. 114.

then it is manifeſt, that men's obligations to obey him lies upon them only from their imbecillity. Or, as it is further explained by him; *Homines ideò Deo ſubjectos eſſe, quia omnipotentes non ſunt, aut quia ad reſiſtendum ſatis virium non habent*; *That men are therefore only ſubject to God, becauſe they are not omnipotent, or have not ſufficient power to reſiſt him.* Thus do we ſee plainly, how the Atheiſts, by reaſon of their vice and ill-nature, (which makes them deny all natural juſtice and honeſty, all natural charity and benevolence) transform the Deity into a monſtrous ſhape; ſuch an omnipotent Being, as if he were, could have nothing neither of juſtice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whoſe only right and authority of commanding them would be his irreſiſtible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, truſt and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and neceſſity, proceeding from their imbecillity, or inability to reſiſt him. And ſuch a Deity as this is indeed a *Mormo* or *Bug-bear*, a moſt formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheiſts falſe imagination, true religion repreſenting a moſt comfortable proſpect of things from the Deity; whereas on the contrary, the atheiſtick ſcene of things is diſmal, hopeleſs and forlorn, that there ſhould be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our inſatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a *dolium pertuſum*, *a perforated and leaking veſſel:* that ourſelves ſhould be but a congeries of atoms, upon the diſſolution of whoſe compages, our life ſhould vaniſh into nothing, and all our hope periſh: that there ſhould be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured Being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and ſenſeleſs matter. True indeed, there could be no ſpiteful deſigns in ſenſeleſs atoms, or a dark inconſcious nature. Upon which account, *Plutarch* would grant, that even this atheiſtick hypotheſis itſelf, as bad as it is, were, notwithſtanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, ſpiteful, and malicious being, (if there can be any ſuch hypotheſis as this) a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the whole world, without any corrival, and having an undiſturbed empire. Neverthleſs it is certain alſo, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in theſe ſenſeleſs atoms, both neceſſarily and fortuitouſly moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempeſtuous ſea, whoſe mercileſs waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and ſupplications. For which reaſon *Epicurus*[1] himſelf confeſſed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of the gods, (as he calls it) than to ſerve the atheiſtick fate, or that material neceſſity of all things, introduced by thoſe atheiſtick Philoſophers, *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ καλακολθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν Φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήτεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην· *Becauſe there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worſhip and prayer; but the other* [neceſſity] *is altogether deaf and inexorable.* And though *Epicurus* thought to mend the matter, and make the atheiſtick hypotheſis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of thoſe Principles) liberty of will

De Superſt. [P. 164. Tom. II. Oper.]

Epiſt. ad Men. p. 49. Gaſſ.

[1] Vide Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 134. p. 659.

will in men; yet this being not a power over things without us, but our ſelves only, could alter the caſe very little. *Epicurus* himſelf was in a panick fear, leſt the frame of heaven ſhould ſometime upon a ſudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be diſſolved into a chaos;

> [1] ——————*Tria talia texta*
> *Una dies dabit exitio; multoſque per annos*
> *Suſtentata ruet moles & machina mundi.*

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happineſs in ſecurity from external evils? Τέλος τὸ μὴ νομίζειν θεὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, (ſaith *Plutarch:*) *The atheiſtick deſign in ſhaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear*; but by means hereof, they framed ſuch a ſyſtem of things to themſelves, as, under which, they could not have the leaſt hope, faith or confidence. Thus running from fear, did they plunge themſelves into fear; for they, who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endleſs of neceſſity muſt the fears and anxieties of thoſe men be, who ſhake of that one fear of God, that would only preſerve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in him. Wherefore we might conclude, upon better grounds than the Atheiſts do of theiſm, that atheiſm (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reaſon) ſprings firſt from the impoſture of fear. For the faith of religion being the ſubſtance or confidence of ſuch things not ſeen, as are to be hoped for; atheiſtick infidelity muſt needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, deſpondence and miſgiving of mind, or a timorous diſtruſt and diſbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of ſenſe; namely, of an inviſible Being omnipotent, that exerciſeth a juſt, kind, and gracious providence, over all thoſe who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to pleaſe him, both here in this life, and after death. But vice, or the love of lawleſs liberty, prevailing over ſuch diſbelieving perſons, makes them, by degrees, more and more deſirous, that there ſhould be no God; that is, no ſuch hinderer of their liberty; and to count it a happineſs to be freed from the fear of him, whoſe juſtice (if he were) they muſt needs be obnoxious to.

De Superſt. [P. 165. Tom. II. Oper.]

And now have we made it evident, that theſe Atheiſts, who make religion and the belief of a God to proceed from the impoſture of fear, do firſt of all diſguiſe the Deity, and put a monſtruous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into ſuch a thing, as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it, (as well indeed they may) that there is no ſuch thing as this really exiſting in nature, but that it is only a *Mormo* or *Bug-bear*, raiſed up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be ſaid, that the opinion of a God ſprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil; but really, it ſprings neither from hope nor fear, (however in different circumſtances it raiſes both thoſe paſſions in our minds;) nor is it the impoſture of any paſſion, but that whoſe belief is ſupported and ſuſtained by the ſtrongeſt

[1] Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 95.

ſtrongeſt and cleareſt reaſon, as ſhall be declared in due place. But the ſenſe of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itſelf more immediately upon us, it is certain, that there is alſo, beſides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepſis, or anticipation, in the minds of men concerning it, which, by *Ariſtotle*, is called Μαντεία, *a vaticination.*

Thus have we ſufficiently confuted the firſt atheiſtick pretence to ſolve the phænomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, ſo generally entertained, from the impoſture of fear. We come now to the ſecond, That it proceeded from the ignorance of cauſes alſo, or men's want of philoſophy; they being prone, by reaſon of their innate curioſity, where they find no cauſes to make or feign them; and from their fear, in the abſence of natural and neceſſary cauſes, to imagine ſupernatural and divine; this alſo affording them a handſome cover and pretext for their ignorance: for which cauſe theſe Atheiſts ſtick not to affirm of God Almighty, what ſome philoſophers do of occult qualities, that he is but *perfugium & aſylum ignorantiæ, a refuge and ſhelter for men's ignorance*; that is, in plain and downright language, *the mere ſanctuary of fools.*

And theſe two things are here commonly joined together by theſe Atheiſts both *fear*, and *ignorance of cauſes*, as which jointly concur in the production of theiſm; becauſe, as the fear of children raiſes up bug-bears, eſpecially in the dark, ſo do they ſuppoſe in like manner the fear of men, in the darkneſs of their ignorance of cauſes eſpecially, to raiſe up the *Mormo*, ſpectre, or phantaſm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet [1],

——————— *Omnia cæcis*
In tenebris metuunt.

And accordingly *Democritus* gave this account of the original of theiſm or religion, ὁρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βρουτὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς, καὶ κεραυνούς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἐδειματοῦτο θεὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους· *That when, in old times, men obſerved ſtrange and affrightful things in the meteors and the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts and eclipſes, they not knowing the cauſes thereof, and being terrified thereby, preſently imputed them to the Gods.* And *Epicurus* declares this to have been the reaſon, why he took ſuch great pains in the ſtudy of phyſiology, that, by finding out the natural and neceſſary cauſes of things, he might be able to free both himſelf and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwiſe invade and aſſault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loſs for natural cauſes, urging them ſo much with the fear, ſuſpicion, and jealouſy of a Deity.

Steph. Poe. Phil. 158. ex *Sexto.* [Vide Sextum Empir. Lib. VIII. adverſ. Mathemat. §. XXIV. p. 554.]

Wherefore the Atheiſts thus dabbling in phyſiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical cauſes for ſome of the phænomena of nature, and eſpecially for ſuch of them as the unſkilful vulgar ſometimes impute to God himſelf, when they can prove eclipſes (for example),

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. verſ. 54, 55.

exampl-) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himſelf, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful meſſengers of his wrath and diſpleaſure; they preſently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning *nature* or *matter*, that it doth

[1] *Ipſa ſuâ per ſe, ſponte, omnia Diis agere expers,*

do all things alone of itſelf without a God. But we ſhall here make it appear in a few inſtances, as briefly as we may, that philoſophy, and the true knowledge of cauſes, leads to God; and that atheiſm is nothing but ignorance of cauſes and of philoſophy.

For firſt, no Atheiſt, who derives all from ſenſeleſs atoms, or matter, is able to aſſign any cauſe at all of himſelf, or give any true account of the original of his own ſoul or mind, it being utterly unconceivable and impoſſible, that ſoul and mind, ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, ſhould ever ariſe from irrational and ſenſeleſs matter, however modified; or reſult from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, ſite and motion of parts: For though it be indeed abſurd to ſay (as theſe Atheiſts alledge) that *laughing and crying things* are made out of *laughing and crying principles*,

[2] *Et ridere poteſt non ex ridentibu' factus;*

yet does it not therefore follow, that ſenſitive and rational beings might reſult from a compoſition of irrational and ſenſeleſs atoms; which, according to the Democritick hypotheſis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion, or reſt, becauſe *laughing* and *crying* are motions, which reſult from the mechaniſm of human bodies, in ſuch a manner organized; but *ſenſe* and *underſtanding* are neither local motion, nor mechaniſm. And the caſe will be the very ſame, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonick or Hylozoick atheiſm; becauſe *ſenſe* and *conſcious underſtanding* could no more reſult, either from thoſe qualities of heat and cold, moiſt and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and ſenſeleſs matter, than it could from the

[3] *Concurſus, motus, ordo, poſitura, figuræ,*

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but ſenſeleſs matter, fortuitouſly moved, there could never have emerged into being any ſoul or mind, ſenſe or underſtanding; becauſe no effect can poſſibly tranſcend the perfection of its cauſe. Wherefore Atheiſts ſuppoſing themſelves, and all ſouls and minds, to have ſprung from ſtupid and ſenſeleſs matter, and all that wiſdom, which is any where in the world, both political and philoſophical, to be the reſult of mere fortune and chance, muſt needs

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. verſ. 1091. [2] Id. ibid. verſ. 985. [3] Id. Lib. I. verſ. 686.

needs be concluded to be groſly ignorant of cauſes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheiſts. So that ignorance of cauſes is the ſeed, not of theiſm, but of atheiſm; true philoſophy, and the knowledge of the cauſe of ourſelves, leading neceſſarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheiſts are ignorant of the cauſe of motion in bodies alſo; by which notwithſtanding they ſuppoſe all things to be done; that is, they are never able to ſolve this phænomenon, ſo long as they are Atheiſts, and acknowledge no other ſubſtance beſides matter or body. For firſt, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not eſſential to all body as ſuch, becauſe then no particles of matter could ever reſt; and conſequently there could have been no generation, nor no ſuch mundane ſyſtem produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and reſt; no ſun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; ſince there could be no coherent conſiſtency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual ſeparation and divulſion from one another. Again, it is certain likewiſe, that matter or body, as ſuch, hath no power of moving itſelf freely or ſpontaneouſly neither, by will or appetite; both becauſe the ſame inconvenience would from hence enſue likewiſe, and becauſe the phænomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiouſly abſurd paradox of ſome few hylozoick Atheiſts, that all matter as ſuch, and therefore every ſmalleſt particle thereof, hath not only life eſſentially belonging to it, but alſo perfect wiſdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and ſelf-moving power, though without animal ſenſe or conſciouſneſs: this, I ſay, will be elſewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheiſts, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democriticks, attributed no manner of life to matter as ſuch; and therefore could aſcribe no voluntary or ſpontaneous motion to the ſame, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet [1] already cited,

Nam certè neque conſilio, primordia rerum
Ordine ſe quæque, atque ſagaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent motus pepigere profecto.

Wherefore theſe Democriticks, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere [2] intimates, were able to aſſign no other cauſe of motion, than only this, *That one body moved another from eternity infinitely*, ſo that there was no πρῶτον κινοῦν, no *firſt unmoved mover*, ever to be found; becauſe there is no beginning, nor firſt in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of ſome atheiſtick Stoicks in *Alex. Aphrodiſius* was derived, *That there is no firſt in the rank and order of cauſes.* In the footſteps of which philoſophers a modern writer ſeemeth to have trodden, when declaring himſelf after this manner [3]; *Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad cauſam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac ſic perpetuò ratiociniatione aſcenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, ſed defatigatus aliquando deficiet. If any one will will from whatſoever effect aſcend upward to its immediate cauſe, and from thence to a remoter, and* *Alex. Aph. Lib. de Fato, P.* [§. XXV. p. 118. Edit. *Lond.*]

[1] Lib. I. Verſ. 1020.

[2] Vide Phyſic. Lib. VIII. Cap. I. §. III. p. 796. Tom. I. Oper. & §. XXVII. p. 579.

[3] Hobbes, Elem. Philoſoph. Part. IV. Cap. XXVI. p. 204.

and ſo onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination; yet ſhall he never be able to hold on thorough all eternity; but at length being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to deſiſt, or give over. Which ſeems to be all one, as if he ſhould have ſaid, one thing moved or cauſed another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is conſequently no firſt mover or cauſe to be reach'd unto. But this infinite progreſs of theſe Democriticks, in the order of cauſes, and their ſhifting off the cauſe of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly underſtood by *Ariſtotle*[1], to be indeed the aſſigning of no cauſe of motion at all, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν, εἰ μήτι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινοῦν πρῶτον, *They acknowledging* (ſaith he) *no firſt mover according to nature, muſt needs make an idle progreſs infinitely*; that is, in the language of this philoſopher, aſſign no cauſe at all of motion. *Epicurus* therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomick phyſiology, he diſcarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithſtanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderoſity in atoms, preſſing them continually downwards in infinite ſpace. In which, as nothing could be more abſurd nor unphiloſophical, than to make upwards and downwards in infinite ſpace, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of reſt; ſo did he not aſſign any cauſe of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, becauſe they did ſo; a quality of gravity, ſignifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore, no body knows. And it is all one, as if *Epicurus* ſhould have ſaid, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himſelf to this as an aſylum, a ſanctuary or refuge for his ignorance; or elſe indeed more abſurdly, making his very ignorance itſelf (diſguiſed under that name of a quality) to be the cauſe of motion. Thus the atheiſts univerſally either aſſigned no cauſe at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democriticks; or elſe no true one, as the Hylozoiſts; when, to avoid incorporeal ſubſtance, they would venture to attribute perfect underſtanding, appetite or will, and ſelf-moving power to all ſenſeleſs matter whatſoever. But ſince it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itſelf, either the motion of all bodies muſt have no manner of cauſe; or elſe muſt there of neceſſity be ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, ſuch as is ſelf-active and hylarchical, or hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account *Plato* rightly determined, that cogitation, which is ſelf-activity or autokineſy, was in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokineſy. Though motion conſidered paſſively in bodies, or taken for their tranſlation, or change of diſtance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of thoſe bodies themſelves moving; yet, as it is conſidered actively for the *vis movens*, that *active force*, which cauſes this tranſlation, or change of place, ſo is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a ſelf-active ſubſtance upon that ſluggiſh matter or body, which cannot at all move itſelf. Wherefore in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cauſe of motion, or the determination thereof at leaſt, is not the matter itſelf organized, but the ſoul either as cogitative, or plaſtickly ſelf-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himſelf, originally impreſſing

[1] Phyſic. Auſcultat. Lib. VII. Cap. II. p. 365. Tom. I. Oper.

a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the univerſe, and conſtantly conſerving the ſame, according to that of the Scripture, *In him we live and move*; (which ſeems to have been the ſenſe alſo of that noble Agrigentine poet and philoſopher [1], when he deſcribed God to be only *a pure or holy mind, that with ſwift thoughts agitates the whole world*;) or elſe it is inſtrumentally an inferiour created ſpirit, ſoul, or life of nature; that is, a ſubordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a ſuperiour perfect Mind. And thus do we ſee again, that ignorance of cauſes is the ſeed of atheiſm, and not of theiſm; no Atheiſts being able to aſſign a true cauſe of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God. Act. xvii. 28.

Furthermore, thoſe Atheiſts, who acknowledge no other principle of things but ſenſeleſs matter fortuitouſly moved, muſt needs be ignorant alſo of the cauſe of that grand phænomenon, called by *Ariſtotle*, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, *the well and fit in nature*; that is, of the moſt artificial frame of the whole mundane ſyſtem in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conſpiring harmony of all. For they, who boaſted themſelves able to give natural cauſes of all things whatſoever, without a God, can give no other cauſe at all of this phænomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they, who make fortune and chance to be the only cauſe of this ſo admirable phænomenon, the moſt regular and artificial frame, and harmony of the univerſe, they either make the mere abſence and want of a cauſe to be a cauſe, fortune and chance being nothing elſe but the abſence or want of an intending cauſe; or elſe do they make their own ignorance of a cauſe, and *they know not how*, to be a cauſe; as the author of the *Leviathan* [2] interprets the meaning hereof: *Many times* (ſaith he) *men put for cauſe of natural events their own ignorance, but diſguiſed in other words; as when they ſay, that fortune is the cauſe of things contingent; that is, of things, whereof they know no cauſe.* Or they affirm, againſt all reaſon, one contrary to be the cauſe of another, as confuſion to be the cauſe of order, pulchritude and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cauſe of art and ſkill; folly and nonſenſe, the cauſe of the moſt wiſe and regular contrivance: or, laſtly, they deny it to have any cauſe at all, ſince they deny an intending cauſe, and there cannot poſſibly be any other cauſe of artificialneſs and conſpiring harmony, than mind and wiſdom, counſel and contrivance.

But becauſe the Atheiſts here make ſome pretences for this their ignorance, we ſhall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may diſcover their weakneſs and foolery. Firſt, therefore, they pretend, that the world is not ſo artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer, that it was not made by a God, he being ſuppoſed by Theiſts to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wiſe, who therefore ſhould have made all things for the beſt.

[1] Empedocles, cujus Verſus duos vide apud Ammonium Comm. in Librum Ariſtot. περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, p. 107. Edit. Aldinæ.

[2] Cap. XI. & aliàs.

But this being already ſet down by itſelf, as a twelfth atheiſtick objection againſt a Deity, we muſt reſerve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we ſhall obſerve thus much here by the way; that thoſe Theiſts of later times, who, either becauſe they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or becauſe their faith in the divine goodneſs is but weak; or becauſe they judge of things according to their own private appetites, and ſelfiſh paſſions, and not with a free uncaptivated univerſality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or becauſe they look only upon the preſent ſcene of things, and take not in the future into conſideration, nor have a comprehenſive view of the whole plot of divine providence together; or laſtly, becauſe we mortals do all ſtand upon too low a ground, to take a commanding view and proſpect upon the whole frame of things; and our ſhallow underſtandings are not able to fathom the depths of the divine wiſdom, nor trace all the methods and deſigns of providence; grant, that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to ſay, that it is not well made: theſe neoterick Chriſtians (I ſay) ſeem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheiſts, than the Pagan Theiſts themſelves heretofore did, who ſtood their ground, and generouſly maintained againſt them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary ſelf-will, and irrational humour omnipotent, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is abſolutely the beſt in every caſe, ſo far as the neceſſity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the meaſure and rule both of nature and providence.

Again, the atomick Atheiſts further alledge, that though there be many things in the world, which ſerve well for uſes, yet it does not at all follow, that therefore they were made intentionally and deſignedly for thoſe uſes; becauſe though things happen by chance to be ſo or ſo made, yet may they ſerve for ſomething or other afterward, and have their ſeveral uſes conſequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (ſay they) by chance to be ſo made as they are, and their ſeveral uſes notwithſtanding were conſequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:

Lucret. l. 4. p. 367. Lamb. [Verſ. 832, 833.]

——————*Nil ideo natum eſt in corpore, ut uti*
Poſſemus, ſed quod natum eſt id procreat uſum.

Nothing in man's body was made out of deſign for any uſe; but all the ſeveral parts thereof, happening to be ſo made as they are, their uſes were conſequent thereupon. In like manner the old atheiſtick philoſophers in *Ariſtotle*, concluded, τὰς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι, τὰς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τὰς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ ὑ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του· *That the former teeth were made by material or mechanicul neceſſity, thin and ſharp, by means whereof they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became*

Phyſ. l. 2. c. 8. [P. 475. Tom. I. Oper.]

became uſeful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be ſuch, for the ſake of theſe uſes, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which ſeem to be made for ends. Accordingly the ſame *Ariſtotle* repreſents the ſenſe of thoſe ancient Atheiſts, concerning the other parts of the univerſe, or things of nature, that they were all likewiſe made ſuch, by the neceſſity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheleſs their ſeveral uſes conſequent upon this their accidental ſtructure. Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεύς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, &c. *What hinders but that nature might act without any reſpect to ends or good and better, as* Jupiter, *or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from neceſſity? becauſe the vapours, being raiſed up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condenſed, muſt needs deſcend down again in the form of water. But this happens by meer chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary ſometimes happens by the exceſs of it.*

But to this we reply, that though a thing, that happens accidentally to be ſo or ſo made, may afterwards, notwithſtanding, prove often ſerviceable for ſome uſe or other; yet, when any thing conſiſteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportionated together, and with much curioſity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwiſe in the leaſt placed and diſpoſed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for ſuch a uſe; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counſel and deſign, intentionally, for ſuch uſes. As for example, the eye, whoſe ſtructure and fabrick conſiſting of many parts (humours and membranes) is ſo artificially compoſed, no reaſonable perſon, who conſiders the whole anatomy thereof, and the curioſity of its ſtructure, can think otherwiſe of it, but that it was made out of deſign for the uſe of ſeeing; and did not happen accidentally to be ſo made, and then the uſe of ſeeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain perſuade us,

Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus.

P. 367. *Lamb.* [Lib. IV. Verſ. 823.]

You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that ſo dangerous opinion (to atheiſm) *that eyes were made for the ſake of ſeeing, and ears for the ſake of hearing.* But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be ſo made, and the uſe of ſeeing unintended followed; but alſo, that in all the ſame animals, ears happened to be ſo made too, and the uſe of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be ſo made likewiſe, and the uſe of eating, and (in men) of ſpeaking, was alſo accidentally conſequent thereupon; and feet were in the ſame animals made by chance too, and the uſe of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance alſo, upon which ſo many neceſſary uſes depend; beſides innumerable other parts of the body, both ſimilar and organical, none of which could

have been wanting, without rendering the whole inept or uſeleſs: I ſay, to think, that all theſe things ſhould happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the ſame animal, and not deſigned by mind or counſel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greateſt inſenſibility of mind imaginable. But this abſurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long ſince ſo induſtriouſly confuted, and the folly thereof ſo fully manifeſted by that learned Pagan philoſopher and phyſician, *Galen*, in his book *of the uſe of parts*, that it would be altogether ſuperfluous to inſiſt any more upon it [r].

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and ſharp, and the jaw-teeth thick and broad, by chance only, and not for uſe, was one of the Democritick dotages; as alſo, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whoſe atmoſphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical neceſſity. Which conceit though *Carteſius* ſeem to have written his whole book of meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the deriſion of thoſe, who *ſeat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be imployed in opening and ſhutting the cloiſters of the winds, in ſprinkling the flowers with dews, and thunder-ſtriking the tops of mountains*; and cloſing his diſcourſe with this boaſt, that he had now made it manifeſt, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a god upon the ſtage) to ſolve thoſe phænomena; yet were it eaſy enough to demonſtrate the defectiveneſs of thoſe his mechanical undertakings in ſundry particulars, and to evince, that all thoſe things could not be carried on with ſuch conſtant regularity, by meer fortuitous mechaniſm, without any ſuperiour principle to guide and ſteer them. Nevertheleſs, we acknowledge, that God and nature do things every where, in the moſt frugal and compendious way, and with the leaſt operoſeneſs; and therefore that the mechanick powers are not rejected, but taken in, ſo far as they could comply ſerviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but ſtill ſo, as that all is ſuperviſed by one underſtanding and intending cauſe, and nothing paſſes without his approbation, who, when either thoſe mechanick powers fall ſhort, or the ſtubborn neceſſity of matter proves uncompliant, does over-rule the ſame, and ſupply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without ſetting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a ſubſervient miniſter under him, an artificial nature, which, as an *Archeus* of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechaniſm thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purpoſes, intended by its director.

But our atomick Atheiſts ſtill further alledge, that though it might well ſeem ſtrange, that matter fortuitouſly moved ſhould, at the very firſt jump, fall into ſuch a regular frame as this is, having ſo many aptitudes for uſes, ſo many correſpondencies between ſeveral things, and ſuch an agreeing harmony in the whole; yet ought it not to ſeem a jot ſtrange, if atoms, by motion, making all poſſible combinations and contexures, and trying all manner of concluſions and experiments, ſhould, after innumerable other

[r] Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, Cap. VI. p. 1003.

other freaks, and diſcongruous forms produced, in length of time, fall into ſuch a ſyſtem as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at firſt, brought forth divers monſtrous and irregular ſhapes of animals;

Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata viciſſim;
Multa ſine ore etiam, ſine voltu cæca reperta.

Lucret. l. 5. p. 476. Lamb. [Verſ. 838.]

Some without feet, ſome without hands, ſome without a mouth and face, ſome wanting fit muſcles and nerves for the motion of their members. And the old philoſophick Atheiſts were ſo frank and laviſh herein, that they ſtuck not to affirm, amongſt thoſe monſtrous ſhapes of animals, there were once produced Centaurs, and Scyllas, and Chimæras; βεγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, *mixtly boviform and hominiform*, biform and triform animals. But *Epicurus*, a little aſhamed of this, as that which muſt needs look oddly and ridiculouſly, and ſeeming more cautious and caſtigate, pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy;

Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
Eſſe queat duplici natura, & corpore bino,
Ex alienigenis membris compacta poteſtas.

Lucret. l. 5. p. 479. [Verſ. 876.]

Nevertheleſs, there were not then any Centaurs, nor biform and triform animals; he adding, that they, who feigned ſuch things as theſe, might as well fancy *rivers flowing with golden ſtreams, and trees germinating ſparkling diamonds, and ſuch vaſtly gigantean men, as could ſtride over ſeas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the ſtrength of their arms.* Againſt all which, notwithſtanding, he gravely gives ſuch a reaſon, as plainly overthrows his own principles;

Res ſic quæque ſuo ritu procedit, & omnes
Fœdere naturæ certo diſcrimina ſervant.

P. 480. [Verſ. 920.]

Becauſe things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their ſpecifick differences, without being confounded together. For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be ſet to the abſolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumſcribe them by? Wherefore it muſt be acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypotheſis of the atomick Atheiſm, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants and animals, as Centaurs, Scylla's and Chimæra's, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilſt it doth

[1] *Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,*
Quæcunque inter ſe poſſint congreſſa creare;

put itſelf into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all poſſible concluſions and experiments.

But

[1] Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 191.

But they pretend, that theſe monſtrous, irregular ſhapes of animals, were not therefore now to be found, becauſe by reaſon of their inept fabrick, they could not propagate their kind by generation, as neither indeed preſerve their own individuals. Thus does *Lucretius* declare the ſenſe of *Epicurus*;

Lumb. p. 476. [Lib. V. Verſ. 844.]

Quoniam natura abſterruit auctum,
Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.

Nat. Auſc. l. 2. c. 8. [P. 475. Tom. I. Oper.]

And that this atheiſtick doctrine was older than *Epicurus*, appeareth from theſe words of *Ariſtotle*; ὅπᾳ μὲν ἕν ἅπανλα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τῆ αὐτομάτᾳ συ⁊άνλα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ὅτως, ἀπώλελο, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βοϒενῆ κὴ ἀνδρόπρωρα· *When animals happened at firſt to be made, in all manner of forms, thoſe of them only were preſerved, and continued to the preſent time, which chanced to be fitly made* (for generation,) *but all the others periſhed, as* Empedocles *affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man-animals.* Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſts concluded, that beſides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds, (they conceiving it as abſurd to think, there ſhould be but one only world in infinite ſpace, as that in a vaſt plowed and ſowed field, there ſhould grow up only one ear of corn, and no more;) and they would have us believe, that amongſt theſe infinite worlds (all of them fortuitouſly made) there is not one of a thouſand, or, perhaps, of ten thouſand, that hath ſuch regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought ſtrange (as they ſuppoſe) if, amongſt infinite worlds, one or two ſhould chance to fall into ſome regularity. They would alſo confidently aſſure us, that the preſent ſyſtem of things, in this world of ours, ſhall not long continue ſuch as it is, but after a while fall into confuſion and diſorder again;

[a] *Mundi naturam totius ætas*
Mutat, & ex alio terram ſtatus excipit alter,
Quod potuit nequeat, poſſit quod non tulit antè:

The ſame wheel of fortune, which moving upward, hath brought into view this ſcene of things that now is, turning round, will, ſome time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its ſtead: and then ſhall we have Centaurs, and Scylla's and Chimæra's again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

But becauſe men may yet be puzzled with the univerſality and conſtancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through ſo many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomick Atheiſt further adds, that the ſenſeleſs atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, concluſions and experiments, were at length (they know

[a] Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 832.

know not how) taught, and by the neceſſity of things themſelves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialneſs and methodicalne s ; ſo that though their motions were at firſt all caſual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themſelves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly ; or elſe being, by the mere neceſſity of things, at length forced ſo to move, as they ſhould have done, had art and wiſdom directed them. Thus *Epicurus* in his epiſtle to *Herodotus*[1], ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑπολητέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· *It muſt be held, that nature is both taught and neceſſitated by the things themſelves:* or elſe, as *Gaſſendus* interprets the words, *quadam veluti naturali neceſſariaque doctrina ſenſim imbuta ; by little and little embued with a certain kind of natural and neceſſary doctrine.* P. 28. *Gaſſ.*

To which atheiſtick pretences we ſhall briefly reply, *firſt*, That it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of theſe Atheiſts, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monſtrous and irregular ſhapes of animals produced, *Centaurs*, *Scylla's*, and *Chimæra's*, &c. and indeed at firſt none but ſuch ; there being not the leaſt footſtep of any ſuch thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity, and traditions of former times ; and theſe Atheiſts being not able to give any manner of reaſon, why there ſhould not be ſuch produced as well at this preſent time, however the individuals themſelves could not continue long, or propagate by generation ; or at leaſt why it ſhould not happen, that, in ſome ages or countries, there were either all *Androgyna*, of both ſexes, or elſe no animal but of one ſex, male, or female only ; or, laſtly, none of any ſex at all. Neither is there any more reaſon to give credit to theſe Atheiſts, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophecy concerning future times, that, in this world of ours, all ſhall ſometime fall into confuſion and nonſenſe again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an abſolute impoſſibility, ſo to their bold and confident aſſertion concerning thoſe ſuppoſed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongſt ten thouſand of them, there is hardly one, that hath ſo much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reaſon, that were every planet about this ſun of ours an habitable earth, and every fixed ſtar a ſun, having likewiſe its ſeveral other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of theſe deſert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we ſay, were this ſo extravagant ſuppoſition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept ſyſtem amongſt them all, but that the divine art and wiſdom (which being infinite, can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exerciſe its dominion upon all, and every where impreſs the ſculptures and ſignatures of itſelf.

In the next place we affirm, That the fortuitous motions of ſenſeleſs atoms, trying never ſo many experiments and concluſions, and making never ſo many

[1] Apud Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 75. p. 633.

many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce ſo much as the form or ſyſtem of one complete animal, with all the organick parts thereof ſo artificially diſpoſed (each of theſe being as it were a little world) much leſs the ſyſtem of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but leaſt of all could it conſtantly continue ſuch regularity and artificialneſs every where: for that the fortuitous motions of irrational, ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter ſhould in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if perfect art or wiſdom had directed them, this is the moſt prodigious nonſenſe imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheiſtick fanaticiſm.

It is no more poſſible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and ſenſeleſs matter ſhould ever from itſelf be taught and neceſſitated to produce ſuch an orderly and regular ſyſtem as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of animals, and conſtantly to continue the ſame, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of ſcrawls, with ink upon paper, ſhould at length be taught and neceſſitated, by the thing itſelf, to write a whole quire of paper together, with ſuch characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philoſophick ſenſe; or than that we ourſelves, writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, tranſpoſedly, any how, as it happens, without the leaſt thought, either of words or ſenſe, after our ſcribling a long time together what was altogether inſignificant, ſhould at length have been taught and neceſſitated by the thing itſelf, without the leaſt ſtudy and conſideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to uſe another inſtance, this is no more poſſible, than that ten or a dozen perſons, altogether unſkilled in muſick, having ſeveral inſtruments given them, and ſtriking the ſtrings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, ſhould, after ſome time of diſcord and jarring, at length be taught and neceſſitated to fall into moſt exquiſite harmony, and continue the ſame uninterruptedly for ſeveral hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one, that hath read over the works of *Plato* or *Ariſtotle*, or thoſe ſix books of *T. Lucretius Carus*, *De natura rerum*, to contend, that poſſibly the letters of thoſe books might be all put together by chance, or ſcribled at random, without the leaſt thought or ſtudy of the writer, he having alſo no manner of philoſophick ſkill in him; or for one, that hears ten or a dozen perſons playing in conſort upon inſtruments of muſick, and making raviſhing harmony, to perſuade himſelf, that none of thoſe players had, for all that, the leaſt of muſical art or ſkill in them, but ſtruck the ſtrings as it happened; it muſt needs be much more ridiculous and abſurd, to ſuppoſe this artificial ſyſtem of the whole world to have reſulted from the fortuitous motion of ſenſeleſs atoms, without the direction of any art or wiſdom, there being much more of ſenſe, art and philoſophy therein, than in any philoſophick volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion, than in any compoſition

of vocal muſick. We conclude therefore with *Ariſtotle*, ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. *that it is abſolutely impoſſible things ſhould have come to paſs after this manner*; that is, by meer fortune and chance, and without the direction of any Mind or God. The divine Mind and Wiſdom hath ſo printed its ſeal or ſignature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never poſſibly have counterfeited the ſame. *Nat. Auſc. L. 2. c. 8. [P. 475. Tom. I. Oper.]*

Notwithſtanding all which, the ancient Atheiſts would undertake, by their wonderful ſkill in logick, to demonſtrate, that the frame of nature could not poſſibly be made by any intending cauſe, and for the ſake of ends and uſes; as for example, that eyes could not be firſt of all made intentionally for the uſe of ſeeing, nor ears intentionally for the uſe of hearing, and ſo for the reſt; becauſe, forſooth, theſe things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their ſeveral uſes. The argument is ſeriouſly propounded by *Lucretius*, after this manner:

Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
Nec dictis orare, prius quam lingua creata eſt;
Sed potius longè linguæ præceſſit origo
Sermonem, multoque creatæ ſunt prius aures,
Quam ſonus eſt auditus; & omnia denique membra
Antè fuere, ut opinor, eorum quam fuit uſus.
Haud igitur potuere utendi creſcere cauſâ. *Lamb. p. 367. [Lib. IV. Verſ. 834.]*

To this ſenſe; *There was no ſuch thing as ſeeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor ſpeaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded ſpeech: ſo likewiſe eyes and ears were made before there was any ſeeing of colours or hearing of ſounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their reſpective uſes. And therefore they could not be made intentionally, for the ſake of thoſe uſes.* The force of which argument conſiſteth in this propoſition; *That whatſoever is made for the ſake of another thing, muſt exiſt in time after that other thing, for whoſe ſake it was made:* or, *That, for which any thing is made, muſt not only be, in order of nature, but alſo of time, before that which is made for it.* And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by ſundry inſtances;

At contra conferre manu certamina pugnæ,
Antè fuit multò quàm lucida tela volarent, &c. *Ibid.*

Darts were made for the ſake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or elſe they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and deviſed, for the keeping off of blows and ſtrokes, but the declining of ſtrokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the ſake of reſting and ſleeping, but reſting and ſleeping were older than beds, and gave occaſion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and deſigned for the ſake of drinking, which they would not have been, had there not been drinking before. According to the force of which inſtances, the poet would infer, that whoſoever affirms eyes to have been

made for the ſake of ſeeing, muſt ſuppoſe in like manner, there was ſome kind of ſeeing or other before eyes. But ſince there was no ſeeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the ſake of ſeeing. And this is the atheiſtick demonſtration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cauſe, for the ſake of ends and uſes.

But it is evident, that this logick of Atheiſts differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whoſe ſake darts were invented, in time after darts, and only in intention before them. It is true indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, ſleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occaſion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious ſleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the ſenſe of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once before-hand a preventive knowledge of whatſoever would be uſeful, and for the good of animals, and ſo make them intentionally for thoſe uſes. Wherefore the argument ſhould have been framed thus; whatſoever any thing is made for, as the end, that muſt needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the exiſtence of that, which is made for it. And therefore if eyes were made for the ſake or end of ſeeing, ſeeing muſt of neceſſity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually exiſting. But there could be no knowledge of ſeeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the ſake of ſeeing.

And this indeed is the genuine ſcope and drift of the premiſed atheiſtick argument, however it were diſguiſed by them in their manner of propounding it. The reaſon whereof was, becauſe they took it for granted, that all knowledge, as ſuch is derived by ſenſe from the things themſelves known pre-exiſting. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of viſion or ſeeing, before there was actual ſeeing and eyes; and ſo they think it to be demonſtrated, that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the ſake of ſeeing before there was ſeeing; no more than ſpectacles by men for the ſake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly; [*L.* 3. *p.* 268. Lib. IV. Verſ. 851.]

Illa quidem ſeorſum ſunt omnia, quæ prius ipſa
Nata, dedere ſuæ poſt notitiam utilitatis.
Quo genere imprimis ſenſus & membra videmus.
Quare etiam atque etiam procul eſt, ut credere poſſis,
Utilitatis ob officium potuiſſe creari.

That is, *The members of men's bodies, and organs of ſenſe, were firſt made by themſelves, and then did they afterwards give the notice or knowledge of their ſeveral utilities; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impoſſible theſe things ſhould have been made deſignedly for their uſes.*

So that the controverſy is at laſt reſolved wholly into this; Whether or no, all knowledge and underſtanding, as ſuch, univerſally does ariſe from things antecedently exiſting without the knower? Which being aſſerted by Atheiſts, they conclude from thence, that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counſel, contrivance, and intention of any underſtanding Deity, but that they all blunder'd out themſelves, one after another, according to the train or ſequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and underſtanding, counſel and intention, ſprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheiſtick argument againſt a Deity, *viz. That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themſelves known, exiſting before and without the knower, and a paſſion from them; and therefore that the world muſt needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cauſe*; we ſhall refer the anſwer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we ſhall plainly demonſtrate, that knowledge or underſtanding, is not in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world, and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheiſts yet further urge, againſt the proving of a God from the τὸ εὖ ἢ καλῶς, *the regular frame of the whole world* in general, and the artificial ſtructure of the bodies of animals, after this manner; That it is altogether unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, there ſhould be no cauſe in nature for the phænomena thereof, eſpecially for thoſe things, which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragick poets) a god ſhould be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to ſolve them. And indeed though there were a God, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to ſuch mean offices as this, *viz.* to make the body of every the moſt contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculouſly; nor ought nature or the world to be ſuppoſed ſo imperfect, as if it muſt be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature therefore, which is the cauſe of theſe natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act deſignedly for ends and uſes, appears not only from hence, becauſe it never conſults or deliberates, (which *Ariſtotle*[1] intimates to have been the reaſon, why ſome of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends) but alſo becauſe it hath no animal ſenſe or conſciouſneſs, no underſtanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final cauſality in nature, can be accounted no other than an *idolum ſpecus* (as ſome[2] affect to phraſe it) or a prejudice of men's minds,

[1] Vide de Nat. Auſcultat. Lib. II. Cap. VIII. p. 477. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Lord *Bacon* in his *Novum Organum*, P. II. §. LIII. p. 47.

when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think because themſelves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well ſay, that nature laughs and cries, ſpeaks and walks, ſyllogizes and philoſophizes, becauſe themſelves do ſo. But, as a modern philoſopher concludeth, *The univerſe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it.* And accordingly, were all final cauſes rightly baniſhed by *Democritus* out of phyſiology, as *Ariſtotle*[1] recordeth of him, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀφεὶς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις· *That he reduced all things to natural and neceſſary cauſes, altogether rejecting final.*

To all which we briefly reply; That there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided, the one, of thoſe, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of ſenſeleſs matter, which is the extreme of the atomick Atheiſts; the other, of bigotical religioniſts, who will needs have God αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, *to do all things himſelf immediately*; as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both theſe extremes; namely, to ſuppoſe, that beſides God, and in ſubordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a ſecondary or inferiour cauſe of generations. Now, this *natura artificioſa*, this *artificial nature*, though itſelf indeed do not underſtand the reaſon of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the ſake of ends underſtood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers underſtand not the deſigns of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their ſeveral taſks impoſed by him; and as types or forms of letters, compoſed together, print coherent philoſophick ſenſe, which themſelves underſtand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or ſpermatick nature, we have largely inſiſted before, in the *Appendix* to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculouſly by God himſelf; neither are they all done fortuitouſly and temerariouſly, but regularly and methodically for the ſake of ends, though not underſtood by nature itſelf, but by that higher Mind, which is the cauſe of it, and doth, as it were, continually inſpire it. Some, indeed, have unſkilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they ſay, that matter deſires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies deſcend down by appetite towards the centre, that ſo they may reſt therein; and that they ſometimes again aſcend in diſcretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagancies if the Advancer of Learning be underſtood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following paſſage of his; *Incredibile eſt quantum agmen idolorum philoſophiæ immiſerit naturalium operationum ad ſimilitudinem actionum humanarum reductio: It is incredible, how many errors have been transfuſed into philoſophy, from this one deluſion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking, that nature acteth as a man doth.* But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final cauſes from the things of nature, as if nothing

[1] De Generat. Animal. Lib. V. cap. VIII. p. 733. Tom. II. Oper.

nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is it the very ſpirit of atheiſm and infidelity. It is no *idol* of the *cave* or *den*, (to uſe that affected language) that is, no prejudice or fallacy impoſed upon ourſelves, from the attributing our own animaliſh properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and ſyſtem of this whole world was contrived by a perfect underſtanding Being or Mind, (now alſo preſiding over the ſame) which hath every where printed the ſignatures of its own wiſdom upon the matter. As alſo, that though nature itſelf do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform preſcribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the divine architectonick art, or this art itſelf as it were transfuſed into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus *Cicero*'s [1] *Balbus* long ſince declared concerning it, that it was not *vis quædam ſine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus neceſſarios; ſed vis particeps ordinis, tanquam via progrediens, cujus ſolertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex conſequi poteſt imitando: Not a force unguided by reaſon, exciting neceſſary motions in bodies temeariouſly; but ſuch a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were mothodically; whoſe cunning or ingenioſity no art or human opificer can poſſibly reach to by imitation.* For it is altogether unconceivable, how we ourſelves ſhould have mind and intention in us, were there none in the univerſe, or in that higheſt principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by *Ariſtotle* [2], that there is much more of art in ſome of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental cauſality, can no more be ſecluded from the conſideration of natural, than it can from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a houſe or clock, can neither be underſtood, nor any true cauſe of them aſſigned, without deſign, or intention for ends and good. For to ſay, that a houſe is ſtones, timber, mortar, iron, glaſs, lead, *&c.* all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being ſuch an apt diſpoſition of all theſe materials, as may make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uſes of men. Wherefore this is not ſufficiently to aſſign the cauſe of a houſe neither, to declare out of what quarry the ſtones were dug, nor in what woods or foreſts the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as *Ariſtotle* addeth, εἴτις τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ· *if any one ſhould go about thus to give an account of a houſe from material neceſſity* (as the atheiſtick philoſophers then did of the world and the bodies of animals) *that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore the ſtones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was higher; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that; but above all the ſtraw, or thatch, it being the lighteſt of all.* Nor laſtly, if, as the ſame *Ariſtotle* elſewhere [3] alſo ſuggeſteth, one ſhould further pretend, that a houſe was therefore made ſuch, ἐμπέσοντος τῶν ὀργάνων, &c. merely becauſe the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers and trowels, and other inſtruments, chanced all to be moved ſo and ſo; we ſay, that none of all theſe

Nat. Auſc. l. 2. c. 9. [p. 478. Tom. I. Op.]

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXXII. p. 476, Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Vide Natur. Auſcult. Lib. II. Cap. X. p. 3001. Tom. IX. Oper.

[3] De Partib. Animal. Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 473, Tom. II. Oper.

theſe would be to aſſign the true cauſe of a houſe, without declaring, that the architect firſt framed in his mind a model or platform of ſuch a thing to be made out of thoſe materials, ſo aptly diſpoſed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, ſtairs, chimneys, windows, *&c.* as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uſes. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whoſe very eſſence final cauſality is as much included) be either rightly underſtood, or the cauſes of them aſſigned, merely from matter and mechaniſm, or the neceſſary and unguided motion thereof, without deſign or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to ſay [1], that the bodies of animals became ſuch, merely becauſe the fluid ſeed, by motion, happened to make ſuch traces, and beget ſuch ſtamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole reſulted; is not to aſſign a cauſe of them, but to diſſemble, ſmother, and conceal their true efficient cauſe, which is the wiſdom and contrivance of that divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uſes of their reſpective ſouls. Neither indeed can we baniſh all final, that is, all mental cauſality, from philoſophy or the conſideration of nature, without baniſhing at the ſame time reaſon and underſtanding from ourſelves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheiſts would ever undertake to aſſign neceſſary cauſes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechaniſm; thoſe ſmall and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by ſome of them in a few inſtances, (as that the *ſpina dorſi* [2] came from the flexure of the bodies of animals, when they firſt ſprung out of the earth, the inteſtines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itſelf, and that the noſtrils were broke open by the eruption of breath;) theſe, I ſay, only ſhowing the unfeaſableneſs and impoſſibility thereof. And therefore *Democritus* was ſo wiſe, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the *fœtus*, he looking upon it as a thing abſolutely deſperate; nor would he venture to ſay any more concerning it (as *Ariſtotle* [3] informeth us) than ὅτι ἅτως ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάϊκης γίνεϊαι, *that it always cometh ſo to paſs of neceſſity*, but ſtopp'd all further enquiry concerning it after this manner, τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, ωερὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινὸς, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τὴ ἀπείρω ἀρχήν, *That to demand, about any of theſe things, for what cauſe it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite.* As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatſoever corporeal thing was now produced. And *Lucretius*, notwithſtanding all his ſwaggering and boaſting, that he and *Epicurus* were able to aſſign natural and neceſſary cauſes for every thing without a God, hath no where ſo much as one word concerning it. We conclude therefore, that *Ariſtotle*'s judgment concerning final cauſes in philoſophy is much to be preferred before that of *Democritus*, Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῶ φυσικῶ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον, δὲ ἡ τινὸς ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τὸ τέλος, *That both kind of cauſes (material and final) ought to be declared by a phyſiologer, but eſpecially the final; the end being the cauſe of the matter, but the matter not the cauſe of the end.* And thus do we

Nat. Auſc. l. 2. c. 9. [p. 478. Tom. I. Op.]

[1] This ſeems to be levell'd againſt Des Cartes's book *de formatione fœtûs.*

[2] Vide Ariſtot. de Partib. Animal. Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 471, 472.

[3] De Generat. Animal. Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 629. Tom. II. Oper.

we ſee plainly, that the atomick Atheiſts are utterly ignorant of the cauſe, τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, *of the regular and artificial frame of the things in nature*, and conſequently the whole mundane ſyſtem, the true knowledge whereof neceſſarily leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiouſly ſtrange, that theſe Atheiſts ſhould, in this their ignorance and ſottiſhneſs, be juſtified by any profeſſed Theiſts and Chriſtians of later times, who atomizing in their phyſiology alſo, would fain perſuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane ſyſtem, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the neceſſary and unguided motion of the ſmall particles of matter, at firſt turned round in a vortex, or elſe jumbled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the mean time ſtanding by, only as an idle ſpectator of this *luſus atomorum*, this *ſportful dance of atoms*, and of the various reſults thereof. Nay theſe mechanick Theiſts have here quite outſtripped and outdone the atomick Atheiſts themſelves, they being much more immodeſt and extravagant than ever thoſe were; for the profeſſed Atheiſts durſt never venture to affirm, that this regular ſyſtem of things reſulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very firſt, before they had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonſenſical ſyſtems of the whole. And they ſuppoſed alſo, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue ſuch neither, but that ſome time or other confuſion and diſorder would break in again. Moreover, that, beſides this world of ours, there are at this very inſtant, innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thouſand, or ten thouſand, amongſt the infinite worlds, that have ſuch regularity in them. The reaſon of all which is, becauſe it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τὸ αὐτομάτου, οὐδὲν ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεσθαι, as *Ariſtotle* expreſſeth it [1], that *none of thoſe things, which are from fortune or chance, come to paſs conſtantly and always alike.* But our mechanick or atomick Theiſts will have their atoms never ſo much as once to have fumbled in theſe their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept ſyſtem, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very firſt all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themſelves ſo orderly, methodically and diſcreetly, as that they could not poſſibly have done it better, had they been directed by the moſt perfect wiſdom. Wherefore theſe atomick Theiſts utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phænomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been ſo much inſiſted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the ſtrongeſt impreſſion of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphyſical arguments for a Deity; which, though never ſo good, yet by reaſon of their ſubtilty, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongſt the learned do ſometimes beget more of doubtful diſputation and ſcepticiſm, than of clear conviction and ſatisfaction; the Atheiſts in the mean time laughing in their ſleeves,

[1] Natur. Auſcult. Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 469. Tom. I. Oper.

ſleeves, and not a little triumphing, to ſee the cauſe of theiſm thus betrayed by its profeſſed friends and aſſertors, and the grand argument for the ſame totally ſlurred by them; and ſo their work done, as it were, to their hands, for them.

Now, as this argues the greateſt inſenſibility of mind, or ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity in pretended Theiſts, not to take the leaſt notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the ſignatures of the divine art and wiſdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horſes do; ſo are there many phænomena in nature, which being partly above the force of theſe mechanick powers, and partly contrary to the ſame, can therefore never be ſolved by them, nor without final cauſes, and ſome vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in reſpiration, the ſyſtole and diaſtole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muſcular conſtriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might alſo add, amongſt many others, the interſection of the plains of the equator and ecliptick, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptick, nor perpendicular to the plain thereof. For though *Carteſius* [a] would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a ſun, and ſo itſelf the centre of a leſſer vortex, whoſe axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore ſtill kept the ſame ſite or poſture, by reaſon of the ſtriate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their paſſage thorough it, but only in this direction; yet does he himſelf confeſs, that becauſe theſe two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechaniſm, they ſhould perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptick come to have their axes parallel to one another; which, as it hath not yet come to paſs, ſo neither hath there been, for theſe laſt two two thouſand years, (according to the beſt obſervations and judgments of aſtronomers) any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of theſe two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is reſolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cauſe, or the τὸ Βέλτιςον, becauſe it was beſt it ſhould be ſo, the variety of the ſeaſons of the year depending hereupon. But the greateſt of all the particular phænomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, conſiſting of ſuch variety and curioſity, which theſe mechanick philoſophers being no way able to give an account of from the neceſſary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their ſyſtem there, when they ſhould come to animals, and ſo leave it altogether untouch'd. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a poſthumous piece extant, imputed to *Carteſius*, and entitled, *De la Formation du Fœtus*, wherein there is ſome pretence made to ſolve all this by fortuitous mechaniſm. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a falſe ſuppoſition, ſufficiently

[a] Vide Principia ejus Philoſoph. Part III. §. CLV. p. 136. & Part IV. § II. p. 137.

sufficiently confuted by the learned *Harvey*, in his Book of Generation, *that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg*; so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanick Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the metaphysical meditations [1]; *Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod à fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei.* And again likewise in the *Principles of Philosophy*: [2] *Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales à fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus.* But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing, (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto) and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistick incredulity (masked perhaps under an hypocritical veil of humility) can make any doubt thereof. And therefore *Aristotle* [3] justly reprehended *Anaxagoras* for that absurd aphorism of his, διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, Φρονιμώταλον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, *That man was therefore the wisest, (or most solert) of all animals, because he chanced to have hands.* He not doubting to affirm on the contrary; εὔλογον διὰ τὸ Φρονιμώταλον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος Φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αὐλητῇ δοῦναι μᾶλλον αὐλὸς, ἢ τῷ αὐλὸς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι αὐλητικήν· *That it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest* (or most solert and active) *of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature* (saith he) *distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill.*

Wherefore these mechanick Theists would further alledge, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle. But to this also the reply is easy, that though the divine Wisdom itself contrived

[1] Meditat. IV. p. 26. Edit. Amstelod. 1685.
[2] Vide Part I. §. XXVIII. p. 8. & Part III. §. II, III. p. 50.
[3] De Partib. Animal. Lib. IV. Cap. X. p. 559, 560. Tom. II. Oper.

trived the system of the whole world for ends and good; yet nature, as an inferiour minister, immediately executes the same; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and meerly mechanical, but a vital, orderly and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by *Proclus* [1]: ἡ φύσις ἐχάτη μὲν ἐστι τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῦτο καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιργύντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας τῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ὐσιῶν πλάτυς· πλήρης δὲ λόγου καὶ δυνάμεων δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἔγκόσμα· τοιαύτη δὲ ὅσα προελήλυθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνυ θεᾶς,

Steph. Poet. Philos.

Νώτοις δ' ἀμφὶ, θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος ἠώρηται.

ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἥ τε νοερὰ καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν διοικυμένων· ἐξηρτημένη δ' ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀπηωρημένη, φοιτᾶ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνεῖ, δι' ἣν τὰ ἀψύχωλα ψυχῆς μετέχει τινὸς, καὶ τὰ φθειρομένα μένει διαιωνίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδων αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων
φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,
Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέῃ δρόμον ἀίδιον κατασύρων·
Καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς·

Nature is the last of all causes, that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which being full of reasons and powers, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magick Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens. Here have we a description of one universal, substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same *Proclus* elsewhere [2] supposeth other particular natures, or spermatick reasons, in those words of his, μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις· *After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, parcicular natures.* Where it may be observed, by the way, that this *Proclus*, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or a bigotick Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (*viz.* because it was no intellectual thing) as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words, καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ ἐνθεᾶσθαι, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτόθεν ἔσχασα τὸ εἶναι θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σώματα, θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν· *Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods.*

Where-

[1] [2] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. I. p. 4. Edit. Græc. [2] Ibid. p. 118.

Wherefore we cannot otherwiſe conclude concerning theſe our mechanick Theiſts, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and ſtupid nature, or from the neceſſary motions of ſenſeleſs matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed couſin-germans to Atheiſts, or poſſeſſed, in a degree, with a kind of atheiſtick enthuſiaſm, or fanaticiſm, they being ſo far forth inſpired with a ſpirit of infidelity, which is the ſpirit of atheiſm.

But theſe mechanick Theiſts are again counterbalanced by another ſort of Atheiſts, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoiſts, who are unqueſtionably convinced, that *opera naturæ ſunt opera intelligentiæ*, that *the works of nature are works of underſtanding*; and that the original of theſe corporeal things was not dead and ſtupid matter fortuitouſly moved: upon which account *Strato* derided *Democritus* his rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But theſe notwithſtanding, becauſe they would not admit of any other ſubſtance beſides matter, ſuppoſe life and perception, eſſentially to belong to all matter as ſuch; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatſoever itſelf could do or ſuffer (though without animal conſciouſneſs) and can form itſelf to the beſt advantage, ſometimes improving itſelf by organization to ſenſe in brutes, and to reaſon and reflexive underſtanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of theſe Hylozoiſts, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect Mind or underſtanding Being preſiding over the whole world; they concluding, accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a miſtaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetick nature taken alone abſtractly, for a complete ſubſtance by itſelf. Nevertheleſs theſe Hylozoick Atheiſts are no way able, by this hypotheſis of theirs neither, to ſolve that phænomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole univerſe; becauſe every part of matter being, according to them, a diſtinct percipient by itſelf, whoſe knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing preſiding over all, the things of the whole world (ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντέτακται, *in which all things are co-ordered together*) could never have fallen into one ſuch agreeing and conſpiring harmony.

And as for thoſe other Coſmo-plaſtick Atheiſts, who ſuppoſe the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one ſpermatick, plaſtick and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically diſpoſing the whole, but without ſenſe and underſtanding; theſe can no way do the buſineſs neither, that is, ſolve the forementioned phænomenon, it being utterly impoſſible, that there ſhould be any ſuch artificial and regular nature, otherwiſe than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wiſdom.

And thus do we ſee plainly, that no Atheiſts whatſoever can ſolve the phænomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and har-

mony of the univerſe; and that true philoſophy, or the knowledge of cauſes, neceſſarily leadeth to a God.

But beſides theſe phænomena of cogitation, or ſoul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uſes, together with the conſpiring harmony of the whole, which can no way be ſolved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſts, who univerſally aſſerted the novity of this mundane ſyſtem, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the firſt beginning of men, and thoſe greater animals, that are no otherwiſe begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Lib. 3. *c. ult.* [p. 665. Tom. II. Oper.] *Ariſtotle*, in his book of the generation of animals, writeth thus; Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως, ὑπολάβοι τις ἄν, εἴπερ ἐγίγνουτό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκ& συνισταμένης τοῦ ὡροῦτου, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν· *If men and fourfooted animals were ever generated out of the earth, as ſome affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of theſe two ways, either that they were produced, as worms, out of putrefaction, or elſe formed in certain eggs*, growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again [3], εἴπερ ἦν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις, εὔλογον δυεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν, *That if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reaſonable to think it to have been one of theſe two forementioned ways.* It is well known, that *Ariſtotle*, though a Theiſt, elſewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypotheſis of his, there was never any firſt male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of ſuch an infinity of number and time, and of a ſucceſſive generation from eternity. But here *Ariſtotle* himſelf ſeems ſtaggering, or ſceptical, about it, *if men were ever generated out of the earth*, and *if there were any beginning of the generation of animals*; as he doth alſo, in his *Topicks*, propound it for an inſtance of a thing diſputable, Πότερον ὁ κόσμ& ἀΐδι& ἢ οὔ; *Whether the world were eternal or no?* he ranking it amongſt thoſe, περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν ὄντων μεγάλων, *Thoſe great things, for which we can give no certain reaſon one way nor other.* Now (ſaith he) if the *world had a beginning*, and if men were once γηγενεῖς, or αὐτόχθονες, *earth-born*, then muſt they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or elſe out of eggs; he ſuppoſing (it ſeems) thoſe eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheiſts in *Ariſtotle*'s time, as well as Theiſts, denying this eternity of the mundane ſyſtem, as not ſo agreeable with their hypotheſis, becauſe ſo conſtant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not ſuch an appearance or ſemblance of chance, nor can be eaſily ſuppoſed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind preſiding over it, and ſenior to it (as *Ariſtotle* conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewiſe, men at firſt

Lib. 1. *c.* 9. [Cap XI. p. 265. Tom. I. Oper.]

[3] Ibid. p. 666.

firſt to have been generated one of theſe two ways, either out of putrefaction, or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any Deity. But after *Ariſtotle*, *Epicurus* fancied thoſe firſt men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth;

[1] *Creſcebant uteri terræ radicibus apti* ;

And this no otherwiſe than by the fortuitous motion of atoms alſo.

But if men had been at firſt formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth) or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reaſon imaginable, why it ſhould not ſometimes ſo happen now, the motions of atoms being as briſk and vigorous, as ever they were, and ſo to continue to all eternity: ſo that there is not the leaſt ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of *Epicurus*[2], that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at firſt excluded out of bags, wombs or egg-ſhells, or generated out of putrefaction, were ſuppoſed by theſe Atheiſts themſelves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak and tender ſtate, juſt ſuch as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nouriſh themſelves, nor defend themſelves from harms and injuries. But when the ſame *Epicurus* [3] would here pretend alſo, that the earth, which had been ſo fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurſe of this her own progeny, and ſent forth ſtreams or rivers of milk after them out of thoſe gaps of her wounded ſurface, which they had before burſt out of, as *Critolaus* long ſince obſerved, he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breaſts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what ſhould hinder, but that ſhe might have arms and hands alſo, and ſwaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that leſs precarious, when the ſame atheiſtick philoſopher adds, that in this imaginary ſtate of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churliſh blaſts of wind, the leaſt to annoy or injure thoſe tender earth-born infants and nurſlings. All which things being conſidered, *Anaximander* [4] ſeems of the two to have concluded more wiſely, that men, becauſe they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at firſt generated in the bellies of fiſhes, and there nouriſhed up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and ſhift for themſelves, and then were diſgorged, and caſt up upon dry land. Thus do we ſee, that there is nothing in the world ſo monſtrous, nor prodigiouſly abſurd, which men, atheiſtically inclined, will not rather imagine, and ſwallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

In Philo. Quod Mund. Incorr. [P. 945.]

Wherefore here is *dignus vindice nodus*, and this phænomenon of the firſt beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be ſolved otherwiſe,

[1] Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 806.

[2] Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 823, 824. & Lib. II. Verſ. 1149.

[3] Vide Lucret. Lib. V. Verſ. 810.

[4] Vide Cenſorinum de Die Natali, Cap. IV. p. 26. Edit. Lindenbrogii.

wiſe, than according to the Moſaick hiſtory, by admitting of θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, *a God out of a machine*, that is, an extraordinary manifeſtation of the Deity, in forming man, and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender and infant-like ſtate, but mature and adult, that ſo they might be able immediately to ſhift for themſelves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any neceſſity of ſuch an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a ſtop immediately thereunto, that ſo no more *terrigenæ*, nor *autochthones*, *earth-born men*, ſhould be any longer produced. For all theſe circumſtances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole phænomenon ſurpaſſes not only the mechanical, but alſo the plaſtick powers; there being much of diſcretion in it, which the latter of theſe cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and neceſſarily. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall not here determine, whether God Almighty might not make uſe of the ſubſervient miniſtry of angels or ſuperiour ſpirits, created before man, in this firſt extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult ſtate; as *Plato*, in his *Timæus* [1], introduceth the ſupreme God (whom he ſuppoſeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal ſouls) thus beſpeaking the junior gods, and ſetting them a work in the fabrifaction of mortal bodies, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε, *It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terreſtrial animals:* he afterwards adding [2], μετὰ τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδοτε θεοῖς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, *That after the ſowing of immortal ſouls* (the ſupreme God) *committed to theſe junior gods the taſk of forming mortal bodies.* Which of *Plato*'s ſome conceive to have been derived from that of *Moſes*, *Let us make man after our own image.*

Moreover, theſe Atheiſts are no more able to ſolve that other common and ordinary phænomenon neither, of the conſervation of the ſpecies of all animals, by keeping up conſtantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the ſexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechaniſm, it cannot well be conceived, but that, in ſome ages or other, there ſhould happen to be either all males or all females; and ſo the ſpecies fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwiſe, but that there is in this a providence alſo, ſuperiour to that of the plaſtick or ſpermatick nature, which hath not ſo much of knowledge and diſcretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Laſtly, there are yet other phænomena, no leſs real, though not phyſiological, which Atheiſts can no way ſolve; as that of natural juſtice, and honeſty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethicks and politicks; and the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, *liberty of will*, properly ſo called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deſerve commendation and blame, rewards and puniſhments, and ſo become fit objects for remunerative juſtice to diſplay itſelf upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth;

[1] §. XXVII. p. 250. [2] §. XXIX. p. 252.

turneth ; (though thoſe two be not commonly ſo well diſtinguiſhed as they ought.) For when *Epicurus* (an abſolute Atheiſt) departing here from *Democritus*, pretended to ſolve this by his *exiguum clinamen principiorum*, this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheiſtick phrenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheiſtick pretence alſo, to ſolve the phænomenon of religion and the belief of a God, ſo generally entertained ; namely, from the fiction and impoſture of politicians : we having not only manifeſted, that there is a natural prolepſis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reaſon ; but alſo that the belief thereof is ſuſtained and upheld by the ſtrongeſt reaſon ; the phænomena of nature being no way ſolvable, nor the cauſes of things aſſignable, without a Deity ; ſo that religion being founded, both upon the inſtincts of nature, and upon ſolid reaſon, cannot poſſibly be any fiction or impoſture of politicians. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall ſpeak ſomething particularly to this alſo. The Atheiſts therefore conceive, that though thoſe infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much diſpoſe and incline them to the belief of a God, or elſe of a rank of beings ſuperiour to men, (whether viſible or inviſible) commonly called by the Pagans, gods ; yet would not this be ſo generally entertained, as it is, eſpecially that of one ſupreme Deity, the firſt original of all things, and monarch of the univerſe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil ſovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and ſubjection under them, and in a kind of religious and ſuperſtitious obſervation of their laws, and devotion to the ſame, deviſed this notion of a God, and then poſſeſſed the minds of men with a belief of his exiſtence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not, but that politicians may ſometimes abuſe religion, and make it ſerve for the promoting of their own private intereſts and deſigns ; which yet they could not do ſo well neither, were the thing itſelf a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing ſolid at the bottom of it. But ſince religion obtains ſo univerſally every where, it is not conceivable, how civil ſovereigns throughout the whole world, ſome of which are ſo diſtant, and have ſo little correſpondence with one another, ſhould, notwithſtanding, all ſo well agree in this one cheating myſtery of government, or piece of ſtate-cozenage ; nor, if they could, how they ſhould be able ſo effectually to poſſeſs the generality of mankind, (as well wiſe as unwiſe) with ſuch a conſtant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an inviſible nothing ; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in ſenſe nor reaſon, but alſo (as the Atheiſts ſuppoſe) tends to their own great terrour and diſquietment, and ſo brings them at once under a miſerable vaſſalage both of mind and body. Eſpecially ſince men are not generally ſo apt to think, that how much the more any have of power and dignity, they have therefore ſo much the more of knowledge and ſkill in philoſophy and the things of nature,

nature, above others. And is it not ſtrange, that the world ſhould not all this while have ſuſpected or diſcovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have ſmelt out a plot upon themſelves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthral them under bondage; and that ſo many of theſe politicians, and civil ſovereigns themſelves alſo, ſhould have been unacquainted herewith, and as ſimply awed with the fear of this inviſible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles, when they are once never ſo little detected, are preſently thereupon daſhed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themſelves upon the world. But though the Atheiſts have, for theſe two thouſand years paſt, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere ſtate-juggle and political impoſture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the leaſt impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing ſolid at the bottom, and ſupported by its own ſtrength. Which yet may more fully appear from Chriſtianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly intereſt or deſign; which yet by its own, or the divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madneſs of all civil ſtates, Jewiſh and Pagan, and hath conquered ſo great a part of the perſecuting world under it; and that not by reſiſting, or oppoſing force, but by ſuffering deaths and martyrdoms, in way of adherence to that principle [1], *That it is better to obey God than men.* Which thing was thus preſignified in the prophetick Scripture [2]; *Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth ſet themſelves, and the rulers take counſel together, againſt the Lord, and againſt his Chriſt*, &c. *He that ſitteth in the heavens ſhall laugh; the Lord ſhall have them in deriſion. Then ſhall he ſpeak unto them in his wrath*, &c. *Yet have I ſet my king upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermoſt parts of the earth for thy poſſeſſion. Be wiſe now therefore, O ye kings*, &c.

But that theiſm, or religion, is no gullery or impoſture, will be yet further made unqueſtionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one ſupreme Deity, as a Being eternal and neceſſarily exiſtent, abſolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing diſcourſe. To which purpoſe is this of *Sextus* the philoſopher [3]; Κοινὴν γὰρ πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ' ἣν μακάριόν τι ἔστι ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον· *All men have this common prolepſis concerning God, that he is a living Being incorruptible, perfectly happy, and uncapable of all manner of evil.* And the notion of that God, which *Epicurus* oppoſed, was no other than this, *An underſtanding Being, having all happineſs, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world.* Now, I ſay,

[1] Acts v. 29.
[2] Pſal. ii. 1.
[3] Lib. I. adverſ. Phyſicos, ſive Lib. VIII. adverſ. Mathemat. Sect. I. §. XXXIII. p. 556. Ed. Fabricii.

ſay, that if there be no ſuch thing as this exiſting, and this idea of God be a meer fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrarious. But it is unconceivable, how the generality of mankind (a few Atheiſts only excepted) ſhould univerſally agree in one and the ſame arbitrarious figment. This argumentation hath been formerly uſed by ſome Theiſts, as appeareth from the forementioned *Sextus*; τελέως δέ ἐστιν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς ἅπτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι· *Adv. Math.*, 3'14. *It is altogether irrational to think, that all men ſhould by chance light upon the ſame properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto.* [P. 557.] Neither is that any ſufficient account, which the Atheiſts would here give, that ſtateſmen and politicians every where thus poſſeſſed the minds of men with one and the ſame idea; the difficulty ſtill remaining, how civil ſovereigns and law-makers, in all the diſtant parts of the world, and ſuch as had no communication nor intercourſe with one another, ſhould univerſally jump in one and the ſame fictitious and arbitrarious idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea ſhould ever have entred into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheiſts again think it enough to ſay, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind, by law-makers and politicians, telling them of ſuch a being, and perſuading them to believe his exiſtence; or that it was, from the firſt feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philoſophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into mens minds from without, meerly by telling, or by words; we being paſſive to nothing elſe from words but their ſounds and the phantaſms thereof, they only occaſioning the ſoul to excite ſuch notions, as it had before within itſelf (whether innate or adventitious) which thoſe words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be ſigns of; or elſe to reflect alſo further upon thoſe ideas of their own, conſider them more diſtinctly, and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the ſoul once before actually underſtood, in a pre-exiſtent ſtate, as *Plato* ſomewhere would have it, according to that of *Boëtius* [1],

Quod ſi Platonis *muſa perſonat verum,*
Quod quiſque diſcit, immemor recordatur:

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obſtetricious; and not the filling of the ſoul as a veſſel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it ſo to excite and awaken, compare and compound its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that, which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expreſſed by the forementioned philoſophick poet, in theſe words,

Hæret profecto ſemen introrſum veri,
Quod excitatur ventilante doctrina.

[1] De Conſolat. Philoſ. Lib. III. p. 79, 80.

Wherefore the meer telling of men, there is a God, could not infuſe any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being abſolutely perfect, eternal and ſelf-exiſtent, make them underſtand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themſelves, correſpondent to thoſe ſeveral words. However the difficulty ſtill remains, how thoſe civil ſovereigns and law-makers, or how *Critias* his very firſt inventor of that cheat of a God, could form that idea within themſelves; ſince upon ſuppoſition of his non-exiſtence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a non-entity. And this was judiciouſly hinted alſo by the ſame *Sextus*; οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοκοῦντες, φασὶν ὅτι νομοθέται τινες ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι, τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄτοπον αὐτῶν περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἄν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μήδενος πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν Θεοῦ; *The Atheiſts affirming, that certain law-makers firſt put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not conſider, that they ſtill remain intangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them, how thoſe law-makers themſelves could firſt form that idea?* From whence it is afterwards concluded [1]; ὃ τοίνυν θέζει, οὐδὲ κατά τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδέξαντο οἱ πάλαιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι Θεόν· *That therefore the notion of a God ſprung not from the arbitrarious fiction of law-makers and politicians.*

Adv. Math. 313, 314. [P. 556.]

But ſome Atheiſts will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human ſoul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of ſuch things, as actually never were nor will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by ſuch a feigning power as this, the idea of God, though there be no ſuch thing exiſting, might be framed. And here we deny not, but that the human ſoul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exiſt ſeverally, and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power, that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but muſt uſe ſuch as exiſt in nature; only he can variouſly compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of ſuch things as no where are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, ſhoulders, and body of a horſe. In like manner, that more ſubtile painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things, which no where exiſt, but yet his ſimple colours, notwithſtanding, muſt be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a poſitive conception of that, which is abſolutely nothing; which were no leſs than to make nothing to be ſomething, or create ſomething out of nothing. And though the whole of theſe fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not any where actually exiſt, yet for as much as it doth not abſolutely imply a contradiction, for it ſo to do, therefore hath it alſo a poſſible entity too, and otherwiſe it could not be conceivable. As a triangular ſquare, for example, being a contradictious thing, hath not ſo much as a poſſible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as ſuch; (though both a triangle and a ſquare ſeverally be conceivable) it being meer nonſenſe, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theiſt may pre-

[1] Ibid. p. 557.

preſume with reverence to ſay, that God Almighty himſelf, though he can create more or fewer really exiſtent things, as he pleaſeth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wiſdom, nor have a poſitive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor poſſible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things, which exiſt ſcatteredly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrarious thing, and it might be what every one pleaſed, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did under theſe their ſeveral figments: whereas we have already proved, that the idea of God is one moſt ſimple idea of an abſolutely perfect Being, though having ſeveral partial and inadequate conceptions, ſo that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonſtrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrarious.

Moreover, many of thoſe partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are no where elſe to be found in the whole world, exiſting ſingly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they muſt needs be abſolute non-entities; as immutability, neceſſary exiſtence, infinity, and perfection, *&c.* So that the painter, that makes this idea, muſt here feign colours themſelves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheiſtick ſuppoſition.

Laſtly, If there be no God now exiſting, it is impoſſible, that ever there ſhould be any, and ſo the whole idea of God would be the idea of that, which hath no poſſible entity neither; whereas thoſe other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of ſuch things as have no actual exiſtence, yet have they all a poſſible entity, as was ſaid before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheiſts ſtrength, we muſt here acknowledge, that ſome of them have yet pretended further, that beſides this power of compounding things together, the human ſoul hath alſo another ampliating, or increaſing and improving power; by both which together, though there be no God exiſting, nor yet poſſible, the idea of him may be fictitiouſly made; thoſe partial ideas, which are no where elſe to be found, ariſing, as they ſay, from a μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *a tranſition and gradual proceſſion from men, in way of amplification, augmentation and improvement.* Thus do we read in *Sextus*, Τὸ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρῆλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλωπος, ἅτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιθείναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεν Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιον τινὰ φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον οἱ πάλαιοι, ἐπηύξησαν τὸν Χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἶτα ἐνθεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀΐδιον *Adv. Math. P.* 317. [Lib. VIII. ſeu adv. Phyſic. Lib. I. Sect. II. §. XLVI. p. 559, 560.]

ἀΐδιον παραγενόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν. *The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men: for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God.*

But to this we reply, first, That according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could *make more than is*; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of *Protagoras* in *Plato*'s *Thæetetus*, ὅτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάζαι, ὅτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ· *It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise, than he suffers.* Again, as *Sextus* [1] the philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a *circle*, or δι' ἀλλήλων. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared; (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect:) that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that, which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, give this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done *per viam remotionis, by way of remotion of all imperfection from him.* Thus *Alcinous* [2], πρώτη μὲν αὐτῷ νόησις ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, *the first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction.* We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have

P. 167. Serr.

[1] Vide Lib. VIII. adv. Mathemat. Sect. II. §. XLVII. p. 560.

[2] Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. Cap. X. p. 602. *printed at the end of* Dan. Heinsius's *edit. of* Maximus Tyrius.

have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity of magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites. Neither is that of any moment which *Gassendus* [1] so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite Being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers: for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature, (and no fiction of the mind) as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute non-entity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence: much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely perfect Being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect Being, to create a real world out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further unquestionably appear from that, which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary *vinculum* of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power) without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer *De Cive* could not dissemble it, (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation) but acknowledgeth it in these words; *Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.——Quòd si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, Non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est.* *Imper. c. 14. Sect. 21. [p. 109.]*

[1] In Disquisit. Metaphys. seu dubitationibus & instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. Dubit. IV. p. 336. Tom. III. Oper.

eſt; *& ſi prius obligentur eſt ſuperflua. The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before thoſe civil laws. And if any prince ſhould make a law to this purpoſe, That no man ſhould rebel againſt him, this would ſignify nothing, becauſe unleſs they, to whom it is made, were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid*; *and if they were, then is it ſuperfluous.* Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer *De Cive*, and of the *Leviathan*, ſuppoſes) from men's private utility only; becauſe every man being judge of this for himſelf, it would then be lawful for any ſubject to rebel againſt his ſovereign prince, and to poiſon or ſtab him, whenſoever he could reaſonably perſuade himſelf, that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he ſhould thereby procure the ſovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as eaſily be diſſolved by the ſame. It remaineth therefore, that conſcience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only baſis, and eſſential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth; without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any ſovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or impoſture of civil ſovereigns, unleſs civil ſovereignty itſelf be accounted a fiction and impoſture, or a thing, which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and ſubjection under them, then would they doubtleſs have ſo framed and contrived it, as that it ſhould have been every way flexible and compliant; namely, by perſuading the world, that whatſoever was commanded by themſelves, was agreeable to the divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws, was diſpleaſing to God Almighty, and would be puniſhed by him; God ruling over the world no otherwiſe than by and in theſe civil ſovereigns as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of ſovereigns, ſhould be acknowledged to be the only meaſure of juſt and unjuſt, (there being nothing naturally ſuch) the only rule of conſcience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil ſovereigns might think to have an abſolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatſoever they pleaſed, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their ſubjects being always obliged, in conſcience, without the leaſt ſcruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere *Larva* of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion, that can be called a political figment. Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus perſuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil ſovereigns was the only rule of juſtice and conſcience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwiſe than by theſe, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conſcience are no ſuch waxen things, ſervilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous,

rigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed, and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of him, who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politicks condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth; *That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust; or have any other conscience besides the law of the land.* *Lev. p.* 168. As also this, *That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign.* *De Civ. c.* 12. *Sect.* 2. [P. 83.] He likewise adds, *That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature.* *Lev. c.* 38. *p.* 238. Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, It is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained. Thus does the same writer declare, That if the *superstitious fear of spirits* (whereof God is the chief) *and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are, for civil obedience:* and that they, who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death, *fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.* *Lev. p.* 8. *Pag.* 373. And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no Scripture or divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that, which can make religion and gods, must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenour of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king over all the children of pride) is the highest Deity, next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistick politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as

as altogether inconſiſtent with their deſigns, they cannot be ſuppoſed to have been the figments of civil ſovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted thoſe three atheiſtick pretences, to ſolve the phænomenon of religion; from fear, and the ignorance of cauſes, and the fiction of politicians.

But ſince, beſides thoſe ordinary phænomena before mentioned, which are no way ſolvable by Atheiſts, there are certain other phænomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or elſe that there is a rank of underſtanding beings, inviſible, ſuperiour to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, theſe three eſpecially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies; (where the Atheiſts obſtinately denying matter of fact and hiſtory, will needs impute theſe things, either to juggling fraud and knavery; or elſe to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to diſtinguiſh dreams, and other ſtrong imaginations, from viſion and ſenſe; or laſtly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the publick authority of civil ſovereigns, for political ends:) we ſhall here ſuggeſt ſomething briefly, to vindicate the hiſtorick truth of thoſe phænomena, againſt Atheiſts.

Firſt therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabuloſity in theſe relations, yet can it not reaſonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; ſince ſomething of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times atteſted by perſons of unqueſtionable prudence, and unſuſpected veracity. And whereas the Atheiſts impute the original of theſe things to men's miſtaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real viſions and ſenſations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philoſophy, that ſenſe is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth: for if prudent and intelligent perſons may be ſo frequently miſtaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with ſenſations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from ſenſe? However, they here derogate ſo much both from ſenſe, and from human teſtimonies, as that if the like were done in other caſes, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheiſts, being apprehenſive of this inconvenience, of denying ſo many ſenſible appearances, and teſtimonies, or relations of fact, have choſe rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheleſs concluding them to be things cauſed and created, by the power of imagination only: as if the ſtrength of imagination were ſuch, that it could not only create fancies, but alſo real ſenſible objects, and that at a diſtance too from the imaginers, ſuch as whereby the ſenſe of others ſhall be for the time affected, though they quickly vaniſh away again. From which prodigious paradox, we may take notice of the fanaticiſm of ſome Atheiſts, and that there is nothing ſo monſtrouſly abſurd, which men infected with atheiſtick incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief,

belief, than admit of any thing, that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason, why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all, and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that *Democritus* was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant, that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon imagination, superiour to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him *idols*, or *images*; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvious effluxes, that stream continually from the surface of bodies; only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus *Sextus* the philosopher, Δημόκριτος εἰδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὔχεσθαι εὐλόγων τυγχάνειν εἰδώλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δὲ, προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρέμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα. Democritus *affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are of a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible; and that they sometimes do foresignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices.* Now, though *Democritus* were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow-Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to Theists; yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and æthereal animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be: so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in *Sextus*, ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ, ὑπενόησαν εἶναι θεὸν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος θείου, τοῦ ἀφθάρτου φύσιν ἔχοντος. *Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols, fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God, that hath an incorruptible nature.* However, though *Democritus* continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aërial and ætherial animals; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste. Where it may be observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with *Democritus*, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose them to have their certain subtile ætherial or aërial bodies. In which respect St. *Austin*, in his 115th epistle[1], calleth angels, *æthereos*, and devils, *aëreos animantes*.

Adv. Math. p. 311. [Lib. VIII. §. XIX. p. 552]

[1] Epist. IX. ad Nebridium, p. 9. Tom. II. Oper. Edit Benedict.

Pag. 29. [vel P. 44, 45. Edit. Gaulmini.] Thus *Pſellus* in his *Dialogue* περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματον, ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέγε, καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτυφε· Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖναι τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· Καὶ Βασίλειος δὲ ὁ θεῖος, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκραιφνέσιν ἀγγέλοις, ἐνεῖναι σώματα διαλεύειν, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ αἰρώδη καὶ ἄκραντα, καὶ ἐξῆς. *But you are to know, that dæmons or devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and ſo converſe with bodies; which may be learned alſo from the fathers, the divine* Baſil *contending, that there are bodies, not only in devils, but alſo in the pure angels themſelves, as certain ſubtile, airy, defecate ſpirits.* Where afterwards he ſhows, how the σύμφυες ἀγγέλοις σῶμα, that *body which is connate with angels*, differs from that, which devils are united to, in reſpect of the radiant ſplendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obſcurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that they ſhall be *puniſhed with fire*; which (ſaith he) were a thing impoſſible, were they all of them incorporeal. And ſome perhaps will attempt to prove the ſame concerning angels too, from thoſe other words of our Saviour, where, ſpeaking of the reſurrection ſtate, he affirmeth, that they, who ſhall be accounted worthy thereof, ſhall neither *marry, nor be given in marriage*, but be ἰσάγγελοι [1], *equal to the angels:* which comparative expreſſion of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not ſo proper, were the angels abſolutely devoid of all body. But of this we determine not.

To this phænomenon of apparitions might be added thoſe two others of magicians or wizards, dæmoniacks or *Energumeni*; both of theſe proving alſo the real exiſtence of ſpirits, and that they are not mere phancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As alſo, that among thoſe ſpirits there are ſome foul, unclean, and wicked ones, (though not made ſuch by God, but by their own apoſtacy) which is ſome confirmation of the truth of Chriſtianity, the Scripture inſiſting ſo much upon theſe evil dæmons or devils, and declaring it to be one deſign of our Saviour Chriſt's coming into the world, to oppoſe theſe confederate powers of the kingdom of darkneſs, and to reſcue mankind from the thraldom and bondage thereof. As for wizards and magicians, perſons who aſſociate and confederate themſelves in a peculiar manner with theſe evil ſpirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, luſt, ambition, and other paſſions; beſides the Scriptures, there hath been ſo full an atteſtation given to them by perſons unconcerned in all ages, that thoſe our ſo confident exploders of them, in this preſent age, can hardly eſcape the ſuſpicion of having ſome hankering towards atheiſm. But as for the dæmoniacks and *Energumeni*, it hath been wondered, that there ſhould be ſo many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this preſent age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of *Joſephus*, in ſundry places, that the Phariſaick Jews were then generally poſſeſſed with an opinion of theſe δαιμονιζόμενοι, dæmoniacks, men poſſeſſed with devils, or infeſted by them. And that this was not a mere phraſe or form of ſpeech only amongſt them for perſons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Jo-

[1] Luke xx. 34, 36.

Josephus[1] declares it as his opinion concerning the dæmons or devils, that they were πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα, *the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living.* From hence it was, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were not at all surprised with his casting out of devils, it being usual for them also to exorcise the same; an art, which they pretended to have learn'd from *Solomon.* Of whom thus *Josephus*, παρέχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων τέχνην, εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπωδάς τε συντάξαμενος αἷς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐνδάμενα, τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει. *God also taught* Solomon *an art against dæmons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day.* Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistick writer[2] hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of dæmons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant, that this very thing was imputed by *Plotinus* afterward to the Gnosticks, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physick, but expelled by words or charms. Thus he, *En.* 2. *Lib.* 9. *c.* 14.[3] νῦν δὲ ὑποσημαίνοντες τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σεμνοτέρους μὲν ἀνεῖναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὐφρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐκ αἰσίστοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις, &c. δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπεῖαι αὐτῶν, γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ αἵματος ἀφηρημένου καὶ ἐνδείᾳ δὲ ἰάσατο· ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου, καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι. *Now when they affirm diseases to be dæmons or devils, and pretend, that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or inanition, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away.* Nor can we think, that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either supposed all madmen to be dæmoniacks, or all dæmoniacks madmen (though this latter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own) we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman, which had a spirit *of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself,* which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been *bowed by Satan.* Wherefore the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being look'd upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of

Ant. Jud. Lib. 8. c 2. [p. 419, 420]

[1] De Bello Judaico, Lib. VII. Cap. VI. §. III.] p. 417. Tom. II. Edit. Havercamptii.

[2] Hobbes. See Leviathan, Cap. XL.

[3] P. 212. Oper.

ſome devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to ſuppoſe evil dæmons to be the cauſes of ſuch bodily diſeaſes as had extraordinary ſymptoms, and eſpecially madneſs; but the Greeks, and other Gentiles alſo, were embued with the ſame perſuaſion; as appeareth from *Apollonius Tyanæus* his curing a laughing dæmoniack[1] at *Athens*, he ejecting that evil ſpirit by threats and menaces, who is ſaid, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noiſe; as alſo[2], from his freeing the city of *Epheſus* from the plague, by ſtoning an old ragged beggar, ſaid by *Apollonius* to have been the plague, which appeared to be a dæmon, by his changing himſelf into the form of a ſhagged dog.

But that there is ſome truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil ſpirits, or dæmons, do ſometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily diſtempers and diſeaſes, hath been the judgment of two very experienced phyſicians, *Sennertus* and *Fernelius*. The former in his book *De Mania*, *Lib.* 1. *cap.* 15. writing thus; *Etſi ſine ulla corporis morboſa diſpoſitione, Deo permittente, hominem obſidere & occupare dæmon poſſit, tamen quandoque morbis, & precipuè melancholicis, ſeſe immiſcet dæmon; & forſan frequentius hoc accidit, quam ſæpè creditur. Although the devil may, by divine permiſſion, poſſeſs men without any morbid diſpoſition, yet doth he uſually intermingle himſelf with bodily diſeaſes, and eſpecially thoſe of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to paſs oftner than is commonly believed or ſuſpected.* The other in his *De abditis rerum Cauſis*, where having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth, *Neque ſolum morbos, verum etiam dæmonas, ſcelerati homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem viſuntur furoris quadam ſpecie diſtorti; hoc uno tamen à ſimplici furore diſtant, quod ſummè ardua obloquantur, præterita & occulta renuntient, aſſidentiumque arcana referent. Neither do theſe wicked magicians only inflict diſeaſes upon men's bodies, but alſo ſend devils into them; by means whereof they appear diſtorted with a kind of fury and madneſs, which yet differs from a ſimple madneſs* (or the diſeaſe ſo called) *in this, that they ſpeak of very high and difficult matters, declare things paſt and unknown, and diſcover the ſecrets of thoſe that ſit by.* Of which he ſubjoins two notable inſtances of perſons, well known to himſelf, that were plainly dæmoniacal, poſſeſſed, or acted by an evil dæmon; one whereof ſhall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal perſons do not only diſcover ſecrets, and declare things paſt, but future alſo, and, beſides this, ſpeak in languages, which they had never learn'd; this puts it out of all doubt and queſtion, that they are not mere madmen, or *Maniaci*, but dæmoniacks or *Energumeni*. And that ſince the time of our Saviour Chriſt there have been often ſuch, may be made evident from the records of credible writers. *Pſellus* in his book Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων, *De Operat. Dæm.* avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though ſhe knew nothing but her own mother tongue, yet, when a ſtranger, who was an *Armenian*, was brought into the room to her, ſhe ſpake to him preſently in the *Armenian* language, ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἦμεν, ὅτι καλ' Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μηδ' εἰς ὄψιν ἀφιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κεχρῃσθαι εἰδυῖα πλέον ὑδέν· *We all ſtood amazed,*

Pag. 69. [P. 105.]

[1] Vide Philoſtrat. de Vitâ Apollonii Tyanæi, Lib. X. Cap. XX. p. 157. [2] Id. Ibid. Lib. IV. Cap. X. p. 147.

amazed, when we heard a woman, that had never ſeen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learnt any thing but the uſe of her diſtaff, to ſpeak the Armenian language readily. Where the relater alſo affirmeth the ſame maniacal perſon to have foretold certain future events, which happened ſhortly after to himſelf; Σὺ δὲ, σραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμὲ, μεγάλων ἐν χρῷ συμφορῶν ὑποσ-ήσῃ· χολᾷ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαιμόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λαλιάς· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλεπὰς ἐπιῤῥάψασι καὶ ἐσχάτης κινδύνους, ὃς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύξαθαι δυνηθείης, εἰ μήτις δύναμις κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ· *Then looking upon me, ſhe* (or rather the dæmon) *ſaid, Thou ſhalt ſuffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the dæmons are extremely angry with thee, for oppoſing their ſervices and worſhip; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou ſhalt not be able to eſcape, unleſs a power, greater than that of dæmons, exempt thee from them. All which things* (ſaith he) *happened ſhortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death, by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered.* Whereupon *Pſellus* concludes, Τίς οὖν ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρησμὸν ἑωρακὼς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων· *Who is there therefore, that conſidering this oracle or prediction, will conclude* (as ſome phyſicians do) *all kind of madneſſes to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragick paſſions of the dæmons.* But becauſe this inſtance is remoter from our preſent times, we ſhall ſet down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned *Fernelius*, who was an eye-witneſs thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was ſtrangely convulſed in his body, having ſometimes one member, and ſometimes another, violently agitated, inſomuch that four ſeveral perſons were ſcarcely able to hold them; and this at firſt without any diſtemper at all in his head, or crazedneſs in brain. To whom *Fernelius*, with other ſkilful phyſicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; bliſters, purgations, cupping-glaſſes, fomentations, unctions, plaiſters, and ſtrengthening medicines; but all in vain. The reaſon whereof is thus given by the ſame *Fernelius: Quoniam omnes longe aberamus à cognitione veri, nam menſe tertio primum deprehenſus dæmon quidam totius mali author, voce, inſuetiſque verbis ac ſententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis, (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans eſſet) ſe prodens; is multa aſſidentium maximáque medicorum ſecreta detegebat, ridens, quòd irritis pharmacis corpus hoc penè jugulaſſent. Becauſe we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was firſt plainly diſcovered to us, that it was a certain dæmon, who was the author of all this miſchief; he manifeſting himſelf by his ſpeech, and by unuſual words and ſentences, both in Greek and Latin, (though the patient were altogether ignorant of Greek tongue:) and by his revealing many of the ſecrets of thoſe, who ſtood by, eſpecially of the phyſicians, whom alſo he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their fruſtraneous remedies.* Here therefore have we an unqueſtionable inſtance of a dæmoniack in theſe latter times of ours, and ſuch a one, who at firſt, for two months together, had no manner of madneſs or mania at all upon him, though afterwards the dæmon poſſeſſing his whole body, uſed his tongue, and ſpake therewith. *Fernelius* concludes his whole diſcourſe in this manner: *Theſe things do I produce, to make it manifeſt, that evil*

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evil dæmons (or devils) do ſometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into, and poſſeſs their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and diſturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or elſe by obſtructing the veins and other paſſages with them, or diſordering the ſtructure of the members, they cauſe innumerable diſeaſes. There are many other inſtances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of perſons either wholly dæmoniacal, and poſſeſſed by evil dæmons, (this appearing from their diſcovering ſecrets, and ſpeaking languages which they had never learnt) or elſe otherwiſe ſo affected and infeſted by them, as to have certain unuſual and ſupernatural ſymptoms; which, for brevity's ſake, we ſhall here omit. However, we thought it neceſſary thus much to inſiſt upon this argument of dæmoniacks, as well for the vindication of Chriſtianity, as for the conviction of Atheiſts; we finding ſome ſo ſtaggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of dæmoniacks (they being ſo ſtrongly poſſeſſed, that there neither is, nor ever was any ſuch) they are ready enough to ſuſpect the whole Goſpel, or New Teſtament itſelf, of fabuloſity and impoſture.

We come now to the ſecond head propoſed, of miracles and effects ſupernatural. That there hath been ſomething miraculous or above nature, ſometimes done even among the Pagans, (whether by good or evil ſpirits,) appears not only from their own records, but alſo from the Scripture itſelf. And it is well known, that they pretended (beſides oracles) to miracles alſo, even after the times of Chriſtianity; and that not only in *Apollonius Tyanæus*, and *Apuleius*, but alſo in the Roman emperors themſelves, as *Veſpaſian* and *Adrian*, but eſpecially in the temple of *Æſculapius*; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at *Rome* [a], in which, amongſt other things, this is recorded; *That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then paſſing from the right ſide thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his ſight, the people all applauding, that great miracles were done under the emperor* Antoninus, *&c.* But we have in the Scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done eſpecially by *Moſes*, and our Saviour Chriſt and his Apoſtles.

Wherefore it ſeems, that there are two ſorts of miracles or effects ſupernatural. Firſt, ſuch as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural cauſes here amongſt us, and in that reſpect may be called ſupernatural; yet might notwithſtanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other inviſible created ſpirits, angels or dæmons. As for example, if a ſtone or other heavy body ſhould firſt aſcend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any viſible either mover or ſupporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect ſupernatural; and yet, according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created

[a] Vide Gruteri Inſcription. Tom. I. p. LXXI.

created inviſible beings, angels or dæmons; God only permitting, without whoſe ſpecial providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate perſon ſhould readily ſpeek Greek or Latin, this alſo would be to us a miracle, or effect ſupernatural; for ſo is the Apoſtle's ſpeaking with tongues accounted; and yet in Demoniacks is this ſometimes done by evil dæmons, God only permitting. Such alſo amongſt the Pagans was that *miraculum cotis*, (as *Apuleius* calls it) that *miracle of the whetſtone*, done by *Accius Navius*, when, at his command, it was divided into two with a razor [1]. But ſecondly, there is another ſort of miracles, or effects ſupernatural, ſuch as are above the power of all ſecond cauſes, or any natural created being whatſoever, and ſo can be attributed to none but God Almighty himſelf, the author of nature, who therefore can controul it at pleaſure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing againſt miracles, denies as well thoſe of the former, as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name, which the ignorant vulgar gives to *opus naturæ inſolitum, any unwonted work of nature, or to what themſelves can aſſign no cauſe of*; as alſo, that if there were any ſuch thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the divine exiſtence [2]; we find his diſcourſe every way ſo weak, groundleſs, and inconſiderable, that we could not think it here to deſerve a confutation.

But of the former ſort of thoſe miracles, is that to be underſtood, *Deuter.* xiii. *If there ariſe among you a prophet, or dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a ſign or a wonder, and the ſign or wonder come to paſs, whereof he ſpake unto thee, ſaying, Let us go after other gods, and ſerve them; thou ſhalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know, whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your ſoul.* For it cannot be ſuppoſed, that God Almighty would himſelf purpoſely inſpire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately aſſiſt ſuch a one with his own ſupernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of ſuch doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the ſuggeſtion of evil ſpirits, ſome falſe prophets might be raiſed up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at leaſt, that, by aſſiſtance of them, ſuch miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as thoſe ſometimes done by the Egyptian ſorcerers or magicians, God himſelf not interpoſing in this caſe to hinder them, for this reaſon, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulneſs towards him. Foraſmuch as both, by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worſhip of any but God Almighty, had been ſufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at leaſt ſuch miracles as theſe) are no ſufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without conſideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man ſhould have done never ſo many true and real miracles amongſt the Jews, and yet ſhould perſuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a falſe prophet.

Accordingly

[1] Vide Livium Lib. I. Cap. XXXVI. [2] Vide Spinoſæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. Cap. VI. p. 67.

Accordingly in the New Teſtament do we read, that our Saviour Chriſt forewarned his diſciples, that [1] *falſe prophets and falſe Chriſts ſhould ariſe, and ſhow great ſigns or wonders, in ſo much, that if it were poſſible, they ſhould ſeduce the very elect.* And St. *Paul* foretelleth concerning the man of ſin, or antichriſt [2], *That his coming ſhould be after the working of Satan, with all power, and ſigns, and wonders (or miracles) of a lye.* For we conceive, that by τέρατα ψεύδους in this place, are not properly meant *feigned and counterfeit miracles*, that is, meer cheating and juggling tricks, but *true wonders and real miracles*, (*viz.* of the former ſort mentioned) done for the confirmation of a lye, as the doctrine of this man of ſin is there afterwards called; for otherwiſe how could his coming be ſaid to be *according to the working of Satan, with all power?* In like manner alſo, in St. *John*'s Apocalypſe, where the coming of the ſame man of ſin, and the myſtery of iniquity, is again deſcribed, we read Chap. xiii. of a two-horned beaſt like a lamb, *That he ſhall do great wonders, and deceive thoſe, that dwell on the earth, by means of thoſe miracles, which he hath power to do, in the ſight of the beaſt.* And again, Chap. xvi. *Of certain unclean ſpirits like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beaſt, and of the falſe prophet, which are the ſpirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth.* And laſtly, Chap. xix. *Of the falſe prophet, that wrought miracles before the beaſt.* All which ſeem to be underſtood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real alſo, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lye, that is, of idolatry, falſe religion and impoſture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulneſs of his own ſervants, and partly in way of juſt judgment and puniſhment upon thoſe, who *receive not the love of the truth, that they might be ſaved*; as the Apoſtle declareth [3]. Wherefore thoſe miracles, pretended, for divers ages paſt, to have been done before the relicks of ſaints and images, *&c.* were they all true, could by no means juſtify or warrant that religious worſhip by many given to them; becauſe true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are ſo far from juſtifying that idolatry, that they are themſelves condemned by it to be τέρατα ψεύδους, *the miracles of a lye*, done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Chriſt, had they been all of them only of the former kind, ſuch as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created ſpirits, and their aſſiſtance; yet for as much as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry, nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reaſon of thoſe miracles, to have been received by the Jews themſelves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of *Moſes* himſelf. Who both in the 13th and 18th chapters of *Deuter.* plainly ſuppoſeth, that God would in no other caſe permit any falſe prophet to do miracles by the aſſiſtance of evil ſpirits, ſave only in that of idolatry, and, (which is always underſtood of what is plainly diſcoverable by the light of nature to

[1] Luke xxiv. 24. [2] Theſſal. ii. 9. [3] Theſſal. ii. 10.

to be false, or evil.) The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty, by *Moses*, promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at *Horeb*. *Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not.* Whereupon the Lord said, *They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.* Deut. xviii. Which is all one as if he should have said; I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to, as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such, as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself; as for example, when before himself he raised *Lazarus*, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good) whenever they please to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lye, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superiour to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also, as could not be wrought, but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of *Moses*, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles; and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.

The laſt extraordinary phænomenon propoſed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwiſe unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God, or at leaſt that there are underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men. For if there be preſenſion or foreknowledge of ſuch future events, as are to human underſtanding alone altogether unforeknowable, then is it certain, that there is ſome more perfect underſtanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient Pagan Theiſts[1], in the genuine and proper ſenſe thereof, unqueſtionably true; *Si divinatio eſt, dii ſunt*; *If there be divination, or preſenſion of future events, (undiſcoverable by men) then are there gods:* which, in their language, was no more than to ſay, underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men.

Wherefore we muſt here diſtinguiſh of oracles and predictions, after the ſame manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. Firſt, ſuch as might proceed only from the natural preſaging power of created ſpirits ſuperiour to men, whether called angels or dæmons. For theſe being ſuppoſed to have not only clearer underſtandings than men, and a greater inſight into nature, but alſo by reaſon of their agility and inviſibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely diſtant, and of being privy to men's ſecret machinations and conſultations; it is eaſily conceivable, that many future events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at leaſt) foreſeen by them; and that without any miraculous divine revelation, their cauſes being already in being. As men learned in aſtronomy can foretel eclipſes of the ſun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or ſtateſmen, that are furniſhed with great intelligence, foreign and domeſtick, can preſage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And ſuch were thoſe predictions, which *Democritus*, though otherwiſe much addicted to atheiſm, allowed of; *Cicero* writing thus of him, *Plurimis locis, gravis auctor* Democritus *præſenſionem rerum futurarum comprobat*; Democritus, *a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the preſention of future events.* The reaſon whereof was, becauſe he ſuppoſed certain underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, called by him idols, which having a larger comprehenſion of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretel many future events, that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought, that *Democritus* would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not aſſerted the neceſſity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as *Epicurus* afterwards did; (as if this were inconſiſtent with all manner of preſage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge;) yet is it certain, that there is not ſo much contingency in all human actions, by reaſon of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by *Epicurus*, and ſtill is by many ſuppoſed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many caſes and circumſtances it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what ſuch or ſuch perſons

De Div. L. 1. [Cap. III. p. 3111. Tom. IX. Oper.]

[1] The Stoicks. Vide Ciceron. de Divinat. Lib. I. Cap. V, VI. p. 3113, 3114. Tom. IX. Oper.

perſons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous perſon, having a ſtrong temptation to ſatisfy his ſenſual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of ſhame or puniſhment, would readily cloſe with the ſame. Beſides which, ſuch inviſible ſpirits, as angels or dæmons, may ſometimes predict alſo what themſelves cauſe and effect.

Secondly, There is another ſort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural preſaging faculty of any ſuch created ſpirits, but only to the ſupernatural preſcience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely diſtant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate cauſes actually in being, which alſo depend upon many circumſtances, and a long ſeries of things, any one of which being otherwiſe would alter the caſe; as likewiſe upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always neceſſarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often looſe and free; and upon that contingency, that ariſes from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Laſtly, ſuch things as do not at all depend upon external circumſtances neither, nor are cauſed by things natural anteceding, but by ſome ſupernatural power; I ſay, when ſuch future events as theſe are foretold, and accordingly come to paſs, this can be aſcribed to no other but ſuch a Being as comprehends, ſways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniſcient. *Epicurus*, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, becauſe he denied providence; yet did he pretend this further reaſon alſo againſt it, becauſe it was a thing abſolutely inconſiſtent with liberty of will, and deſtructive of the ſame; ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτικὴ, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤδη τὰ γινόμενα. *Divination is a thing, which hath no exiſtence, nor poſſibility in nature: and if there were ſuch a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power.* Thus alſo *Carneades*, in *Cicero*[1], maintained, *Ne Apollinem quidem futura poſſe dicere, niſi ea, quorum cauſas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri neceſſe eſſet. That* Apollo *himſelf was not able to foretel any future events, other than ſuch, as had neceſſary cauſes in nature antecedent.* And ſome Chriſtian Theiſts of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the ſame pretence, as being both inconſiſtent with men's liberty of will, and deſtructive thereof. For, ſay they, if men's actions be free, then are they unforeknowable, they having no neceſſary cauſes; and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being *ipſo facto* neceſſitated thereby. But as it is certain, that preſcience does not deſtroy the liberty of man's will, or impoſe any neceſſity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, becauſe they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, becauſe future; and were a thing never ſo contingent, yet upon ſuppoſition that it will be done, it muſt needs have been future from all eternity: ſo is it extreme arrogance for men, becauſe themſelves can naturally foreknow nothing, but by ſome cauſes antecedent, as an eclipſe of the ſun or moon, therefore to preſume to meaſure the knowledge of God Almighty according

[*Diog. Laert. in V. Epic.* Lib. X Segm. 135. p. 660.]

[1] De Fato, Cap. XIV. p. 3281. Tom. IX. Oper.

according to the ſame ſcantling, and to deny him the preſcience of human actions, not conſidering, that, as his nature is incomprehenſible, ſo his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as ſuch too; that which is *paſt our finding out*, and *too wonderful for us*. However, it muſt be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itſelf, foreknow any future events, otherwiſe than in and by their cauſes anteceding. If therefore we ſhall find, that there have been predictions of ſuch future events as had no neceſſary antecedent cauſes; as we cannot but grant ſuch things therefore to be foreknowable, ſo muſt we needs from thence infer the exiſtence of a God, that is, a Being ſupernatural, infinitely perfect and omniſcient, ſince ſuch predictions as theſe could have proceeded from no other cauſe.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the perſuaſion of the generality of mankind. Thus *Cicero*, *Vetus opinio eſt, jam uſque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque &* *De Div. l. 1.* *populi Romani, & omnium Gentium firmata conſenſu, verſari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci* μαντικὴν *appellant, id eſt, præſenſionem & ſcientiam rerum futurarum. This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroick times* (or the mythical age) *and not only entertained amongſt the Romans, but alſo confirmed by the conſent of all nations, that there is ſuch a thing as divination, and preſenſion or foreknowledge of future events.* And the ſame writer elſewhere, in the perſon of *Balbus*; *Quamvis nihil tàm irri-* *De N.D. l. 2. p. 239. Lamb.* [Cap. LXV. p. 3046. Tom. IX. Oper.] *det* Epicurus, *quàm prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maximè confirmare, Deorum providentia conſuli rebus humanis. Eſt enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cùm in privatis tùm maximè in publicis. Multa cernunt aruſpices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa ſomniis, multa portentis. Although* Epicurus *deride nothing more, than the prediction of future things; yet does this ſeem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, becauſe there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but eſpecially publick. Soothſayers foreſee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents.* And indeed that there were even amongſt the Pagans predictions of future events, not diſcoverable by any human ſagacity, which accordingly came to paſs, and therefore argue a knowledge ſuperiour to that of men, or that there are certain inviſible underſtanding beings or ſpirits, ſeems to be undeniable from hiſtory. And that the augurs themſelves were ſometimes not unaſſiſted by theſe officious genii, is plain from that of *Attius Navius* before mentioned, as the circumſtances thereof are related by hiſtorians; that *Tarquinius Priſcus* having a mind to try what there was in this ſkill of augury [1], *Dixit ei ſe cogitare quiddam; id poſſétne fieri, conſuluit. Ille augurio acto, poſſe reſpondet.* Tarquinius *autem dixit ſe cogitaſſe cotem novaculâ poſſe præcidi; tum Attium juſſiſſe experiri: ita cotem in comitium illatam, inſpectante & rege & populo, novaculâ eſſe diſciſſam; Told* Navius, *that he thought of ſomething, and he would know*

[1] Cicero de Divinat. Lib. II. Cap. XVII. p. 3129. Tom. IX. Oper.

know of him, whether it could be done or no. Navius *having performed his augurating ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon* Priſcus *declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetſtone might be cut in two with a razor.* Navius *willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetſtone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the ſight of the king and all the people divided with a razor.* But the predictions amongſt thoſe Pagans were, for the moſt part, only of the former kind, ſuch as proceeded merely from the natural preſaging faculty of theſe dæmons; this appearing from hence, becauſe their oracles were often expreſſed ambiguouſly, ſo as that they might be taken either way; thoſe dæmons themſelves, it ſeems, being then not confident of the event; as alſo, becauſe they were ſometimes plainly miſtaken in the events. And from hence it was, that they ſeldom ventured to foretel any events remotely diſtant, but only what were nigh at hand, and ſhortly to come to paſs; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being. Notwithſtanding which, we acknowledge, that there are ſome few inſtances of predictions amongſt the Pagans, of the other kind. Such as that intimated by *Cicero* in his book of Divination [1], where he declareth the doctrine of *Diodorus* concerning neceſſity and contingency; *Non neceſſe fuiſſe Cypſelum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id milleſimo antè anno Apollinis oraculo editum eſſet: That it was not neceſſary* Cypſelus *the tyrant ſhould reign at* Corinth, *though that were a thing predicted by* Apollo's *oracle a thouſand years before.* As alſo this recorded by *Varro* [2], of *Vectius Valens*, an augur in the time of *Romulus*, who when *Rome* was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures preſaged, that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which ſeems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred fifty and five, immediately after the death of the third *Valentinian* (whom ſome make to be the laſt real emperor of the Weſt or *Rome*) when *Genſericus* the Vandal took the city the ſecond time, and fired it. But above all, that of the Sibyls; of whoſe prophecies ſuch things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very ſuſpicious, that they did foretel the coming of our Saviour Chriſt, and the times of Chriſtianity. But were theſe, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then muſt they needs have had ſome higher original than the natural preſaging faculty of their dæmons, eſpecially thoſe of the Sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well aſſiſted ſupernaturally to predict our Saviour Chriſt, amongſt the Pagans in the Weſt, as *Balaam* was in the Eaſt.

But here the Scripture triumpheth over Paganiſm, and all its oracles and divinations; there being contained in it ſo many unqueſtionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and ſuch as can be imputed to nothing but the ſupernatural foreknowledge and omniſcience of God Almighty. As for example, thoſe concerning the Meſſiah, or our Saviour Chriſt, delivered by *Jacob*, *Moſes*, *David*, *Iſaias*, *Jeremy*, *Daniel*, and moſt of the prophets; foretelling ſundry particular circumſtances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans.

[1] It ſhould be, *De Fato*, Cap. vii. p. 3269. [2] In the Fragments of the XVIIIth Book of his *Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum.*

gans ſo general reception and entertainment of Chriſtianity; that is, the belief of the Meſſiah, promiſed to the Jews; together with the ſhaking off of their gods and idols. Amongſt which Scripture-Prophecies, concerning our Saviour Chriſt, we muſt needs reckon for one, and none of the leaſt conſiderable neither, that of *Daniel*'s weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by *Artaxerxes* the ſon of *Xerxes*, in the ſeventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of *Iſrael*, Prieſts and Levites, to *Jeruſalem*; and to terminate in the death of the Meſſiah, and the preaching of the goſpel to the Jews only: though we are not ignorant, how ſome learned men, both of the former and latter times, have ſtretched their wits, they ſometimes uſing no ſmall violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that theſe prophecies, concerning our Saviour Chriſt, could have no other original than the immediate ſupernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itſelf; it being ſuch as depended on no natural cauſes, much leſs upon thoſe conſtellations of the aſtrological Atheiſts [1], but only upon his own ſecret will and counſel.

But beſides theſe prophecies concerning our Saviour Chriſt, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and ſucceſſions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the riſe of the Perſian monarchy; of its fall and conqueſt by the Macedonian *Alexander*; of the quadripartite diviſion of this Greekiſh empire after *Alexander*'s death; of the ſucceſſion of the *Seleucidæ* and *Lagidæ*, a prophetick hiſtory, ſo agreeable with the events, that it was by *Porphyrius* [2] pretended to have been written after them; and laſtly, of the riſe and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithſtanding the endeavours of ſome, to pervert all thoſe Scripture-prophecies, that extend to the preſent times, it is clearly demonſtrable, that this was *Daniel*'s fourth ten-horned beaſt, or the legs and toes of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s ſtatue, that fourth empire, ſtrong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetick language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongſt whom was to ſtart up another *horn with eyes, ſpeaking great words againſt the Moſt High, and making war with the ſaints, and prevailing againſt them, for a time, times, and half a time.* Which prophecy of *Daniel*'s is the ground-work of St. *John*'s Apocalypſe, it being there further inſiſted upon, filled up, and enlarged, with the addition of ſeveral particulars; ſo that both *Daniel* and *John* have each of them, from their reſpective ages, ſet down a prophetick calendar of times, in a continued ſeries, (the former more compendiouſly and generally, the latter more copiouſly and particularly) to the very end of the world.

And thus do we ſee plainly, that the Scripture-prophecies evince a Deity; neither can theſe poſſibly be imputed by Atheiſts, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Chriſtianity alſo; partly as predicted by them in

[1] Cardan, &c. [2] Vide Hieronymum Comment. in Daniel. Tom. V. Oper. p. 481.

in its ſeveral circumſtances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles reception of it; and partly as itſelf predicting future events, this ſpirit of prophecy being the teſtimony of Jeſus. Both which Scripture-prophecies, of Chriſt in the Old Teſtament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater force to us in this preſent age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themſelves recorded in the Scripture; we having now certain knowledge our ſelves of many of thoſe events, and being no way able to ſuſpect, but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all theſe extraordinary phænomena of apparitions, witchcraft, poſſeſſions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that ſpirits, angels or dæmons, though inviſible to us, are no phancies, but real and ſubſtantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheiſtick hypotheſis: but ſome of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do alſo immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity; a Being ſuperiour to nature, which therefore can check and controul it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the moſt remotely diſtant, and contingent events.

And now have we not only fully anſwered and confuted all the atheiſtick pretences againſt the idea of God, tending to diſprove his exiſtence; but alſo occaſionally propoſed ſeveral ſolid and ſubſtantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all ſucceſſive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature abſolutely uncapable of an ante-eternity; and therefore, there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething elſe of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning: that no Atheiſt, according to his principles, can poſſibly give any account of the original of his own ſoul or mind: that the phænomenon of motion cannot be ſolved without an incorporeal principle, preſiding over the whole: that the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, *the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things*, together with the harmony of the whole, demonſtrate an underſtanding and intending cauſe of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Beſides, that there are ſeveral other phænomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheiſts being no way able to ſolve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, ſome of the ancient Theiſts have themſelves affirmed, that there could be no demonſtration of a God: which aſſertion of theirs hath been by others miſunderſtood into this ſenſe, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's exiſtence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or ſcience, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of thoſe ancient Theiſts, who denied that there could be any demonſtration of a God, was only this, That the exiſtence of a God could not be demonſtrated *à priori*, himſelf being the firſt cauſe of all things. Thus doth *Alexander Aphrodiſius*, in his *Phyſical Doubts and Solutions*, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Ariſtotelick principles, from motion, declare himſelf; ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, ὁ γὰρ διόντε τῆς πρότης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑςέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συςῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνε Φύσιν. *That this argument* L. 1. c. 2. [P. 2. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1536. fol.]

gument or proof of his was in way of analyſis only; it being not poſſible, that there ſhould be a demonſtration of the firſt Principle of all. Wherefore (ſaith he) *we muſt here fetch our beginning from things, that are after it, and manifeſt; and thence, by way of analyſis, aſcend to the proof of that firſt nature, which was before them.* And to the ſame purpoſe *Clemens Alexandrinus*, having firſt affirmed, ὡς δυσμεταχειρισ-όταλ© ὁ περὶ θεῦ λόγ©· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγμαλ© δυσεύρελ©, πάντως πᾳ ἡ πρώτη κ) πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικλ©, ἥτις κ) τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τῦ γενέσθαι, κ) γενομένοις εἶναι· *That God is the moſt difficult thing of all to be diſcourſed of; becauſe, ſince the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the firſt and moſt ancient Principle of all, which was the cauſe to all other things of their being made, muſt needs be the hardeſt of all to be declared or manifeſted*; he afterwards ſubjoins, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐπιſήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων κ) γνωριμωτέρων συνίſαται· τῦ δὲ ἀγενήτᾳ δὲν προϋπάρχει· *But neither can God be apprehended by any demonſtrative ſcience: for ſuch ſcience is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exiſt before that which is altogether unmade.* And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect Being, ſhould be thus demonſtrated by any thing before him as his cauſe. Nevertheleſs it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the exiſtence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonſtrated *à priori*, or from antecedent neceſſary cauſes: as for example, that there was ſomething eternal of itſelf, without beginning, is not at all demonſtrable by any antecedent cauſe, it being contradictious to ſuch a thing to have a cauſe. Nevertheleſs upon ſuppoſition only, that ſomething doth exiſt, which no man can poſſibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but alſo certain knowledge, from the neceſſity of irrefragable reaſon, that there was never nothing, but ſomething or other did always exiſt from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the exiſtence of a God or perfect Being cannot be demonſtrated *à priori*, yet may we notwithſtanding, from our very ſelves (whoſe exiſtence we cannot doubt of) and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwiſe conſequent from him, by undeniable principles of reaſon, neceſſarily infer his exiſtence. And whenſoever any thing is thus neceſſarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonſtration, though not of the διότι, yet of the ὅτι of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonſtrations are no other.

Strom. l. 5. p. 388. [Cap. XII. p. 695. Edit. Potteri.]

It hath been aſſerted by a late eminent philoſopher [1], that there is no poſſible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the exiſtence of a God eſſentially good; becauſe we can never otherwiſe free our minds from the importunity of that ſuſpicion, which with irreſiſtible force may aſſault them; that ourſelves might poſſibly be ſo made, either by chance, or fate, or by the pleaſure of ſome evil dæmon, or at leaſt of an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as that we ſhould be deceived in all our moſt clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themſelves, and even in our common

[1] Des Cartes. *See his* Meditat. Metaphyſ. IV. p. 25. and V. p. 31.

common notions. But when we are once aſſured of the exiſtence of ſuch a God as is eſſentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this ſuſpicion utterly vaniſh, and ourſelves become certain, that our faculties of reaſon and underſtanding are not falſe and impoſturous, but rightly made. From which hypotheſis it plainly follows, that all thoſe Theiſts, who ſuppoſe God to be a meer arbitrary being, whoſe will is not determined by any nature of goodneſs or rule of juſtice, but itſelf is the firſt rule of both (they thinking this to be the higheſt perfection, liberty, and power) can never be reaſonably certain of the truth of any thing, not ſo much as that two and two are four; becauſe, ſo long as they adhere to that perſuaſion, they can never be aſſured, but that ſuch an arbitrary omnipotent Deity might deſignedly make them ſuch, as ſhould be deceived in all their cleareſt perceptions.

Now though there be a plauſibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God eſſentially good ſo neceſſary a præcognitum to all other ſcience, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very ſuppoſition, that our underſtanding faculties might poſſibly be ſo made, as to deceive us in all our cleareſt perceptions, (whereſoever it is admitted) render it utterly impoſſible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the exiſtence of a God eſſentially good; foraſmuch as this cannot be any otherwiſe proved, than by the uſe of our faculties of underſtanding, reaſon, and diſcourſe. For to ſay, that the truth of our underſtanding faculties is put out of all doubt and queſtion, as ſoon as ever we are aſſured of the exiſtence of a God eſſentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilſt this exiſtence of a God is in the mean time itſelf no otherwiſe proved, than by our underſtanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's exiſtence from our faculties of reaſon and underſtanding, and again to prove the truth of thoſe faculties from the exiſtence of a God eſſentially good: this, I ſay, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a groſs overſight, which the forementioned philoſopher ſeems plainly guilty of.

Wherefore, according to this hypotheſis, we are of neceſſity condemned to eternal ſcepticiſm, both concerning the exiſtence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonſtrations for the ſame, we muſt at length gratify the Atheiſts with this confeſſion in the concluſion, that it is poſſible notwithſtanding there may be none; and alſo concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is ſuppoſed to depend upon the certainty of the exiſtence of ſuch a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the exiſtence of a God, we muſt of neceſſity explode this new ſceptical hypotheſis of the poſſibility of our underſtandings being ſo made, as to deceive us in all our cleareſt perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to uſe our utmoſt endeavour to remove the ſame. In the

firſt place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great ſoever, and therefore not omnipotence itſelf, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or falſe, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falſhood, or to make them nothing but words, without any ſignification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing, which cannot be arbitrarily *made*, but *is*. The divine will and omnipotence itſelf (now ſuppoſed by us) hath no imperium upon the divine underſtanding; for if God underſtood only by will, he would not underſtand at all. In the next place we add, that though the truth of ſingular contingent propoſitions depends upon the things themſelves exiſting without, as the meaſure and archetype thereof; yet, as to the univerſal and abſtract theorems of ſcience, the terms whereof are thoſe reaſons of things, which exiſt no where but only in the mind itſelf (whoſe noemata and ideas they are) the meaſure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but muſt be native and domeſtick to it, or contained within the mind itſelf, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and diſtinct perception. In theſe intelligible ideas of the mind, whatſoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and diſtinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a non-entity or falſhood. Nay, the very eſſence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or diſtinct perception of falſhood: which muſt be acknowledged by all thoſe, who, though granting falſe opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no falſe knowledge. For the knowledge of theſe univerſal abſtract truths is nothing but the clear and diſtinct perception of the ſeveral ideas of the mind, and their neceſſary relations to one another: wherefore, to ſay, that there can be no falſe knowledge, is all one as to ſay, that there can be no clear and diſtinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind falſe. In falſe opinions, the perception of the underſtanding power itſelf is not falſe, but only obſcure. It is not the underſtanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourſelves, who err, when we raſhly and unwarily aſſent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upſhot of all is this, that ſince no power, how great ſoever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and ſince the eſſence of truth in univerſal abſtract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that omnipotence cannot make any thing, that is falſe, to be clearly perceived to be, or create ſuch minds and underſtanding faculties, as ſhall have as clear conceptions of falſhoods, that is, of non-entities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational underſtanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cauſe and what an effect, could poſſibly be ſo made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cauſe, or the like. Wherefore, we may preſume with reverence to ſay, that there could not poſſibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon, or in ſome other planet, or elſewhere, that ſhould clearly and diſtinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been ſo made, as that we ſhould have as clear conceptions of falſhoods as of truths. Mind or underſtanding faculties

ties in creatures may be made more or leſs weak, imperfect, and obſcure, but they could not be made falſe, or ſuch as ſhould have clear and diſtinct conceptions of that which is not, becauſe every clear perception is an entity; and though omnipotence can make ſomething out of nothing, yet can it not make ſomething to be nothing, nor nothing ſomething. All which is no more, than is generally acknowledged by theologers, when they affirm, that God Almighty himſelf cannot do things contradictious; there being no other reaſon for this aſſertion, but only this, becauſe contradictiouſneſs is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the meaſure of all power, even omnipotence, or infinite power itſelf, being determined thereby; from whence it follows, that power hath no dominion over underſtanding, truth, and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatſoever to be clearly conceivable. For could it make contradictious things clearly conceivable, then would itſelf be able to do them; becauſe whatſoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unqueſtionably be done by infinite power.

It is true indeed, that ſenſe, conſidered alone by itſelf, doth not reach to the abſoluteneſs either of the natures, or of the exiſtence of things without us, it being, as ſuch, nothing but ſeeming, appearance, and phancy. And thus is that ſaying of ſome ancient philoſophers to be underſtood, that πᾶσα φαντασία ἀληθὴς, *every phantaſy is true*; namely, becauſe ſenſe and phancy reach not to the abſolute truth and falſhood of things, but contain themſelves only within ſeeming and appearance; and every appearance muſt needs be a true appearance. Notwithſtanding which, it is certain, that ſenſe often repreſents to us corporeal things otherwiſe than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falſity. Wherefore ſenſe in the nature of it is not abſolute, but πρὸς τὶ, or τινὶ, relative to the ſentients. And by ſenſe alone, without any mixture of reaſon or underſtanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they ſo ſeem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomick philoſophers in *Plato*, ἢ σὺ διισχυρίζαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ. *Neither you nor any man elſe can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very ſame phantaſms of colours, that himſelf hath.* Now were there no other perception in us, but that of ſenſe, (as the old atheiſtick philoſophers concluded knowledge to be ſenſe) then would all our human perceptions be merely ſeeming, phantaſtical and relative; and none of them reach to the abſolute truth of things. Every one in *Protagoras*[1] his language would then τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, *think or opine only his own things*; all his truths being private and relative to himſelf. And that Protagorean aphoriſm were to be admitted alſo in the ſenſe of that philoſopher, that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, *Every man is the meaſure of all things to himſelf*; *and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's*, but τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ, *That which ſeemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it ſeemed*; all truth and perception being but ſeeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt underſtanding, or knowledge, and ſenſe; that whereas the latter is *Theæt. p.* 154. [p. 119. Edit. Ficini.]

[1] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118.

phantaſtical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond phancy and appearance to the abſoluteneſs of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatſoever is clearly and diſtinctly perceived in things abſtract and univerſal, by any one rational Being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himſelf only that perceived it; but it is, as ſome Stoicks have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν, *a publick, catholick, and univerſal truth:* it obtains every where, and, as *Empedocles* ſang of natural juſtice,

[1] ——————— Διὰ τ' εὐρομέδοντ@
Αἰθερ@ ἠεκέως τέταλαι, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτε αὐγῆς·

It is extended throughout the vaſt æther, and through infinite light or ſpace. And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable, that omnipotence itſelf could create any ſuch underſtanding beings, as could have clear and diſtinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictious. But in all probability, becauſe ſenſe is indeed but ſeeming, phantaſtical, and relative, this is the reaſon, that ſome have been ſo prone and inclinable to ſuſpect the like of underſtanding, and all mental perception too, that this alſo is but ſeeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or underſtandings might have been ſo made, by an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as clearly and diſtinctly to perceive every thing that is falſe. But, if notwithſtanding all that hath been ſaid, any will ſtill ſing over the old ſong again; that all this, which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether theſe be true or no, no man can ever be certain: we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-ſtiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only ſenſe, but alſo reaſon and underſtanding, and all human perception is meerly ſeeming, or phantaſtical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the abſoluteneſs of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itſelf.

Nevertheleſs, it will probably be here further objected; that this is too great an arrogance, for created Beings to pretend to an abſolute certainty of any thing, it being the ſole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore ſtyled in Scripture, ὁ μόν@ σοφὸς, *the only wiſe*; to which we briefly anſwer, that the Deity is the firſt original fountain of truth and wiſdom, which is ſaid to be the brightneſs of the everlaſting light, the unſpotted mirrour of the power of God, and the image of his goodneſs. The divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created Beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their underſtandings being obſcure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it ſeems to be no derogation from Almighty God to ſuppoſe, that created minds by a participation of the divine mind,

[1] Apud Ariſtot. Rhetoric. Lib. I. Cap. XIII. p. 737. Tom. III. Oper.

mind, ſhould be able to know certainly, that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals; that a whole is greater than the part; and the cauſe before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cauſe; and ſuch like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed were rational creatures never able to be certain of any ſuch thing as this at all; what would their life be but a meer dream or ſhadow? and themſelves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of phantaſtick vanity? Beſides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty ſhould make rational creatures, ſo as to be in an utter impoſſibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own exiſtence; or of having more than an hypothetical aſſurance thereof, *if our faculties be true*, (which poſſibly may be otherwiſe) then is there a God. We ſhall conclude this diſcourſe againſt the Carteſian ſcepticiſm with that of *Origen*'s, Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπιστήμη, *Knowledge is the only thing in the world, which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm*; they having here ſomething of certainty, but no where elſe.

Wherefore we having now that, which *Archimedes* required, ſome firm ground and footing to ſtand upon, ſuch a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot poſſibly be falſe; without which, nothing at all could be proved by reaſon: we ſhall in the next place endeavour, not to ſhake or diſſettle any thing thereby, (which was the undertaking of that geometrician) but to confirm and eſtabliſh the truth of God's exiſtence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended againſt all the aſſaults of Atheiſts.

It is well known, that *Carteſius*[r] hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he diſpatches the buſineſs briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect Being, includeth neceſſary exiſtence in his very idea; and therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had been before uſed by ſome ſcholaſticks, affirmeth it to be as good a demonſtration for the exiſtence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheleſs it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved ſo fortunate and ſucceſsful, there being many, who cannot be made ſenſible of any efficacy therein, and not a few, who condemn it for a meer ſophiſm. As for ourſelves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments *pro Deo*; nor yet would we be thought to lay ſtreſs, in this cauſe, upon any thing which is not every way ſolid and ſubſtantial. Wherefore we ſhall here endeavour to ſet down the utmoſt that poſſibly we can, both againſt this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgement concerning the ſame.

Againſt it in this manner; firſt, becauſe we can frame an idea in our own

[r] Vide Principia ejus Philoſophiæ Part I. §. XIII. p. 4. & Meditat. Metaphyſic. V. p. 31. & aliàs.

own minds, of an abſolutely perfect Being, including neceſſary exiſtence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is ſuch a perfect Being really exiſting without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect Being ſeems to be this, that if it contain nothing, which is contradictious to it, then it is not impoſſible, but that there might be ſuch a Being actually exiſting. But the ſtrength of this argument not lying meerly in this, that becauſe we have an idea of a perfect Being, therefore it is; but becauſe we have ſuch an idea of it, as includeth neceſſary exiſtence in it, which the idea of nothing elſe beſides doth; therefore may it be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect Being doth include neceſſary exiſtence in it, becauſe that cannot be every way perfect, whoſe exiſtence is not neceſſary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is ſuch a perfect Being actually exiſting; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatſoever hath no neceſſary and eternal exiſtence, is no abſolutely perfect Being. And again, that if there be any abſolutely perfect Being, then was its exiſtence always neceſſary, and will be always ſuch; that is, it did both exiſt of itſelf, from all eternity, without beginning, and muſt needs exiſt to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to ceaſe to be. It ſeems indeed no more to follow, that becauſe a perfect Being includes neceſſary exiſtence in its idea, therefore there is ſuch a perfect Being actually exiſting; than becauſe a perfect Being includes neceſſary omniſcience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is ſuch a perfect omniſcient and omnipotent Being: all that follows in both caſes, being only this; that if there be any Being abſolutely perfect, then it is both omniſcient and omnipotent, and it did exiſt of itſelf neceſſarily, and can never ceaſe to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the neceſſity of exiſtence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a ſuppoſition of a perfect Being, the concluſion is made concerning it abſolutely. As ſome would prove the neceſſity of all human events, as for example of *Adam*'s ſinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either *Adam* would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and neceſſarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either neceſſarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an abſolute neceſſity is wrongly inferred in the concluſion from an hypothetical one in the premiſſes. In like manner, when upon ſuppoſition of an abſolutely perfect Being, it is affirmed of it, that its exiſtence muſt not be contingent, but neceſſary, and from thence the concluſion is made abſolutely, that there is ſuch a perfect Being; this ſeems to be the very ſame fallacy. From the idea of a perfect Being including neceſſary exiſtence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing abſolutely perfect, it muſt exiſt neceſſarily, and not contingently: but it doth

doth not follow, that there muſt of neceſſity be ſuch a perfect Being exiſting; theſe two propoſitions carrying a very different ſenſe from one another. And the latter of them, that there muſt of neceſſity be a God, or perfect Being exiſting, ſeems to be a thing altogether indemonſtrable, it implying, that the exiſtence of God, or a perfect Being, may be proved *à priori*, or from ſome antecedent neceſſary cauſe; which was before declared to be a thing contradictious and impoſſible.

And now in juſtice are we obliged to plead the beſt we can alſo on the defenſive ſide. Thus therefore, the idea of God, or an abſolutely perfect Being, including in it, not an impoſſible, nor a contingent, but a neceſſary ſcheſis, or relation to exiſtence, it follows from thence abſolutely, and without any *ifs* and *ands*, that he doth exiſt. For as of things contradictious, having therefore in the idea of them an impoſſible ſcheſis to exiſtence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictious or impoſſible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent ſcheſis to exiſtence, we can pronounce alſo, that poſſibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect Being including in the idea of it a neceſſary ſcheſis to exiſtence, or an impoſſible one to non-exiſtence, or containing exiſtence in its very eſſence; we may by parity of reaſon conclude concerning it, that it is neither impoſſible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be; but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impoſſible it ſhould not be. And indeed when we ſay of imperfect Beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may poſſibly either be, or not be, we herein tacitly ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a perfect Being, becauſe nothing, which is not, could be poſſible to be, were there not ſomething actually in being, that hath ſufficient power to cauſe or produce it. True indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but theſe are only ſuch as include no neceſſary, but contingent exiſtence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow, that a perfect Being, which includes neceſſity of exiſtence in its idea, may, notwithſtanding, not be. Wherefore this neceſſity of exiſtence, or impoſſibility of non-exiſtence, contained in the idea of a perfect being, muſt not be taken hypothetically only or conſequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing abſolutely perfect, then its exiſtence both was, and will be neceſſary; but abſolutely, that though contradictious things cannot poſſibly be, and things imperfect may poſſibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect Being cannot but be; or it is impoſſible that it ſhould not be. For otherwiſe were the force of the argumentation meerly hypothetical, in this manner; If there be a perfect Being, then its exiſtence both was, and will be neceſſary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect Being, notwithſtanding that neceſſity of exiſtence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to exiſtence; which is a manifeſt contradiction, that the ſame thing ſhould exiſt both contingently and neceſſarily. And this hypothetical abſurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expreſſed in other words, as that neceſſity of exiſtence, and impoſſibility of non-exiſtence, and actual exiſtence, belong to the very eſſence of a perfect Being; ſince it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there

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be a perfect Being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical propoſition is true of every thing elſe, but abſurd. Wherefore there is ſomething more to be inferred from the neceſſity of exiſtence included in the idea of a perfect Being than ſo; which can be nothing elſe but this, that it abſolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theiſts can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect Being (ſuppoſed by them to exiſt) might not happen by chance only to be; if from the neceſſity of exiſtence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithſtanding which, here is no endeavour, (as is pretended) to prove the exiſtence of a God, or perfect Being, *à priori* neither, or from any neceſſary cauſe antecedent; but only from that neceſſity, which is included within itſelf, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the neceſſity of its own perfect nature. And now we ſhall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Carteſian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including neceſſity of exiſtence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be meerly ſophiſtical, or hath ſomething of ſolidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheiſts will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to ſay, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in diſpute, and a meer begging of the queſtion; that therefore God is, becauſe he is, or cannot but be.

Wherefore we ſhall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonſtration, for the exiſtence of a God, from his idea, as including neceſſary exiſtence in it, ſome other ways. And firſt, we ſhall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, becauſe we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore ſuch a thing really exiſteth; yet nevertheleſs, whatſoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that ſuch a thing was not impoſſible to be; there being nothing to us impoſſible, but what is contradictious and repugnant to conception. Now, the idea of God, or a perfect Being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it, becauſe it is only the idea of ſuch a thing; as hath all poſſible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections, which are neither contradictious in themſelves, nor to one another. And they, who will not allow of this conſequence, from the idea of a perfect Being, including neceſſity of exiſtence in it, that it doth therefore actually exiſt, yet cannot deny, but that this at leaſt will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing poſſible, or not impoſſible to be. For thus much being true of all other contingent things, whoſe idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore poſſible; it muſt needs be granted of that, whoſe very idea and eſſence containeth a neceſſity of exiſtence in it, as the eſſence of nothing elſe but a perfect Being doth. And this is the firſt ſtep, that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect Being, having nothing contradictious in it, that therefore God is at leaſt poſſible, or no way impoſſible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that, which is poſſible, includeth neceſſity of exiſtence in it; from theſe two things put together at leaſt, the poſſibility of ſuch a Being, and its neceſſary exiſtence

iſtence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reaſon follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect Being, in whoſe eſſence is contained neceſſary exiſtence, be poſſible, or no way impoſſible to have been; then he is: becauſe upon ſuppoſition of his non-exiſtence, it would be abſolutely impoſſible, that he ſhould ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect Beings, that are contingently poſſible, that if they be not, it was therefore impoſſible for them ever to have been; for that, which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it, for all that, poſſibly have been. But a perfect neceſſarily exiſtent Being, upon the bare ſuppoſition of its non-exiſtence, could no more poſſibly have been, than it could poſſibly hereafter be; becauſe, if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a neceſſary exiſtent Being. The ſum of all is this, a neceſſary exiſtent Being, if it be poſſible, it is; becauſe, upon ſuppoſition of its non-exiſtence, it would be impoſſible for it ever to have been. Wherefore God is either impoſſible to have been, or elſe he is. For if God were poſſible, and yet be not, then is he not a neceſſary, but contingent Being; which is contrary to the hypotheſis.

But becauſe this argumentation may perhaps run the ſame fate alſo with the former, and, by reaſon of its ſubtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted ſophiſtical too; men being generally prone to diſtruſt the firmneſs and ſolidity of ſuch thin and ſubtle cobwebs, (as theſe and the like may ſeem to be) or their ability to ſupport the weight of ſo great a truth; and to ſuſpect themſelves to be illaqueated and circumvented in them: therefore ſhall we lay no ſtreſs upon this neither, but proceed to ſomething, which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatſoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or elſe if it be not, it is poſſible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not poſſible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reaſon and neceſſity of the minor is evident; becauſe, if God be not, and yet poſſible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and neceſſarily exiſtent Being, which is contradictious to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect Being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, becauſe there can be no poſitive conception of an abſolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor poſſible exiſtence. Here the poſture of the argument is only inverted; becauſe we have an idea of God, or a perfect Being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore muſt it needs have ſome kind of entity or other, either an actual or poſſible one; but God, if he be not, is not poſſible to be, therefore he doth actually exiſt.

But perhaps this argumentation alſo, how firm and ſolid ſoever, may prove leſs convictive of the exiſtence of a God to the generality; becauſe whatever is received, is received according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonſtration be never ſo good in itſelf, yet is it more or leſs ſuch

to particular perſons, according to their ability to comprehend it; therefore ſhall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonſtration for a God from the idea of him, including neceſſary exiſtence in it: it being firſt premiſed, that unqueſtionably ſomething or other did exiſt from all eternity, without beginning. For it is certain, that every thing could not be made, becauſe nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itſelf; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always ſomething, and conſequently, that there was ſomething unmade, which exiſted of itſelf from all eternity. Now all the queſtion is, and indeed this is the only queſtion betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts; ſince ſomething did certainly exiſt of itſelf from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect Being? We ſay therefore, that whatſoever exiſted of itſelf from eternity, and without beginning, did ſo exiſt naturally and neceſſarily, or by the neceſſity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exiſt of itſelf from eternity, naturally and neceſſarily, but that, which containeth neceſſary and eternal ſelf-exiſtence in its own nature. But there is nothing, which containeth neceſſary eternal exiſtence in its own nature or eſſence, but only an abſolutely perfect Being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently poſſible, either to be, or not be. Wherefore ſince ſomething or other muſt and doth exiſt of itſelf naturally and neceſſarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this, but what included neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence in its nature or eſſence; it is certain, that it was a perfect Being, or God, who did exiſt of himſelf from eternity, and nothing elſe; all other imperfect things, which have no neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence in their nature, deriving their Being from him. Here therefore are the Atheiſts infinitely abſurd and unreaſonable, when they will not acknowledge that, which containeth independent ſelf-exiſtence, or neceſſity of exiſtence (which indeed is the ſame with an impoſſibility of non-exiſtence) in its nature and eſſence, that is, a perfect Being, ſo much as to exiſt at all; and yet in the mean time aſſert that, which hath no neceſſity of exiſtence in its nature, the moſt imperfect of all Beings, inanimate body and matter, to have exiſted of itſelf neceſſarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary ſucceſſive Being, (whoſe duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew) and therefore neither our own ſouls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could poſſibly have exiſted from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but muſt have had a beginning, and been cauſed by ſomething elſe; namely, by an abſolutely perfect Being, whoſe duration therefore is permanent, and without any ſucceſſive generation, or flux.

But beſides all theſe arguments, we may otherwiſe from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to ſtate the controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts, and ſatisfactorily to decide the ſame. In order whereunto,

unto, there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made, and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning, (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade,) here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that, which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect Being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as *Aristotle* affirmeth of those ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles, οἷον Φερεκύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γενναῖζαν πρῶτον τὸ Ἄριστον τιθέασι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι· καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας; *As namely*, Pherecydes, *and the Magi*, *and* Empedocles *and* Anaxagoras, *and many others*; *that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best, and most perfect.* Where by the way we may observe also, that, according to *Aristotle*, the ancient Magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect Being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all. This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect Being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect Beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter or inanimate body. But the atheistick hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent Being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections, that are in the world, to have climbed up, or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason from that, which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans, a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless Matter, Night and Chaos; and therefore doubtless to be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in *Aristotle* to be understood, βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν ἁ τὰς πρώτας οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, ἢ Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὠκεανὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία. *They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but* Jupiter *(or God) to rule and govern all.* Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to *Jupiter*, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending, that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to *Jupiter* himself, the mundane Soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended

Met. l. 12. *c.* 5. [Cap. IV. p. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. l. 12. *c.* 4. [P. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. l. 12. *c.* 5. *Du Vall.* [P. 448. Tom. IV. Oper.] by *Ariſtotle* in theſe words; οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴτις παρεικάζει τὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων δὲ ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον. *Nor would he think rightly, who ſhould reſemble the principle of the univerſe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as ſeeds) do always ariſe the more perfect. For even here alſo is the caſe otherwiſe than they ſuppoſe; for it is a man, that generates a man; nor is the ſeed the firſt.*

The controverſy being thus clearly ſtated betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts, it may now with great eaſe, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced, and unprepoſſeſſed with falſe principles, be determined; it being, on the one hand, undeniably evident, that leſſer perfections may naturally deſcend from greater, or at leaſt from that, which is abſolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all: but, on the other hand, utterly impoſſible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, ſhould riſe and aſcend out of leſſer and lower, ſo as that, which is the moſt abſolutely imperfect of all things, ſhould be the firſt fountain and original of all; ſince no effect can poſſibly tranſcend the power of its cauſe. Wherefore it is certain, that in the univerſe things did not thus aſcend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary, deſcend and ſlide down from higher to lower: ſo that the firſt original of all things was not the moſt imperfect, but the moſt perfect Being. But to ſpeak more particularly; it is certain, notwithſtanding all the vain pretences of *Lucretius*, and other Atheiſts, or Semi-Atheiſts, to the contrary, that life and ſenſe could never poſſibly ſpring out of dead and ſenſleſs matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms, (no compoſition of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation) or in the way of qualities, ſince life and perception can no more reſult from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moiſt and dry, *&c.* than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonſtrable from that very principle of reaſon, which the Atheiſts are ſo fond of, but miſunderſtanding abuſe, (as ſhall be manifeſted afterward) that nothing can come from nothing. Much leſs could underſtanding and reaſon in men ever have emerged out of ſtupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we muſt needs here freely declare againſt the darkneſs of that philoſophy, which hath been ſometimes unwarily entertained by ſuch as were no Atheiſts, that ſenſe may riſe from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and ſenſleſs matter; as alſo that underſtanding and reaſon may reſult from ſenſe: the plain conſequence of both which is, that ſenſeleſs matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtleſs, a main piece of the philoſophy of the kingdom of darkneſs. But this darkneſs hath been of late in great meaſure diſpelled by the light of the atomick philoſophy, reſtored, as it was in its firſt genuine and virgin ſtate, undeflower'd as yet by Atheiſts; this clearly ſhowing, how far body and mechaniſm can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the firſt chapter, that *Nothing can come from nothing.* And *Strato* and

and the hylozoick Atheiſts were ſo well aware, and ſo ſenſible of this, that all life and underſtanding could not poſſibly be generated or made, but that there muſt be ſome fundamental and ſubſtantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought neceſſary to attribute life, and perception (or underſtanding) with appetite, and ſelf-moving power, to all matter as ſuch, that ſo it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more monſtrous, ſo ſhall we elſewhere evince the impoſſibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument propoſed is a ſufficient demonſtration of the impoſſibility of atheiſm; which will be further manifeſted in our anſwer to the ſecond atheiſtick objection againſt a divine creation, becauſe nothing can come from nothing.

But this controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts may be yet more particularly ſtated from the idea of God, as including mind or underſtanding in it eſſentially, *viz.* Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or elſe, Whether all mind were itſelf made or generated, and that out of ſenſeleſs matter? For, according to the doctrine of the Pagan Theiſts, mind was πρεσγενέσταλος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν, *the oldeſt of all things, ſenior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all.* But, according to thoſe Atheiſts, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and underſtanding, to be the firſt principle, mind muſt be ὑστερογενὴς, *a poſt-nate thing*, younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.

And the controverſy, as thus ſtated, may be alſo clearly and ſatisfactorily decided. For firſt, we ſay, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; ſo is it true likewiſe, that if once there had been no life in the whole univerſe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, underſtanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or underſtanding produced. Becauſe, to ſuppoſe life and underſtanding to riſe and ſpring up out of that which is altogether dead and ſenſeleſs, as its only original, is plainly to ſuppoſe ſomething to come out of nothing. It cannot be ſaid ſo of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never poſſibly have been; becauſe, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might theſe have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal being, which in itſelf eminently containeth all things. Dead and ſenſeleſs matter could never have created or generated mind and underſtanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, becauſe there is mind, we are certain, that there was ſome mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not becauſe there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now theſe imperfect minds of ours were by no means themſelves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent non-exiſtence brought forth into being; but ſince no mind could ſpring out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, and

and all minds could not poſſibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely; there muſt of neceſſity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence thoſe imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cauſe of all other things, as of human ſouls.

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we muſt needs take notice here, that the Atheiſts ſuppoſe no ſmall part of their ſtrength to lie in this very thing, namely, their diſproving a God from the nature of underſtanding and knowledge; nor do they indeed ſwagger in any thing more than this. We have already ſet it for the eleventh atheiſtick argument, that *knowledge being the information of the things themſelves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the paſſion of the conceiver; the world and all ſenſible things muſt needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cauſe.* Or more briefly thus: the world could not be made by knowledge and underſtanding, becauſe there could be no knowledge or underſtanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to theſe Atheiſts, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by *things* here ſuch only, as are ſenſible and corporeal. So that Mind and Underſtanding could not be the creator of the world and theſe ſenſible things, itſelf being the meer creature of them; a ſecondary, derivative reſult from them, or a phantaſtick image of them; the youngeſt and moſt creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to ſuppoſe mind and underſtanding to be the maker of all things would be no better ſenſe, than if one ſhould ſuppoſe the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the ſun, moon and ſtars, and other things repreſented in them. And upon ſuch a ground as this, does a modern writer preſume to determine, that knowledge and underſtanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, becauſe they imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without:

De Cive Rel. c. 15. Sect. 14. *Quoniam ſcientia & intellectus in nobis nihil aliud ſunt, quàm ſuſcitatus à rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non eſt putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim eſt potentiæ ab alio dependentis.* Which is again Engliſhed thus; *Knowledge and underſtanding being in us nothing elſe but a tumult in the mind, raiſed by external things, that preſs the organical parts of man's body; there is no ſuch thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things, which depend upon natural cauſes.* Where this writer thus denying knowledge and underſtanding to God, upon pretence, that it ſpeaks imperfection, and dependance upon external corporeal things, (it being nothing but a tumult raiſed by the motions and preſſures of them) he muſt needs abſolutely deny the firſt principle of all things to be any knowing underſtanding nature, unleſs he had aſſerted ſome other kind of knowledge diſtinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the ſame to God Almighty. Hitherto the ſenſe of Atheiſts.

Lev. cap. 31.

Now we ſhall, for the preſent, only ſo far forth concern ourſelves in confuting this atheiſtick doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for

for the demonſtration of the contrary, namely, the exiſtence of a God, or a Mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and underſtanding. Firſt, therefore it is a ſottiſh conceit of theſe Atheiſts, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only ſenſe, but alſo knowledge and underſtanding in men, is but a tumult, raiſed from corporeal things without, preſſing upon the organs of their body; or elſe, as they declare themſelves more diſtinctly, nothing but the activity of ſenſible objects upon them, and their paſſion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing, that ſuffered and reacted motion, eſpecially polite bodies, as looking-glaſſes, have ſomething both of ſenſe and of underſtanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and preſſure. Neither is ſenſe itſelf the meer paſſion of thoſe motions, but the perception of their paſſions in a way of phancy. But ſenſible things themſelves (as for example, light and colours) are not known or underſtood either by the paſſion, or the phancy of ſenſe, nor by any thing meerly foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itſelf, that is, by ſomething native and domeſtick to it: nothing being more true, than this of *Boetius* [1], that, *Omne, quod ſcitur, non ex ſua, ſed ex comprehendentium naturâ, vi, & facultate cognoſcitur*; *Whatſoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity of that thing itſelf, which knows or comprehends it.* Wherefore, beſides the phantaſms of ſingular bodies, or of ſenſible things exiſting without us, (which are not meer paſſions neither) it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and eſſences of things, which are univerſal, and by and under which it underſtands ſingulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheiſtick writer, that univerſals are nothing elſe but names, attributed to many ſingular bodies, becauſe whatſoever *is*, is ſingular. For though whatſoever exiſts without the mind be ſingular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively univerſal. Which univerſal objects of our mind, though they exiſt not as ſuch any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reaſon, becauſe they are conceivable; for ſince non-entity is not conceivable, whatſoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore ſomething. And as for axiomatical truths, in which ſomething is affirmed or denied, as theſe are not all paſſions from bodies without us, (for what local motions could impreſs this common notion upon our minds, that *things which agree in one third, agree amongſt themſelves*, or any other?) ſo neither are theſe things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated ſenſations; we clearly apprehending at once, that is is impoſſible they ſhould be otherwiſe. Thus *Ariſtotle* [2] ingeniouſly; ὐδὲ ἔπιστασθαι δὶ αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν, ὅτι κὴ εἰ ἦν αἰσθανεσθαι. ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, κὴ ὐχ ὡς φασὶ τινὲς ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλυ γνωρίζειν ἔστι. *It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the univerſal theorems of geometry) by ſenſe. For if we could perceive by ſenſe, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet ſhould*

[1] Vide Conſolat. Philoſoph. Lib. V. p. 131.

[2] Analytic. poſterior. Lib. I. p. 226.

ſhould we not reſt ſatisfied in this, as having therefore a ſufficient knowledge hereof; but would ſeek further after a demonſtration of it: ſenſe reaching only to ſingulars, but knowledge to univerſals. When from the univerſal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we ſee a plain neceſſity, that its three angles muſt be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this univerſal theorem, and not before: as alſo we underſtand, that every ſingular triangle, (ſo far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from ſingulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of aſcent from ſingulars to univerſals; but, on the contrary, having firſt found them in the univerſals, we afterwards deſcending, apply them to ſingulars: ſo that our knowledge here is not after ſingular bodies, and ſecondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now theſe univerſal conceptions, ſome of which are alſo abſtract, (as life, ſenſe, reaſon, knowledge, and the like) many of them are of ſuch things, whoſe ſingulars do not at all fall under ſenſe; which therefore could never poſſibly be impreſſed upon us from ſingular bodies by local motion: and again ſome ſuch, as though they belong to corporeal and ſenſible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by ſenſe, ſo neither did they ever exiſt in that matter of this lower world, which here encompaſſeth us, and therefore could not be ſtamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect ſtrait line, and a plain ſuperficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, ſphere, or cube; no material thing here amongſt us being terminated in ſo ſtrait lines, but that even by microſcopes there may be diſcovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly ſtrait lines, no ſuch triangles, circles, ſpheres, or cubes, as anſwer to the exactneſs of our conceptions, in any part of the whole material univerſe, nor never will be. Notwithſtanding which, they are not abſolute non-entities, ſince we can demonſtrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they poſſible to exiſt, ſince nothing can be conceived, but it either is, or elſe is poſſible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but alſo of things, which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only poſſible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of ſome things, that though they are not, yet they are poſſible to be; ſince nothing that is not, can be poſſible to be, unleſs there be ſomething actually in being, which hath ſufficient power to produce it; we do implicitely ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a God or omnipotent Being thereby, which can make whatſoever is conceivable, though it yet be not to exiſt; and therefore material triangles, circles, ſpheres, cubes, mathematically exact.

The reſult of what we have hitherto ſaid is this, that ſince ſingular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having alſo univerſal and abſtract ideas of the intelligible natures or eſſences of things; (ſome of which are ſuch, whoſe ſingulars do not

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at all fall under ſenſe; others, though they belong to bodies, yet ſenſe can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter;) moreover, ſince our mind can conceive of things, which no where actually exiſt, but are only poſſible, and can have ſuch a demonſtrative ſcience of univerſal truths, as ſenſe can never aſcend to: that therefore human knowledge and underſtanding itſelf is not the meer image and creature of ſingular bodies only; and ſo derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal univerſe, it is a thing independent upon ſingular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then poſſibly give of knowledge and underſtanding, their nature and original? ſince there muſt be Νοητὸν, *that which is intelligible*, in order of nature, before Νόησις, or *intellection?* Certainly no other than this, that the firſt original knowledge is that of a perfect being, infinitely good and powerful, comprehending itſelf, and the utmoſt extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the poſſibilities of all things; their ideas, with their ſeveral relations to one another; all neceſſary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all ſenſible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the ſame. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatſoever doth actually exiſt, but alſo of ſuch things, as never were, nor will be, but are only poſſible, or objects of divine power.

Wherefore, ſince it is certain, that even human knowledge and underſtanding itſelf is not a meer paſſion from ſenſible things, and ſingular bodies exiſting without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheiſtick argument, that *things made knowledge*, and *not knowledge things*) and conſequently it muſt needs have ſome other original: moreover, ſince knowledge and underſtanding apprehend things proleptically to their exiſtence, (mind being able to frame conceptions of all poſſible entities and modifications) and therefore in their nature do plainly ſuppoſe the actual exiſtence of a perfect being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful, and could produce all things poſſible or conceivable; the firſt original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an abſolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itſelf, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all poſſibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their neceſſary immutable truths; accordingly as wiſdom and underſtanding are deſcribed to be, ἄτμις τῆς τȣ̃ θεȣ̃ δυνάμεως, ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τȣ̃ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἔσοπτρον τῆς τȣ̃ θεȣ̃ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτȣ̃, *The breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirrour (or looking glaſs) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodneſs:* I ſay, the reſult of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and underſtanding is ſo far from being a ground of diſproving a Deity (as *Wiſd. c. 7.*

the Atheists ignorantly pretend) that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, *viz.* that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, *&c.* together with all geometrical theorems; as *Aristotle* himself declareth, he writing in his Ethicks[1] after this manner, περὶ ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. *Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no.* Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematicks, and concerning quantity, but also in ethicks concerning morality; there being here αἰώνια δίκαια, as *Justin Martyr* calls them, *things eternally just*, which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) *the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever*[2]. For of these is that famous passage of *Sophocles* in his *Antigona*[3],

Οὐ γάρ τι νῦνγε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πότε
Ζῇ ταῦτα, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came. No man can declare the time, when all common notions, and geometrical truths were first made and generated out of nothing, or brought out of antecedent non-existence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the *diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotheneuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides*, were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians, who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated; nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be. Now

[1] Ethicor. ad Nicomach. Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 39. Tom. III. Oper.

[2] Hebr. xiii. 8.

[3] Vers. 467. 468.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then muſt the *rationes rerum*, the *ſimple reaſons* of things alſo, or their intelligible natures and eſſences, out of which thoſe truths are compounded, be of neceſſity eternal likewiſe. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a ſquare is incommenſurable with the ſides, if the *rationes*, the *reaſons* of a ſquare, diameter, and ſides, or their intelligible eſſences, were not themſelves eternal? Theſe are therefore called by *Plato* (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philoſopher) not only ἀεὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, *things, which are always the ſame, and unchangeable*, but alſo, τὰ μὴ γινόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα, *things, which were never made, but always are*; and ſometimes, μήτε γινόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, *things, that were neither made, nor can be deſtroyed*; ſometimes, τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, *things ingenerable and incorruptible*. Of which *Cicero* thus [1], *Hæc* Plato *negat gigni, ſed ſemper eſſe, & ratione & intelligentiâ contineri. Theſe things* Plato *affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reaſon and underſtanding.* And, though perhaps it may ſeem ſtrange, even *Ariſtotle* [2] himſelf alſo, notwithſtanding his ſo often claſhing with *Plato*'s ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and ſpecies, or the univerſal intelligible eſſences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of ſcience, were eternal and never made. Thus in his Metaphyſicks, τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, *No man makes the form, or ſpecies of a thing, nor was it ever generated*; and again, τῆς ζφαίρας εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, *There is no generation of the eſſence of a ſphere*; and, ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἴδη, *The forms or ſpecies of things are without any generation or corruption.* And he ſometimes calleth theſe objects of ſcience ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν [3] or φύσιν, *an immutable eſſence or nature.* Laſtly, where he writeth againſt the Heracliticks, and thoſe other Scepticks, who denied all certainty of ſcience, he firſt diſcovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they ſuppoſed ſingular bodies, or ſenſibles exiſting without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge; [4] αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὑλῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐζήτουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει ——— ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, καλῶς τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθεύομεν, περὶ γὲ τὸ πάντως πάντα μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν· *The original of theſe men's miſtake was this, becauſe truth is to be look'd for in things, and they conceiv'd the only things to be ſenſibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of ſenſibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, ſince nothing can poſſibly be verified or conſtantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the ſame but changeable, concluded, that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of ſcience; thoſe things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the ſame.* And then he ſubjoins in way of oppoſition to this ſceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὐτὲ φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν. *We would have theſe men therefore to know, that there is another kind of eſſence of things, beſides that of ſenſibles, to which belongeth*

[1] De Oratore ad Brutum, Cap. III. p. 695. Tom. II Oper.

[2] Vide Metaphyſic. Lib. VII. Cap. VIII. p. 361. & Lib. XIV. Cap. III. p. 473. Tom. IV. Oper.

[3] Ibid. Lib. XIV. Cap. II. p. 472. & Cap. VI p. 477.

[4] Ibid. Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 313.

neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all. By which eſſences of things, that have no generation nor corruption, he could underſtand nothing elſe, but thoſe intelligible natures, ſpecies, and ideas, which are the ſtanding and immutable objects of ſcience. And certain it is, that there could be no conſtant and immutable ſcience at all, were there no other objects of the mind, but ſingulars and ſenſibles, becauſe theſe are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical ſcience are no ſingular and material triangles, ſquares, ſpheres, and cubes, *&c.* not only becauſe none of theſe are found mathematically exact, and becauſe geometricians, in all the ſeveral diſtant ages and places of the world, could not have the ſame ſingular bodies before them, but alſo becauſe they do none of them continue immutably the ſame; all corporeal things being more or leſs in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonſtrated, muſt be immutably and unalterably the ſame. The triangles and circles, ſpheres and cubes of *Euclid*, *Archimedes*, *Pappus*, *Apollonius*, and all other ancient and modern geometricians, in all the diſtant places and times of the world, were both indiviſibly one and the ſame, and alſo perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the ſcience of geometry being ſuch. For which cauſe it is affirmed alſo of theſe mathematical things, by the forementioned *Ariſtotle*, that they are no where as in a place, as all ſingular bodies are, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος· διὸ χωριστὰ τόπῳ· τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικὰ, ἀ πού. *It is abſurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as ſolid bodies are; for place belongeth only to ſingulars, which are therefore ſeparable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where.* Becauſe they being univerſal and abſtract, are only in minds: nevertheleſs, for the ſame reaſon are they alſo every where, they being in every mind, that apprehends them. Laſtly, theſe intelligible eſſences and ideas of things are called alſo by *Philo*[1], ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, *the moſt neceſſary eſſences*; as being not only eternal, but having likewiſe neceſſary exiſtence belonging to them: for though there be no abſolute neceſſity, that there ſhould be matter or body, yet is there an abſolute neceſſity that there ſhould be truth.

Met. l. 12. *c.* 5. [Pag. 448. Tom. IV. Oper.]

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and neceſſary exiſtence do belong to them; then muſt there be an eternal mind neceſſarily exiſting, ſince theſe truths and intelligible eſſences of things cannot poſſibly be any where but in a mind. For by the eſſences of things, when they are ſaid to be eternal, muſt not be meant their very ſubſtances, as if every thing were in itſelf eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation did only, as a modern writer abuſively expreſſeth it, *ſartoris inſtar, veſtire eſſentias rerum novâ exiſtentiâ, cloathe the antecedent eſſences of things with a new garment of exiſtence*; but only their *eſſe cognitum*, their *poſſible and intelligible natures*, as they were objects of infinite power and underſtanding, before they were made. There muſt be a mind ſenior to the world, and all ſenſible things, and ſuch as at once comprehends in it the ideas of all intelligibles, their neceſſary ſcheſes and relations to one another,

[1] Legis Allegor. Lib. I. p. 68. Oper.

ther, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not ὅτε μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ δ νοεῖν, (as *Ariſtotle*[1] writeth of it) ſometimes underſtand, and ſometimes not underſtand, as if it were ſometimes awake, and ſometimes aſleep, or like an eye, ſometimes open, and ſometimes ſhut; but ἀσία ἐνέργεια, ſuch a mind, as is eſſentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect Being, comprehending itſelf, and the extent of its own power, or how far itſelf is communicable, that is, all the poſſibilities of things, that may be made by it, and their reſpective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, ſuppoſing the actual exiſtence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful Being, as its Νοητὸν, or *intelligible*; it being nothing but the comprehenſion of the extent of infinite or divine power, and the meaſure of the ſame.

And from hence it is evident alſo, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one underſtanding Being ſelf-exiſtent; all other minds whatſoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, ſtamped with the impreſſion or ſignature of one and the ſame ſeal. From whence it cometh to paſs, that all minds, in the ſeveral places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indiviſibly the ſame. Truths are not multiply'd by the diverſity of minds, that apprehend them; becauſe they are all but ectypal participations of one and the ſame original or archetypal mind and truth. As the ſame face may be reflected in ſeveral glaſſes; and the image of the ſame ſun may be in a thouſand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the ſame voice may be in a thouſand ears liſtning to it: ſo when innumerable created minds have the ſame ideas of things, and underſtand the ſame truths, it is but one and the ſame eternal light, that is reflected in them all, (*that light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh in the world*;) or the ſame voice of that one everlaſting Word, that is never ſilent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by *Themiſtius*, that one man, by teaching, could not poſſibly beget in the mind of another the very ſame notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himſelf had in his own mind, εἰ μὴ ταυτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τῷ διδάζκοντι καὶ τῷ μανθάνοντι; *Were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and ſtamped alike.* As alſo that men could not poſſibly ſo confer together as they do, preſently apprehending one another's meaning, and raiſing up the very ſame ſenſes in their minds, and that meerly by occaſion of words and ſounds, εἰ μήτις ἦν Εἷς Νοῦς ᾧ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν, *Were there not ſome one mind, which all men did partake of.* As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many underſtanding beings, or minds, ſelf-originated, and independent, (none of which therefore could be omnipotent) it is neither conceivable, how ſuch ſhould all agree in the ſame truths, there being no common meaſure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how they ſhould have any knowledge or underſtanding at all, properly ſo called, that being the comprehenſion of the poſſibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas according

[1] Vide Metaphyſ. Lib. XIV. Cap. IX. p. 483.

to this hypotheſis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of thoſe many ſuppoſed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, ſince that, which could create one thing, could create all, and conſequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonſtrable, that there can be but one original and ſelf-exiſtent Mind, or underſtanding Being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiouſly than we deſigned, confuted the firſt atheiſtick argument; we having not only aſſerted the idea of God, and fully anſwered and refelled all the atheiſtick pretences againſt the ſame; but alſo from this very idea of God, or a perfect Being, demonſtrated his exiſtence. We ſhall diſpatch the following atheiſtick objections with more brevity.

WE come, in the next place, to the *Achilles* of the Atheiſts, their invincible argument againſt a divine creation and omnipotence; becauſe, *Nothing could come from nothing*. It being concluded from hence, that whatſoever ſubſtantially or really is, was from all eternity of itſelf unmade or uncreated by any Deity. Or elſe thus; by God is always underſtood a Creator of ſome real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an undoubted principle of reaſon and philoſophy, an undeniable common notion, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, and therefore there can be no ſuch creative power as this. And here we ſhall perform theſe three things; firſt, we ſhall ſhow, that in ſome ſenſes, this is indeed an unqueſtionable truth, and common notion, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, and what thoſe ſenſes are. Secondly, we ſhall make it evident, that in the ſenſe of this atheiſtick objection, it is abſolutely falſe, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, or be made out of nothing; and that a divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly underſtood. Thirdly and laſtly, we ſhall prove, that as from this principle or common notion, *Nothing out of nothing*, there can be no execution at all done againſt theiſm, or a divine creation; ſo from the very ſame rightly underſtood, the impoſſibility of all atheiſm may be demonſtratively proved, it bringing ſomething out of nothing in an impoſſible ſenſe; as alſo the exiſtence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the firſt place, that this is in ſome ſenſe an undoubted principle of reaſon, or an undeniable common notion, that *Nothing can come from nothing*. For firſt, it is unqueſtionably true, that *Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itſelf come into being*; or, that *Nothing could bring itſelf out of non-exiſtence into being*; that *Nothing can take beginning of exiſtence from itſelf*; or, that *Nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cauſe*. And from hence, as hath been already intimated, is it demonſtratively certain, that every thing was not made, but that there is ſomething neceſſarily ſelf-exiſtent, and which could not but be. For had every thing

been made, then muſt ſomething of neceſſity have been made out of nothing by itſelf; which is impoſſible.

Again; As nothing, which was not, could ever of itſelf come into being, or be made, without an efficient cauſe; ſo is it certain likewiſe, that nothing can be efficiently cauſed or produced by that, which hath not in it at leaſt equal (if not greater) perfection, as alſo ſufficient power to produce the ſame. We ſay, nothing which was not, could ever be brought into being, by that, which hath not formally equal perfection in it; becauſe nothing can give what it hath not, and therefore ſo much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the ſuppoſed cauſe, ſo much thereof muſt needs come from nothing, or be made without a cauſe. Moreover, whatſoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cauſe or produce that other thing; becauſe it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being meerly paſſive, or elſe no ſufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impoſſible, that motion, which once was not, ſhould be produced; yet is it impoſſible, that it ſhould be ever produced without a ſufficient cauſe. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or ſelf-active power in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain, that there could never poſſibly ariſe any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no ſufficient cauſe to produce the ſame; ſince nothing can produce motion, but that which hath life, or ſelf-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing elſe, ſhould begin to be, without a ſufficient cauſe, then muſt it needs be cauſed by itſelf, or of itſelf come into being: which is a thing impoſſible. Now no imperfect Being whatſoever hath a ſufficient emanative power to create any other ſubſtance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmoſt, that can be done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human ſouls can produce new cogitations in themſelves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect Being is ſubſtantially emanative, or can produce another ſubſtance out of non-exiſtence. Therefore for any ſubſtance to be brought into being, by an imperfect ſubſtance, which hath not ſufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impoſſible; it being all one as to ſay, that a ſubſtance might of itſelf come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no ſubſtance could be created, or brought out of non-exiſtence into being, but by the ſole efficiency of an abſolutely perfect Being, which hath both greater perfection, (it eminently containing all things in it,) and alſo a ſufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two ſenſes, wherein it is impoſſible for *any thing to come from nothing*; one, for a thing, which was not, to bring itſelf into being, or to be made without an efficient cauſe. Another, for a thing to be efficiently cauſed by that, which hath not at leaſt equal perfection in it, or a ſufficient emanative or productive power. Both which ſenſes of this axiom reſpect the efficient cauſe; and thus was it frequently underſtood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by *Cicero*[t]. We ſhall

[t] Vide Lib. ejus de Fato.

ſhall now propound a third ſenſe, wherein this axiom is alſo verified, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, reſpecting chiefly the material cauſe. For ſince no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new ſubſtance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-exiſting matter by motion, and modify the ſame; and ſince matter, as ſuch, being meerly paſſive, cannot cauſe any thing, that was not before, or will not reſult from the compoſition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-exiſtent matter (without a divine creation) there can never be any new ſubſtance or real entity brought out of non-exiſtence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient phyſiologers meant, when (as *Ariſtotle*[1] tells us) they ſo much inſiſted upon this principle, Τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *That it was impoſſible, that any real entity ſhould be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing*; or, as it is alſo otherwiſe expreſſed[2], Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, *that no real entity was either generated or corrupted.* That is, that in natural generations, corruptions, and alterations, (where God is ſuppoſed not miraculouſly to interpoſe) there is no creation of any new ſubſtance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or deſtruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant, that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old phyſiologers in *Ariſtotle* into quite different ſenſe; as deſigning therein to take away all divine creation out of nothing, (or non-exiſtence;) they making all things to have ſprung out of matter (exiſting of itſelf from eternity) either without a God, or elſe rather (becauſe *Parmenides* and *Empedocles*, and other aſſerters of this doctrine, were undoubted Theiſts) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-exiſting unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a houſe, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus is it commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philoſopher ever went ſo far, as to acknowledge a divine creation of any thing out of nothing, in the ſenſe of Chriſtian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that, beſides the Stoicks, there have been ſome other philoſophick Theiſts amongſt the Pagans of this perſuaſion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwiſe than out of ſomething præ-exiſting; as *Plutarchus Chæronenſis* for one, who in a place already cited poſitively affirmeth[3], τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ· *That though the world were indeed made by God, yet the ſubſtance or matter, out of which it was made, was not made.* And then he ſubjoins this very reaſon for it, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένεσις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος. *Becauſe there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of ſomething præ-exiſting, not rightly ordered, or ſufficiently diſpoſed; as in a houſe, garment, or ſtatue.* From which conceit of *Plutarch*'s, though he were otherwiſe ingenious, it may well be ſuppoſed, that the

[1] Natural. Auſcultat. Lib. I. p. 451. Tom. I. Oper. Vide etiam. Cap. VIII. p. 457, & aliàs.

[2] Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. VIII. p. 457.

[3] Libro de procreat. animæ ex Timæo p. 1014. Tom. II. Oper.

the dull Bœotick air had too much effect upon him. However, neither *Plutarch* nor the Stoicks, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted abſolute and downright Atheiſts, but only imperfect, mungrel, and ſpurious Theiſts. And therefore were Atheiſts never ſo much able to prove, that there could be no creation out of nothing præ-exiſting, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow theiſm in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheleſs, it will undeniably appear from what ſhall follow, that thoſe ancient Italicks and Phythagoricks were ſo far from intending here any ſuch thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without, or with a God, as that they plainly deſigned the very contrary; namely, to prove, that no new real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that ſouls could not be generated out of the ſame; which therefore of neceſſity muſt, according to them, have another divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing præ-exiſting; ſince it could not be ſuppoſed by any, that all ſouls exiſted of themſelves from eternity unmade. And indeed all thoſe Pagan philoſophers, who aſſerted the incorporeity of ſouls, muſt of neceſſity, in like manner, ſuppoſe them not to have been made out of præ-exiſting matter, but by God out of nothing. *Plutarch* being only here to be excepted, by reaſon of a certain odd hypotheſis, which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle, beſides God and matter, a diſorderly ſoul, or evil dæmon ſelf-exiſtent, who therefore ſeems to have ſuppoſed all particular human ſouls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body præ-exiſting, but out of a certain ſtrange commixture of the ſubſtance of that evil ſoul, and God, blended together: upon which account does he affirm ſouls to be, not ſo much ἔργον as μέρος θεοῦ, not ſo much *the work of God*, as *a part of him*. And now let any one judge, whether upon *Plutarch*'s account, there be not yet further reaſon to complain of this Bœotick air. Wherefore we conclude, that thoſe old phyſiologers in *Ariſtotle*, who inſiſted ſo much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as phyſiologers therein, and not as theologers or metaphyſicians; they not oppoſing a divine creation out of nothing præ-exiſting, but only contending, that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.

But what the true ſcope and meaning of theſe phyſiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that uſe or improvement, which themſelves made of this philoſophick principle; and this was twofold. For firſt, it is certain, that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to eſtabliſh a peculiar kind of phyſiology, and ſome atomology or other, either an homœomery, or an anomœomery, a ſimilar or diſſimilar atomology. For *Anaxagoras* looking upon this maxim of the Italick philoſophers, that nothing could be phyſically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reaſon; and being alſo not able to conceive otherwiſe of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter, or its

modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων, *out of præ-existent, and in-existent things*; and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that, which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of nothing, but every thing out of præ-existing similar atoms. Thus was the sense of *Anaxagoras* plainly declared by *Aristotle*[1], that *because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made, either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree, that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things præ-existing and in-existing, though by reason of their parvitude insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogenial atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing.* Here therefore have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that *Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing.*

But the Italicks or Pythagoricks, as well before *Anaxagoras*, as after him, (with whom also hitherto concurred *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, those atheizers of the Italick physiology) did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which in-existing, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies, (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; and sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things, that are in the whole world,

[1] Natural. Auscultat. Lib. I. Cap. V. p. 451. Tom. I. Oper.

world, without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very ſame numerical matter, neither more nor leſs, only differently modified, cauſing very different phantaſms in us, which are therefore vulgarly ſuppoſed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the ſame water is ſucceſſively changed and transformed into vapour, ſnow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpoſe is the forementioned ſimilitude elegantly purſued by the Epicurean Poet, in theſe following verſes;

Quin etiam refert noſtris in verſibus ipſis,
Cum quibus & quali ſint ordine quæque locata.
Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, ſolem,
Significant, eadem fruges, arbuſta, animantes.
Sic ipſis in rebus item jam materiai
Concurſus, motus, ordo, poſitura, figuræ,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

L. 2. p. 191. Lamb. [Verſ. 1012.]

For were thoſe ſuppoſed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter, or its different modifications, in reſpect of the magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion of parts, (there being no ſuch things before in-exiſting, as *Anaxagoras* ſuppoſed;) then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impoſſible. And this diſſimilar atomology of the ancient Italicks, ſo far as to theſe material forms and qualities, ſeems to be undoubtedly the only true phyſiology; it being built upon this ſure principle of reaſon, that becauſe nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new ſubſtance or real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as ſuch, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a houſe, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the præ-exiſtent matter.

This is the firſt improvement, which the ancient Italick philoſophers made of this principle, that *Nothing can be* (phyſically and materially) *generated out of nothing*; or that *No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted*; that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But beſides this, there was alſo another thing, which theſe philoſophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the ſame principle concerning ſouls; that ſince the ſouls of animals, eſpecially human, are unqueſtionably entities really diſtinct from matter, and all its modifications; (no magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or conſciouſneſs, much leſs a power of underſtanding eternal verities) that therefore theſe could not be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the ſame. Becauſe forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really diſtinct from matter, and its different modifications: but becauſe ſouls, at leaſt human, are unqueſtionably entities really diſtinct from matter, and all its modifications; therefore can they not poſſibly be generated out of mat-

ter, nor corrupted into the ſame. For if human ſouls were generated out of matter, then muſt ſome real entity be materially produced out of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing abſolutely impoſſible. Wherefore, theſe philoſophers concluded concerning ſouls, that being not generated out of matter, they were inſinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts concerning the human ſoul, as *Lucretius* expreſſeth it[1];

Nata ſit, an contrà naſcentibus inſinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter, (that is, indeed out of nothing) or elſe were θύραθεν, *from without*, inſinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs ſuppoſes ſouls as well to have exiſted before the generations of all animals, as to exiſt after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with thoſe particular bodies. So that the generations, and corruptions or deaths of animals, according to this hypotheſis, are nothing but an anagrammatical tranſpoſition of things in the univerſe, præ and poſt-exiſtent ſouls being ſometimes united to one body, and ſometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, becauſe theſe ancient philoſophers held ſouls to be thus ingenerable, and to have præ-exiſted before the generation of animals, that therefore they ſuppoſed all ſouls to have exiſted of themſelves from eternity unmade: this being a thing, which was never aſſerted any more by Theiſt than Atheiſt; ſince even thoſe philoſophick Theiſts, who maintained *æternitatem animorum, the eternity of human minds and ſouls*, together with the worlds, did notwithſtanding aſſert their eſſential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the ſun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation from an eternal ſun. Even *Proclus*[2] himſelf, that great champion for the eternity of the world and ſouls in this very caſe, when he writes againſt *Plutarch*'s ſelf-exiſtent evil ſoul, expreſly declaring, that πᾶσα ψυχὴ γένημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, *there is no ſelf-exiſtent ſoul*; but every *ſoul whatſoever is the work, effect and production of God.* Wherefore, when they affirmed ſouls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not meer accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itſelf is generated out of ſomething elſe; upon which account, as *Ariſtotle*[3] informs us, ſouls were called alſo by them, ἀρχαὶ, *principles*, as well as matter, they being both of them ſubſtances in the univerſe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other. But they did not ſuppoſe them to be ἀγενήτους, *ingenerate* or *unmade* in the other ſenſe, as if they had been ſelf-originated, and independent, as *Plutarch*'s ſecond and third principles, his evil ſoul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but ſo doubtleſs, as that if the world had had any beginning, they ſhould then have been all created together with it out of nothing præ-exiſting. But as for the perpetual creation of new ſouls, in the ſucceſſive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing

[1] Lib. I. Verſ. 114.
[2] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. Tom. II. Oper. p. 116.
[3] Vide Lib. I. de Animâ. Cap. II. p. 59.

thing, which theſe philoſophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that ſouls, which are in order of nature ſenior to bodies, ſhould be in order of time juniors to them; as alſo not reaſonable, that divine creation (as it were proſtituted) ſhould without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.

But as for this præ-exiſtence of ſouls, we have already declared our own ſenſe concerning it, in the firſt chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, beſides *Origen* [1], ſeveral others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, ſeem either to have eſpouſed it, or at leaſt to have had a favour and kindneſs for it; inſomuch that St. *Auſtin* [2] himſelf is ſometimes ſtaggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great ſecret, whether men's ſouls exiſted before their generations or no; and ſomewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opining either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this caſe is, that human ſouls could not poſſibly be generated out of matter, but were ſome time or other created by God Almighty out of nothing præ-exiſting, either in generations or before them. Laſtly, as for brute animals, we muſt confeſs, that if they be not meer machines or *automata*, as ſome ſeem inclinable to believe, but conſcious and thinking beings; then from the ſame principle of reaſon it will likewiſe follow, that their ſouls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore muſt be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who ſince he can as eaſily annihilate as create, and does all for the beſt, no man need at all to trouble himſelf about their permanency, or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the ſeveral ſenſes, wherein this axiom muſt be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that *Nothing can poſſibly be made out of nothing*, or *come from nothing*; namely, theſe three. Firſt, That *nothing*, *which was not*, *could ever bring itſelf into being*, or *efficiently produce itſelf*; or, that *nothing can poſſibly be made without an efficient cauſe*. Secondly, that *nothing*, *which was not*, could be produced, or *brought into being by any other efficient cauſe*, *than ſuch as hath at leaſt equal perfection in it*, *and a ſufficient active or productive power*. For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then muſt ſo much of the effect, as tranſcendeth the cauſe, be indeed made without a cauſe (ſince nothing can give what it hath not) or be cauſed by itſelf, or by nothing. Again, to ſuppoſe a thing to be produced by that, which hath no ſufficient productive power, is really to ſuppoſe it alſo to be produced from itſelf without a cauſe, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new ſubſtance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in reſpect of the efficient cauſe. But in the third place, it is alſo true in reſpect of the material likewiſe. Not that *nothing could poſſibly be ever made* by any power whatſoever, but only out of pre-exiſtent

[1] Vide Petr. Dan. Huetium in Origenianis Lib. II. Quæſt. VI. §. IV. p. 93. & §. X. p. 97.

[2] Vide Hen. Noriſ. Vindic. Auguſtian. Cap. IV. p. 101.

pre-exiſtent matter; and conſequently, that matter itſelf could be never made, but was ſelf-exiſtent. For the falſity of this is ſufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human ſouls, their being undoubtedly ſubſtances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifeſted afterwards. But the third and laſt ſenſe is this; That *nothing, which is materially made out of things præ-exiſting* (as ſome are) *can have any other real entity*, than what was either before contained in, or reſulteth from the things themſelves ſo modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or ſubſtances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing elſe but mixtures, or new modifications of things præ-exiſting.

Theſe, I ſay, are all the ſenſes, wherein it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general ſenſe, That *nothing can be made out of nothing cauſally*; or, that *nothing cannot cauſe any thing, either efficiently or materially*. Which as it is undeniably true, ſo is it ſo far from making any thing againſt a divine creation, or the exiſtence of a God, that the ſame may be demonſtratively proved, and evinced from it, as ſhall be ſhewed afterward.

But there is another ſenſe, wherein things may be ſaid to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or *out of nothing*, when thoſe words are not taken cauſally, but only ſo as to ſignify the *terminus à quo*, or *term from which* they are made, to wit, an antecedent non-exiſtence. And then the meaning of this propoſition, that *Nothing can poſſibly be made out of nothing*, will be this; that *Nothing, which once was not*, could by any power whatſoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the ſenſe inſiſted on in this ſecond atheiſtick argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritick or Epicurean atheiſm; That no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatſoever be made, or brought out of non-exiſtence into being; and conſequently, that no creative power out of nothing can poſſibly belong to any thing, though ſuppoſed never ſo perfect.

In anſwer whereunto, we ſhall perform theſe two things. Firſt, we ſhall make it appear, that *Nothing out of nothing*, taken in this ſenſe declared, is ſo far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And ſecondly, we ſhall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more againſt Atheiſm, than it doth againſt Theiſm, and therefore ought by no means to be uſed by Atheiſts, as an argument againſt a Deity. Firſt, therefore, it is unqueſtionably certain, that this cannot be univerſally true, that nothing, which once was not, could poſſibly be made, or brought out of non-exiſtence into being; becauſe, if it were, then could there be no ſuch thing as making or cauſing at all; no action nor motion, and conſequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal univerſe, but the whole world would be like a ſtiff immoveable adamantine rock; and this would doubtleſs be a better argument againſt motion, than any of *Zeno*'s was. But we have all experience within ourſelves of a power of

producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as alſo new local motion in our bodies, or at leaſt new determinations thereof, and of cauſing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheiſts forced to reſtrain the ſenſe of this propoſition to ſubſtantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new ſubſtances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reaſon, why one of thoſe ſhould be in itſelf more impoſſible than the other, or why no ſubſtance ſhould be makeable. But that ſome are ſo ſtagger'd with the ſeeming plauſibility of this argument, is chiefly upon theſe following accounts. Firſt, by reaſon of the confuſion of their own conceptions; for, becauſe it is certain, that *nothing can poſſibly be made out of nothing*, in one ſenſe, to wit, cauſally; they not diſtinguiſhing ſenſes, nor being aware of the equivocation, that is in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, inadvertently give their aſſent to thoſe words in a wrong ſenſe; that no ſubſtance (as matter) could poſſibly be brought out of non-exiſtence into being. Secondly, by reaſon of their unſkilful arguing from artificial things; when, becauſe nothing can be artificially made, but out of præ-exiſting matter, as a houſe or garment, and the like, (there being nothing done in the production of theſe things, but only a new modification of what before ſubſtantially was) they over-haſtily conclude, that no power whatſoever could produce any thing otherwiſe, than out of præ-exiſting matter, and that matter itſelf therefore could not poſſibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, becauſe the old phyſiologers maintained the ſame thing concerning natural generations likewiſe, that nothing was in them produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing* neither; or that there was no new ſubſtance or entity made in them really diſtinct from the pre-exiſting matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of phyſicks into metaphyſicks, and unduly meaſuring, or limiting infinite power accordingly. Laſtly, becauſe it is undeniably certain concerning ourſelves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of theſe can create any new ſubſtance, which was not before; men are therefore apt to meaſure all things by their own ſcantling, and to ſuppoſe it univerſally impoſſible, according to human reaſon, for any power whatſoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology muſt in this be acknowledged to be contradictious to the principles of natural light and underſtanding. But ſince it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themſelves produce ſome things out of nothing præ-exiſting, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reaſonable to think, that an abſolutely perfect Being could do ſomething more, that is, create new ſubſtances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as eaſy for God, or an omnipotent Being, to make a whole world, matter and all, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the ſun to ſend out rays, or a candle light; or laſtly, for any opake body to produce the image of itſelf in glaſſes or water, or to project a ſhadow; all theſe imperfect things being but the energies,

energies, rays, images, or shadows of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a Being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him, who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for any thing whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing, which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible, for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of non-existence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictious for a thing to be, and not be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent Being, which before was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent Being existing.

If nothing could be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, in this latter sense, that is, *Nothing which before was not*, afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily, and independently upon any thing else. But first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself should be eternal without beginning, because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present. But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning, (which yet hath been done by some mistaken Theists) but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make *Something to come from nothing in the impossible sense*, to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that *Nothing could ever move itself*, and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they, who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature, (as nothing but a perfect Being hath) do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain, that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect Being, (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature) yet is it certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural

See Enchir. Met. c. 10.

and eſſential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently poſſible to be or not to be, reaſon pronounces of them, that they could not exiſt of themſelves neceſſarily, but were cauſed by ſomething elſe; and derived their original from that one abſolutely perfect, and neceſſarily exiſtent Being. So that *Plato*'s [1] diſtinction muſt needs be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ὄν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, *That which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning*; and τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε, *That which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is*; it having not a permanent, but ſucceſſive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, *Ariſtotle* alſo affirmeth [2], *That there is no neceſſity all things ſhould be unmade or ſelf-originated; but ſome things might be made from others unmade.*

Laſtly, we ſhall diſprove the truth of this aſſertion, that whatſoever ſubſtantially and really is, did exiſt of itſelf from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Becauſe it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms, (as the Democritick Atheiſts ſuppoſe) but alſo ſouls, eſpecially human, muſt needs have exiſted of themſelves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be ſo ſottiſh, as to conceive himſelf, or that which thinketh in him, his own ſoul or mind, and perſonality to be no real entity, whilſt every clod of earth is ſuch; ſo is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter or body, nor reſult, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, and therefore muſt needs be a thing really diſtinct from it, or ſubſtance incorporeal; the Democritick Atheiſts being here groſly deceived in thinking, that becauſe forms and qualities of bodies may be reſolved into thoſe forementioned elements of matter, and conſequently concluded to be no entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance thereof, but only different modifications of the ſame, that therefore the like may be ſaid of ſouls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no ſubſtance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-exiſtence into being, or be cauſed by any thing elſe, then muſt all human ſouls and perſonalities, as well as matter and atoms, have exiſted not only from eternity, without beginning, but alſo of themſelves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheiſts are ſo abhorrent from this eternity of human ſouls, that they will by no means admit of their poſt-exiſtence or immortality; they apprehending, that if any living underſtanding Being ſhould prove immortal, they could not ſufficiently ſecure themſelves againſt the poſſibility and danger of a God. Some Theiſts indeed have aſſerted *æternitatem animorum*, not only the præ-exiſtence, but alſo the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as *Cicero* more than once doth; who alſo, in his book of Divination [3], thus further declares himſelf concerning it: *Animus, quià vixit ab omni æternitate, verſatuſque eſt cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in naturâ rerum ſunt, videt: Our mind, becauſe it hath exiſted from all eternity, and converſed with innumerable minds, ſeeth all things that are in nature:* and again, *Cum animi hominum ſemper fuerint futurique ſint: Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be.*

 Nevertheleſs,

[1] Vide Phædon. p. 384, 385. & de Repub. Lib. VI. p. 479. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Vide Lib. II. de Cœlo. Cap. II. p 674. Oper.

[3] Lib. I. Cap. LI. p. 3174. Tom. IX.

Nevertheleſs, none of theſe ever maintained, that human minds, and their diſtinct perſonalities, were thus all, of themſelves, independently upon any thing as their cauſe or original. And, as it was before demonſtrated from the nature of knowledge and underſtanding, (it comprehending the poſſibilities of all things, and therefore ſuppoſing infinite power) that there can be but one mind, or underſtanding Being, ſelf-exiſtent, all minds partaking of that one mind; ſo is it hardly poſſible for any one in good earneſt to entertain ſuch a conceit as this, that his own particular ſoul, mind, and perſonality, and conſequently all human ſouls, though ſubject to ſuch laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exiſt before their reſpective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but alſo exiſted of themſelves neceſſarily and independently upon any thing elſe. Wherefore, if human ſouls, minds, and perſonalities, being unqueſtionably ſubſtantial things and really diſtinct from matter, (which therefore could not poſſibly be generated out of it) did not all exiſt from eternity of themſelves, neceſſarily, and independently, it is certain, that they muſt derive their whole Being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, or non-exiſtence by it. And if human ſouls were unqueſtionably thus created, it cannot reaſonably be doubted, but that matter or body itſelf was created likewiſe out of nothing, or cauſed by the Deity: for as much as that, which created one thing out of nothing, could create every thing; and there is really more of ſubſtance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and ſouls, conſcious ſelf-moving and underſtanding Beings, than in ſenſeleſs matter, or unactive bulk.

But for as much as this doctrine of a divine creation out of nothing præ-exiſting lies under no ſmall prejudice upon this account, becauſe it is ſo generally taken for granted, that none of the Pagan Theiſts, who are ſuppoſed to have kept cloſe to the ſimple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any ſuch creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cauſe of any ſubſtance; we muſt of neceſſity here declare this, how common ſoever it be, to be a great miſtake. For beſides that *Plato*, in his *Sophiſt* [1], having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner; Ποιητικὴν πᾶζαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον ὕστερον γίνεσθαι, *to be a power or cauſality, whereby that, which was not before, was afterwards made to be*; and then dividing this efficiency into divine and human, he immediately ſubjoins concerning the former, Ζῶα δὴ πάντα, &c. μῶν ἄλλα τινὸς ἢ θεᾶ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; *Shall we not then ſay, that all animals, and other things, were by the divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be?* Where thus much at leaſt is certain, that *Plato* did not at all queſtion the poſſibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this ſenſe; that is, brought into being, after it had not been by a divine power. But becauſe it may be thought, that he meant this no further, than of the firſt compages of animals, in which notwithſtanding every thing, ſouls and all, might be made out of præ-exiſting matter; we ſhall here further add, what in his *Timæus* [2] he declareth concerning the ſoul, τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὕστεραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν

[1] Pag. 168. Oper. Edit. Ficini. [2] Pag. 528. Oper.

ἐπιχειρῶμεν λέγειν, ὅτως ἐμηχανήσατο ϗ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν, ὁ γὰρ ἂν ἄρξαθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρᾳ εἴασεν, ὁ δὲ ϗ γενέζει ϗ ἀρειῆ προτέραν ϗ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώμαλ☉, ὡς δεσπότιν ϗ ἄρξασαν ἄρξομένᾳ συνες-ήσαλο· *That God did not make it after body, and junior to it; ſince it was not fit, that the elder ſhould be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made ſoul before body, older than it, and ſuperiour to it, as well in reſpect of time as dignity.* Which notion is further purſued by him in his tenth *de Legibus*[1], ὀρθῶς ἄρα ϗ κυρίως ἀληθές-αλά τε ϗ τελεώταλα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώμαλ☉ ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε ϗ ὕς-ερον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν. *Wherefore it was rightly, properly, and moſt truly affirmed by us, that ſoul was made firſt, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby.* From whence alſo he draws this conſectary, ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώμαλ☉· ὅσα ϗ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τᾶ σώμαλ☉ ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι ϗ ἤθη ϗ βελήσεις ϗ λογισμοὶ ϗ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε ϗ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκως σωμάτων ϗ πλάτως ϗ βάθως, εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ ϗ ψυχὴ σώμαλ☉· *That if the ſoul be older than the body, then muſt the things of the ſoul alſo be older than thoſe of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the ſeveral ſpecies of it, muſt be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but alſo before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies.* From whence it is plain, that *Plato*'s firſt γένεσις, or production of ſouls by God, could not be out of any præ-exiſting body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatſoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, becauſe in his *Sophiſt*[2] he plainly condemns that opinion of ſome, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κεκτῆθαι, *that the ſoul itſelf had ſomething of body in it*; and he often elſewhere declares the ſoul to be incorporeal. It is certain alſo, that not only *Plato*, but all thoſe other Pagan philoſophers too, who aſſerted the incorporeity and immortality of human ſouls, could not poſſibly conceive ſouls to have been made out of præ-exiſtent matter, but either ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, they being not eternal, but having a newneſs of being, (as *Plato* himſelf ſeemed to ſuppoſe;) or elſe if they were conceived to be eternal by them, (which was the opinion of moſt of the junior Platoniſts, yet) to have derived their whole ſubſtance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal ſun. *Plutarch*, and his followers, being only here to be excepted, who would neither have ſouls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter præ-exiſting, (they being themſelves incorporeal;) but out of a ſtrange commixture of the ſubſtance of God himſelf with the ſubſtance of a certain diſorderly ſoul, ſelf-exiſtent and uncreated; of which we have ſpoken already. But that the genuine Platoniſts did univerſally ſuppoſe, that one ſubſtance might be cauſed by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, becauſe their ſecond divine hypoſtaſis or ſubſtance, (though eternal) was according to them derived from, or begotten by their firſt, and their third hypoſtaſis or ſubſtance produced both from the firſt and ſecond; and other inferiour orbs of being, as the particular ſouls of dæmons and men, from that whole trinity of divine hy-

[1] Pag. 669. [2] Pag. 170.

poſtaſes jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itſelf, it is certain alſo, that *Proclus* and other Platoniſts expreſly denied it to have been ἀγένητον, *unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent*, and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is ſtyled by *Proclus* [1], ἀῤῥήτῳ αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, *the ineffable cauſe of matter*. In like manner have we already ſhowed, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itſelf was alſo cauſed or produced by the Deity, to which purpoſe is this verſe cited by *Proclus* [2], Ἔνθεν ἄδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλη ὕλης. *From whence* (that is, from *the Deity*) *abundantly ſprings forth the generation of the multiform matter*. The metre here requiring, that it ſhould be read ἄδην, and not ἄρδην, as it is in *Proclus* his copy. Moreover, *Jamblichus* hath recorded in his *Myſteries* [3], that *Hermes*, and the old Egyptian theologers likewiſe, held matter not to be ἀγένητον, that is, *ſelf-exiſtent*, *unmade*, or *underived* from the Deity, but to have been cauſed by it. Whence does *Proclus* [4] conclude it probable, that *Plato* was of the ſame perſuaſion alſo; as likewiſe *Orpheus* before had been, he deriving this, as is ſuppoſed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true indeed, that many of theſe philoſophers aſſerted matter, ſouls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and conſequently not created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in that ſtricter ſenſe, that is, out of an antecedent non-exiſtence in time. Notwithſtanding which, they did ſuppoſe them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that, which gives to any ſubſtance its whole being, though from eternity, ſo that it never was not; the ſame upon ſuppoſition, that it once had not been, could unqueſtionably have produced it, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, or an antecedent non-exiſtence.

Thus *Hierocles* in *Photius*; δημιουργὸν θεὸν προυγίσησιν ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένης γε ὑπομενούσης, &c. Plato *cenſuit mundum à Deo, ex nullâ priùs exiſtente materiâ, productum*, &c.

We have now ſufficiently diſproved the truth of that aſſertion, that *Nothing could be made out of nothing*, in the atheiſtick ſenſe thereof, *viz.* that *Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards poſſibly be made to be:* though this ſhould not be extended ſo far, as to accidental things, and modifications, but reſtrained and confined only to ſubſtantials; *That no ſubſtance whatſoever could have a newneſs of being, or be cauſed by any other ſubſtance:* but whatſoever ſubſtantial thing any where is in the world, the ſame did exiſt of itſelf from eternity, and independently upon any thing elſe; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which ſame aſſertion has been alſo ſometimes otherwiſe thus expreſſed; *Nothing can be made but out of præexiſting ſubſtance*; the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made, but new accidental modifications of what before ſubſtantially was; no ſubſtance itſelf being makeable or producible by any other ſubſtance, neither in time, (ſo as to have a newneſs or beginning of being) nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheiſts and ſome others taking it for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body, or matter, do further limit and reſtrain the ſenſe of that propoſition in this manner; *Nothing can be made but out of præ-exiſting matter*; that is, nothing can be made, but out of

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 116.
[2] Ibid. p. 118.
[3] De Myſteriis Ægyptior. Sect. V. Cap. XXIII. p. 138. Sect. VIII. Cap. III. p. 159.
[4] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II.

of corporeal ſubſtance præ-exiſting. An *idolum ſpecus* (if I may uſe that language) which in all probability had its firſt original chiefly from men's meaſuring the extent of all power by their own production of artificial things. Becauſe forſooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a houſe, but out of præ-exiſting timber, bricks, and ſtones; nor a taylor a garment, but out of præ-exiſting cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pyes, but out of præ-exiſting materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatſoever, no not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of præ exiſtent matter, but not to the production or cauſing of any ſubſtance. We ſhall in the next place make it appear, that were this aſſertion true, That no ſubſtance or real entity, which once was not, could be cauſed or produced, yet would it notwithſtanding, of the two, more impugn atheiſm, than theiſm (it being poſſible for falſhoods, though not for truths, to diſagree) foraſmuch as the Atheiſts do bring more out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, than the Theiſts do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection againſt theiſm. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect Being, be ſuppoſed to be the only neceſſary ſelf-exiſtent thing, and the cauſe of all other ſubſtance, and conſequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only ſouls, but alſo matter itſelf, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, or an antecedent non-exiſtence; yet is there, by reaſon of the weakneſs of human underſtandings, a latitude in theiſm. Wherefore ſome there are, who though impoſed upon by that *idolum ſpecus*, or impriſoned in it, That *nothing can poſſibly be made, but out of præ-exiſting matter*, by the new modification thereof; do notwithſtanding devoutly worſhip a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly underſtanding Being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the ſupreme governour of the ſame; they thus ſuppoſing two principles in the univerſe, an active and a paſſive one, God and Matter. Beſides which, it is not impoſſible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only ſubſtance, but human ſouls are incorporeal, yet the ſubſtance of theſe ſouls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of ſome præ-exiſting common ſoul, (as their intelligible matter) or out of the ſubſtance of the Deity itſelf; or elſe exiſted of themſelves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheleſs may theſe acknowledge one ſupreme underſtanding Being ſelf-exiſtent alſo, though neither the creator of matter, nor of ſouls, yet the ſupreme governour and orderer of all. And it is certain, that *Plutarch*'s God was no better than this; and yet was that Pagan, notwithſtanding, a devout religioniſt in his kind, as well as a hearty moraliſt. And ſuch a theiſm or theology, as either of thoſe forementioned, (though not genuine and ſincere, but imperfect and mongrel things) would perhaps be to the Atheiſts little leſs troubleſome and uneaſy, than the true. Thus have we ſhewed, that this principle, *That nothing can come out of nothing*, or be made, otherwiſe than out of præ-exiſting ſubſtance or matter, though it be indeed contradictious to the true and genuine theology, yet is it not abſolutely inconſiſtent with all manner of religion; there being certain ſpurious, or imperfect forms of theiſm built upon this foundation. But now, on the

the contrary, we ſhall make it manifeſt, that this very principle, made uſe of by the Atheiſts, is in truth and reality contradictious to all manner of atheiſm, and deſtructive of the ſame; the Atheiſts univerſally generating and corrupting real entities, and ſubſtantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, and reducing them to nothing again: foraſmuch as they make all things whatſoever, the bare ſubſtance of matter only excepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or elſe nothing but meer bulk, or reſiſting and diviſible magnitude) to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does *Ariſtotle*, [1] in a place before cited, declare the atheiſtick ſenſe, εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν ἀδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι· *There are certain men, who affirm, that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made.* Whoſe ſenſe is afterwards more diſtinctly thus propoſed by him, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίνεσθαί τε καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως ἀδέν· ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα πάντα μεταχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· *That all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is,* (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing) *but that there is only one thing, which remaineth; namely that, out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof.* Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the ſame *Ariſtotle* further adds, they affirmed to be the only ſubſtance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatſoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, *paſſions, affections*, and *diſpoſitions* thereof, γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, *to be generated and corrupted infinitely*; that is, to be produced out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtleſs, this is the true meaning of that paſſage in *Plato*'s tenth *De Legibus* [2], not underſtood by the Latin interpreters; where being to repreſent the atheiſtick hypotheſis of the ſyſtem of the univerſe, he diſcovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων, *the wiſeſt and moſt myſterious of all doctrines*, after this manner; λέγουσί που τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γενησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης. *Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; ſome by nature, and ſome by art, and ſome by fortune or chance.* For unqueſtionably here, *Plato*'s λέγουσί που τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα, *Certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made*, &c. is the very ſame with *Ariſtotle*'s εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν, ἀδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι, *Certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated.* And perhaps this of *Ariſtotle*'s was taken out of that of *Plato*'s: which yet nevertheleſs is ſo to be underſtood, as it is afterwards explained by *Ariſtotle*; all things whatſoever, the bare ſubſtance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter; that is, beſides diviſible and ſeparable extenſion, or reſiſting magnitude, and conſequently that life and cogitation, ſenſe and conſciouſneſs, reaſon and underſtanding, all our own minds, and perſonalities, are no real entities; or elſe, that there are, according to the atheiſtick hypotheſis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theiſts

[1] De Cœlo Lib. III. Cap. I. p. 668. Tom. I. Oper. [2] Pag. 665. Oper.

Theiſts ſuppoſe all the greateſt perfections in the univerſe, as life and underſtanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect Being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or non-exiſtence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of non-exiſtence, by this one perfect Being or Deity: the Atheiſts, on the contrary, ſuppoſing the loweſt and moſt imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or diviſible and reſiſting extenſion, to be the only ſelf-exiſtent and unmade thing, conclude all the greateſt perfections in the univerſe, life, cogitation, and underſtanding, to be made out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, as alſo to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoick Atheiſts, being ſenſible ſomewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and underſtanding out of nothing, and that there muſt of neceſſity be ſome fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but ſubſtantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter as ſuch. Notwithſtanding which, even theſe alſo, for as much as they deny to matter animal ſenſe, and conſciouſneſs, ſuppoſe all animal life or ſenſe, and conſcious underſtanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and underſtanding, be reckoned amongſt the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or diviſible and antitypous extenſion, ſince they may be conceived without the ſame; whereas modes cannot be conceived without their ſubſtance. Standing, ſitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of ſuch a body. When that human body, which before did ſtand, doth afterwards ſit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the ſame matter, which was ſquare or cubical, is made ſpherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and underſtanding, which was not before, then is there unqueſtionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts themſelves, according to the tenour of the atomick phyſiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more or leſs magnitude of parts, figure, ſite, motion, or reſt. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, conſidered as entities really diſtinct from theſe modes; becauſe, in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cauſe; whereupon they reſolve theſe qualities into mechaniſm and fancy. But life, cogitation, and underſtanding, are things, which have more real entity in them, and can no way be ſolved by mechaniſm and phancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of ſubſtance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, eſpecially human ſouls, and perſonalities, are unqueſtionably ſubſtantial things; and yet do the Atheiſts bring theſe, and conſequently themſelves out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, and reduce them to nothing again. The concluſion is; that theſe very Atheiſts, who contend againſt Theiſts, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, do themſelves bring all things out of nothing or non-exiſtence, and perpetuallly reduce them to nothing again; according to whoſe principles, as once there was no

no life nor underſtanding at all in the univerſe, ſo may there be none again. They who deny a God, becauſe there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themſelves notwithſtanding attribute to matter (though a meer paſſive, ſluggiſh, and unactive thing) a creative power of things ſubſtantial (as human ſouls and perſonalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheiſts, that there can be no God, becauſe nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be falſe, but alſo retorted upon theſe Atheiſts themſelves, they bringing all things beſides ſenſeleſs and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, firſt, in what ſenſe this propoſition is unqueſtionably true, that nothing, can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, *viz.* cauſally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cauſe, and a ſufficient cauſe. Or more particularly theſe three ways; firſt, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itſelf, or without an efficient cauſe. Secondly, that nothing, which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at leaſt equal perfection in it, and a ſufficient active or productive power; and conſequently that no new ſubſtance can be made, but by a perfect Being, which only is ſubſtantially emanative. Thirdly and laſtly, that when things are made out of præ-exiſting matter, as in artificial productions, and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before ſubſtantially was; the material cauſe, as ſuch, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom underſtood by *Cicero*, that *Nothing could be made out of nothing*, viz. cauſally, in his book *de Fato* [1], where he reprehendeth *Epicurus* for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to eſtabliſh liberty of will by that abſurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. *Nec cum hæc ita ſint, eſt cauſa, cur* Epicurus *fatum extimeſcat, & ab atomis petat præſidium, eaſque de via deducat; & uno tempore ſuſcipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut ſine causâ fiat aliquid, ex quo exiſtet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipſi, nec cuiquam phyſico placet. Nor is there for all that any reaſon, why* Epicurus *ſhould be ſo much afraid of fate, and ſeek refuge in atoms, he ſuppoſing them, in their infinite deſcents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himſelf at once into two inextricable difficulties, the firſt whereof was the ſuppoſing of ſomething to be made without a cauſe, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing, that will neither be allowed by any phyſiologer, nor could* Epicurus *himſelf be pleaſed or ſatisfied therewith.* The reaſon whereof is, becauſe it was a fundamental principle of the atomick philoſophy, that *Nothing* (in this ſenſe) *could be made out of nothing.* Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other ſenſe this propoſition, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, is falſe, namely, when this *out of nothing* is not taken cauſally, but ſo as to ſignify the *terminus* from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent non-exiſtence: that no real entity or ſubſtance, which before was not, could by any power whatſoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing

[1] Cap. IX. p. 3273. Tom. IX. Oper.

thing can poſſibly be made, but out of ſomething præ-exiſting, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of *Cicero*, that the true and genuine ſenſe of this propoſition, *De nihilo nihil fit*, (according to the mind of thoſe ancient phyſiologers, who laid ſo great ſtreſs thereupon) was not, that nothing could by any power whatſoever be brought out of non-exiſtence into being; but only, that *nothing could be made without a cauſe*. Nor did they here by *cauſe* mean the material only, in this ſenſe, as if nothing could poſſibly be made, but out of præ-exiſting matter; *Epicurus* being taxed by *Cicero* for introducing that his third motion of atoms, or *clinamen principiorum* [1], out of nothing, or without an efficient cauſe; as indeed all motion alſo was, to thoſe atomick Atheiſts, in this ſenſe, from nothing. Nevertheleſs, we have alſo ſhewed, that if this propoſition, *Nothing out of nothing*, in that atheiſtick ſenſe, (as levell'd againſt a Deity) were true; yet would it of the two more impugn atheiſm itſelf, than it does theiſm; the Atheiſts generating and corrupting all things, the ſubſtance of matter only excepted, all life, ſenſe and underſtanding, human ſouls, minds and perſonalities, they producing theſe, and conſequently themſelves, out of nothing, and reſolving them all to nothing again. We ſhall now, in the third and laſt place, make it manifeſt, that the Atheiſts do not only bring real entities, and ſubſtantial things, out of nothing in the ſecond ſenſe, that is, out of an antecedent non-exiſtence, (which yet is a thing poſſible only to God, or a perfect Being) but alſo that they bring them out of nothing in the abſolutely impoſſible ſenſe; that is, ſuppoſe them to be made without a cauſe, or *nothing to be the cauſe of ſomething*.

But we muſt prepare the way hereunto, by ſetting down, Firſt, a brief and compendious ſum of the whole atheiſtick hypotheſis. The Atheiſts therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of præ-exiſting ſubſtance; taking it for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body or matter, do conclude accordingly, that nothing can be made, but out of præ-exiſting matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only ſubſtance, the only unmade ſelf-exiſtent thing, whatſoever elſe is in the world, beſides the bare ſubſtance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are theſe three things contained in the atheiſtick hypotheſis; Firſt, that no ſubſtance can be made or cauſed by any thing elſe, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only ſubſtance; and therefore whatſoever is made, is made out of præ-exiſting matter. Thirdly and laſtly, that whatſoever there is elſe in the whole world, beſides the ſubſtance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we ſhall demonſtrate the abſolute impoſſibility of this atheiſtick hypotheſis, from that very principle of the ancient phyſiologers, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing*, in the true ſenſe thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and ſubſtantial things, out of an antecedent non-exiſtence, (though nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create) but alſo producing them without a cauſe.

[1] Vide Lucret. Lib. II. Verſ. 292.

Firſt, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only ſubſtance, and all things elſe whatſoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly ſuppoſe all things to be made without an efficient cauſe, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impoſſible ſenſe. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of præ-exiſting matter (and conſequently that God himſelf, ſuppoſed to exiſt, could in this reſpect do no more, than a carpenter or taylor doth;) I ſay, though it be not univerſally true, that every thing, that is made, muſt have a material cauſe, (ſo that the quaternio of cauſes in logick is not to be extended to all things cauſed whatſoever;) yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could poſſibly be made without an efficient cauſe. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there muſt of neceſſity, beſides matter, be ſome other ſubſtance exiſting, as the efficient cauſe thereof; foraſmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a ſtatue, nor timber and ſtones a houſe, nor cloth a garment. This is our firſt demonſtration of the impoſſibility of the atheiſtick hypotheſis; it ſuppoſing all things, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or deity, or to be made without an efficient cauſe; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impoſſible ſenſe. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts admit of no other efficient cauſality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only ſubſtance, no ſelf-moving power, they hereby make all the motion, that is in the whole world, to be without a cauſe, and from nothing; action without any ſubject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, ſhould we be ſo liberal, as to grant to the atomick Atheiſts motion without a cauſe, or permit *Strato* and the hylozoick Atheiſts to attribute to matter a ſelf-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not poſſibly produce any new real entity, which was not before; matter, as ſuch, efficiently cauſing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, ſite, and diſpoſition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as ſuch, have no animal ſenſe and conſcious underſtanding, eſſentially belonging to it, (which no Atheiſts as yet have had the impudence to aſſert;) then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, poſſibly beget ſenſe and underſtanding, ſoul and mind; becauſe this would be to bring ſomething out of nothing, in the impoſſible ſenſe, or to ſuppoſe ſomething to be made by itſelf without a cauſe. Which may ſerve alſo for a confutation of thoſe imperfect and ſpurious Theiſts, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether ſuppoſed by them to be corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of præ-exiſtent matter, by the new-modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a houſe out of præ-exiſting timber and ſtone, and a taylor a garment out of præ-exiſting cloth. For ſince animal life and underſtanding are not by them ſuppoſed to belong at all to matter as ſuch; and ſince they

they cannot reſult from any modifications, or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not poſſibly make animals, or produce ſenſe and underſtanding, ſouls and minds, which nevertheleſs theſe Theiſts ſuppoſe him to have done; and therefore ought in reaſon to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter, (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a houſe) but alſo of real entities diſtinct from the ſame.

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the moſt ancient atomick phyſiologers; not that *every thing whatſoever might be made out of præ-exiſting matter*; but, on the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and conſequently, that ſouls and minds, being not meer modifications of matter, in reſpect of magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion, could never be produced out of it, becauſe they muſt then of neceſſity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themſelves without a cauſe, or without a ſufficient cauſe. It hath alſo been before noted out of *Ariſtotle*, how the old atheiſtick materialiſts, being aſſaulted by thoſe Italick philoſophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, beſides its modifications, could poſſibly be produced out of it, becauſe nothing can come out of nothing, and conſequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or deſtroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that propoſition, to evade after this manner; διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c. *That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted, (in ſome ſenſe,) foraſmuch as the ſame ſubſtance of matter always remains, it being never made nor deſtroyed. For, as men do not ſay, that* Socrates *is made, when he is made muſical or handſome; nor deſtroyed, when he loſeth theſe diſpoſitions, becauſe the ſubject* Socrates *was before, and ſtill remaineth; ſo neither is any ſubſtantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or deſtroyed in this ſenſe; becauſe matter, which is the ſubſtance of all, perpetually remains*; and all other things whatſoever are but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, *paſſions and affections, and diſpoſitions thereof*, as muſicalneſs and unmuſicalneſs, in reſpect of *Socrates*. Which is all one, as if they ſhould ſay, that all things whatſoever, beſides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing, ſo long as the ſubſtance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the ſame. Wherefore, though life, ſenſe, and underſtanding, all ſouls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence, that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, becauſe theſe are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the ſubterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheiſts [1].

Now it is true indeed, that whatſoever is in the univerſe, is either ſubſtance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any ſubſtance may be

[1] Vide Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 264. Tom. IV. Oper.

generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; for as much as the ſubſtance ſtill remains entirely the ſame. But the Atheiſts taking it for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body or matter, do therefore falſly ſuppoſe that, which is really incorporeal ſubſtance, or elſe the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the meer accidents of matter, and conſequently conclude theſe to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We ſay therefore, that it does not at all follow, becauſe the ſame numerical matter, (as for example, a piece of wax) may be ſucceſſively made ſpherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the ſame man may ſucceſſively ſtand, ſit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or becauſe a heap of ſtones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together diſorderly and confuſedly, may be made into a ſtately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the ſame may be affirmed likewiſe of every thing elſe, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter, as namely, life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, that though there be no ſuch thing in matter itſelf, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production, of ſomething out of nothing. One ground of which miſtake hath been from men's not rightly conſidering, what the accidents of a ſubſtance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is ſuch a thing, as cannot poſſibly be conceived, without that, whereof it is a mode; as ſtanding, ſitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived, without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any thing of extenſion: nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of ſuch a length, breadth, and thickneſs, or to be hewed and ſliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as ſo many ſmall chips thereof, would make up again the entireneſs of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extenſion, but a mode or attribute of another ſubſtance, really diſtinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing elſe clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extenſion, but only more or leſs magnitude of parts, figures, ſite, motion, or reſt; and all the different bodies, that are in the whole world, are but ſeveral combinations or ſyllables, made up out of theſe few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, can poſſibly ſpell or compound life and ſenſe, cogitation and underſtanding, as the ſyllables thereof; and therefore to ſuppoſe theſe to be generated out of matter, is plainly to ſuppoſe ſome real entity to be brought out of nothing, or ſomething to be made without a cauſe; which is impoſſible.

But that, which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the buſineſs of ſenſible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be diſtinct entities, from theſe forementioned modifications of matter, in reſpect of magnitude of parts, figure, ſite, motion, or reſt. For ſince theſe qualities and forms are unqueſtionably generated

nerated and corrupted, there ſeems to be no reaſon, why the ſame might not be as well acknowledged of life, ſenſe, cogitation, and underſtanding, that theſe are but qualities or accidents of matter alſo, (though of another kind) and conſequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts themſelves have, from the principles of the atomick philoſophy, ſufficiently confuted and rectified this miſtake concerning ſenſible qualities; they exploding and baniſhing them all, as conceived to be entities really diſtinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reaſon, becauſe the generation of them would, upon this ſuppoſition, be the production of ſomething out of nothing, or without a cauſe; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing elſe but mechaniſm, or different modifications of matter, in reſpect of the magnitude of parts, figure, ſite, and motion, or reſt; they only cauſing different fancies and apparitions in us. And in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies ſeems to have no other original at all, than men's miſtaking their own phancies, paſſions, and affections, for things really exiſting in the objects without them. For as ſenſible qualities are conceived to be things diſtinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, ſo are they really nothing but our own phancies, paſſions, and affections; and conſequently no accidents or modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own ſouls, which are ſubſtances incorporeal. Now if theſe Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts themſelves concluded, that real qualities, conſidered as diſtinct from the modifications of matter, could not poſſibly be generated out of it, becauſe this would be the production of ſomething out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the ſame, concerning life and cogitation, ſenſe and underſtanding, that the generation of theſe out of ſenſeleſs matter would be an impoſſible production of ſomething out of nothing; and conſequently, that theſe are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of ſubſtance incorporeal; ſince they can no way be reſolved into mechaniſm and phancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar ſenſible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democriticks and Epicureans did indeed ſuppoſe all human cogitations to be cauſed or produced by the incurſion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to ſuch a degree, either of ſottiſhneſs or impudence, as a modern writer [1] hath done, to maintain, that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themſelves really nothing elſe but local motion or mechaniſm, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that *mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibuſdam corporis organici, that mind itſelf is nothing but motion in ſome parts of the organized body*; who therefore, as if *Carteſius* had not been ſufficiently paradoxical, in making brute animals, (though ſuppoſed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but meer machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious concluſion, that all cogitative beings, and men themſelves, are really nothing elſe but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour to.

[1] Hobbes. Vide Phyſic. Cap. XXV. & Leviathan, Part I. Cap. I, & II.

to be found, number to be figure, or any thing elſe in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very ſelf-ſame thing. Nevertheleſs, ſo ſtrong was the atheiſtick intoxication in thoſe old Democriticks and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reaſon, becauſe *Nothing could be produced out of nothing*, they notwithſtanding contradicting themſelves, would make ſenſe, life, and underſtanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and ſo unqueſtionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cauſe.

Moreover, it is obſervable, that *Epicurus* having a mind to aſſert contingent liberty in men, in way of oppoſition to that neceſſity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by *Democritus*, and his followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not poſſibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philoſophy, without ſuppoſing ſomething of contingency, in the firſt principles, that is, in the motion of thoſe atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:

L. 2. p. 134. Lamb. [Verſ. 251.]

——— *Si ſemper motus connectitur omnis,*
Et vetere exoritur ſemper novus ordine certo,
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne cauſam cauſa ſequatur;
Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
Unde eſt hæc, inquam, fatis avolſa voluntas?

The reaſon for which is afterwards thus expreſſed by him, *Quoniam de nihilo nil fit*, becauſe *Nothing can be made out of nothing*. Upon which account he therefore ridiculouſly feigned, beſides his two other motions of atoms from *pondus* and *plagæ*, *weight* and *ſtrokes*, a third motion of them, which he calls *clinamen principiorum*, a *contingent* and *uncertain declination*, every way from the perpendicular; out of deſign to ſolve this phænomenon of free-will in men, without bringing ſomething out of nothing, according as he thus ſubjoineth,

[1] *Quare in ſeminibus quoque idem fateare neceſſe eſt,*
Eſſe aliam præter plagas & pondera cauſam
Motibus, unde hæc eſt nobis innata poteſtas;
De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL poſſe videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
Externa quaſi vi. Sed ne mens ipſa neceſſum
Inteſtinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et devicta quaſi cogatur ferre patique,
Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.

Now if *Epicurus* himſelf conceived, that liberty of will could not poſſibly be generated, in men out of matter or atoms, they having no ſuch thing at all

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. verſ. 283.

all in them, (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion) without bringing of *ſomething out of nothing*; which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomick philoſophy, (though this were intolerably abſurd in him, thus to ſuppoſe contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of ſenſeleſs atoms, ſo that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing;) certainly ſenſe and underſtanding, ſoul and mind in animals and men, could not poſſibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all ſenſe and underſtanding; for the very ſame reaſon, *Quoniam de nihilo nil fit, Becauſe nothing can be made out of nothing.* For unqueſtionably, were all life and underſtanding, all ſouls and minds generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter; and were there no ſubſtantial or eſſential life and underſtanding in the whole univerſe; then muſt it of neceſſity be all made out of nothing, or without a cauſe, and conſequently real entities and ſubſtantial things be made out of nothing, which is abſolutely impoſſible. For though we do not ſay, that life and cogitation, ſenſe and underſtanding, abſtractly conſidered, are ſubſtances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really diſtinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather eſſential attributes of ſubſtance incorporeal; as alſo that ſouls and minds, which are the ſubjects of them, are indeed ſubſtantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkneſs of that philoſophy, which educes not only ſpecies viſible and audible, (entities perfectly unintelligible) and real qualities, diſtinct from all the modes of body, and even ſubſtantial forms too, (as they call them) but alſo ſenſitive ſouls themſelves, both in men and brutes, *ex potentia materiæ, out of the power of the matter*; that is, indeed out of nothing. For as much as this prepares a direct way to atheiſm; becauſe, if life and ſenſe, cogitation and conſciouſneſs, may be generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, then might this well be ſuppoſed the firſt original of all things; nor could there reaſonably be any ſtop made at rational ſouls, eſpecially by theſe men, who alſo conclude them to be *raſæ tabulæ, meer white ſheets of paper*, that have nothing at all in them, but what is ſcribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the underſtanding or mind of man, which was not before in ſenſe: ſo that ſenſe is the firſt original knowledge, and underſtanding but a ſecondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonſtrated that all things whatſoever could not poſſibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and ſenſe, mind and underſtanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But becauſe ſome may poſſibly imagine, that matter might otherwiſe than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce ſouls and minds, we ſhall add in the laſt place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or ſubſtantial thing, that was not before, unleſs it have at leaſt equal perfection to it, and a ſubſtantially emanative or creative power. But ſcarcely any man can be ſo ſottiſh, as to imagine, that every atom of duſt hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational ſoul in man, or to attribute

tribute a creative power to all matter, (which is but a paſſive thing) whilſt this is in the mean time denied by him to a perfect Being; both theſe aſſertions alſo, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing cauſally. And thus have we demonſtrated the impoſſibility and non-ſenſe of all atheiſm, from this very principle, by which the Atheiſts would aſſault theiſm, in the true ſenſe thereof, that *Nothing can be made without a cauſe*, or that *Nothing cannot be the cauſe of any thing.*

Now, if there be no middle betwixt atheiſm and theiſm, and all things muſt of neceſſity either ſpring from ſenſeleſs matter, or elſe from a perfect underſtanding Being; then is this demonſtration of the impoſſibility of atheiſm a ſufficient eſtabliſhment of the truth of theiſm; it being ſuch a demonſtration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction *ad impoſſibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make uſe of. Thus, either there is a God; or elſe matter muſt needs be acknowledged to be the only ſelf-exiſtent thing, and all things elſe whatſoever, to be made out of it; but it is impoſſible, that all things ſhould be made out of ſenſeleſs matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall here, for further ſatisfaction, ſhow how the exiſtence of a God may be directly demonſtrated alſo from this very principle, which the Atheiſts endeavour to take ſanctuary in, and from thence to impugn theiſm, *De nihilo nihil*, that *Nothing can be made out of nothing cauſally*, or that *Nothing cannot be the cauſe of any thing.*

In the firſt place therefore, we ſhall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that *Something or other did exiſt of itſelf from all eternity, or without beginning and unmade by any thing elſe.* The certainty of which propoſition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that *Nothing can come from nothing*, or be *made out of nothing*, or that *Nothing, which once was not, can of itſelf come into being without a cauſe*; it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we ſhall in the next place make this further ſuperſtructure, that becauſe ſomething did certainly exiſt of itſelf from eternity unmade, therefore is there alſo actually a neceſſarily exiſtent Being. For to ſuppoſe, that any thing did exiſt of itſelf from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not neceſſarily, but contingently, ſince it might have willed otherwiſe; this is to ſuppoſe it to have exiſted before it was, and ſo poſitively to have been the cauſe of itſelf; which is impoſſible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is ſaid to be of itſelf, or the cauſe of itſelf, this is to be underſtood no otherwiſe, than either in a negative ſenſe, as having nothing elſe for its cauſe; or becauſe its neceſſary eternal exiſtence is eſſential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which exiſted of itſelf from eternity, independently upon any thing elſe, did not ſo exiſt contingently, but neceſſarily; ſo that there is undoubtedly ſomething actually in being, whoſe exiſtence is, and always was neceſſary. In the next place,

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it is certain alſo, that nothing could exiſt neceſſarily of it ſelf, but what included neceſſity of exiſtence in its own nature. For to ſuppoſe any thing to exiſt of it ſelf neceſſarily, which hath no neceſſity of exiſtence in its own nature, is plainly to ſuppoſe that neceſſary exiſtence of it to come from nothing, ſince it could neither proceed from that thing it ſelf, nor yet from any thing elſe. Laſtly, there is nothing, which includes neceſſity of exiſtence in its very nature and eſſence, but only an abſolutely perfect being. The reſult of all which is, that God, or a perfect Being, doth certainly exiſt; and that there is nothing elſe, which exiſted of it ſelf from eternity, neceſſarily and independently; but all other things whatſoever derived their being from him, or were cauſed by him, matter or body itſelf not excepted.

That which hath ſtaggered ſome Theiſts here, and made them ſo inclinable and prone to believe, that matter alſo exiſted from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that becauſe nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwiſe than out of pre-exiſting matter, as houſes and garments, puddings and pies; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatſoever: though even men themſelves can produce ſomething out of no pre-exiſtent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the ſame partly proceedeth alſo from certain falſe opinions entertained concerning matter. For ſome Theiſts have ſuppoſed ὕλην ἀσώματον, an *incorporeal firſt matter*; out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the eſſence of body to have been compounded, and made up. And no wonder, if theſe ſame fanciful philoſophers have further added alſo hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewiſe incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what elſe ſhould be meant by this incorporeal *Hyle*, or matter, but only a metaphyſical notion of the potentiality, or poſſibility of things, reſpectively to the Deity; which, becauſe it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himſelf is, it being nothing but the divine power conſidered paſſively, or the reverſe of it; therefore, in all probability, were theſe philoſophers ſo prone to think the phyſical matter of this corporeal univerſe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal *Hyle*, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by ſome junior Platoniſts, but older than *Ariſtotle* himſelf, as appeareth plainly from theſe following words of his in his Metaphyſicks, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, εἴτε σῶμα, εἴτε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν, *Some ſpeak of the principle as matter; whether they ſuppoſe this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal.* But this incorporeal matter in phyſiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphyſical nonſenſe. Again, others ſeem to have been the more prone to think matter or body to have been ſelf-exiſtent and unmade, becauſe they both conceived it to be really the ſame thing with ſpace, and alſo took it for granted, that ſpace was infinite and eternal, and conſequently neceſſarily exiſtent. In anſwer whereunto, we reply firſt, that though ſpace and diſtance ſhould be granted to be poſitively infinite, or to have no

L. 1. c. 6. [*P.* 273. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Thus *Porphyr.* Τῇ ὕλῃ τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τὰς ἀρχαίας τάδε ἀσώματας, *&c. Materiæ Proprietates, ſecundum Veteres, hæ ſunt; Quod ſit Incorporea, &c.* [In Sentent. ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, §. XXI. p. 226. Ed. Cantab.]

no bounds nor limits at all, as alſo to have been eternal; yet, according to the opinion of ſome, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and neceſſarily exiſtent; not as if ſpace or diſtance could exiſt alone by it ſelf, an accident without a ſubſtance, it being plainly impoſſible, that nothing ſhould have any accidents, modifications and attributes, or be menſurable by yards and poles; but becauſe this ſpace is by them ſuppoſed, not to be the extenſion of body, but the infinite and unbounded extenſion of the Deity. But, in the next place, if ſpace be concluded to be certainly nothing elſe but the extenſion and diſtance of body, or matter, conſidered in general, (without reſpect to this or that particular body) and abſtractly in order to the conception of motion, and the menſuration of things; (for ſpace thus conſidered, is neceſſarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof reſpectively; as the two extremes of a yard diſtance can never poſſibly come nearer to one another:) then do we ſay, that there appeareth no ſufficient ground for this poſitive infinity of ſpace, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never ſo great, it is not impoſſible, but that it might be ſtill greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increaſableneſs of body and ſpace ſeems to be miſtaken for a poſitive infinity thereof. Whereas, for this very reaſon, becauſe it can never be ſo great, but that more magnitude may ſtill be added to it, therefore can it never be poſitively infinite. Nor is there perhaps ſo great an abſurdity in this, that another world could not poſſibly be made a mile diſtant from this, for as much as there being nothing between them, they muſt needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exteriour ſurface of it, ſince it might be either ſpherical, cubical or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatſoever the maker pleaſed to form it in. To conclude therefore, by ſpace without the finite world, is to be underſtood nothing but the poſſibility of body, further and further, without end, yet ſo as never to reach to infinity; and ſuch a ſpace as this was there alſo, before this world was created, a poſſibility of ſo much body to be produced. But ſpace and actual diſtance, as really menſurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be poſitively infinite, ſo as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence, to prove the neceſſary exiſtence of matter.

Moreover, the exiſtence of a Deity might be further demonſtrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing caſually; becauſe, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect Being, ſince it muſt have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; ſo neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or underſtanding at all. For ſingular bodies exiſting without us cannot enter into us, and put underſtanding in us; nor is there any thing but local motions propagated from them to our organs of ſenſe. The Mind muſt have its immediate Intelligibles within it ſelf, for otherwiſe it could not poſſibly underſtand any thing; which Intelligibles and their relations to one another, or Verities, are (as was ſaid before) eternal. Moreover, the mind

Mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually exiſting, but alſo of all poſſibilities; which plainly implies and ſuppoſes the actual exiſtence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of Mind and Underſtanding is a perfect Being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect Being, comprehending it ſelf and the extent of its own power, or the poſſibilities of all things, is the firſt original Mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it ſelf, and its own power, or all the poſſibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas muſt have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, *Nothing from nothing*, that the powers of ſenſe and underſtanding, or the entities of ſoul and mind, could never have reſulted from any modifications of ſenſleſs matter whatſoever. Wherefore, ſince it is mathematically certain, that our human ſouls and perſons could not poſſibly have been generated out of matter, one of theſe two things will undeniably follow; That either they muſt all have exiſted of themſelves, from eternity unmade; or elſe have been created ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων, *out of an antecedent non-exiſtence*, by a perfect underſtanding Being unmade, or at leaſt have derived their whole ſubſtance from it. So that it is altogether as certain, that there is a God, as that our human ſouls and perſons did not all exiſt from eternity of themſelves. And that there muſt be ſome eternal, unmade Mind, hath been already demonſtrated alſo from the ſame principle, *Nothing out of nothing*. Thus, have we abundantly confuted the ſecond atheiſtick argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor divine creation, becauſe nothing can be made out of nothing; we having plainly ſhewed, that this very principle, in the true ſenſe thereof, affordeth a demonſtration for the contrary.

THE ſix following atheiſtick argumentations, driving at theſe two things, Firſt, the diſproving of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity; (from both which, the Atheiſts conceive, it muſt follow of neceſſity, that there can be none at all;) we ſhall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform theſe three things. Firſt, we ſhall anſwer the atheiſtick argumentations againſt an incorporeal Deity, (contained in the third and fourth heads.) Secondly, we ſhall ſhew, that from the very principles of the atheiſtick corporealiſm, (as repreſented in the fifth and ſixth heads) incorporeal ſubſtance is demonſtrable. And laſtly, that there being undeniably incorporeal ſubſtance, the two following atheiſtick argumentations alſo, againſt a corporeal Deity, (in the ſeventh and eighth ſections) prove altogether inſignificant.

We begin with the firſt of theſe; to ſhew the invalidity of the atheiſtick argumentations againſt an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already obſerved, that

though all Corporealiſts be not therefore of neceſſity Atheiſts, yet Atheiſts univerſally have been Corporealiſts; this being always their firſt and grand poſtulatum, That there is no other ſubſtance beſides body. Thus *Plato* long ago declared concerning them; διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινὰ, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. *Soph.* p. 172. *Ficin.* [P. 160.] *They contend ſtrongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can reſiſt their touch; concluding body and ſubſtance to be one and the ſelf-ſame thing: and if any one ſhould affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will preſently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him.* For there can be no doubt, but that the perſons here intended by *Plato* were thoſe very Atheiſts, which himſelf ſpake of afterward, in the ſame dialogue[1]; μῶν τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι φήσομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης; *Whether ſhall we aſſent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by ſo many, That nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cauſe, without the direction of any Mind or Underſtanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reaſon and knowledge, proceeding from God?* Indeed the philoſopher there tells us, that ſome of theſe atheiſtick perſons began then to be ſomewhat aſhamed of making prudence, and juſtice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies, ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὧν ἠρώτησας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διϊσχυρίζεσθαι. *Though they affirm concerning the ſoul it ſelf, that this ſeems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and thoſe other virtues mentioned, ſome have now ſcarcely the confidence to maintain theſe to be either bodies or nothing.* But this (ſaith he) was indeed no leſs than the quite giving up of the cauſe of atheiſm; εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλυσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ, *becauſe, if it be but once granted, that there is never ſo little incorporeal, this will be ſufficient to overthrow the atheiſtick foundation.* Wherefore he concludes, that ſuch as theſe were but mongrel and imperfect Atheiſts, ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν γ' ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθείεν, οἵ γε αὐτῶν παρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διαλείψουσιν ἄν, πᾶν ὅ μὴ δυναλοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν, ὡς ἆρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστι· *For they, who are thorough-paced and genuine Atheiſts indeed, will boggle at neither of thoſe forementioned things, but contend, that whatſoever they cannot graſp with their hands, is altogether nothing.* That is, that there is no other ſubſtance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or reſiſts the touch. *Ariſtotle* alſo repreſenteth the atheiſtick hypotheſis after the ſame manner, τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων· *They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the ſubſtance, that is; and that all other things are but the paſſions and affections thereof.* *Met. l.* 1. *c.* 7. [P 274. Tom. IV. Oper.] And again, in his Metaphyſicks, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν. *Theſe men maintain all to be one, and that there is but one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude.* And now we ſee plainly, that the ancient Atheiſts were of the very ſame mind with theſe in-

[1] P. 163.

in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal substance would be the same with an incorporeal body, *i. e.* an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For first, the Democriticks and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, That whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing; (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended;) did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass thorough; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritick Atheists.

To which we reply, That if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite, incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by it self, without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance, that is infinite. But here will *Gassendus* step in, to help out his good friends the Democriticks and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by it self, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident, nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth subsist by it self. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor mensurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be mensurable by yards and poles. We conclude therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance

ſubſtance, whoſe affection its extenſion is; and becauſe there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extenſion of an incorporeal Deity; juſt as ſome learned Theiſts and Incorporealiſts have aſſerted. And thus is the argument of theſe Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts, againſt an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifeſt, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would diſprove the ſame, it is againſt themſelves demonſtrable.

To which it might be here further added, that *Epicurus*, who profeſſedly oppoſed *Plato*'s incorporeal God, as an impoſſibility, did notwithſtanding manifeſtly contradict himſelf, when he aſſerted ſuch a Democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum, (though, according to him, the only principles of body,) that ſo they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in thoſe verſes of *Lucretius* [1],

Tenuis enim natura deûm, longeque remota
Senſibus à noſtris, animi vix mente videtur.
Quæ quoniam manuum tactum ſuffugit & ictum,
Tactile nil nobis quod ſit, contingere debet.
Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipſum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elſewhere made by him the very eſſence of body;) and laſtly, ſuch as had not *corpus*, but *quaſi corpus*, and therefore muſt needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that *Epicurus* colluded in all this; himſelf not believing a jot of it, nor any ſuch gods at all.

But other Atheiſts there were, who concluding likewiſe, That whatſoever was unextended was nothing, were ſenſible of the inconvenience of making ſpace thus to be a thing really diſtinct from body, (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal ſubſtance;) and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in *Ariſtotle*, μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, *one only nature, and that bodily*; ſpace being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantaſm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghoſt, apparition, or ſpectre of a body; or elſe indeed the very extenſion of body it ſelf, conſidered in general, and abſtractly, from this or that ſingular body, moveable. And theſe men therefore framed their argumentation againſt an incorporeal Deity after this manner: Nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude, (becauſe that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and conſequently nothing.) But whatſoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other ſubſtance beſides body; and conſequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or elſe to put the argument into a more approveable ſyllogiſtick form; whatſoever is extended, is body, or

[1] Lib. V. ver. 149.

or corporeal; but whatſoever is, is extended. Therefore whatſoever is, is body, or corporeal. And by conſequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the aſſertors of incorporeal ſubſtance have replied two manner of ways. For firſt, the generality of the ancient Incorporealiſts taking it for granted, that whatſoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was diviſible, as alſo probably impenetrable by any thing elſe extended, becauſe there can be no penetration of dimenſions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or ſwallowed up into another, but muſt of neceſſity ſtand without it, adding ſo much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their aſſent to that propoſition, That whatſoever is extended into longitude, latitude and profundity, is body. But being ſtrongly perſuaded of the exiſtence of ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, they denied that other propoſition of theirs, that whatſoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that beſides body, or extended ſubſtance, there was another ſubſtance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἄποσος, and ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, *unextended*, and devoid of *quantity* and *magnitude*, without *parts*, and *indiviſible*. That *Plato* himſelf philoſophized after this manner, might be proved from ſundry paſſages of his writings; as that in his tenth *De Legibus*, where he affirmeth, that the ſoul it ſelf, and thoſe things, which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερα μήκης σωμάτων καὶ βάθης καὶ πλάτης, *in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies*. Where, doubtleſs, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude and profundity in ſouls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude and profundity, being the eſſential properties of body only, ſoul and cogitation, as devoid of theſe, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that in his *Timæus*, where ſpeaking of place, ſpace, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error, That whatſoever is, muſt of neceſſity be in ſome place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἕδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν——πρὸς ὃ οἱ μὲν ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φαμὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που, τὸ οὖν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινὰ· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῇ, μητέπου κατ' οὐρανόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι· *The third kind is that of ſpace, which gives room to all things, that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, That every thing, that is, muſt of neceſſity be in ſome place, and poſſeſs a certain room and ſpace, and that whatſoever is not ſomewhere, either in earth, or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowſy or dreaming imagination*, (ſaith he,) *like a ghoſt, continually haunteth and poſſeſſeth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity*. Whereas this philoſopher himſelf, diſcourſing elſewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, *the vaſt ſea of pulchritude*, deſcribeth him after this manner; οὐδέπου ὄν, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ, μεθ' αὑτοῦ, μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα· *As that, which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but it ſelf alone by it ſelf, and with it ſelf, all other beautiful things partaking of it*. And as for *Ariſtotle*'s ſenſe in this particular; that

that he here departed not, as he did in ſome other things, from his maſter *Plato*, may appear from that whole chapter, or ſection, at the end of his phyſicks, ſpent upon this very ſubject, to prove, ὅτι τᾶτ' ἀμερὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος, *That his firſt Immoveable Mover* (which is God Almighty) *muſt of neceſſity be devoid of parts, or indiviſible, and have no magnitude at all.* The concluſion of which ſection, and his whole book of Phyſicks [1], is this, διωρισμένων δὲ τάτων, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινᾶν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι πεπερασμένου αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν ἓν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀδύναλον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν· φανερὸν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαιρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερὲς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος. *Theſe things being thus determined, it is manifeſtly impoſſible, that the firſt Mover ſhould have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that muſt of neceſſity be either finite, or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonſtrated in the Phyſicks; and that nothing, which hath a finite magnitude, can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the firſt mover is indiviſible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all.* Which ſame Doctrine is again taught and aſſerted by *Ariſtotle*, in his Metaphyſicks, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τὶς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον· *From what hath been declared, it is manifeſt, that there is an eternal and immoveable ſubſtance, ſeparate from ſenſibles; as alſo, that this ſubſtance cannot poſſibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indiviſible. Becauſe no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no ſuch thing poſſible as infinite magnitude.* Neither doth *Ariſtotle* appropriate this to the ſupreme Deity, *To be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts*, and conſequently *indiviſible*; he ſomewhere [2] attributing the ſame alſo to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, *every thing, that is devoid of matter, is indiviſible, as the human mind.* And the like doth he aſſert, at once, both concerning the mundane, and the human ſoul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculouſly (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to *Plato*, ὃ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἓν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχὴς. ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερὴς, ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθός τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὢν, ὅτῳ οὐκ ἔστιν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτᾶ; μορίων δὲ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθός, ἢ κατὰ σῶμα· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ σῶμα, οὐταὶ δ' ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. Ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ. *It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane, or rational ſoul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the ſame with the Intelligibles. But theſe are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not ſo continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could*

P. 14. *c.* 7. [P. 480. Tom. IV. Oper.]

De An. l. 1. *c.* 3. [P. 9, 10. Tom. II. Oper.]

[1] P. 608. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Metaphyſ. L. 14. Cap. IX. p. 484. Tom. IV. Oper.

it underſtand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as leſſer magnitudes; ſince either way there would be an innumerable company of intellections? Moreover, how can it conceive any thing, that is indiviſible, by what is diviſible? Furthermore, in this ſame book *De Animâ*[1], *Ariſtotle* ſtifly denies ſouls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwiſe than by accident, as they are ſaid to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus *Simplicius*[2], ὅρα ὡς πανταχῆ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, *See how* Ariſtotle *doth every where remove, or exclude from the ſoul, corporeal* (or local) *motions.* And again, ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἴτια κἂν πρῶτα κἂν μέσα κἂν ἔσχατα ᾖ, Ariſtotle *will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatſoever, whether of the firſt, ſecond, or loweſt rank, (they being all the cauſes of motion) themſelves to be moved.* *Philoponus*[3] likewiſe, ὁρᾷς ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναί φησι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν. *You ſee how* Ariſtotle, *reſpecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the ſoul, that it is immoveable. For whatſoever is in a place* (and moveable) *is body.* Laſtly, in that paſſage before cited, *Ariſtotle* plainly makes the eſſence of corporeal ſubſtance, as oppoſed to incorporeal, to conſiſt in magnitude. *Fol. 6.*

Beſides *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, we might here inſtance in ſundry other of the ancient Incorporealiſts, who clearly maintained the ſame doctrine *Philo* doth not only aſſert in general a double eſſence or ſubſtance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, *a diſtant, and indiſtant one*; but ſomewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity, ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος καὶ περιεχόμενος, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ· οὐδαμοῦ μὲν ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγένηκε τὸ· δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων θέμις εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, &c. *All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where, and no where. No where, becauſe himſelf created ſpace and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, becauſe he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world deſtitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himſelf, hath bound them faſt with inviſible bonds.* But none hath more induſtriouſly purſued this buſineſs, than *Plotinus*, who every where aſſerts body and magnitude to be one and the ſame thing; and that, beſides this, there is another ſubſtance incorporeal, which, conſequently, is ἄποσος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερὴς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally diſtant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, *it having in its nature tranſcended the imperfection of quantity.* And who hath alſo written two whole books[4] upon this very ſubject, τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ ἅμα παντοχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον, *That one and the ſelf-ſame numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where.* Wherein his prin- *De Conſuſ. Ling. p. 339.*

 cipal

[1] Lib. I. Cap. IV. p. 12. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] Comment. in Libros Ariſtot. de Animâ, fol. 6. Ed. Græc. Franc. Aſulani, Venet. 1527. fol.
[3] Comment. in Libros tres Ariſtot. de Animâ, fol. 13, Ed. Græc. Venet. 1553. fol.
[4] Lib. IV. & V. Ennead. VI.

cipal design was to prove, that *the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there*; and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another, (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles;) but the whole undivided Deity every where, Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων (saith he) *God is before all things, that are in a place.* And [1] θαυμάζειν δὲ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη· αὐτῷ πόπου ὄκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τοῦτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι, *It is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλος, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present.* Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that, which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind; τὸ ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, παντα χοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἔννοια φησὶν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεόν, ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν· *That one and the same numerical substance (to wit, of the Deity) is at once entirely every where, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind, when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God, who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all.* Where the philosopher subjoins, καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχὴ, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, &c. *And this is the firmest of all principles, that, which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination.* Moreover, he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly; ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, *As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand, and in the foot.* And again, εἶτα πῶς ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς, ἃ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷδε· *Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not, in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul, or Deity,* which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, *Simplicius* [2], proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus; τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀμερὲς εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, ἃ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ἐφαρμόττειν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινοῦν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον. *Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible, and indistant; for were it divisible, and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved.* Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it, ἃ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενον κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι βουλεύεσθαι, διαιρεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις· *The soul, being not moved by corporeal, or local motions,*

P. 667. [Lib. IV. Cap. IX]

P. 644.

[1] Lib. IV. Ennead. VI. Cap. III. p. 647. [2] Ubi supra, fol. 7.

tions, (for in reſpect of theſe it is immoveable) but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Conſultation and Deliberation, &c.) by theſe moveth bodies locally. And that this was really *Plato*'s meaning alſo, when he determined the ſoul to be a ſelf-moving ſubſtance, and the cauſe of all bodily motion; that moving itſelf in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally, (notwithſtanding that *Ariſtotle* would not take notice of it) ſufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek ſcholiaſts themſelves upon *Ariſtotle*'s *De Animâ*. Thus again *Simplicius* elſewhere, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχή, οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις, *Since the ſoul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion.*

We ſhould omit the teſtimonies of any more philoſophers, were it not that we find *Porphyrius* ſo full and expreſs herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, his *Manuduction to Intelligibles*; Πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, *That though every body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly incorporeal, is in a place:* and who afterwards further purſues it in this manner, οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον· ὅπου ἔλεται· οἴκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἄοικον παντελῶς ἢ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμοιρον, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποίᾳ ἔχειν εὑρίσκεται, ὅπου ἢ διάκειται· ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῷ φανερὰ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῷ γίνεται· *Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that, which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewiſe devoid of local motion. Wherefore it is only preſent by a certain diſpoſition, and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its preſence there diſcernible otherwiſe, than by its operations and effects.* Again, concerning the three divine hypoſtaſes he writeth thus; ὁ Θεὸς πάνταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, ἢ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, ἢ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, &c. *The ſupreme God is therefore every where, becauſe he is no where; and the ſame is true alſo of the ſecond and third divine hypoſtaſis, Nous and Pſyche. The ſupreme God is every where and no where, in reſpect of thoſe things which are after him, and only his own, and in himſelf. Nous, or Intellect, is in the ſupreme God, every where and no where, as to thoſe things, that are after him. Pſyche, or the mundane ſoul, is both in intellect and the ſupreme God, and every where and no where, as to bodies. Laſtly, body is both in the ſoul of the world, and in God.* Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to ſay, that the *corporeal world is in God, than God in it*; becauſe the world is held and contained in the divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his ſenſe after this manner [1]; οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν ἔν τι ἐπινοηθείη ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενὸν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦναι ἐνεργείᾳ, *Nor, if there were conceived to be ſuch an incorporeal ſpace, or vacuum,* (as *Democritus* and *Epicurus* ſuppoſed) *could Mind, or God, poſſibly exiſt in this empty ſpace* (as co-extended with the ſame) *for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing.* And again [2], ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διαλικῶς πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώμαλον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς

P. 229, 230. [§. XXVIII. Ed. Cantab.]

P. 231.

[1] In Appendice ſententiarum, five graduum ad Intelligibilia, §. XLIV. p. 278. Ed. Cantab.

[2] Part II. Sententiarum ad Intelligibilia docentium, §. XXXV. p. 241.

ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἄμερες ἐν διαλείπῳ ὅλου γίνεσθαι κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν ὂν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς πάρεστι καὶ ἀπλησθύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληθυσμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ, *The corporeal world is diſtantly preſent to the intelligible, (or the Deity ;) and that is indiviſibly and indiſtantly preſent with the world. But when that, which is indiſtant and unextended, is preſent with that, which is diſtant and extended ; then is the whole of the former one and the ſame numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indiviſibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) preſent with that, which is naturally diviſible, and multipliable, and in a place.* Laſtly, he affirmeth the ſame likewiſe of the human ſoul, that this is alſo οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, *a ſubſtance devoid of magnitude*, and which is not locally preſent to this or that body, but by diſpoſition and energy ; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly [1].

And as for Chriſtian writers, beſides *Origen*, who was ſo famous an aſſerter of incorporeal ſubſtance, that (as *Socrates* [2] recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to *Theophilus* the Alexandrian biſhop, unleſs he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of *Origen*, and profeſs the belief of a corporeal God of human form ; and who alſo maintained incorporeal ſubſtance to be unextended, as might be proved from ſundry paſſages, both of his book againſt *Celſus*, and that *Peri Archon* ; we ſay, (beſides *Origen*, and others of the Greeks) St. *Auſtin* amongſt the Latins clearly aſſerted the ſame ; he maintaining in his book *De Quantitate Animæ* [3], and elſewhere, concerning the human ſoul, that being incorporeal, it hath no dimenſions of length, breadth and profundity, and is *illocabilis*, no where as in a place. We ſhall conclude with the teſtimony of *Boëthius*, who was both a philoſopher and a Chriſtian ; *Quædam ſunt* (ſaith he [4]) *communes animi conceptiones, per ſe notæ, apud ſapientes tantum ; ut incorporalia non eſſe in loco ; There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themſelves amongſt wiſe men only ; as this for example, That incorporeals are in no place.* From whence it is manifeſt, that the generality of reputed wiſe men were not formerly of this opinion, *Quod nuſquam eſt, nihil eſt, That what is no where, or in no certain place, is nothing* ; and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unqueſtionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal ſubſtance being unextended, indiſtant, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor firſt ſtarted in the ſcholaſtick age ; but that it was the general perſuaſion of the moſt ancient and learned aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance, eſpecially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the ſubſtance thereof menſurable by yards and poles, as if there were ſo much of it contained in one room, and ſo much

[1] Vide Part. I. Sententiar. §. XVIII. p. 225.

[2] Hiſtor. Eccleſ. Lib. VI. Cap. VII. p. 310.

[3] It is publiſh'd in the firſt Tome of the Benedictine Edition of St. *Auguſtine*'s Works.

[4] Dr. *Cudworth* ſeems to have quoted this paſſage from memory out of *Boethius*'s Book, intitled, *Quomodo Subſtantiæ in eo, quod ſint, bonæ ſint, cum non ſint Subſtantialia bona*, p. 167.

much and no more in another, according to their ſeveral dimenſions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and conſequently no where locally after the manner of bodies. But, becauſe this opinion ſeems ſo ſtrange and paradoxical, and lies under ſo great prejudices, we ſhall in the next place ſhow, how theſe ancient Incorporealiſts endeavoured to acquit themſelves, in repelling the ſeveral efforts and plauſibilities made againſt it. The firſt whereof is this, That to ſuppoſe incorporeal ſubſtances unextended and diviſible is to make them abſolute parvitudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itſelf) contemptible: ſince they muſt of neceſſity be either phyſical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reaſon of their littleneſs, (if there be any ſuch thing) or elſe meer mathematical points, which are not ſo much as mentally diviſible: ſo that thouſands of theſe incorporeal ſubſtances, or ſpirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long ſince thus replied by *Plotinus*, ἀχ ὕτω δὲ ἀμερὲς ὡς μικρὸν· ὅτω γὰρ ἀόδεν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσαι· καὶ ὁ παυτὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· ἀδ' ἂν αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσαι· ἀλλ' ἀδ' ὕτως ὡς σημεῖον, ὁ γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκ☉, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει· *God, and all other incorporeal ſubſtances, are not ſo indiviſible, as if they were parvitudes or little things, as phyſical points; for ſo would they ſtill be mathematically diviſible; nor yet as if they were mathematical points neither, which indeed are no bodies nor ſubſtances, but only the* termini *of a line. And neither of theſe ways could the Deity* congruere *with the world; nor ſouls with their reſpective bodies, ſo as to be all preſent with the whole of them.* Again, he writeth particularly concerning the Deity thus; ἄτε ὕτως ἀμερὲς, ὡς τὸ σμικρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων, ὁ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·——λητλέον δὲ ἀ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν, ὁ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ, ἢ τᾶ μεγέθος, ἢ τᾶ ἀριθμᾶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπλῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. *God is not ſo indiviſible, as if he were the ſmalleſt or leaſt of things, for he is the greateſt of all, not in reſpect of magnitude, but of power. Moreover, as he is indiviſible, ſo is he alſo to be acknowledged infinite; not as if he were a magnitude, or a number, which could never be paſt thorough, but becauſe his power is incomprehenſible.* Moreover, the ſame philoſopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, proceeding from ſenſe and imagination, that whatſoever is unextended, and indiſtant, muſt therefore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary, the vulgar to be much miſtaken, as to true greatneſs and littleneſs; μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ ἀϊδηλὸν, ἀπορᾶμεν πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀ τοσάτῳ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκλείνειαι· τὸ δὲ ἐστι τᾶτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζειαι μικρὸν εἶναι μέγα· ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τάτᾳ μέρ☉ φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τᾶτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτᾶ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχᾶ πᾶν ἀ μεῖζον ἑαυτᾶ. *We commonly, looking upon this ſenſible world as great, wonder how that* (indiviſible and unextended) *nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be preſent with it. Whereas that, which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that, which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Foraſmuch as the whole of this diffuſeth itſelf through every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal univerſe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itſelf.* To the ſame purpoſe alſo *Porphyrius*, τὸ ὄντως ὂν ὅτε μέγα, ὅτε μικρόν ἐστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα ἀ μικρὸν κυρίως οἷκα ἴδια) ἐκθεθηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα ἀ μικρόν· ἀ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον ἀ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταὐτὸ ἀ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ ἀ εὑρίσκειαι ἅμα ὑπὸ παυτὸς μεγ'σ', ἀ

P. 656. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IV. Cap. XIII.]

P. 764. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IX.]

P. 645. [Ennead. VI. Lib. IV. Cap. II.]

Sent. p. 243. [§. XXXVI.]

κὴ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλαχίστου εὑρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονόησις· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπορήσεις πῶ μέγιστον ὂν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλέν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὂν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιαθὲν, ἢ αὐξηθὲν. *The Deity, which is the only true Being, is neither great nor little, (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk, or magnitude ;) but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing, that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little, (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful, than any thing that is great ;) so that it is above both the greatest and the least ; it being found all one and the same by every greatest, and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing*, (that is, in a way of quantity) *for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted ; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither ; for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented.* In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible ; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position ; a point being, according to *Aristotle*[1], a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* with all the greatest things ; nor yet as a great thing, in a way of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little ; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as *Aristotle* before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of *thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point* ; and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorporeal substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it ; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all) nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it ; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute non-entity, forasmuch as magnitude or extension are the very essence of being or entity, as such ; so that there can be neither substance, nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended, is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtile body ; in which sense fire was, by some in *Aristotle*[2], said to be, μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, and ἀσωματώτατον, *the most*

[1] De Animâ, Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 13. [2] De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Vide etiam Metaphys. Lib. XIII. Cap. XII. Oper. p. 471. Tom. IV. Oper.

moſt incorporeal of all the elements ; and *Ariſtotle*[1] himſelf uſeth the word in the ſame manner, when he affirmeth, that all philoſophers did define the ſoul by three things, motion, ſenſe, and incorporeity ; ſeveral of thoſe, there mentioned by him, underſtanding the ſoul to be no otherwiſe incorporeal, than as σῶμα λεπτόμερες, *a thin and ſubtle body*. In anſwer to which objection, we may remember, that *Plato*, in the paſſage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatſoever doth not take up ſpace, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have ſprung from men's adhering too much to thoſe lower faculties of ſenſe and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal. And accordingly *Plotinus* ; ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φησὶν, οὐκ ἐκτεθείσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γενομένην, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτεθὲν πᾶν αὐτῷ μετειληφέναι, ὅλῳ δὲ ἀδιαστάτῳ αὐτῷ. *Senſe indeed, which we attending to, diſbelieve theſe things, tells us of here and there ; but reaſon dictates, that here and there is ſo to be underſtood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but becauſe every extended thing, and the ſeveral parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indiſtant and unextended.* To the ſame purpoſe *Porphyrius*, δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κεκρατοῦντας τῆς ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πρασσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται· *We ought therefore, in our diſquiſitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conſerve the property of each, and not to confound their natures ; but eſpecially to take heed, that our phancy and imagination do not ſo far impoſe upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accuſtomed to bodies ; but as for incorporeals, ſcarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, ſo long as they are held under the power of their imagination.* Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we ſhould think of incorporeals, ſo as not to confound their natures with corporeals ; ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τὸ διαστατὸν παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, ὅτε μεριεῖ πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδοὺν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχειν ἑαυτὸ πόλλα πλησιαθὲν· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσί τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ οἰκουμένου, ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διηρημένως ἀπολαύειν αὐτοῦ. *That the indiſtant and unextended Deity is the whole of it preſent in infinite parts of the diſtant world, neither divided, as applying part to part ; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of thoſe things, that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and the ſame in number) is preſent to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of thoſe many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly ; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly.* It was granted therefore by theſe ancients, that this unextended, and indiſtant nature of incorporeals is ἀφάντασον, *a thing altogether unimaginable* ; and this was concluded by them to be the only reaſon, why ſo many have pronounced it to be impoſſible, becauſe they attended only to ſenſe and imagination, and made them the only meaſure of things and truth ; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them, (as *Porphyrius* tells us) that imagination and intellection are but two different names for

P. 656.

ΑΦ. p. 242.

[1] De Animâ Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Oper.

P. 224. 'Αφ. for one and the same thing; ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ἡ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζώῳ φαντασία δέδοκται αὐτοῖς νόησις, *There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and phancy; phancy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection.* But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond phancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do, or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a non-entity, meerly for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but ὄγκοι, *bulks*, or *tumours*, devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are ἄογκοι δυνάμεις, *substantial powers*, *vigours*, and *activities*; which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain βάθος in them in another sense, an *essential profundity*, according to this of *Simplicius*, μεριστὴ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μερίων κειμένων· ἀμέριστος δὲ εἰλικρινῶς ἡ νοερὰ, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα, *All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here, and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense.* But that there is something ἀφανάστον, *unimaginable*, even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible, or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς ποδιαῖον, *as of a foot diameter*[a]; and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore, if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion, or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be, as to things insensible. Besides all which, the ancient

In Ar. Phys. p. 3.

[a] Vide Ciceron. Acad. Quæstion. Lib. IV. Cap. XXVI. p. 2294. Tom. VIII. Oper.

ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a substance, whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also ἄχρονον αἰῶν, a *timeless eternity*, or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time, (which is one of *Plato*'s [1] γεννητὰ, *things generated*, or that had a beginning) this parity of reason is by *Plotinus* thus insisted on, διὸ οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνου ἔξω, τῷ μὲν χρόνῳ σκιδναμένῳ αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τῷδ' αἰῶνι ἐ τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντι καὶ καθ' ἑνὶ, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει αἰδίῳ τῷ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος εἶναι χρόνου. *For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time, in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length.* Now, the reason, why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only, because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered and confined to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, μαντείαν τινὰ, *a certain vaticination*, of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration. p. 669. [Ennead. VI. Lib. V. Cap. XI.]

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God, and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as σῶμα λεπτομερες, *a thin and subtile body*, such as wind or vapour, air or æther; it is certain, that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomick philosophy, (before it was atheized) there being no such real quality of subtilty or tenuity, (because this is altogether unintelligible) but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtile body, that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opake, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystallized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid as the finest æther. So that there is no specifick difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opake and pellucid, an hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason, why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists, (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtile, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.

[1] In Timæo, p. 529. Oper.

But it is further objected againſt this unextended nature, of incorporeal ſubſtances, as they are ſaid to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into, or act upon; that this is an abſolute contradiction and impoſſibility, becauſe if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that muſt needs be another whole, and nothing the ſame with the former. In like manner, if the whole human ſoul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and ſo not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealiſts made this two-fold reply. Firſt, in way of conceſſion, That this is indeed an abſolute contradiction for an extended ſubſtance, or body, to be all of it in every one part of that ſpace, which the whole occupieth. Thus *Plotinus*; *En.* 4. *L.* 7. *p.* 460. σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν, *It is is impoſſible for a body, or extended ſubſtance, to be one and the ſame, all of it in every part of that ſpace, which it poſſeſſes; and for every part thereof, to be the ſame with the whole.* But ſecondly, as for an unextended and indiſtant ſubſtance, which hath no parts one without another, it is ſo far from being a contradiction, that it ſhould be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe, only a part in a part thereof, ſo that an equal quantity of both ſhould co-exiſt together, becauſe this is to ſuppoſe an unextended ſubſtance to be extended. We ſay it is contradictious to the nature of that ſubſtance, which is ſuppoſed to be, ἀμεγέθης, ἄποσος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, ἀδιαίρετος, *devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indiſtant, and indiviſible*; that it ſhould be otherwiſe united to, or conjoined with an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as ſuch conjuring; namely, that the whole of it ſhould be preſent with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus *P.* 662. *Plotinus*, ὅτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας· *This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is neceſſarily taken from the thing itſelf (viz.* the nature of them as unextended) *and hath nothing in it aliene from that eſſence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith.* Whatſoever is unextended and indiſtant, cannot poſſibly co-exiſt with an extended ſubſtance, point by point, and part by part, but it muſt of neceſſity be, ὅλον ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, *All of it, one and the ſame numerically*; that is, (like itſelf) undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is ſaid, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole ſoul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a poſitive ſenſe, for a whole conſiſting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, *an whole undivided*; ſo that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the ſoul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον *P.* 662. μὴ μεμερισμένον, *every where all of it, undividedly.* Thus again *Plotinus*, εἰ ἓν παντάχοῦ θεὸς, ἀχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· ὃ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη,

εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστου αὐτῶ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὧδὶ, τὸ δὲ ὧδὶ ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλὰ, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἔτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἄνθρώπω, ὁμῶ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι· *If therefore God be every-where, it cannot poſſibly be, that he ſhould be ſo dividedly; becauſe then himſelf would not be every-where, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the whole world; himſelf being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude. Laſtly, this would be the very ſame, as to make God a body.* Now if theſe things be impoſſible, then muſt that ſo much diſbelieved thing (look'd upon as ſuch a puzzling *griphus*, or rather as contradictious nonſenſe) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is every where; to wit, that he is all of him the ſame whole, undividedly, every where. The ſum of all is, that though it be an abſolute contradiction, for a body, or *quantum*, to be ὁμῶ πᾶν, *all of it in every part* of that ſpace, which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indiſtant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but on the contrary, it would be flatly contradictious to it, to ſay, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indiviſible thing into parts.

The fourth and laſt objection againſt incorporeal and unextended ſubſtance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human ſouls, and other finite particular ſpirits, ſuch as dæmons or angels; that this is not only itſelf very abſurd, to ſuppoſe theſe finite and particular beings, to be thus illocal and immovable, no where, and every where; (from whence it would ſeem to follow, that they might act the whole corporeal univerſe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where) but alſo, that this conceit is contradictious to the very principles of religioniſts themſelves, and plainly confuted by the ſame; they acknowledging univerſally, that human ſouls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called *Hades*, *Hell*, or *Inferi*. Now the latter part of this objection is firſt to be anſwered. And this is indeed a thing, which the ancient aſſertors of incorporeal ſubſtance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly received tradition, of human ſouls (after death) going into Hades, might be objected againſt them. For the ſatisfying whereof, *Plotinus* ſuggeſteth theſe two things; Firſt, Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἅδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἀϊδεῖ τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται· *That if by Hades be meant nothing but* τὸ ἀειδὲς, *the inviſible*, (as many times it is) *then is there no more ſignified by the ſoul's going into Hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itſelf, and ſo hath it nothing of place neceſſarily included in it.* Secondly, Εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον· τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἓ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κἀκείνῃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ οὔσῃ ἔτι σώματι; ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ ἓ τὸ εἴδωλον· *But if by Hades be underſtood a certain worſer place, (as ſometimes it alſo is)* *En. 6. l. 4.* [Cap. XVI. p. 659.]

what wonder is this? ſince now where our body is, there in the ſame place is our ſoul ſaid to be alſo? But you will reply, how can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We anſwer, that if the idol of the ſoul be not quite ſeparated from it, why ſhould not the ſoul itſelf be ſaid to be there alſo, where its idol is? Where, by the idol of the ſoul, *Plotinus* ſeems to mean an airy or ſpirituous body, quickned and vitalized by the ſoul, adhering to it after death. But when the ſame philoſopher ſuppoſes this very idol of the ſoul to be alſo ſeparable from it, and that ſo as to ſubſiſt apart by itſelf too, this going alone into Hades, or the worſer place, whilſt that liveth only in the intelligible world, (where there is no place nor diſtance) lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and ſo ſituate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both abſurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the ſoul as it were into two, and forgat the doctrine of his own ſchool, which, as himſelf elſewhere intimateth, was this; τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν τὸ δὲ μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, ὰ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι· *That our ſoul, though it ſhall quit this body, yet ſhall it never be diſunited from all body.* Wherefore *Porphyrius* anſwering the ſame objection, though he were otherwiſe much addicted to *Plotinus*, and here uſes his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagorick tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was this, *That human ſouls are always united to ſome body or other.* Ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῆς ἐστιν, ὰ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὅ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· ὅτω καὶ ἐν ἅδῃ εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἅδης ὑπώγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινὸς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ἅδῃ γίνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἴδωλον· ἐξελθόσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔνυγρον, ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, ὅτω καὶ αὐτὴ λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται· *As the ſoul's being here upon earth,* (ſaith he) *is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its preſiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; ſo is its being in Hades nothing but its preſiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whoſe nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark ſubſiſtence. Wherefore, if Hades be taken for a ſubterraneous and dark place, yet may the ſoul nevertheleſs be ſaid to go into Hades, becauſe when it quits this groſs earthy body, a more ſpirituous and ſubtile body, collected from the ſpheres* (or elements) *doth ſtill accompany it. Which ſpirit being moiſt and heavy, and naturally deſcending to the ſubterraneous places, the ſoul itſelf may be ſaid in this ſenſe to go under the earth alſo with it, not as if the ſubſtance thereof paſſed from one place to another, but becauſe of its relation and vital union to a body which does ſo.* Where *Porphyrius* addeth, contrary to the ſenſe of *Plotinus*; That *the ſoul is never quite naked of all body, but hath alway ſome body or other joined with it ſuitable and agreeable to its own preſent diſpoſition, (either a purer or impurer one.) But that at its firſt quitting this groſs earthy body, the ſpirituous body, which accompanieth it, (as its vehicle) muſt needs go away fouled and incraſſated with the groſs va-*

pours

En. 4. l. 3. c. 4. [P. 374]

Ap. p. 235.

pours and ſteams thereof, till the ſoul afterwards by degrees purging itſelf, this becometh at length a dry ſplendour, which hath no miſty obſcurity, nor caſteth any ſhadow.

But becauſe all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealiſts, concerning the human ſoul's being always (after death) united to ſome body or other, is more fully declared by *Philoponus* than by any other, that we have yet met withal, we ſhall here excerp ſome paſſages out of him about it. Firſt, therefore, he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the ſenſe of the beſt philoſophers; τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστὴν, ἄλλου μέντοι τινὸς σώματος καὶ ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δείξομεν· *That the rational ſoul, as to its energy, is ſeparable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is ſeparable only from this groſs body, and not from all body whatſoever, but hath* (after death) *a ſpirituous or airy body, in which it acteth; this I ſay is a true opinion, as ſhall be afterwards proved by us.* *Proœm. in Ariſtot. De An.*

And again, ἡ δὲ ἄλογος ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ὄγκου, Ὄχημα καὶ Ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ ἄέρος· ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦτο γήινον, λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος. *The irrational life of the ſoul hath not all its being in this groſs earthy body, but remaineth after the ſoul's departure out of it, having for its vehicle and ſubject, the ſpirituous body; which itſelf is alſo compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this groſs body of ours is called earthy, from what is moſt predominant therein.* Thus do we ſee, that, according to *Philoponus*, the human ſoul, after death, does not merely exerciſe its rational powers, and think only of metaphyſical and mathematical notions, abſtract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciſeth alſo its lower ſenſitive and irrational faculties, which it could not poſſibly do, were it not then vitally united to ſome body; and this body then accompanying the ſoul he calls *pneumatical*, that is, (not ſpiritual in the Scripture-ſenſe, but) ſpirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, ſee what rational account *Philoponus* can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeably thereunto; ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τούτου ἔξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰς ἅδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποιναὶς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιωμένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν Φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ Φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· καὶ ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματα· διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γὴν δικαιωτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη ἓν πᾶσα σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῆφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινόμενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρου, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐξημμένον αὐτῆς; οὐ δήπου τοῦτο ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, τὸ Πνευματικὸν, ὃ λέγομεν ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι πάντως διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία· καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς· *Our human ſoul* (in thoſe who are not purged and cleanſed in this life) *after its departure out* *Ibid.*

of

of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonſtrated, to go into Hades, *there to receive puniſhment for its evil actions paſt. For providence does not only take care of our being, but alſo of our well-being. Therefore is the ſoul, though lapſed into a preternatural ſtate, yet not neglected by providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And ſince ſinning had its original from the deſire of pleaſure, it muſt of neceſſity be cured by pain: for here alſo contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the ſoul being to be purged, is puniſhed and pained in thoſe ſubterraneous judicatories and priſons, in order to its amendment. But if the ſoul be incorporeal, it is impoſſible for it to ſuffer. How then can it be puniſhed? There muſt of neceſſity be ſome body joined with it; which being immoderately conſtringed or agitated, concreted or ſecreted, and diſcordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the ſoul ſenſible of pain, by reaſon of ſympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that, which is then conjoined with the ſoul, after the diſſolution of that earthy body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical, or ſpirituous body, which we now ſpeak of; for in this are ſeated, as their ſubject, the iraſcible and concupiſcible paſſions, and they are inſeparable from the ſame; nor could they be in the ſoul diſunited from all body: and that ſoul, which is freed from theſe, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in thoſe ſubterraneous judicatories and priſons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celeſtial regions,* &c. After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phænomena, δῆλον δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα, καὶ τοῦτο ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ ζκιοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; ἃ γὰρ δήγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁρατὴ· ἀλλὰ φασὶ τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τοῦτο τῷ σώματι πλανᾶσθαι ἐπί τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ τοῦτο παραδεικνύναι περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διὸ φροντιστέον εὐζωΐας· ὑπὸ τούτου γὰρ φασι τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, κατασπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ παθη τὴν ψυχήν· *Furthermore, that there is ſuch a pneumatical* (ſpirituous, vaporous, or airy) *body, which accompanieth ſouls unpurged after death, is evident alſo from the phænomena themſelves. For what account can otherwiſe be given of thoſe ſpectres and phantoms, which appear ſhadow-like about graves or ſepulchres, ſince the ſoul itſelf is neither of any figure, nor yet at all viſible? Wherefore theſe ancients ſay, that impure ſouls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain ſpace, in their ſpirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about ſepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cauſe there is great reaſon, that we ſhould take care of living well, as alſo of abſtaining from a fouler and groſſer diet; theſe ancients telling us likewiſe, that this ſpirituous body of ours, being fouled and incraſſated by evil diet, is apt to render the ſoul, in this life alſo, more obnoxious to the diſturbances of paſſions.* And here *Philoponus* goes on to gratify us with a further account of ſome other of the opinions of theſe ancients, concerning this ſpirituous or airy body, accompanying the ſoul after death; ἔχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτόφασι τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι. τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀτμῶν ἃ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλε, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ Ζπόγγοι,

δέχονται

δέχουλαι τὰς ἀτμὰς· διὰ τᾶτο Φροντίζουσιν οἱ Ζπιδαῖοι τῆς λεπλοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχυνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλλὰ λεπλύνεσθαι· πρὸς τᾶτο καὶ τὰς καθαρμὰς Φασι παραλαμβάνειν· τᾶτο μέν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδαλι πλύνεσθαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ καθαρμοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν, διὰ γὰρ ἀτμων τινῶν τρέφεται τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεσθαι· ὰ διωργανῶσθαι δέ Φασιν αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλα ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μελὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἴσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἕν· *They further add, that there is ſomething of the plantal and plaſtick life alſo, exerciſed by the ſoul, in thoſe ſpirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nouriſhed too, though not after the ſame manner, as theſe groſs earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them, (as ſponges) they imbibing every where thoſe vapours. For which cauſe, they, who are wiſe, will in this life alſo take care of uſing a thinner and dryer diet, that ſo that ſpirituous body* (which we have alſo at this preſent time within our groſſer body) *may not be clogged and incraſſated, but attenuated. Over and above which, thoſe ancients made uſe of catharms, or purgations, to the ſame end and purpoſe alſo: for as this earthy body is waſhed by water, ſo is that ſpirituous body cleanſed by cathartick vapours; ſome of theſe vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, theſe ancients further declared concerning this ſpirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exerciſe all functions of ſenſe, the ſoul hearing, and ſeeing, and perceiving all ſenſibles, by it every where. For which cauſe,* Ariſtotle *himſelf affirmeth, in his Metaphyſicks, that there is properly but one ſenſe, and but one ſenſory; he, by this one ſenſory, meaning, the ſpirit, or ſubtile airy body, in which the ſenſitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of ſenſibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to paſs, that this ſpirit appears organized in ſepulchres, and moſt commonly of human form, but ſometimes in the form of ſome other animals? to this thoſe ancients replied, That their appearing ſo frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incraſſated with evil diet, and then, as it were, ſtamped upon with the form of this exteriour ambient body in which they are, as cryſtal is formed and coloured like to thoſe things, which it is faſtned in, or reflects the image of them; and that their having ſometimes other different forms proceedeth from the phantaſtick power of the ſoul itſelf, which can at pleaſure transform this ſpirituous body into any ſhape: for being airy, when it is condenſed and fixed, it becometh viſible, and again inviſible, and vaniſhing out of ſight, when it is expanded and rarified.*

Now, from theſe paſſages cited out of *Philoponus*, it further appeareth, that the ancient aſſerters of the ſoul's immortality did not ſuppoſe human ſouls, after death, to be quite ſtript ſtark naked from all body; but that the generality of ſouls had then a certain ſpirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity reſpectively to themſelves. As alſo, that they conceived this ſpirituous body (or at leaſt ſomething of it) to hang about the ſoul alſo here in this life, before death, as its interiour indument or veſtment, which alſo then ſticks to it, when that other groſs earthly part of the body is, by death,

death, put off, as an outer garment. And ſome have been inclinable to think (by reaſon of certain hiſtorick phænomena) theſe two to be things ſo diſtinct, that it is not impoſſible for this ſpirituous body, together with the ſoul, to be locally ſeparated from the other groſſer body, for ſome time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our ſoul acteth, not immediately only upon bones, fleſh and brains, and other ſuch like groſs parts of this body, but firſt, and chiefly, upon the animal ſpirits, as the immediate inſtruments of ſenſe and phancy, and that, by whoſe vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is ſo nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reaſon, but we may aſſent here to that of *Porphyrius* [1], τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστι τῷ πνεύματι, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς; *That the blood is the food and nouriſhment of the ſpirit,* (that is, that ſubtile body called the *animal ſpirits*) *and that this ſpirit is the vehicle of the ſoul, or the more immediate ſeat of life.*

Nevertheleſs, the ſame *Philoponus* there addeth, that, according to theſe ancients, beſides the terreſtrial body, and this ſpirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former, (peculiarly belonging to ſuch ſouls after death, as are purged and cleanſed from corporeal affections, luſts and paſſions) called by them, σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and ἠράνιον, and αἰθέριον, &c. a *luciform,* and *celeſtial,* and *ætherial body.* The ſoul (ſaith he) continueth either in the terreſtrial or the aërial body, ſo long, ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθάρασα ἀνενεχθῇ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγεῖσα· τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεσθαι, μετὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ὀχήματος τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δέ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἀϊδίως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα ἠράνιον καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἀϊδιον, ὅ φασιν Αὐγοειδὲς ἢ Ἀστροειδὲς· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων ὄντων ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινὰ κλῆρον οὗ διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου· καὶ εἰ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν ἀϊδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ ἀεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ αὐγοειδὲς φασι σῶμα αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἔχειν, *until that having purged itſelf, it be carried aloft, and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the iraſcible and concupiſcible paſſions at once, together with this ſecond vehicle, or body, which we call ſpirituous. Wherefore theſe ancients ſay, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the ſoul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and ſtar-like: for it being a mundane thing, muſt of neceſſity have ſome part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may adminiſter. And ſince it is always moveable, and ought always to act, it muſt have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for theſe cauſes do they affirm, the ſoul always to have a luciform body.* Which lucid and ætherial body of the ſoul is a thing often mentioned
P. 290. by other writers alſo; as *Proclus,* in his commentary upon the *Timæus,* καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐξήρτηταί τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν· ἐμβιβάσαι γὰρ εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτὴν φησὶ τὸν δημιουργόν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καὶ ἐυκινήτοις χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὧν κατ' ὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν; *The human ſoul hath alſo* (ſaith he) *ſuch an ætherial vehicle belonging to it, as* Plato *himſelf intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at firſt*

[1] Vide Libr. de Antro Nymphar. p. 257, & 259.

firſt to have placed it in a chariot. For of neceſſity every ſoul, before this mortal body, muſt have an eternal and eaſily moveable body, it being eſſential to it to move. And elſewhere the ſame *Proclus*, ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μερισ-τῶν ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρτηται καὶ τελοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς, πάσας ἔχων ἡνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις· *Whilſt we remain above, we have no need of theſe divided organs, which now we have deſcending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or ſplendid vehicle is ſufficient, this having all ſenſes united together in it.* Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and ſpirituous vehicles ſeems to have been derived from *Plato*, he, in his *Epinomis*, writing thus concerning a good and wiſe man after death; ὃν καὶ διϊσχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα; ἐάνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς μοίρας μελιελιηφότα μόνου, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι· *Of whom, whether I be in jeſt or earneſt, I conſtantly affirm, that when dying he ſhall yield to fate, he ſhall no longer have this variety of ſenſes, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life.* Moreover, *Hierocles*[1] much inſiſteth upon this, Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα, this *luciform* and *ethereal body*, ὃ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι, *which alſo* (ſaith he) *the oracles call the thin and ſubtile vehicle or chariot of the ſoul*; he meaning, doubtleſs, by theſe oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongſt thoſe now extant under that title, there ſeems to be a clear acknowledgment of theſe two vehicula of the ſoul, or interiour induments thereof; the ſpirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called Ἐπίπεδον, or a plain ſuperficies, in theſe words[2]; Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Ἐπίπεδον, *take care not to defile or contaminate the ſpirit; nor to make the plain ſuperficies deep.* For thus *Pſellus* gloſſeth upon that oracle, δύο χιτῶνας ἐπενδύσατο τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὐγοειδῆ, λεπτὸν καὶ ἀναφῆ, ὅπερ Ἐπίπεδον· *The Chaldaick philoſophers beſtow upon the ſoul two interiour tunicles or veſtments, the one of which they called pneumatical, or the ſpirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the groſs ſenſible body,* (it being the more thin and ſubtile part thereof;) *the other the luciform veſtment of the ſoul, pure and pellucid, and this is that, which is here called the plain ſuperficies.* Which, ſaith *Pletho*[3], is not ſo to be underſtood, as if it had not three dimenſions (foraſmuch as it is a body alſo) but only to denote the ſubtilty and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforeſaid *Hierocles*[4] alſo calls this luciform and ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, *the ſpiritual vehicle of the rational ſoul* he takes not the word πνευματικὸν, in that ſenſe, wherein it is uſed by *Philoponus*, and others; as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other ſpiritous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather ſtiles it ſpiritual, in a higher ſenſe, (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture) as being a body more ſuitable and cognate with that higheſt and divineſt part of the ſoul, mind or reaſon, than the other terreſtrial body is (which, upon that account, is called alſo, by the ſame *Hierocles*[5],

[1] Comment. in aurea Pythagor. Carmina, p. 214. 215.
[2] Oracul. Zorcaſtr. Sect. X. Verſ. 275. p. 394. Ed. Clerici.
[3] Comment. in hoc Oraculum.
[4] Ubi ſupra, p. 222.
[5] Ibid. p. 214.

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as well as it is by St. *Paul* [1], σῶμα ψυχικὸν, *the animal or natural body.*) So that this ſpiritual body of *Hierocles* is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the ſame with *Syneſius* [2] his θεσπέσιον σῶμα, *his divine body.* And that this diſtinction of two interiour vehicles or tunicles of the ſoul, beſides that outer veſtment of the terreſtrial body (ſtyled in *Plato* τὸ ὀστρεῶδες, the *cruſtaceous*, or *oſtraceous body*) is not a meer figment of the latter Platoniſts ſince Chriſtianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from *Virgil*, in his ſixth Æneid, where, though not commonly underſtood, he writeth firſt of the ſpirituous, or airy body, in which unpurged ſouls receive puniſhment after death, thus:

Quin & ſupremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
Non tamen omne malum miſeris, nec funditus omnes
Corporeæ excedunt peſtes; penituſque neceſſe eſt
Multa diu concreta modis inoleſcere miris.
Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
Supplicia expendunt; aliæ panduntur inanes
Suſpenſæ ad ventos; aliis ſub gurgite vaſto
Infectum eluitur ſcelus, aut exuritur igni.

And then again of the other pure etherial and fiery body, in this manner:

Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum ſenſum, atque auraï ſimplicis ignem.

Now, as it was before obſerved, that the ancient aſſerters of the ſoul's immortality, ſuppoſing it to have, beſides this terreſtrial body, another ſpirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the ſoul after death, but alſo to hang about it here in this life, as its interiour veſt or tunicle; (they probably meaning hereby the ſame with that, which is commonly called the animal ſpirits, diffuſed from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body) in like manner it is certain, that many of them ſuppoſing the ſoul, beſides thoſe two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmoſt clothing or tunicle; yet, ſo as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its ſplendour altogether obſcured by the heavy weight and groſs ſteams or vapours of the terreſtrial body. Thus *Suidas*, upon the word Αυγοειδὴς tells us out of *Iſidore*, ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αυγοειδὲς Ὄχημα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδές τε καὶ ἀίδιον· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αυγοειδὲς σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισθαι ἐνίοις μὲν εἴσω τῆς κεφαλῆς· *That, according to ſome philoſophers, the ſoul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called alſo ſtar, or ſun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now ſhut up within this terreſtrial body* (as a light in a dark lanthorn) *it being ſuppoſed by ſome of them to be included within the head,* &c. With which agreeth *Hierocles*, ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὸ Αυγοειδὲς ἔχεσθαι, προσπνέον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σώματι ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνέχον. *The ſplendid, or luciform body, lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually*

P. 293 [P. 214 Edit. Needham.]

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 44. [2] De Inſomniis p. 140. Oper.

nually inſpiring it with life, and containing the harmory thereof. The ground of which opinion was, becauſe theſe philoſophers generally conceived the human ſoul to have pre-exiſted before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or elſe from the firſt beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect ſtate, to have had a lucid and æthereal body, either co-eternal, or co-eve with it, (though in order of nature junior to it) as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inſeparably adhere to the ſoul, in its after-lapſes and deſcents, into an aëreal firſt, and then a terreſtrial body; this being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the ſoul and them. Thus *Pletho* [1] declares their ſenſe; διὰ δὲ τοιούτου σώματος τῷ δὲ ποτε τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίνεσθαι, ὅλου ὅλῳ τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπιπλεκομένου ἅτε πνεύματός τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. *By this ætherial body is our human ſoul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital ſpirit of the embryo, for as much as this itſelf is a ſpirit alſo.* But long before *Pletho* was this doctrine declared and aſſerted by *Galen*, as agreeable both to *Plato*'s and his own ſenſe; he firſt premiſing, that the immediate organ or inſtrument of ſight was αὐγοειδὲς, a *luciform* and *æthereal ſpirit*; δεόντως ἄν ἐροῦμεν αὐγοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἀεροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς γεῶδες, &c. *Wherefore we may reaſonably affirm, that the organ of ſight is a luciform or æthereal body; as that of hearing is aëreal; that of ſmelling vaporous; that of taſte moiſt or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like.* And he accordingly thus underſtanding thoſe known verſes of *Empedocles*, which as *Ariſtotle* otherwiſe interprets them, are nonſenſe; καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησὶ, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδεστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως, τῷ δ' αὐγοειδεστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς Αὐγοειδοῦς. *And this was that, which* Empedocles *meant to ſignify, in thoſe famous verſes of his; it being certain, that by the moſt earthy of our ſenſes, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of ſenſibles; and by the moſt luciform,* viz. *that of ſight, the paſſions of light; by that, which is aëreal, ſounds; by that, which is moiſt and ſponge-like, taſtes; and laſtly, by the organ of ſmelling, which is the extremity of thoſe former cavities of the brain, as repleniſhed with vapours, odours.* After which he writeth of the eſſence or ſubſtance of the ſoul, in this manner; εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφήνασθαι χρὴ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ οἷον Αὐγοειδὲς, καὶ Αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτὴν, εἰς ὃ καὶ μὴ βούλονται καθ' ἁκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται ζῳϊκοὶ, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλου λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτεθεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δέ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίᾳ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα Φωτοειδὲς γίνεσθαι· *And if we ſhould now declare any thing concerning the eſſence or ſubſtance of the ſoul, we muſt needs affirm one or other of theſe two things; that either itſelf is this luciform and æthereal body* (which the Stoicks, whether they will or no, by conſequence will be brought unto, as alſo *Ariſtotle* himſelf) *or elſe that the ſoul is itſelf an incorporeal ſubſtance, but that this luciform æthereal body is its firſt vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we muſt ſay, that this æthereal*

Dog. Hip. & Plat. l. 7. [Cap. XIII. p. 1043. Tom. 1. Oper.]

[1] In Orac. Chald.

real lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform ſpirit derived, that is the immediate inſtrument of ſight. Now from hence it was, that theſe philoſophers, beſides the moral purgation of the ſoul, and the intellectual or philoſophical, recommended very much a myſtical or teleſtick way of purifying this æthereal body in us, by diet and catharms. Thus the forementioned *Hierocles*[1]; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν, καθαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο, &c. *Since to our lucid or ſplendid body, this groſs mortal body is come by way of acceſſion, we ought to purify the former alſo, and free it from ſympathy with the latter.* And again afterwards, αἱ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς ὀχήμα[2] προμεθεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπόπτερον καὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἵσταιτο πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς· *Together with the purgations of the rational ſoul, the purification of the luciform or æthereal vehicle is alſo to be regarded, that this being made light, and alate or wingy, might no way hinder the ſoul's aſcent upward: but he, that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himſelf to the whole man.* Whereupon he concludes, τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, τὴν τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς καθαρτικὴν δύναμιν· *I therefore call this the teleſtick or myſtick operation; which is converſant about the purgation of the lucid or ætherial vehicle.* And whereas philoſophy was by *Plato* and *Socrates*[2] defined to be a continual exerciſe of dying (which *Pliny*[3] thought to be nothing but an hypochondriacal or atrabilarian diſtemper in them, in thoſe words of his, which *Salmaſius*, and other criticks, can by no means underſtand, *Eſt etiam quidam morbus, per ſapientiam mori: That the dying by wiſdom or philoſophy, is alſo but a certain kind of bodily diſeaſe or over-grown melancholy*) though they ſuppoſed this principally to conſiſt in a moral dying to corporeal luſts and paſſions; yet was the deſign thereof partly myſtical and teleſtick alſo, it driving at this further thing, that when they ſhould put off this terreſtrial body, they might at once die alſo to the ſpirituous or aëreal; and then their ſoul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ætherial body, its light-winged chariot: which in *Virgil*'s language is

P. 294. [P. 214. Ed. Needhami.]

——Purumque relinqui
Æthereum ſenſum, atque auraï ſimplicis ignem.

Notwithſtanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts ſeem not to have been all of them of this perſuaſion, that the ſame numerical æthereal body, which the ſoul was at firſt created with, continueth ſtill about it, and adhereth to it inſeparably to all eternity, during its deſcents into other groſſer bodies; but rather to have ſuppoſed, that, according to the moral diſpoſition of the ſoul, it always finds or makes a cognate and ſuitable body correſpondently pure or impure; and conſequently, that by moral virtue and philoſophy, it might again recover that celeſtial body, which was loſt by its fall and deſcent hither. This ſeemeth to have been *Porphyrius*[4] his ſenſe, in theſe words of his; ὡς ἂν διατεθῇ ἡ ψυχή, εὑρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον· διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένη σύμφυλον τὸ ἐξ ὑγροῦ τοῦ ἀύλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον· *However the ſoul be in itſelf affected, ſo does it always find*

[1] Ibid. p. 216.
[2] Vide Platon. in Phædon. p. 378.
[3] Hiſt. Natur. Lib. VII. Cap. 50.
[4] In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia ducentibus, § XXXII. p. 233.

find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body, that comes next to immateriality; that is, an æthereal one. And probably *Plato* [1] was of the same mind, when he affirmed, the *soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another.*

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus *Hierocles* plainly, ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία σύμφυες ἔχουσα σῶμα, οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς εἶδος· *The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor yet can it be without body; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body.* Accordingly whereunto, the definition, which he gives of a man, is this, ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος, *a rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body.* He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but εἴδωλον ἀνθρώπου [2], *the image of the true man*, or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme Deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a dæmon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by *Hierocles*) is also defined by him after the same manner, ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωλεινοῦ σώματος, *a rational soul together with a lucid body.* And accordingly *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus* [3] affirmeth, πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοερὰν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον· *That every dæmon, superiour to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an æthereal vehicle, the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things.* So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt dæmons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aëreal bodies only, and no further; but the latter, into terrestial also [4]. Now *Hierocles* positively affirmeth [5] this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by *Plato*; καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὲ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεικάσας ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου; πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν· *And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which* Plato *afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and divine soul* (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) *to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:* meaning by the chariot, an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.

P. 289. [P. 120. Edit. Needhami.]

P. 290. [P. 212]:

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered that objection against

[1] De Legibus, Lib. X.
[2] P. 214.
[3] Lib. V. p. 320.
[4] Vide Porphyr. de Abstinent. ab Esu Animal. lib. II. §. 38. p. 81; & alios.
[5] Ubi supra, p. 213.

againſt the illocality and immobility of particular finite ſpirits, dæmons or angels, and human ſouls; that theſe being all naturally incorporate, however in themſelves and directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in ſenſe moved, by accident, together with thoſe bodies, reſpectively, which they are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that theſe finite ſpirits, or ſubſtances incorporeal, being unextended, and ſo having in themſelves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cognizance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, That theſe being eſſentially but parts of the univerſe, and therefore not comprehenſive of the whole, finite or particular, and not univerſal beings, (as the three hypoſtaſes of the Platonick trinity are) the ſphere of their activity could not poſſibly extend any farther, than to the quickening and enlivening of ſome certain parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or that incorporeal ſubſtance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

But it would be no impertinent digreſſion here, (as to the main ſcope of our preſent undertaking) ſhould we briefly compare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient Incorporealiſts (the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts) with that of Chriſtianity; and conſider the agreement, or diſagreement, that is betwixt them. Firſt therefore, here is a plain agreement of theſe beſt, and moſt religious philoſophers, with Chriſtianity, in this; That the moſt conſummate happineſs, and higheſt perfection, that human nature is capable of, conſiſteth not in a ſeparate ſtate of ſouls, ſtript naked from all body, and having no manner of commerce with matter, as ſome high-flown perſons in all ages have been apt to conceit. For ſuch amongſt the philoſophers (and Platoniſts too) was *Plotinus*; the unevenneſs and unſafeneſs of whoſe temper may ſufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human ſouls might poſſibly aſcend to ſo high a pitch, as quite to ſhake off commerce with all body; ſo did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might alſo deſcend and ſink down ſo low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too; two inconſiſtent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a moſt prodigious extravagancy, which yet *Empedocles* (though otherwiſe a great wit) ſeems to have been guilty of alſo, from thoſe verſes of his in *Athenæus* [1];

Ἤδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κόρητε κόρος τε,
Θάμνος, τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἁλὶ ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

And amongſt the Jews, the famous *Maimonides* was alſo of this perſuaſion, it being a known aphoriſm of his, in his great work, שבעולם הבא אין גוף אלא רוח: *That in the world to come* (or ſtate of conſummate happineſs) *there ſhall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity.* Upon which account, being accuſed as a denier of the reſurrection, (an article as well of the Jewiſh, as of the Chriſtian faith) he wrote that book intitled, *Iggereth Teman* purpoſely

[1] Deipnoſophiſt. Lib. VIII. p. 510.

purpoſely to purge himſelf, and to reconcile thoſe two aſſertions together, which he doth after ſuch a manner, as that there ſhould be indeed a reſurrection, at the firſt coming of the Jewiſh Meſſias, of ſome certain perſons, to live here a while upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they ſhould for ever continue pure ſouls, un-united to any body. In which it may be well ſuſpected, that the deſign *Maimonides* drove at, was againſt Chriſtianity; which, notwithſtanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent ſuffrages of the beſt philoſophers, that the moſt genuine and perfect ſtate of the human ſoul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body: and yet our high-flown enthuſiaſts generally (however calling themſelves Chriſtians) are ſuch great Spiritualiſts, and ſo much for the inward reſurrection, (which we deny not to be a Scripture-notion alſo; as in that of St. *Paul*[1], *If ye be riſen with Chriſt*, &c. And again[2], *If by any means I might attain to the reſurrection of the dead)* as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Chriſtianity, the outward reſurrection of the body; and indeed will ſcarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their ſpirituality thus ending in Sadduciſm and infidelity, if not at length in downright atheiſm and ſenſuality.

But, beſides this, there is yet a further correſpondence of Chriſtianity with the forementioned philoſophick cabala, in that the former alſo ſuppoſes the higheſt perfection of our human ſouls, not to conſiſt in being eternally conjoined with ſuch groſs bodies, as theſe we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts have always complained of theſe terreſtrial bodies, as priſons, or living ſepulchres of the ſoul; ſo does Chriſtianity ſeem to run much upon the ſame ſtrain, in theſe Scripture-expreſſions[3], *In this we groan earneſtly, deſiring to be clothed upon with our houſe which is from heaven:* and again[4], *We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed*, (that is, ſtript quite naked of all body) *but ſo clothed upon, that mortality might be ſwallowed up of life:* and laſtly[5], *Ourſelves alſo, which have the firſt-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourſelves, waiting for the adoption* (ſonſhip or inheritance) namely, *the redemption of our bodies*; that is, the freedom of them from all thoſe evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppreſſed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the ſame heavy load and luggage, which the ſouls of good men being here burdened with, do ſo much groan to be delivered from, ſhall, at the general reſurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound faſt to them, to all eternity: for, of ſuch a reſurrection as this, *Plotinus* (though perhaps miſtaking it for the true Chriſtian reſurrection) might have ſome cauſe to affirm, that it would be but ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλου ὕπνου, *a reſurrection to another ſheep*; the ſoul ſeeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, ſoporated with the dull ſteams and opiatick vapours of this groſs body. For thus the author of the *Book of Wiſdom*[6], *The corruptible body preſſeth down the ſoul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the*

[1] Col. iii. 1.
[2] Phil. iii. 2.
[3] 2 Cor. v. 2.
[4] 2 Cor. v. 4.
[5] Rom. viii. 23.
[6] Chap. ix. 15.

the mind, that muſeth upon many things. But the ſame will further appear, from that account, which the Scripture itſelf giveth us of the reſurrection: and firſt, in general, when St. *Paul*, anſwering that query of the philoſophick infidel, *How are the dead raiſed, or with what body do they come?* replieth in this manner, *Thou fool*, (that is, thou, who thinkeſt to puzzle or baffle the Chriſtian article of the reſurrection, which thou underſtandeſt not) *that which thou ſoweſt, is not quickened* (to the production of any thing) *except it firſt die to what it was.* And *thou ſoweſt not that body, that ſhall be,* but *bare grain*, as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; *but God* (in the ordinary courſe of nature) *giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him* (that is, a ſtalk, and an ear, having many grains with huſks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the ſame with that, which was ſowed under ground) nor does he give to all ſeeds one and the ſame kind of body neither, but to every ſeed its own correſpondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he ſhould have ſaid; Know that this preſent body of ours is to be look'd upon but as a kind of ſeed of the reſurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in ſome ſenſe the ſame, and in ſome ſenſe not the ſame with it. Beſides which general account, the particular oppoſitions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the preſent and future body, ſeem very agreeable to thoſe of the philoſophick cabala: for, firſt, the preſent body is ſaid [1] to be ſowed in *corruption*, but the future raiſed in *incorruption*. For the *children of the reſurrection cannot die any more* [2]. And then *mortality ſhall be ſwallowed up of life* [3]. Wherefore the Chriſtian reſurrection-body, as well as that of the philoſophick cabala, is σῶμα ἀθάνατον, and ἀΐδιον too, (2 Cor. v. 1.) *an immortal* and *eternal body*. Again, the body ſowed, is ſaid [4] to be a *diſhonourable*, *ignominious*, and *inglorious body*; and therefore called alſo by St. *Paul* [5], τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, *The body of our humility*, or *humiliation*; a body agreeable to this lapſed ſtate of the ſoul, but the body, which ſhall be raiſed, ſhall be a glorious body; and σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτῦ, *conformable to that glorious body of Chriſt:* who, when he was but externally transfigured, his face did *ſhine as the ſun*, and his *raiment was white as the light*. The glory of a body conſiſteth only in the comelineſs of its proportion, and the ſplendour thereof: thus is there [6] *one glory of the ſun*, and *another glory of the moon*, and *another glory of the ſtars*, that is, a different ſplendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the Scripture alſo, as well as the philoſophick cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινὸν, and σῶμα ἀγγελοειδὲς, and σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς, a *glorious*, *ſplendid*, *luciform* and *ſtar-like body*, Wiſdom iii. 7. ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι, *The righteous, in the time of their viſitation, ſhall ſhine forth.* Daniel xii. 2, 3. *They, that be wiſe, ſhall ſhine as the brightneſs of the firmament; and they, that turn many to righteouſneſs, as the ſtars for ever and ever.* And *Matth.* xiii. 43. *Then ſhall the righteous ſhine forth as the ſun in the kingdom of their father.* And therefore probably this future glorious reſurrection-body is that *inheritance of the ſaints in light*, which the Scripture ſpeaks of, *Col.* i. 12. Moreover, there is another difference betwixt this preſent and that future body of the righteous,

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 42.
[2] Luke xx. 36.
[3] 1 Cor. xv. 54.
[4] 1 Cor. xv. 43.
[5] Phil. iii. 21.
[6] 1 Cor. xv. 41.

righteous, wherein St. *Paul* [1] and *Hierocles* [2] do well agree; the firſt being called by both of them, Ζῶμα ψυχικὸν, *an animal body*, the ſecond Ζῶμα πνευματικὸν, *a ſpiritual body.* Which latter expreſſion, in Scripture, does not only denote the ſubtilty and tenuity thereof; but alſo as this preſent body is called an *animal body*, becauſe it is ſuitable and agreeable to that animal life, which men have common with brutes, ſo is that future called *ſpiritual*, as bearing a fit proportion and correſpondency to ſouls renewed in the ſpirit of their mind, or in whom the divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exerciſing its dominion. [3] *There is an animal body, and there is a ſpiritual body.* And, *the firſt Adam was made a living ſoul, the laſt Adam a quickning ſpirit.* And thus are ψυχικοὶ, in the Scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, *they who have not the Spirit.* And [4] ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, *the animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God.* Which Spirit is alſo ſaid, in Scripture, to be *the earneſt of that our future inheritance*, *Epheſ.* i. 14. and the earneſt of this ſpiritual and heavenly body, 2 *Cor.* v. 5. It is alſo ſaid to be that, by which (efficiently) theſe mortal bodies ſhall be quickned, *Rom.* viii. 11. *If the Spirit of him, that raiſed up Jeſus from the dead, dwell in you; he, that raiſed up Chriſt from the dead, ſhall alſo quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you.* Neither doth *Hierocles* fall much ſhort of this Scripture-notion of a ſpiritual body, when he deſcribes it to be that, ὃ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπτεται, *which is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the ſoul.* This ſpiritual body is that, which the ancient Hebrews called, כנפי תנשר *eagles wings*; we reading thus in the *Gemara* of the *Sanhedrin*, (*c.* 11. *fol.* 92. *col.* 2.) אם תאמר אותן שגים שעמיר תקנת לחרש בהן את תעולם צריקים מה הן עושן תקנה עישה להן כנפים כנשטין על פני המים *If you aſk, What ſhall become of the righteous, when God ſhall renew the world? the anſwer is, God ſhall make them wings like eagles, whereby they ſhall fly upon the face of the waters.* Again, as this preſent body is called, in Scripture, an *earthly body*, ſo is the future body of the righteous ſtyled by St. *Paul*, as well as the *Pythagoreans*, a *heavenly body*, and they, who ſhall then be poſſeſſors thereof, ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι, *heavenly men*, 1 Cor. xv. *As is the heavenly, ſuch are they, that are heavenly.* Beſides which, as philoſophers ſuppoſed both dæmons (or angels) and men, to have one and the ſame Ζῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, ἠθέριον and αἰθέριον, or a like lucid, heavenly and ætherial body; ſo from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they, who [5] *ſhall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the reſurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are* ἰσάγγελοι, *equal to the angels.* From hence, I ſay, we may venture to call this reſurrection-body of the juſt alſo an *angelical* or *iſangelical body*; and the rather becauſe the ancient Hebrews (as we learn from *Nachmonides*, in *Shaar Haggemul*) ſtyled it לבושת תנפש המלאכותי *the angelical clothing of the ſoul*; and *Tertullian* himſelf, *angelificatam carnem, angelified fleſh.* But, laſtly, St. *Paul* is not only poſitive in his doctrine here, but alſo negative [6]; *Now this I ſay, brethren, that fleſh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.* Which place being undoubtedly not

P. 297. [P. 217. Edit. Needhami.]

Thus St. *Auſtin, Corpora Angelica*; and *Qualia ſunt Angelorum.*

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 44.
[2] Comment. in aurea Pythag. carmina, p. 214. Edit. Needhami.
[3] 1 Cor. xv. 45.
[4] 1 Cor. ii. 14.
[5] Luke xx. 36.
[6] 1 Cor. xv. 50.

not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy reſurrection-body ſhall not be this foul and groſs body of ours only varniſhed and gilded over on the outſide of it, it remaining ſtill naſty, fluttiſh, and ruinous within, and having all the ſame ſeeds of corruption and mortality in its nature, which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being ſeized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it ſhall be ſo inwardly changed in its nature, as that the poſſeſſors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been ſaid of the reſurrection-body, is not ſo to be underſtood, as if it belonged univerſally to all, that ſhall be raiſed up at the laſt day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own perſons, at that great and general aſſizes; that they ſhall have all alike (wicked as well as good) ſuch glorious, ſpiritual and celeſtial bodies; but it is only a deſcription of the ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς, the *reſurrection of life*; which is emphatically called alſo by our Saviour Chriſt [1], ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, the *reſurrection from the dead*, or to a happy immortality; as they, who ſhall be thought worthy thereof, are likewiſe ſtyled by him υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως, *the children of the reſurrection*. Of which reſurrection only it is that St. *Paul* treateth, in that fifteenth chapter of his to the *Corinthians*. And we ſay, that this Chriſtian reſurrection of life is the veſting and ſettling of the ſouls of good men in their glorious, ſpiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. The complete happineſs of a man, and all the good that can be deſired by him, was by the Heathen poet thus ſummed up, *Ut ſit mens ſana in corpore ſano*, *That there be a ſound mind in a ſound body*: and the Chriſtian happineſs ſeems to be all compriſed in theſe two things; *firſt*, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the ſpirit of their mind, cleanſed from all pollution of fleſh and ſpirit, and made partakers of the divine life and nature; and then, *ſecondly*, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, ſpiritual, celeſtial and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our ſouls are not at home here, in this terreſtrial body, and theſe earthly manſions, but that they are ſtrangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs alſo confeſſing, plainly declared, that they ſought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which paſſages of Scripture ſome indeed would infer, that ſouls being at firſt created by God pure, pre-exiſted, before this their terrene nativity, in celeſtial bodies; but afterwards ſtraggled and wandered down hither, as *Philo* for one [2], ἀπολιποῦσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον, καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθετὸ σῶμα· *Our ſoul* (ſaith he) *having left its heavenly manſion, came down into this earthly body, as a ſtrange place.* But thus much is certain, that our human ſouls were at firſt intended and deſigned by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal reſting-place: however, to us, that *be not firſt, which is ſpiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is ſpiritual.* Now though ſome, from that of St. *Paul* [3], where he calls this happy reſurrection-body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, *that houſe of ours, that is from heaven*, or which *cometh out of heaven*, would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves

[1] Luke xx. 25.

[2] De Agricult. p. 197. & in Libro, quis divinarum rerum hæres, p. 519. & aliàs.

[3] 2 Cor. v. 1.

graves and charnel houſes; they conceiving alſo, that the individuation and ſameneſs of men's perſons does not neceſſarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, becauſe we never continue thus the ſame, our bodies always flowing like a river, and paſſing away by inſenſible tranſpiration; and it is certain, that we have not all the ſame numerical matter, and neither more nor leſs, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the ſelf-ſame perſons: yet, nevertheleſs, according to the beſt philoſophy, which acknowledges no eſſential or ſpecifical difference of matter, the fouleſt and groſſeſt body that is, merely by motion may not only be cryſtallized, but alſo brought into the purity and tenuity of the fineſt æther. And undoubtedly, that ſame numerical body of our Saviour Chriſt, which lay in the ſepulchre, was after his reſurrection thus tranſformed into a ſpiritual and heavenly body; the ſubtilty and tenuity whereof appeared from his entring in when the doors were ſhut, and his vaniſhing out of ſight; however its glory were for the time ſuſpended, partly for the better convincing his diſciples of the truth of his reſurrection, and partly becauſe they were not then able to bear the ſplendor of it. We conclude therefore, that the Chriſtian myſtery, of the reſurrection of life, conſiſteth not in the ſoul's being reunited to theſe vile rags of mortality, theſe groſs bodies of ours, (ſuch as now they are;) but in having them changed into the likeneſs of Chriſt's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we ſeen the agreement, that is betwixt Chriſtianity and the old philoſophick cabala, concerning the ſoul, in theſe two things: Firſt, that the higheſt happineſs and perfection of the human ſoul conſiſteth not in a ſtate of pure ſeparation from all body; and ſecondly, that it does not conſiſt neither in an eternal union with ſuch groſs terreſtrial bodies, as theſe unchanged; the ſoul being not at home, but a ſtranger and pilgrim in them, and oppreſſed with the load of them: but that at laſt, the ſouls of good men ſhall arrive at glorious, ſpiritual, heavenly and immortal bodies. But now as to that point, whether human ſouls be always united to ſome body or other, and conſequently when by death they put off this groſs terreſtrial body, they are not thereby quite diveſted, and ſtript naked of all body, but have a certain ſubtile and ſpirituous body, ſtill adhering to them, and accompanying them? or elſe, whether all ſouls, that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever ſince continued in a ſtate of ſeparation from all body, and ſhall ſo continue forwards till the day of judgment or general reſurrection? we muſt confeſs, that this is a thing not ſo explicitely determined, or expreſly decided in Chriſtianity, either way. Nevertheleſs, it is firſt of all certain from ſcripture, that ſouls departed out of theſe terreſtrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor aſleep, till the laſt trump and general reſurrection, but ſtill alive and awake; our Saviour Chriſt affirming, that *they all live unto God*; the meaning whereof ſeems to be this, that they, who are ſaid to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themſelves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only diſappear-

Death, called Sleep in Scripture, only κατ' ἐυφημισμόν.

ing to us, and withdrawn from our ſight; for as much as they are gone off this ſtage, which we ſtill continue to act upon. And thus is it ſaid alſo of our Saviour Chriſt himſelf, and that after his reſurrection too, *that he liveth unto God* (*Rom.* vi. 10.) From whence it is evident, that they, who are ſaid to live to God, are not therefore ſuppoſed to be leſs alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now it ſeemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. *Quærendum*, ſaith *Origen*, *ſi poſſibile eſt, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cum ad ſummum ſanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An neceſſe eſt eas ſemper conjunctas eſſe corporibus? It is worth our inquiry, whether is be poſſible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal, and ſeparate from all body, when they are arrived to the higheſt degree of holineſs and happineſs? or whether they be always of neceſſity conjoined with ſome bodies*; and afterwards he plainly affirmeth it to be impoſſible, *Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum: For any other nature, beſides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghoſt, to live quite without a body.* Indeed if this were moſt natural to the human ſoul, and moſt perfective of it, to continue ſeparate from all body, then doubtleſs (as *Origen* implied) ſhould the ſouls of good men, rather after the day of judgment, continue in ſuch a ſtate of ſeparation, to all eternity. But on the contrary, if it be natural to ſouls to enliven and inform ſome body or other, (though not always a terreſtrial one) as our inward ſenſe inclines us to think, then can it not ſeem ſo probable, that they ſhould, by a kind of violence, be kept ſo long in an unnatural or preter-natural ſtate of nakedneſs and ſeparation from all body, ſome of them even from *Adam* till the day of judgment.

περὶ ἀρχῶν, *l.* 2. [Cap. II. p. 69. Oper.]

Again, the Scripture alſo intimates, that ſouls departed out of this life have a knowledge of one another, and are alſo capable of the puniſhment of ſenſe or pain: *Fear him*, (ſaith our Saviour) *who after he hath killed, hath power to caſt into hell*, Luke xii. And the ſoul of the rich man is ſaid to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as likewiſe to have known *Abraham* and *Lazarus*. And it ſeems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the ſouls of wicked men, departing out of this life, from the beginning of the world in their ſeveral ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of puniſhment inflicted on them, ſave only that of remorſe of conſcience, and future expectation. Now it is not conceivable, how ſouls after death ſhould know and be knowable, and converſe with one another, and have any puniſhment of ſenſe or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to ſome bodies. And thus did *Tertullian* reaſon long ago; *Dolet apud inferos anima cujuſdam, & punitur in flamma, & cruciatur in linguâ, & de digito animæ fœlicioris implorat ſolatium roris. Imaginem exiſtimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, & divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic* Lazari *nomen, ſi non in veritate res eſt? Sed etſi imago credenda eſt, teſtimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris ſcriptura, ſi non erant. Quid eſt autem illud,*

De An. p. 309. *Rigal.* [Cap. VII. p. 165.]

illud, quod ad inferna transfertur, post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, & in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod & Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis à pœna & à fovela. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcepit in carcere, vel diversorio inferûm, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, *probata erit corporalitas animæ. Corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est. We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of* Lazarus *signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul* (after death) *have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought, that the Scripture would lye concerning corporal members, if there were none. But what is that, which, after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal.* [1] *Tertullian* would also confirm this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) *Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, & spiritus videbatur, tenera & lucida, & aërii coloris, & formæ per omnia humanæ: There was* (said she) *amongst other things, a soul corporally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of an aëreal colour, and every way of human form.* Agreeably to which, *Tertullian* himself addeth; *Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, & quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit. There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul, but human; and indeed that of the body, which is before carried about.* It is true indeed, that *Tertullian* here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurate, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape, which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons, which he here insisteth on, will indeed extend no further than to prove, that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse, and sensible of pain, for as much as body alone can have no sense of any thing.

And this is that, which *Irenæus* from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body, after death, conjoined with it,

[1] Ubi supra, Cap. IX. p. 166.

it, and that of the same form and figure with that body, which it had before here in this life; *Plenissimè autem Dominus docuit, non solum perseverare, non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed & characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hîc, & à quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divite & de* Lazaro, *qui refrigerabatur in sinu* Abrahæ; *in qua ait Divitem cognoscere* Lazarum *post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum. Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after death, without passing out of one body into another, but also, that they keep the character of body, wherein they are then also adapted, the same, which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration, which is written concerning the rich man and* Lazarus, *who was refreshed in* Abraham's *bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both* Lazarus *and* Abraham *after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order.* And thus again in the following chapter; *Per hæc manifestissimè declaratum est, & perseverare animas; & non de corpore in corpus exire; & habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) & meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; & dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam antè judicium. By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape, (whereby they may be known;) as also that they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment.* Now, that *Irenæus* did not here mean, that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves, *characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem*; the natural sense whereof is this, that they *keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that, which these bodies before had here in this life.* And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter [1], *Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis est, but the breath of life is incorporeal.*

L. 2. *c.* 62. [Cap. XXXIV. p. 168. edit. Massueti.]

C. 63. [Cap. XXXIV. p. 168.]

Furthermore, *Origen* was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtile bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτερίζον, *characterizing form*, which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions of ghosts or departed souls; in way of opposition to *Celsus*, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatick phrenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and phancies

[1] P. 300.

phancies for viſions and ſenſations, after the Epicurean way [1], τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατασκευαστικόν ἐστιν ἀναισκαίᾳ δόξαι, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων· *Though this might ſeem to have been ſmartly oppoſed by* Celſus, *yet are thoſe very apparitions of ghoſts, notwithſtanding, a ſufficient argument or proof of a certain neceſſary opinion, that ſouls do ſubſiſt after death. Neither did* Plato *vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the ſoul, beſides other things, from thoſe ſhadow-like phantaſms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments.* Whereupon he giveth this further account of theſe apparitions, τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένης γίνεσθαι, τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Αὐγοειδεῖ Σώματι ψυχήν· *For theſe apparitions of the dead are not meer groundleſs imaginations, but they proceed from ſouls themſelves, really remaining and ſurviving after death, and ſubſiſting in that, which is called a luciform body.* Where, notwithſtanding *Origen* takes this Αὐγοειδὲς Σῶμα, or *luciform body*, in a larger ſenſe, than the Greek philoſophers were wont to do; namely, ſo as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body alſo, which belongeth to unpurged ſouls, who do therein moſt frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged ſouls to be cloathed with the luciform body only. Beſides which, the ſame *Origen* tells us, that the thing, which St. *Thomas* the Apoſtle diſbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impoſſible for ghoſts or ſouls departed viſibly to appear, but only his riſing and appearing in that ſame ſolid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the ſepulchre; συσκατετέθειτο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τῇ φαντάζῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνάτου ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀνατιτύπῳ ἐγηγέρθαι· Thomas *alſo, as well as the other Apoſtles, aſſented to the woman affirming, that ſhe had ſeen Jeſus; as not thinking it at all impoſſible for the ſoul of a dead man to be ſeen: but he did not believe him to have riſen and appeared* in that ſelf-ſame ſolid body, which before he lived in; for which cauſe he ſaid, not only, *unleſs I ſee him*; but added alſo, *And unleſs I ſhall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thruſt my hand into his ſide, I will not believe.* Where again *Origen* ſubjoins, Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, κρίνουσι ὅτι δύναται Ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἴδει, ——— μεγεθός τε, καὶ ὄμματα καλ' ἑοικυίης, καὶ φωνὴν,

Πολλάκι δὲ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροὶ εἵματ' ἐχούσης.

Theſe things were ſaid by Thomas, *not as doubting at all, but that the body of a ſoul departed* (to wit, condenſed) *might be ſeen with the eyes of ſenſe, every way reſembling that form which it had before in this life, both in reſpect of bigneſs, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes alſo in the ſame cuſtomary garments.* Wherefore, according to *Origen*, the Jews were at that time generally poſſeſſed with this opinion, that ſouls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might viſibly appear; neither is that

of

[1] Adv. Celſum, Lib. II. p. 97.

of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critick objecteth, that *Josephus*, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However this at least is certain from hence, that *Origen* himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtile body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that they were affrighted, as supposing they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted [1]) that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα ἀντίτυπον) no such solid body as they might find him to have; bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles) which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men; yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves, that I am not a meer spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of *Apollonius* in *Philostratus* [2], λαβέ μοι, ἔφη, καὶ μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἴδωλον εἰμί· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἁπτόμενος, πεῖθε καὶ ζῆν τε με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα· *Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost*, (that is, a soul departed;) *but if I firmly resist the same; then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body.* And indeed though spirits or ghosts had certain subtile bodies, which they could so far condense, as to make them sometimes visible to men; yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity, as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least, not without such difficulty and pain, as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of *Phlegon*'s [3], where the body vanished not, as other ghosts use to do, but was left a dead carcase behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples sight: this probably, as *Origen* conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and etherial body.

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our

[1] Luke xxiv. 37.

[2] In Vitâ Apollonii Tyanei, Lib. IX. Cap. XII. p. 355.

[3] In Libello de Rebus Mirabilibus, Cap. I. in Jac. Gronovii Thesauro Antiq. Græcar. Tom. VIII. p. 2694.

our Saviour Christ himself, after his death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtile or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. *Peter*, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε· Which being understood by those ancients, of our Saviour Christ's descending into *Hades* or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin, *Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison*, &c. So that the word πνεύματι, or *spirit* here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for a spirituous body; the sense being this, *That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the flesh, or the fleshly body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a spirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and preached to those spirits that were in prison*, &c. And doubtless it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, that the word *spirit* could not here be taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that is, our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this spirit neither, that is, in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtile spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only *Elias*, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also *Moses* appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Αυγοειδῆ, *luciform* or *lucid*, like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

1 *Pet.* iii. 18, 19.

Of this St. *Austin*, in his 12th Book, *De Gen. ad Lit. c.* 33. *Et Christi quidem animam veniſſe uſque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos ſolvere, quos eſſe ſolvendos occulta nobis ſua juſtitia judicabat, non immeritò creditur.*

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture, which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickning of their mortal bodies is therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing, that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as *Irenæus*; *Nunc autem partem aliquam ſpiritus ejus ſumimus, ad perfectionem & præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim aſſueſcentes capere & portare Deum. Quod & pignus dixit apoſtolus; hoc eſt, partem ejus honoris, qui à Deo nobis promiſſus eſt.———Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam ſpirituales effecit, & abſorbetur mortale ab immortalitate. Now have*

L 5. *c.* 8. [P. 301. Edit. Maſſueti.]

we a part of that ſpirit, for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accuſtomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which alſo the Apoſtle hath called an earneſt; that is, *a part of that honour, which is promiſed to us from God. If therefore this earneſt* (or pledge) *dwelling in us hath made us already ſpiritual, the mortal is alſo ſwallowed up by immortality.* And *Novatian* [1], *Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem & ad reſurrectionem immortalitatis corpora noſtra perducat, dum illa in ſe aſſuefacit cum cœleſti virtute miſceri. This is that, which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the reſurrection of immortality; whilſt in itſelf it accuſtometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue.* Moreover, there are ſome places alſo, which ſeem to imply, that good men ſhall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the reſurrection or day of judgment. We know, that [2] *if our earthly houſe of this tabernacle were diſſolved, we have a building of God, a houſe not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earneſtly.* And verſe 5. *He that hath wrought us for the ſelf-ſame thing is God, who alſo hath given us the earneſt of the Spirit.* Now how theſe preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can conſiſt with the ſoul's continuance, after death, in a perfect ſeparation from all manner of body, till the day of judgement, is not ſo eaſily conceivable.

Laſtly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that *Irenæus*, *Origen*, and thoſe other ancients, who entertained that opinion, of ſouls being clothed after death with a certain thin and ſubtile body, ſuſpected it not in the leaſt to be inconſiſtent with that of the future reſurrection; as it is no way inconſiſtent for one, who hath only a ſhirt or waiſtcoat on, to put on a ſuit of clothes, or exteriour upper-garment. Which will alſo ſeem the leſs ſtrange, if it be conſidered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, twofold, exteriour and interiour; we having, beſides the groſly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interiour ſpirituous body, the ſoul's immediate inſtrument, both of ſenſe and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the other, nor impriſoned under the cold ſods. Notwithſtanding all which, that hath been here ſuggeſted by us, we ſhall not our ſelves venture to determine any thing in ſo great a point, but ſceptically leave it undecided.

The third and laſt thing in the forementioned philoſophick or Pythagorick cabala is concerning thoſe beings ſuperiour to men, commonly called by the Greeks, *dæmons*, (which *Philo* [3] tells us are the ſame with angels amongſt the Jews, and accordingly are thoſe words dæmons and angels, by *Hierocles* [4] and *Simplicius*, and other of the latter Pagan writers, ſometimes uſed indifferently as ſynonymous) *viz.* That theſe dæmons or angels are not pure, abſtract, incorporeal ſubſtances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they conſiſt of ſomething incorporeal, and ſomething corporeal, joined together: ſo that, as *Hierocles* writeth of them, τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος

[1] De Trinitate, Cap. XXIX. p. 450. ad calcem Operum Tertulliani.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 1.

[3] De Inſomniis, p. 586.

[4] Comment. in Aurea Pythagor. Carmina, Sect. 67. p. 210.

τος ἐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματικὴ, *They have a ſuperiour and an inferiour part in them; and their ſuperiour part is an incorporeal ſubſtance; their inferiour corporeal.* In a word, that they all, as well as men, conſiſt of ſoul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the ſouls of theſe dæmons or angels never deſcend down to ſuch groſs and terreſtrial bodies, as human ſouls do; but are always clothed either with aërial, or etherial ones. And indeed this Pythagorick cabala was univerſal, concerning all underſtanding beings, beſides the ſupreme Deity, or Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes; that is, concerning all the Pagan inferiour gods; that they are no other than ſouls vitally united to ſome bodies, and ſo made up of incorporeal and corporeal ſubſtance, joined together. For thus *Hierocles* plainly expreſſeth himſelf in the forecited place [1]; ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c. *The rational nature* (in general) *was ſo produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal ſubſtance, having a cognate or congenite body.* Which ſame thing was elſewhere alſo thus declared by him, ἔστι γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, μετὰ τὸ συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἴκων ὅλου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, *The whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof.* Where, by *Hierocles* his rational nature or eſſence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all underſtanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only theſe three kinds and degrees; firſt, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated ſtars; ſecondly, dæmons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called alſo by him, καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες, *terreſtrial dæmons*; he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal ſubſtances, together with a congenite immortal body; and that there is no other underſtanding nature than ſuch, beſides the ſupreme Deity, which is complete in itſelf, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to *Hierocles*, the ancient Pythagorick cabala acknowledged no ſuch entities at all, as thoſe intelligences of *Ariſtotle*, and the *Noes* of ſome high-flown Platoniſts, (that is, perfectly unbodied minds;) and much leſs any rank of *Henades* or unities, ſuperiour to theſe *Noes*. And indeed ſuch particular created beings as theſe could neither have ſenſe or cognizance of any corporeal thing exiſting without them; (ſenſe, as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, reſulting from a complication of ſoul and body, as weaving reſults from a complication of the weaver and weaving inſtruments:) nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal univerſe. So that theſe immoveable beings would be but like adamantine ſtatues, and things unconnected with the reſt of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the Deity; a kind of inſignificant metaphyſical gazers, or contemplators. Whereas the Deity, though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, a *mundane ſoul*, ſuch as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one compleat and entire animal; yet becauſe the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore muſt it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been ſtyled by theſe *Pythagoreans*, ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, (not a mundane, but) a ſupra-mundane

P. 17. [P. 19.]

[1] Ibid. 210.

dane ſoul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagorick cabala ſeems to be agreeable to reaſon alſo, that God ſhould be the only incorporeal being in this ſenſe, ſuch whoſe eſſence is compleat, and life intire within itſelf, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal ſubſtances created ſhould be compleated and made up by a vital union with matter, ſo that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the higheſt and divineſt things in the univerſe, next to the ſupreme Deity, are animals conſiſting of ſoul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance, as unextended, decline that abſurdity objected againſt them, of the illocality of all finite created ſpirits, that theſe being incorporeal ſubſtances, vitally clothed with ſome body, may, by reaſon of the locality and mobility of their reſpective bodies, truly be ſaid to be here and there, and to move from place to place.

Wherefore we are here alſo to ſhew what agreement or diſagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagorick cabala, and the Chriſtian philoſophy. And firſt, it hath been already intimated, that the very ſame doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly aſſerted by *Origen*. Thus, in his firſt book, *Peri Archon*, *c.* 6. *Solius Dei*, (ſaith he) *id eſt Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, naturæ id proprium eſt, ut ſine materiali ſubſtantia, & abſque ullâ corporeæ adjectionis ſocietate, intelligatur ſubſiſtere. It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, to ſubſiſt without material ſubſtance; or the ſociety of any corporeal adjection.* Again, *L.* 2. *c.* 2. *Materialem ſubſtantiam opinione quidem & intellectu ſolum ſeparari, à naturis rationalibus, & pro ipſis, vel poſt ipſas effectam videri; ſed nunquam ſine ipſa eas vel vixiſſe, vel vivere: ſolius namque trinitatis incorporea vita exiſtere rectè putabitur. Material ſubſtance in rational natures is indeed ſeparable from them in conception and underſtanding, it ſeeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually ſeparable from the ſame; nor did they ever, or can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the Trinity only.* So alſo, in his fourth book, and his *Anacephalæoſis*, *Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti neceſſe eſt rationabiles creaturas. Niſi quis putet ſe poſſe oſtendere, quod natura rationabilis abſque ullo corpore vitam degere poſſit. Sed quam difficile id ſit, & quam propè impoſſibile intellectui noſtro, in ſuperioribus oſtendimus. There always will be rational natures, which ſtand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a neceſſary indument or clothing for theſe rational creatures. Unleſs any one could ſhow, that it is poſſible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almoſt impoſſible it is to our underſtanding, hath been already declared.* *Aquinas* affirmeth[1] *Origen*, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philoſophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagorick cabala, which the learned *Origen* here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in *Hierocles*,

[1] In Summâ Theolog. Part I. Quæſt. LI. p. 1.

Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, *the rational nature made by God*; that is, all created underſtanding beings are neither body, nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or dæmons, as well according to *Origen* as *Hierocles*, are all of them incorporeal ſubſtances, not naked and abſtract, but clothed with certain ſubtile bodies, or animals compounded and made up of ſoul and body together.

Wherefore *Huëtius*[1], and other learned men, ſeem not well to have underſtood *Origen* here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they ſuppoſe him to have aſſerted angels, and all underſtanding creatures, not to *have* bodies, but to *be* bodies, and nothing elſe; and conſequently, that there is no incorporeal ſubſtance at all beſides the Deity: whereas *Origen* only affirmeth, that nothing beſides the Trinity could ſubſiſt and live alone, *abſque ulla corporeæ adjectionis ſocietate, without the ſociety of any corporeal adjection*; and that the material nature is only a neceſſary indument or clothing of all rational or underſtanding creatures. And in this ſenſe is it, that an incorporeal life is ſaid by him to be proper only to the Trinity; becauſe all other underſtanding beings are animals compounded of ſoul and body together. But that *Origen* acknowledged even our human ſoul itſelf to be incorporeal, as alſo that there is ſomething in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from ſundry paſſages in his writings; as this particularly in his ſixth book againſt *Celſus*, ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ οἴζμεν ἐκπυρωμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων, &c. ὑπόστασιν· *We do not think an incorporeal ſubſtance to be combuſtible, nor that the ſoul of man can be reſolved into fire, or the ſubſtance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers.* Where, by the *ſubſtance of angels*, he doubtleſs meant the *ſouls* of them; *Origen*'s ſenſe being thus declared by St. *Jerom*[2], *in libris* περὶ ἀρχῶν, *angelos, & thronos, & dominationes, & poteſtates, & rectores mundi & tenebrarum, & omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas eſſe eorum corporum, quæ vel deſiderio vel miniſterio ſuſceperint*: that *in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governours of the darkneſs of this world, and every name that is named* (in St. *Paul*) *to be all of them the ſouls of certain bodies, ſuch as either by their own deſire and inclination, or the divine allotment, they have received.* Now there can be no queſtion made, but that he, who ſuppoſed the ſouls of men to be incorporeal, in a ſtrict philoſophick ſenſe, and ſuch as could not ſuffer any thing from fire, did alſo acknowledge ſomething incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he ſomewhere declare himſelf, in that book *Peri Archon*[3], *Per Chriſtum creata dixit* (Paulus) *omnia viſibilia & inviſibilia; per quod declaratur, eſſe etiam in creaturis quaſdam inviſibiles, ſecundum proprietatem ſuam, ſubſtantias; ſed hæ, quamvis ipſæ non ſunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipſæ ſunt corporeâ ſubſtantiâ meliores. Illa vero ſubſtantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, eſſe credenda eſt; ſed in toto incorporea. When* Paul *affirmeth all things, viſible and inviſible, to have been created by Chriſt, or the* λόγος, *he intimated, that even amongſt the*

[1] In Origenianis, Lib. II. Queſt. V. p. 68. Johan. Hieroſolymitani, Tom. II. Oper. p. 118.
[2] Epiſt. LXI. ad Pammachium de Erroribus [3] Lib. IV. Cap. II.

the creatures, there are ſome properly inviſible ſubſtances. Which inviſible ſubſtances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they uſe bodies, themſelves being better than corporeal ſubſtance. But the ſubſtance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal. Wherefore angelical and human ſouls are not, as *Huetius* ſuppoſeth, called incorporeal by *Origen*, only as ſubtile bodies ſometimes are by the more ſimple and unſkilful, but in a ſtrict philoſophick ſenſe; only he ſuppoſed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both ſenſes incorporeal, it having not ſo much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in *Origen*, he conſtantly aſſerting angels to have ſomething incorporeal in them as their ſuperiour part, and not in that vulgar ſenſe of a ſubtile body, but in the philoſophick; nevertheleſs, to have alſo a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outſide or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.

It is true indeed, that there were, amongſt the ancient fathers, ſome, who were ſo far from ſuppoſing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies. But theſe either aſſerted, that there was no ſuch thing at all as any incorporeal ſubſtance; and that not only angels, and human ſouls, but alſo God himſelf was a body: or at leaſt they concluded, that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himſelf incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. Theſe are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenick hypotheſis, the ſame with the Pythagorick; that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal ſubſtance both together, or that they are animals conſiſting of ſoul and body. We ſhall now make it appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypotheſis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terreſtrial animals, ſpirits or ſouls, clothed with ætherial or aërial bodies. And that the generality of the ancient and moſt learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied ſpirits, is unqueſtionably evident from hence, becauſe they agreed with the Greek philoſophers in that conceit, that evil dæmons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of ſacrifices, as having their more groſs, airy, and vaporous bodies nouriſhed and refreſhed with thoſe vapours, which they did as it were luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does *Porphyrius* write concerning them, in his book *De Abſtinentia* [1], ἔτοι οἱ χαίροντες λοιβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν, τὸ σωματικὸν καὶ πνευματικὸν πιαίνεται: ζῇ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάμασι· *Theſe are they, who take pleaſure in the incenſe, fumes, and nidours of ſacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and ſpirituous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nouriſhed, by vapours and fumigations.* And that

[1] Lib. II. §. XLII. p. 86.

that, before *Porphyrius*, many other Pagan philoſophers had been of the ſame opinion, appeareth from this of *Celſus*; Χρὴ γὰρ ἴσως ἀκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δή φασι, διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέζει συντετηκὸς, καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵμαλι καὶ κνίσση, &c. *We ought to give credit to wiſe men, who affirm, that moſt of theſe lower and circumterraneous dæmons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and ſuch like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompence, than ſometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities.* Upon which account himſelf, though a zealous Pagan, perſuadeth men to moderation in the uſe of theſe ſacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferiour and worſer dæmons only. In like manner *Origen* frequently inſiſteth upon the ſame thing, he affirming, that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their ſacrifices, but alſo ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις· *That their very bodies were nouriſhed by the vapours and fumes ariſing from them, and that theſe evil dæmons therefore did as it were deliciate and Epicurize in them.* And before *Origen*, moſt of the ancient fathers, as *Juſtin Martyr*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatianus*, *Tertullian*, *&c.* and alſo many others after him endeavour to diſparage thoſe material and bloody ſacrifices upon the ſame account, as things, whereby evil dæmons were principally gratified. We ſhall only cite one paſſage to this purpoſe out of St. *Baſil*, or who ever were the author of that Commentary upon *Iſaiah*, becauſe there is ſomething philoſophick in it; δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιλήδονον καὶ ἐμπαθὲς, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσί τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χρείαν ἐκθυμιώμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμιζομένῳ τῷ αἵματι, καὶ ἕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως, εἰς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβανομένῳ· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὅλων τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, ἀ διὰ μασσήτης καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὄνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφὴν καταδέχεται. *Sacrifices are things of no ſmall pleaſure and advantage to dæmons; becauſe the blood, being evaporated by fire, and ſo attenuated, is taken into the compages and ſubſtances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nouriſhed with vapours, not by eating, and ſtomachs, or ſuch like organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatſoever other things receive nouriſhment into their whole ſubſtance.* And thus do we ſee it undeniably manifeſt, that many of the ancient fathers ſuppoſed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the ſame of angels too, theſe being both of the ſame kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nouriſhed with the fumes and vapours of ſacrifices, and that they Epicurized in them; yet was not the reaſon hereof, becauſe they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ætherial or heavenly bodies; it being proper to thoſe groſs and vaporous bodies of dæmons only to be nouriſhed and refreſhed after that manner. And now, that all theſe ancient fathers did not ſuppoſe either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, becauſe many of them plainly declared the ſouls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it

Orig. l. 8. [P. 417.]

Contra Celſ. l. 7. *p.* 334.

C. 1. [§. 25. p. 398. Tom. I. Oper. Baſilii in Append.]

cannot be imagined, that they ſhould ſo far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.

But we ſhall now inſtance in ſome few, amongſt many of theſe ancients, who plainly aſſerted both devils and angels to be ſpirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to conſiſt of ſoul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal ſubſtance joined together. That angels themſelves have bodies, is every where declared by St. *Auſtin* in his writings; he affirming, that the bodies of good men, after the reſurrection, ſhall be *qualia ſunt angelorum corpora, ſuch as are the bodies of angels*; and that they ſhall be *corpora angelica, in ſocietate angelorum, angelical bodies, fit for ſociety and converſe with angels*; and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner, *Dæmones, antequam tranſgrederentur, cæleſtia corpora gerebant, quæ converſa ſint ex pœna in aëream qualitatem, ut jam poſſint ab igne pati; That though devils, before the tranſgreſſion, had celeſtial bodies, as angels now have, yet might theſe afterwards, in way of puniſhment, be changed into aërial ones, and ſuch as now may ſuffer by fire.* Moreover, the ſame St. *Auſtin* ſomewhere [1] calleth good angels by the name of *animæ beatæ atque ſanctæ, happy and holy ſouls.* And though it be true, that in his Retractations he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a ſcrupuloſity in that pious father concerning the mere word, becauſe he no where found in Scripture angels called by the name of ſouls; it being far from his meaning, even there to deny them to be incorporeal ſpirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human ſouls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have ſuppoſed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, *Claudianus Mamertus* [2], writing againſt *Fauſtus*, who made angels to be mere bodies without ſouls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of oppoſition, not that they are mere incorporeal ſpirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme) but that they conſiſt of corporeal and incorporeal, ſoul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils, *Diabolus ex duplici diverſaque ſubſtantia conſtat; & corporeus eſt & incorporeus: The devil conſiſteth of a double and different ſubſtance; he is corporeal, and he is alſo incorporeal.* And again of angels, *Patet beatos angelos, utriuſque ſubſtantiæ, & incorporeos eſſe in ea ſui parte, qua ipſis viſibilis Deus; & in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus ſunt ipſi viſibiles. It is manifeſt, that the bleſſed angels are of a two-fold ſubſtance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is viſible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themſelves are viſible to men.* Moreover, *Fulgentius* writeth concerning angels in this manner; *Planè ex duplici eos eſſe ſubſtantia aſſerunt magni & docti viri. Id eſt, ex ſpiritu incorporeo, quo à Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; & ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætherea, id eſt, ignea, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum. Great and learned men affirm angels to conſiſt of a double ſubſtance; that is, of a ſpirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body, whereby they are ſometimes viſible to men: as alſo, that they have ætherial*

In Pſal. 85.

In Pſal. 145.

*De Gen. ad Lit. l.*3. *c.*10. [§.15. p.114. Tom. III.]

L. 2. *c.* 11.

L. 3.

*L.*3. *De Trin.* [p.119 Oper. Edit. Sirmondi.]

[1] De Muſicâ, Lib. VI. Cap. XVII. §. 59. p. 401. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] De Statu Animæ, Lib. III. Cap. VII. p. 178. Edit. Barthii.

ætherial or fiery bodies, but devils aëreal. And perhaps this might be the meaning of *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the ſeventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itſelf too, when it is thus declared, νοερὰς μὲν αὐτὰς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, ἀ μὴν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτους δὲ, καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἢ πυρώδεις, &c. *That the catholick church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and inviſible; but to have certain ſubtile bodies, either aiery or fiery.* For it being there only denied, that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning ſhould not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could ſuch an opinion be faſtened upon the catholick church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being alſo ſufficient in order to that deſign, which was driven at in that council. However *Pſellus* [1], who was a curious inquirer into the nature of ſpirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but alſo as agreeable to the ſenſe of the ancient fathers, ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματόν τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε· *That the dæmoniack or angelick kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodileſs, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them.* Who there alſo further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil dæmons, after this manner; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικὸν, αὐγάς τινας ἐξανίσχον ξένας, τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐστὶν ἀφόρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτόν ποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἔοικε δ' ὦν, ἐωσφόρον Ἡσαΐᾳ τὸν ἐκπεσόντα καλουμάζουσι· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφώδες οἷον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι λυπηρὸν, γυμνωθὲν τῷ συζύγῳ φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν παντάπασιν ἐστὶν ἄϋλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ στερεῦ διαδύνον καὶ διίον, καὶ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος οὐ ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλᾶσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν· τῷ δὲ ὑδρὶ ἐστὶ πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν αὐτίθεσιν· τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, κἂν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνυλά πη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδυκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἁφαῖς ὑποπίπτειν, καὶ πλητόμενα ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσομιλήσαντα κάιεσθαι· *The angelical body ſending forth rays and ſplendors, ſuch as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the dæmoniack body, though it ſeemeth to have been once ſuch alſo, (from* Iſaias *his calling him, that fell from heaven,* Lucifer) *yet is it now dark and obſcure, foul and ſquallid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is ſo devoid of groſs matter, that it can paſs through any ſolid thing, it being indeed more impaſſible than the ſun-beams; for though theſe can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opake, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is ſuch, as that there is nothing ſo imporous or ſolid, that can reſiſt or exclude it. But the dæmoniack bodies, though, by reaſon of their tenuity, they commonly eſcape our ſight, yet have they, notwithſtanding, groſs matter in them, and are patible, eſpecially thoſe of them, which inhabit the ſubterraneous places; for theſe are of ſo groſs a conſiſtency and ſolidity, as that they ſometimes fall alſo under touch, and being ſtrucken, have a ſenſe of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire.* To which purpoſe, the Thracian there addeth more afterwards from the information of *Marcus* the monk, a per- P. 33. [P. 48]

[1] Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p 44.

ſon formerly initiated in the diabolick myſteries, and of great curioſity; P. 94. [P. 142] τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλε ὂν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτῃ τούτων διευεγκὸν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διερεθέντων, μόλις ἢ ὀδαμῶς ἁλῶται τὸ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ ἀέρῳ ἢ ὑδατι μόρια μεταξύ τινῳ ἐμπίπλοντα στερεᾶ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ θᾶττον ἢ λόγῳ τυτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιᾶται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν· *The dæmoniack ſpirit or ſubtile body, being in every part of it capable of ſenſe, does immediately ſee and hear, and is alſo obnoxious to the affections of touch; inſomuch that being ſuddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a ſenſe of pain, as the ſolid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that thoſe other bodies, being once diſcontinued, are not eaſily conſolidated together again; whereas the dæmoniack body, being divided, is quickly redintegrated by coaleſcence, as air or water: nevertheleſs it is not without a ſenſe of pain at that time, when it is thus divided,* &c. Moreover, the ſame *Marcus* affirmeth the bodies of theſe dæmons to be nouriſhed alſo, though in a different manner from ours; τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' εἰσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' ὐ στόμασι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σπόγγοι καὶ ὀστρακόδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἔξωθεν[1]· *They are ſome of them nouriſhed by inſpiration, as the ſpirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by ſucking in the adjacent moiſture, not as we do by mouths, but as ſponges and teſtaceous fiſhes.* And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abſtract incorporeal ſubſtances, and unbodied minds, but conſiſting of ſomething incorporeal, and ſomething corporeal, that is, of ſoul or ſpirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reaſon, but hath alſo had more ſuffrages amongſt the ancient fathers, and thoſe of greater weight too, than either of thoſe two other extremes, *viz.* That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or elſe, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.

Notwithſtanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed moſt in theſe latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly ſinks the more weighty and ſolid things, and bears up only the lighter and more ſuperficial. Though there may be other reaſons given for this alſo; as partly becauſe the Ariſtotelick philoſophy, when generally introduced into Chriſtianity, brought in its abſtract intelligences along with it; and partly becauſe ſome ſpurious Platoniſts talking ſo much of their *Henades* and *Noes*, their ſimple monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably ſome Chriſtians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and laſtly, becauſe angels are not only called in Scripture *Spirits*, but alſo by ſeveral of the ancients ſaid to be incorporeal; whilſt this, in the mean time, was meant only either in reſpect of that incorporeal part, ſoul or mind, which they ſuppoſed to be in them, or elſe of the tenuity and ſubtilty of P. 30, 33. [P. 47.] their bodies or vehicles. For this account does *Pſellus* give hereof, καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν· ὃ δὲ

[1] P. 56.

δὲ λεπτομερές ἐστι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγάνον, καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἀσώματον, ὃ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιοῦσι λέγειν· *It is uſual both with Chriſtian writers, and Pagans too, to call the groſſer bodies corporeal, and thoſe, which, by reaſon of their ſubtilty, avoid both our ſight and touch, incorporeal.* And before *Pſellus*, *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*, in his dialogue, approved in the ſeventh Council [1]; εἰ δέ που εὕροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, ὅτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν· *If you find angels, or dæmons, or ſeparate ſouls called ſometimes incorporeal, you muſt underſtand this in reſpect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not conſiſting of the groſſer elements, nor being ſo ſolid and antitypous as thoſe, which we are now impriſoned in.* And before them both, *Origen*, in the proeme of his *Peri Archon*, where, citing a paſſage out of an ancient book, intituled, *The doctrine of* Peter, wherein our Saviour Chriſt is ſaid to have told his diſciples, that he was not δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον, an *incorporeal dæmon*, though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets thoſe words; *Non idem ſenſus ex iſto ſermone* ἀσωμάτου *indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus oſtenditur, quum de incorporeâ naturâ à philoſophis diſputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipſe ille quicunque eſt habitus vel circumſcriptio dæmonici corporis, non eſt ſimilis huic noſtro craſſiori, vel viſibili corpori; ſed ſecundum ſenſum, ejus qui compoſuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum eſt, quod dixit; non eſſe tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod eſt naturaliter ſubtile, & velut aura tenue; & propter hoc vel imputatur à multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; ſed habere ſe corpus ſolidum & palpabile. The word* ἀσώματον, *or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that ſenſe, wherein it is uſed by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philoſophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a dæmon is here ſaid to be incorporeal, becauſe of the diſpoſition of the dæmoniack body, not like to this groſs and viſible body of ours. So that the ſenſe is, as if Chriſt ſhould have ſaid, I have not ſuch a body as the dæmons have, which is naturally ſubtile, thin and ſoft, as the air, and therefore is either ſuppoſed to be by many, or at leaſt called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is ſolid and palpable.* Where we ſee plainly, that angels, though ſuppoſed to have bodies, may, notwithſtanding, be called incorporeal, by reaſon of the tenuity and ſubtilty of thoſe bodies, comparatively with the groſſneſs and ſolidity of theſe our terreſtrial bodies. But that indeed which now moſt of all inclineth ſome to this perſuaſion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council, having paſſed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the ſeventh Oecumenical (ſo called) or ſecond *Nicene*, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at leaſt to counter-balance the other.

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does ſo exactly agree with the old Pythagorick cabala; yet have we reaſon to think, that it was not therefore meerly borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient

[1] In Actis Concilii VII. Oecum. ſeu Nicæni II. Action. V. p. 593. Tom IV. Concilior. Edit. Harduini.

fathers; but that they were led into it by the Scripture itſelf. For firſt, the hiſtorick phænomena of angels in the Scripture are ſuch, as cannot well be otherwiſe ſolved, than by ſuppoſing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any ſtreſs upon thoſe words of the Pſalmiſt[1], *who maketh his angels ſpirits, and miniſters a flame of fire*, (though, with good reaſon, by the ancient fathers interpreted to this ſenſe) becauſe they may poſſibly be underſtood otherwiſe, as ſometime they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to inſiſt upon thoſe paſſages of St. *Paul*[2], where he ſpeaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an arch-angel, and ſuch like; there are ſeveral other places in Scripture, which ſeem plainly to confirm this opinion. As firſt, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpoſe, *Luke* xx. 35. *They who ſhall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the reſurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels.* For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the ſouls of good men, in a ſtate of ſeparation, and without any reſurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a reſurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of theſe words ſeems to be this, (as St. *Auſtin* hath interpreted them) that the ſouls of good men, after the reſurrection, ſhall have *corpora angelica, angelical bodies*, and *qualia ſunt angelorum corpora, ſuch bodies as thoſe of angels are.* Wherein it is ſuppoſed, that angels alſo have bodies, but of a very different kind from thoſe of ours here. Again, that of St. *Jude*, where he writeth thus of the devils; *the angels, which kept not their firſt eſtate* (or rather, according to the vulgar Latin, *ſuum principatum, their own principality*) *but left their proper habitation (or dwelling houſe) hath he reſerved in everlaſting chains, under darkneſs, unto the judgment of the great day.* In which words it is firſt implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν, their *own principality*, that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worſer and inferiour part, they having alſo a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worſer principle, of a ſuperiour part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferiour, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwiſe eaſily conceivable, how they ſhould be capable of ſinning. And this inferiour part in angels ſeems to have a reſpect to ſomething, that is corporeal or bodily in them alſo, as well as it hath in men. But then, in the next place, St. *Jude* addeth, as the immediate reſult and natural conſequence of theſe angels ſinning, that they thereby left or loſt, τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, *ſuum proprium domicilium*; that is, not only *their dwelling-place* at large, thoſe etherial countries, and heavenly regions above, but alſo their proper dwelling-houſe, or immediate manſion; to wit, their heavenly body. Foraſmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after the reſurrection, is thus called by St. *Paul*[3], τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, *Our habitation, or dwelling houſe that is from heaven.* The heavenly body is the proper houſe or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human ſouls; and this is that, which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I ſay, was the natural conſequence of theſe angels ſinning, their leaving, or loſing

De Gen. ad Lit. L. 3.

[1] Pſalm civ. 4. [2] 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Theſſ. iv. 16. [3] 2 Cor. v. 1.

loſing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obſcured and incraſſated; the bodies of ſpirits incorporate always bearing a correſpondent purity or impurity to the different diſpoſition of their mind or ſoul. But then again, in the laſt place, that, which was thus in part the natural reſult of their ſin, was alſo, by the juſt judgment of God, converted into their puniſhment; for their ætherial bodies being thus changed into groſs, aërial, feculent and vapourous ones, themſelves were immediately hereupon, as St. *Peter* in the parallel place expreſſeth it [1], ταρταρωθέντες, *caſt down into Tartarus*, and there impriſoned or *reſerved in chains under darkneſs, until the judgment of the great day.* Where it is obſervable, that the word ταρταρῶσ, uſed by St. *Peter*, is the very ſame that *Apollodorus* and other Greek writers frequently make uſe of in a like caſe, when they ſpeak of the *Titans* being caſt down from heaven; which ſeems to have been really nothing elſe but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by *Tartarus* here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air, or atmoſphere of the earth, according to that of St. *Auſtin*, concerning theſe angels, *Poſt peccatum in hanc ſunt detruſi caliginem, ubi tamen & aër*; *That after their ſin, they were thruſt down into the miſty darkneſs of this lower air.* And here are they, as it were chained and fettered alſo by that ſame weight of their groſs and heavy bodies, which firſt ſunk them down hither; this not ſuffering them to re-aſcend up, or return back to thoſe bright ætherial regions above. And being thus for the preſent impriſoned in this lower *Tartarus*, or caliginous air or atmoſphere, they are indeed here kept and reſerved in cuſtody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general aſſizes; however they may, notwithſtanding, in the mean time ſeem to domineer and lord it for a while here. And, laſtly, our Saviour's [2] *Go ye curſed into everlaſting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels*, ſeems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; becauſe, firſt, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorſe of conſcience, would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain alſo; but to ſay, that incorporeal ſubſtances, united to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth, to expoſe Chriſtianity, and the Scripture, to the ſcorn and contempt of all philoſophers and philoſophick wits. Wherefore *Pſellus* lays no ſmall ſtreſs upon this place; εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τὸ Σωτῆρος λόγων πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθήσεσθαι φαύλους τοὺς δαίμονας· ὃ πῶς ἦν παθεῖν ἀσωμάτους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος· ἀναγκαίως σώμασιν αὐτοὺς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν· *I am alſo convinced of this, that dæmons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming, that they ſhall be puniſhed with fire: which how could it be, were they altogether incorporeal? it being impoſſible for that, which is both itſelf incorporeal, and vitally ununited to any body, to ſuffer from a body. Wherefore of neceſſity it muſt be granted, by us Chriſtians, that devils ſhall receive puniſhment of ſenſe and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of ſuffering.*

De Gen. ad Lit. l. 3. c. 10. [P. 114. Tom. III. Oper.]

P. 37. [p. 52]

Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings ſuperiour to men, be ſubſtances incorporeal, or ſouls vitally united to bodies, though not always the

[1] 2 Pet. ii. 4. [2] Matth. xxv. 41.

the ſame, but ſometimes of one kind, and ſometimes of another, and never quite ſeparate from all body; it may ſeem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal ſubſtances beſides the Deity, yet, *vita incorporea, a life perfectly incorporeal* in the forementioned Origenick ſenſe, or *ſine corporeæ adjectionis ſocietate vivere, to live altogether without the ſociety of any corporeal adjection*, is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only; and conſequently therefore, that human ſouls, when by death they are diveſted of theſe groſs earthly bodies, they do not then live and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and ſo continue till the reſurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not ſo much as the angels themſelves, and therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whoſe nature neceſſarily requires the conjunction of ſome body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it is unconceivable, how they ſhould either have ſenſe or imagination. And thus doth *Origen*, conſentaneouſly to his own principles, conclude; ἡ τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύζει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχὴ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώματος οἰκείου τῇ φύζει τῶ τόπω ἐκείνω· ὅπερ ὅπω μὲν φορεῖ, ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, περίσσον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα· ὅπω δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ὧ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένῳ κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τὰς καθαρωτέρας καὶ αἰθερίους καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους· *Our ſoul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and inviſible, in whatſoever corporeal place it exiſteth, doth always ſtand in need of a body, ſuitable to the nature of that place reſpectively: which body it ſometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was neceſſary, but is now ſuperfluous for the following ſtate; and ſometimes again putting on ſomething to what before it had, now ſtanding in need of ſome better clothing, to fit it for thoſe more pure, ætherial, and heavenly places.* But, in what there follows, we conceive, that *Origen*'s ſenſe having not been rightly underſtood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῇδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένη, τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑςέρᾳ τῆς κυήσης, ἕως ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς μέλοντι διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν ὄντος τινὸς ζκήνους, καὶ ἐπιδεία οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας πω τῷ ζκήνει, καταλύεσθαι μέν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπιγειον οἰκίαν τῆ ζκήνους, τὸ δὲ ζκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τῆ θεῆ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν· The ſenſe whereof is this; *The ſoul deſcending hither into generation, put on firſt that body, which was uſeful for it whilſt to continue in the womb; and then again afterward ſuch a body, as was neceſſary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called* ζκῆνος, *by St.* Paul, (being a more ſubtile body, which it had before) *the other the ſuperinduced earthly houſe, neceſſarily ſubſervient to this* Skenos *here; the Scripture oracles affirm, that the earthly houſe of this* Skenos *ſhall be corrupted or diſſolved, but the* Skenos *itſelf, ſuperindue or put on a houſe not made with hands, eternal in the heavens: the ſame declaring, that the corruptible ſhall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality.* Where it is plain, that *Origen* takes that ζκῆνος, in St. *Paul* (1 *Corinth.* v. 1.) for a ſubtile body, which the ſoul had before its terrene nativity, and

Cont. Celſ. l. 7. p. 353.

and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at laſt, ſuperindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of *Origen*, than thoſe *Excerpta* out of *Methodius* the Martyr, in *Photius* [1], though ſeeming to be vitiated alſo; where, as we conceive, the ſenſe of *Origen* and his followers is firſt contained in thoſe words, ἕτερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τὸ σκήνους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὤν ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνος, *That in St.* Paul *the* τὸ σκῆνος *is one thing*, and the *earthly houſe of this* σκῆνος *another thing*; and we, *that is, our ſouls, a third thing, diſtinct from both.* And then it is further declared in this that follows, τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης τῆς ὠκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἔξοσιν οἰκησιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαινοποιηθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἄπλωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν· ὅθεν καὶ στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι ζωήν· τό γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἡ ἀθανασία· *That this ſhort life of our earthly body being deſtroyed, our ſoul ſhall then have, before the reſurrection, a dwelling from God, until we ſhall at laſt receive it renewed, reſtored, and ſo made an incorruptible houſe. Wherefore in this we groan, deſirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon the body which we ſhall then have. For that houſe, which is from heaven, that we deſire to put on, is immortality.* Moreover, that the ſoul is not altogether naked after death, the ſame *Origen* endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour, concerning the rich man and *Lazarus*; ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ πένης ἀναπαυόμενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτῆρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχή· *The rich man puniſhed, and the poor man refreſhed in* Abraham's *boſom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the reſurrection, plainly teaches, that even now alſo after death, the ſoul uſeth a body.* He thinketh the ſame alſo to be further proved from the viſible apparition of *Samuel's ghoſt*, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ὁρατὸς ὤν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο. Samuel *alſo viſibly appearing after death, maketh it manifeſt, that his ſoul was then clothed with a body.* To which he adds in *Photius* [2], τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παχεῖ καὶ γηίνῳ σώματι, &c. *That the exterior form and figure of the ſoul's body after death doth reſemble that of the groſs terreſtrial body here in this life; all the hiſtories of apparitions making ghoſts, or the ſouls of the dead, to appear in the ſame form, which their bodies had before.* This, therefore, as was obſerved, is that, which *Origen* underſtands by τὸ σκῆνος in St. *Paul*; not this groſs terreſtrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the ſoul after death carries away with it. Now, this opinion of the learned *Origen*'s was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greateſt adverſaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does *Methodius* the martyr, who was ſo great an anti-Origeniſt, where he mentions this Origenick opinion in *Photius*, ſeem to tax it otherwiſe, then as Platonical, implying the ſoul to be incorporeal. *Methodius* himſelf, on the contrary, contending, not that the ſoul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a diſtinct thing from it, but that itſelf is a body; ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἄδειλος ἀσώματος ὢν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ παντὸς τῶν ὅλων, σώματα νοερὰ ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη

Thus Origen *plainly, in his Fifth Book,* (p. 244.) *That there is* διαφορὰ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνος καλουμένης, καὶ σκήνους, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι στενάζουσι βαρούμενοι, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ σκήνει ἐπενδύσασθαι· *A difference betwixt the earthly houſe, in which the* σκῆνος *is, that will be diſſolved; and the* σκῆνος *itſelf, wherein good men groan, being burdened, not that they would put it off, but put on immortality upon it.*

[1] Biblioth. Cod. CCXXIV. p. 919. [2] Apud Phot. ubi ſupra p. 939.

μέλη διακεκόζμηϑαι, ταύτην λαβεῖζαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἅδῃ, καὶ γλῶσσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἱστορεῖσθαι ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ὡταῖς ἀειδέσ· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ Φύζει αἱ ψυχαὶ παντὸς ἀπογυμνωθεῖζαι περιϑλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπάρχωσι· *God alone is praiſed as incorporeal and inviſible; but ſouls are made by him (who is the father of all things) intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out* (as it were) *into members diſtinguiſhable by reaſon, and having the ſame form and ſignature with the outward body. Whence it is, that in Hades* (or hell) *we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another inviſible body coexiſting with theſe ſouls, but becauſe the ſouls themſelves are in their own nature (when ſtript naked of all clothing) according to their very eſſence ſuch.* We ſay therefore, if one of theſe two opinions muſt needs be entertained, that either the ſoul itſelf is a body, or elſe that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was *Origen*'s, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former, whether held in *Tertullian*'s ſenſe, that all ſubſtance, and conſequently God himſelf, is body; or elſe in that of *Methodius*, that all created ſubſtance is ſuch, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already ſhewed, that *Origen* was not ſingular in this opinion, *Irenæus* before him having aſſerted the ſame thing, that ſouls after death are adapted to certain bodies, (where the word in the Greek probably was προσάπτονται) which have the ſame character with theſe terreſtrial ones; and *Philoponus* after him, who was no Pagan, but Chriſtian philoſopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*, in that dialogue of his, read in the ſeventh Synod [2], ſeemeth to have been of the ſame perſuaſion alſo, when he affirmeth of ſouls, as well as angels and dæmons, that they were ὁραϑέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰϑητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ εἴδει τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωμάτων, *often ſeen by many ſenſibly, in the form of their own bodies.* However, it is a thing, which *Pſellus* took for granted, where, ſpeaking of devils, inſinuating their temptations into men's ſouls, by affecting immediately the phantaſtick ſpirit, he writeth after this manner; ὁ λέγων, πόῤῥωϑεν μὲν ὢν ἰσχυροτέρας δεῖται κραυγῆς, ἀσχὲ δὲ γειόμενος, εἰς τὸ τῷ ἀκόντος ὃς ψιϑυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ συνεσγίσαι πνεύματι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐδενὸς ἂν ἐδεήϑη ψύφε, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βάλκτιν λόγ ἀφόφ κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγινόμενος, ὅ φασι καὶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐξιέσαις τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἁπλήκλως ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλαις· *When one man ſpeaks to another from afar off, he muſt* (if he would be heard) *make a loud cry or noiſe; whereas, if he ſtood near to him, he might ſoftly whiſper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the ſpirit (or ſubtile body of the ſoul,) he ſhould not then need ſo much as to make a whiſper, but might ſilently, and without noiſe, communicate whatſoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is ſaid to be the way, that ſouls, going out of theſe bodies, converſe together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noiſe.* For *Pſellus* here plainly ſuppoſeth ſouls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain *ſubtile body*, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may ſilently converſe with each other. It is true indeed, that St. *Auſtin*, in his twelfth book *De Geneſi ad Literam*, does not himſelf cloſe with this opinion, of

P. 94. [P. 72.]

De Geneſi ad Literam, c. 32. [P. 239. Tom. III. Oper.]

[2] Vide Concil. Edit. Harduini. Tom. IV. p. 293, 294.

of the ſoul's having a body after death, but much leſs of its being a body: nevertheleſs does he ſeem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in theſe words; *Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus ſimilia; an verò nec ad ipſa, ſed ad illud, quod & corporibus & ſimilitudinibus corporum eſt excellentius; citò quidem reſponderim; ad corporalia loca eam vel non ferri niſi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, oſtendat, qui poteſt; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror eſſe, non corporalem; ad ſpiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia ſimilia corporibus. But if it be demanded, when the ſoul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporal places, or to incorporals like to corporals, or elſe to neither, but to that, which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likeneſſes of bodies? the anſwer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the ſoul have ſome body, when it goes out of this body, let them, that can, ſhow: but, for my part, I think otherwiſe. For I ſuppoſe the ſoul to be ſpiritual, and not corporal; and that, after death, it is either carried to ſpiritual things, or elſe to penal places, like to bodies, ſuch as have been repreſented to ſome in extaſies*, &c. Where St. *Auſtin* himſelf ſeems to think the puniſhment of ſouls, after death, and before the reſurrection, to be phantaſtical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then ſo much as phantaſtick puniſhments neither, nor any imagination at all in ſouls, without a body, if that doctrine of *Ariſtotle*'s [x] be true, that phancy or imagination is nothing elſe but a weaker ſenſe; that is, a thing, which reſults from a complication of ſoul and body both together. But it is obſervable, that in the forecited place that, which St. *Auſtin* chiefly oppoſed, was the ſoul's being a body, as *Tertullian*, *Methodius*, and others had aſſerted; but as for its having a body, he ſaith only this, *Oſtendat qui poteſt, let him that can ſhew it*; he granting, in the mean time, that the ſoul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the ſame St. *Auſtin*, as he elſewhere condemneth the opinion of thoſe, who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledging it to be real and corporeal; ſo does he ſomewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the reſurrection, the ſouls of men may ſuffer from a certain fire, for the conſuming and burning up of their droſs; *Poſt iſtius ſanè corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui poſt reſurrectionem corporum futurus eſt damnationis & remunerationis ultimus dies; ſi hoc temporis intervallo, ejuſmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non ſentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores & amores in hujus corporis vitâ, ut eorum ligna, & fœnum, & ſtipula conſummantur; alii vero ſentiunt, qui ejuſmodi ſecum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forſitan verum eſt. If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body and the reſurrection or day of judgment, the ſouls of the dead be ſaid to ſuffer ſuch a fire as can do no execution upon thoſe, who have no wood, hay, nor ſtubble, to burn up, but ſhall be felt by ſuch, as have made ſuch buildings or ſuperſtructures, &c. I reprehend it not, becauſe perhaps it is true.* The opinion here mentioned, is thus

De Civ. D. lib. 21. c. 26. [§. IV. p. 490. Tom. VII. Oper.]

[x] De Animâ, Lib. III. Cap. IX. p. 53. Tom. II. Oper.

thus expreſſed by *Origen*, in his fifth book againſt *Celſus*, which very place St. *Auſtin* ſeems to have had reſpect to; ὃ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὥσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγειν τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίουσῳ μὲν καὶ ὃ κατακαίουσῳ τὰς μὴ ἔχουσας ὕλην διομένην ἀναλύεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρός· καίουσῳ δὲ καὶ κατακαίουσῳ τὰς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων τροπικῶς λεγομένῃ οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλάμην οἰκοδομήσαντας. Celſus *did not underſtand, that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Chriſtians, as to ſome of the Greeks, will be purgatory to the world; as alſo to every one of thoſe perſons, who ſtand in need of ſuch puniſhment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon thoſe, who have no combuſtible matter in them, but will be felt by ſuch, as in the moral ſtructure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay and ſtubble.* Now ſince ſouls cannot ſuffer from fire, nor any thing elſe in way of ſenſe or pain, without being vitally united to ſome body, we may conclude, that St. *Auſtin*, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from ſouls having bodies after death.

C. Celſ. l. 5. p. 240.

Hitherto have we declared, how the ancient aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance, as unextended, did repel the aſſaults of Atheiſts and Corporealiſts made againſt it; but eſpecially how they quitted themſelves of that abſurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created ſpirits, by ſuppoſing them always to be vitally united to ſome bodies, and conſequently, by the locality of thoſe their reſpective bodies, determined to *here* and *there*; according to that of *Origen*; ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δέεται σώματος, διὰ τὰς τοπικὰς μεταβάσεις, *our ſoul ſtands in need of a body in order to local motions.* We ſhall in the next place declare, what grounds of reaſon there were, which induced thoſe ancients to aſſert and maintain a thing ſo repugnant to ſenſe and imagination, and conſequently to all vulgar apprehenſion, as a ſubſtance in itſelf unextended, indiſtant and indiviſible, or devoid of magnitude and parts. Wherein we ſhall only repreſent the ſenſe of theſe ancient Incorporealiſts, ſo far as we can, to the beſt advantage, in order to their vindication, againſt Atheiſts and Materialiſts; ourſelves in the mean time not aſſerting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and ſo either to cloſe with this, or that other following hypotheſis, of extended incorporeals.

C. Celſ. l. 5. p. 244.

Now it is here obſervable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both ſides, as well by the aſſerters as the deniers of incorporeal ſubſtance, that there is but one kind of extenſion only; and conſequently, that whatſoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but alſo really and phyſically diviſible or diſcerpible, as likewiſe antitypous and impenetrable; ſo that it cannot coexiſt with a body in the ſame place: from whence it follows, that whatſoever arguments do evince, that there is ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, the ſame do therefore demonſtrate, according to the ſenſe of theſe ancients, (as well Corporealiſts as Incorporealiſts) that there is ſomething unextended, it being ſuppoſed by them, both alike, that whatſoever is extended, is body.

Never-

Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs, as tend directly to prove, that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended Deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of *Simplicius*, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another; *Plotinus* first argues after this manner, τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; πάλιν τὸ μέρος τὸ μέρος; πόθεν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδειγε ποσόν τινος ὄντος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλου πολλαχῇ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύναλον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει· *What then will they say, who contend, that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body* (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, *&c.*) *and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain, that magnitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing, that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soul-less things.* Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him; εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωὴν, ἄτοπον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύναλον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νῦν γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα· *If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind have life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible, that life and soul should result from a congeries of life-less and soul-less things, or that mind-less things put together should beget mind.* The sum of this argumentation is this, that *either every part of an extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not.* Now if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain, that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life nor mind, because nothing can (causally) come from nothing. It is true indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the atomick physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them,

P. 460. [Enead. IV. Lib. VII. Cap. V.]

En. 4. l. 7. c. 2. [P. 457.]

> [1] ——— *Ne ex albis alba rearis;*
> *Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata.*

You are not to think, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black; but the reason of the difference here is plain, be-

[1] Lucret. II. Vers. 730, 732.

cauſe theſe qualities and forms are not entities really diſtinct from the magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion of parts, but only ſuch a compoſition of them, as cauſe different phancies in us; but life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, are entities really diſtant from magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion of parts; they are neither mere phancies, nor ſyllables of things, but ſimple and uncompounded realities. But if every ſuppoſed part of a ſoul be ſoul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the reſt of it beſides any one part be ſuperfluous; or indeed every ſuppoſed part thereof would be the ſame with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, ſince no part of an extended thing can poſſibly be the ſame with the whole.

Again, the ſame philoſopher endeavours further to prove, that the human ſoul itſelf is unextended and indiviſible, from its energies and operations, and that as well thoſe of ſenſation as of intellection. Firſt, therefore, from external ſenſations, he reaſons in this manner; εἰτι μέλλει ἀισθάνεσθαί τινος ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ πανὶὸς ἀνιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν ἀισθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι ἑνὸς ποικίλου, οἷον πρόσωπον· ἑ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταυὶὸν ὁμῶ πάνὶων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι ἀκοῆς, ἓν τι δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμῶ τῶν ἀισθήσιων ἐλθόνὶων· *That, which perceiveth in us, muſt of neceſſity be one thing, and by one and the ſame indiviſible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through ſeveral organs of ſenſe, as the many qualities of one ſubſtance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the ſame organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us, that perceives the noſe, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the ſelf-ſame thing, that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, theſe alſo muſt of neceſſity come all at laſt to one indiviſible, or elſe they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the ſeveral ſentiments of them meeting no where together in one. He concludes therefore, that this one thing in us, that ſenſibly perceives all things, may be reſembled to the centre of a circle, and the ſeveral ſenſes to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one centre. Wherefore that, which perceives and apprehends all things in us, muſt needs be really one and the very ſame*; that is, *unextended and indiviſible.* Which argument is yet further purſued by him, more particularly thus; *If that, which ſenſibly perceiveth in us be extended, ſo as to have diſtant parts one without another; then one of theſe three things muſt needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended ſubſtance of the ſoul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or elſe all comes to ſome one point, which alone perceives both the ſeveral parts of the object, and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre.* Now of the former of theſe three, *Plotinus* thus; μεγέθει ὄνὶι τούτῳ, ζυμμεριζοιὶο ἂν· ὥς-ε ἄλλο ἄλλε μέρος, καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλε τε αἰσθητε αἰτιληψιν ἔχειν· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλε· σὺ δὲ ἄλλε αἴσθοιο· *If the ſoul be a magnitude, then muſt it be divided together with the ſenſible object, ſo that one part of the ſoul muſt*

P. 461. [Cap. VI.]

muſt perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole ſenſible: juſt as if I ſhould have the ſenſe of one thing, and you of another. Whereas it is plain by our internal ſenſe, that it is one and the ſelf-ſame thing in us, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the ſecond, he writeth in this manner; εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μεγέθος πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἐγεμονεύοντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας· *But if every part of the extended ſoul perceive the whole ſenſible object, ſince magnitude is infinitely diviſible, there muſt be in every man infinite ſenſations and images of one and the ſame object.* Whereas we are intimately conſcious to ourſelves, that we have but only one ſenſation of one object at the ſame time. And as for the third and laſt part of this disjunction, that what ſenſibly perceives in every one, is but one ſingle point, either mathematical or phyſical; it is certain, firſt, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor ſubſtance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a phyſical point or minimum, a body ſo little, that there cannot poſſibly be any leſs, *Plotinus* aſſerting the infinite diviſibility of body, here explodes the thing itſelf. However he further intimates, that if there were any ſuch phyſical minimum, or abſolutely leaſt body or extenſum, this could not poſſibly receive upon it a diſtinct repreſentation and delineation of all the ſeveral parts of a whole viſible object at once, as of the eyes, noſe, mouth, *&c.* in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities of an edifice; nor could ſuch a parvitude or atom as this be the cauſe of all animal motions. And this was one of *Ariſtotle*'s [1] arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals, πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν· *If the ſoul were indiviſible as a point, how could it perceive that, which is diviſible?* that is, take notice of all the diſtinct parts of an extended object, and have a deſcription of the whole of them at once upon itſelf? The ſum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the ſoul be an extended ſubſtance, then muſt it of neceſſity be either a phyſical point or minimum, the leaſt extenſum, that can poſſibly be, (if there be any ſuch leaſt, and body or extenſion be not infinitely diviſible) or elſe it muſt conſiſt of more ſuch phyſical points, joined together. As for the former of theſe, it hath been already declared to be impoſſible, that one ſingle atom, or ſmalleſt point of extenſion, ſhould be able diſtinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to ſuppoſe every ſoul to be but one phyſical minimum, or ſmalleſt extenſum, is to imply ſuch an eſſential difference in matter or extenſion, as that ſome of the points thereof ſhould be naturally devoid of all life, ſenſe, and underſtanding, and others again naturally ſenſitive and rational. Which abſurdity, though it ſhould be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there ſhould come to be one ſuch ſenſitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this ſhould conſtantly remain the ſame, from infancy to old-age, whilſt other parts of matter tranſpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if ſouls be extended ſubſtances, conſiſting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every ſenſation; then muſt every one of thoſe points,

[1] De Animâ, Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 10. Tom. II. Oper.

points, either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us, that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many, as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or perception in them, it is impossible, that there should be any in the whole. But in very truth, to say, that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that *Plotinus* contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that Συμπάθεια, or Ὁμοπάθεια, that *sympathy*, or *homopathy*, which is in all animals, to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for
P. 462. divers reasons. Ἐι τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἱόντε τὴν αἴσθησιν τῶ τοιούτω γίνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὄντος ὄντος, ἄλλο παθόντος, ἄλλο γνῶσιν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτῶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει· *Since therefore these sympathetick senses cannot possibly be made by traduction, at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing, and that another) it followeth, that what perceives in us, must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal.* The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, *I my self*, not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one, but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least *extensum*, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside-being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Last'y,

Laſtly, the forementioned philoſopher endeavours yet further to prove the human ſoul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indiviſible, from its rational energies or operations, its νοητῶν νοήσεις, and ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις, *intellections of intelligibles*, and *apprehenſions of things devoid of magnitude*, πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν· *For how could the ſoul* (ſaith he) *if it were a magnitude, underſtand that, which hath no magnitude? and with that, which is diviſible, conceive what is indiviſible?* Now, it is certain, that we have notions of many things, which are ἀφάνταστα, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickneſs in them, as virtue, vice, &c. ἀμέγεθες δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἢ τούτων ἄρα νόησις· ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεσθαι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κεῖσθαι. *Juſtice and honeſty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore muſt the intellections of them needs be ſuch too. So that the ſoul muſt receive theſe by what is indiviſible, and lodge them in that which is diviſible.* We have alſo a notion not only of meer latitude or breadth, indiviſible as to thickneſs; and of longitude or a line, indiviſible both as to breadth and thickneſs; but alſo of a mathematical point, that is every way indiviſible, as to length, breadth and thickneſs. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extenſion or magnitude. And indeed all the abſtract eſſences of things, (or the αὐτοέκαστα) which are the firſt objects of intellection, are indiviſible: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίνονται τῷ νῷ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν, &c. *And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as ſeparated and abſtracted from the ſame; there being nothing of fleſh in our conception of a man*, &c. Nay, the ſoul conceives extended things themſelves, unextendedly and indiviſibly; for as the diſtance of a whole hemiſphere is contracted into a narrow compaſs in the pupil of the eye, ſo are all diſtances yet more contracted in the ſoul itſelf, and there underſtood indiſtantly; for the thought of a mile diſtance, or of ten thouſand miles, or ſemidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the ſoul, nor ſtretches it any more than does the thought of a foot or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, then could it not be, ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ, *equal to every ſenſible*, and alike perceive both leſſer and greater magnitudes than itſelf: but leaſt of all could it perceive ſuch things, as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of *Ariſtotle*'s argumentation, to prove the ſoul and mind to be unextended and indiviſible[1], πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἄμερες μεριστῷ; *For how could it perceive, that which is indiviſible by what is diviſible?* he having before demanded, how it could apprehend things diviſible, and of a great extenſion, by a meer point, or abſolute parvitude. Where the ſoul, or that which perceives and underſtands, is, according to *Ariſtotle*, neither diviſible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indiviſible, either as a mathematical, or as a phyſical point, and abſolute parvitude; but as that, which hath in itſelf no outſwelling

Plot. p. 463.

[1] De Animâ Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 10. Tom. II. Oper.

ſwelling diſtance, nor relation to any place, otherwiſe than as it is vitally united to a body, which (where-ever it be) it always ſympathizes with, and acts upon.

Beſides which, theſe ancient aſſerters of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, becauſe we cannot only conceive extenſion without cogitation, and again cogitation without extenſion; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really diſtinct and ſeparable from one another, (we having no other rule to judge of the real diſtinction and ſeparability of things, than from our conceptions) but alſo are not able to conceive cogitation with extenſion. We cannot conceive a thought to be of ſuch a certain length, breadth, and thickneſs, menſurable by inches and feet, and by ſolid meaſures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much leſs of the thought of an indiviſible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of ſome certain determinate figure, either round or angular; ſpherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatſoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts muſt either be meer non-entities, or elſe extended too into length, breadth, and thickneſs; diviſible into parts, and menſurable; and alſo (where finite) of a certain figure. And conſequently all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts) muſt of neceſſity be long, broad, and thick, and either ſpherically, or angularly figurate. And the ſame muſt be affirmed of volitions likewiſe, and appetites or paſſions, as fear and hope, love, and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings, (ſouls and minds) as knowledge and ignorance, wiſdom and folly, virtue and vice, juſtice and injuſtice, *&c.* that theſe are either all of them abſolute non-entities, or elſe extended into three diviſions of length, breadth, and profundity, and menſurable not only by inches and feet, but alſo by ſolid meaſures, as pints and quarts; and laſt of all (where they are finite as in men) figurate. But if this be abſurd, and theſe things belonging to ſoul and mind (though doubtleſs as great realities at leaſt, as the things, which belong to bodies) be unextended, then muſt the ſubſtances of ſouls and minds themſelves be unextended alſo. Thus *Plotinus* of mind, Νοῦς ὁ διαστὰς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, *mind is not diſtant from itſelf:* and indeed were it ſo, it could not be one thing (as it is) but many; every conceivable part of diſtant and unextended ſubſtance being a ſubſtance by itſelf. And the ſame is to be ſaid of the human ſoul, though it act upon diſtant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itſelf, notwithſtanding, is not ſcattered out into diſtance, nor diſperſed into multiplicity, nor infinitely diviſible; becauſe then it would not be one ſingle ſubſtance, or monad, but a heap of ſubſtances. Soul is no more diviſible than life; of which the forementioned philoſopher thus, ἆραγε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται· *Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life.* Laſtly, if ſoul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, underſtanding and wiſdom, *&c.* be outſpread into diſtance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reaſon given, why they ſhould not be as well really and phyſically, as intellectually diviſible; and one part

part of them separable from another: since, as *Plotinus*, παντὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· *In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another.* At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another, (for as much as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us, may be done by infinite power) in which case, neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, Ὄγκοι, *bulks*, or *tumours*, a mere passive thing; the second, Δυνάμεις, *self-active powers* or *virtues*, or φύσις δραστήριος, the *energetick nature*. The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called *res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *res* were one thing, and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension, or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but *aliud extra aliud*, *one thing without another*, and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no *extensum* whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is trully and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover, magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing, from penetrating into it: (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency, as a logical necessity,) or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body or extension, as such, being able to move itself, or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition, (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe) but all would be a dead heap or lump: nor could any one substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity,

that beſides this outſide bulky extenſion, and tumourous magnitude, there muſt be another kind of entity, whoſe eſſential attribute or character is life, ſelf-activity, or cogitation. Which firſt, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extenſion, is plain from hence, becauſe cogitation may be as well conceived without extenſion, as extenſion without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And ſince there is unqueſtionably much more of entity in life and cogitation, than there is in mere extenſion or magnitude, which is the loweſt of all being, and next to nothing; it muſt needs be imputed to the mere deluſion and impoſture of imagination, that men are ſo prone to think this extenſion or magnitude to be only ſubſtance, and all other things beſides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that ſecondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and ſuch as may be preſent or abſent without the deſtruction of its ſubject; yet can there be no reaſon given, why the primary and original life itſelf ſhould not be as well a ſubſtantial thing, as mere extenſion and magnitude. Again, that extenſion and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the ſelf-ſame ſubſtance, conſider'd brokenly and by piece-meal; as if either all extenſion had life and cogitation eſſentially belonging to it, (as the Hylozoiſts conclude) or at leaſt all life and cogitation had extenſion; and conſequently all ſouls and minds, and even the Deity itſelf, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extenſion; (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extenſion the only entity; ſo that whatſoever is devoid thereof, is, *ipſo facto*, abſolutely nothing:) This, I ſay, will alſo appear from hence, becauſe, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative being, as ſuch, (as wiſdom, folly, virtue, vice, *&c.*) to be extended into length, breadth, and thickneſs, and to be menſurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extenſion, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the ſelf-ſame thing, ſince they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are diſtinct ſubſtances from each other. Lives and minds are ſuch tight and compact things in themſelves, and have ſuch a ſelf-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly ſcattered out from itſelf into diſtance, and diſperſed into infinite multiplicity; nor be ſpread all over the ſame, as coextended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the ſeveral parts of an extended magnitude, ſhould jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the ſame ſingle and indiviſible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things ſhould be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one ſingle ſubſtance, and not a heap of ſubſtances; whereas no body or extended thing is one, but many ſubſtances; every conceivable or ſmalleſt part thereof being a real ſubſtance by itſelf.

But this will yet further appear, if we conſider, what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as ſuch, is nothing but local motion,

motion, change of diſtance, or tranſlation from place to place, a meer outſide and ſuperficial thing; but it is certain, that cogitation, (phancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the meer fridging up and down of the parts of an extended ſubſtance, changing their place and diſtance; but it is unqueſtionably an internal energy; that is, ſuch an energy, as is within the very ſubſtance or eſſence of that, which thinketh, or in the inſide of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude, that there are alſo two kinds of entity or ſubſtance in nature; the one meer outſide, and which hath nothing within it; the other ſuch a kind of entity, as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itſelf, and within itſelf, and upon itſelf; an inſide thing, whoſe action is within the very eſſence or ſubſtance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is ſuch a thing, as hath an eſſential inſide or profundity. Now, this inſide of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themſelves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickneſs in it, becauſe if it had, it would be again a meer outſide thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (ſouls and minds) extenſion and magnitude never ſo much belonging to them, as ſome ſuppoſe them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the meer outſide of their being; beſides which, they muſt of neceſſity have alſo an unextended inſide, that hath no outſwelling tumour, and is not ſcattered into diſtance, nor diſperſed into multiplicity, which therefore could not poſſibly exiſt a part in a part of the ſuppoſed extenſion, as if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extenſion, and another in another; but muſt of neceſſity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this *extenſum* not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor conſequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwiſe conceivable, how a whole quantity of extended ſubſtance ſhould be one thing, and have one perſonality, one *I myſelf* in it all, were there not one indiviſible thing preſiding over it, which held it all together, and diffuſed itſelf thorough all. And thus do we ſee, how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghoſt, ſtill haunt them, and follow them every where. But now it is impoſſible, that one and the ſelf-ſame ſubſtance ſhould be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypotheſis of extended underſtanding ſpirits, having one part without another, there is an undiſcerned complication of two diſtinct ſubſtances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confuſion of them into one. Where, notwithſtanding, we muſt acknowledge, that there is ſo much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal ſubſtances are always naturally united to ſome bodies; ſo that the whole of theſe created animals is compleated and made up of both theſe together, an extended inſide, and an unextended outſide, both of them ſubſtances indeed really diſtinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The ſum of all is, that there are two kinds of ſubſtances in nature, the firſt extenſion or magnitude, really exiſting without the mind, which is a thing, that hath no ſelf-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and diviſibility, as it is alſo meer outſide and outwardneſs, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move, when it is moved. The ſecond, life and mind, or the ſelf-active cogitative nature, an inſide being, whoſe action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the ſubſtance or eſſence of the thinker himſelf, or in the inſide of him; which therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward receſs, Βάθος, or eſſential profundity. And this is a thing, which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or leſſer quantity of extended ſubſtance or body, and its ſeveral parts, penetrating into it, and co-exiſting in the ſame place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical, or as a phyſical point, as an abſolute parvitude, or the leaſt *extenſum* poſſible, it having not only ſuch an eſſential inſide, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itſelf, but alſo a certain amplitude of active power *ad extra*, or a ſphere of activity upon body. Upon which account, it was before affirmed by *Plotinus*, that an unextended incorporeal is a thing bigger than body, becauſe body cannot exiſt otherwiſe than a point of it in a point of ſpace; whereas this one and the ſame indiviſible can at once both comprehend a whole *extenſum* within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And laſtly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally united to ſome body or other; from both which together is compleated and made up in every created underſtanding being one entire animal, conſiſting of ſoul and body, and having ſomething incorporeal, and ſomething corporeal in it, an unextended inſide, and an extended outſide, by means whereof it is determined to *here* and *there*, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we repreſented the ſenſe of the ancient unextended Incorporealiſts to the beſt advantage, that we could, in way of anſwer to the premiſed atheiſtick argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheiſts; and we do affirm, that the fore-mentioned argumentations of theirs do evince, that there is ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, which therefore, according to the principles of theſe Atheiſts themſelves, muſt be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatſoever is extended is body. But whether they do alſo abſolutely prove, that there is, οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, *a ſubſtance devoid of magnitude, indiſtant, without parts, and indiviſible*; this we ſhall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain, that Atheiſts, who maintain the contrary, muſt needs aſſert, that every thought, and whatſoever belongeth to ſoul, mind, (as knowledge, virtue, &c.) is not only mentally and mathematically diviſible, ſo that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the reſt, ſuppoſed; but alſo phyſically ſeparable, or diſcerpible, together with the ſoul, wherein it is. They muſt alſo deny, that

that there is any internal energy at all, or any other action beſides that outſide ſuperficial action of local motion, and conſequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or tranſlation. And laſtly, they muſt maintain, that no ſubſtance can co-exiſt with any other ſubſtance (as ſoul with body) otherwiſe than by juxta-poſition only, and by poſſeſſing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the firſt anſwer to the forementioned atheiſtick argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance; That though whatſoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indiſtant and indiviſible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance, who, leſt God and ſpirits, being thus made unextended, ſhould quite vaniſh into nothing, anſwer that atheiſtick argumentation after a different manner, by granting to theſe Atheiſts that propoſition, *that whatſoever is, is extended*; *and what is unextended, is nothing*; but then denying that other of theirs, *that whatſoever is extended, is body*; they aſſerting another extenſion, ſpecifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extenſion is not only impenetrable, ſo as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but alſo both mentally and really diviſible, one part being in its nature ſeparable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extenſion, which is both penetrable, and alſo indiſcerpible, ſo that no one part thereof can poſſibly be ſeparated from another, or the whole; and that to ſuch an incorporeal extenſion as this belongeth life, cogitation, and underſtanding, the Deity having ſuch an infinite extenſion, but all created ſpirits a finite and limited one, which alſo is in them ſuppoſed to be contractible and dilatable. Now it is not our part here to oppoſe Theiſts, but Atheiſts: wherefore we ſhall leave theſe two ſorts of Incorporealiſts to diſpute it out friendly amongſt themſelves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of diſſent mutually, becauſe it ſeemeth, that ſome are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controverſy, and ſome another. And whatever the truth of the caſe be, it muſt be acknowledged, that this latter hypotheſis may be very uſeful and ſerviceable to retain ſome in theiſm, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing elſe, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others alſo, who would go in a middle way betwixt theſe two, or compound them together, by ſuppoſing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created ſpirits, to have an unextended inſide, a life or mind, diffuſing itſelf into a certain amplitude of outward extenſion, whereby they are determined to a place, yet ſo as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extenſion is therefore not to be accounted body, becauſe penetrable, contractable, and dilatable, and becauſe no one part thereof is ſeparable from the reſt, by the ruſhing or incurſion of any corporeal thing upon them. And thus is the Atheiſts argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance anſwered two manner of ways;

ways; firſt, That there is ſomething unextended; and, ſecondly, That if there were none, yet muſt there of neceſſity be a ſubſtance otherwiſe extended than body is, ſo as to be neither antitypous nor diſcerpible. And ourſelves would not be underſtood here dogmatically to aſſert any thing in this point, ſave only what all Incorporealiſts do agree in, to wit, that beſides body, which is impenetrably and diviſibly extended, there is in nature another ſubſtance, that is both penetrable of body and indiſcerpible, or which doth not conſiſt of parts ſeparable from one another. And that there is at leaſt ſuch a ſubſtance as this, is unqueſtionably manifeſt from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheiſt will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal ſubſtance, and undertake to ſhew from what miſtake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it ſprung partly from the abuſe of abſtract names and notions, men making ſubſtances of them; and partly from the ſcholaſtick eſſences, diſtinct from the things themſelves, and ſaid to be eternal. From both which deluſions and dotages together the Atheiſts conceive, that men have been firſt of all much confirmed in the belief of ghoſts and ſpirits, dæmons and devils, inviſible beings called by ſeveral names. Which belief had alſo another original, men's miſtaking their own phancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghoſts and ſpectres, according to theſe Atheiſts, is the Deity, the *Oberon*, or prince of fairies and phancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reaſon, could not conceive otherwiſe of theſe ghoſts and ſpirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aërial bodies, their underſtandings have been ſo enchanted by theſe abſtract names (which are indeed the names of nothing) and thoſe ſeparate eſſences and *quiddities* of ſcholaſticks, as that they have made incorporeal ſubſtances of them; the atheiſtick concluſion is, that they, who aſſert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a ſcholaſtick ſeparate eſſence, or the mere abſtract notion of an accident, a ſubſtantial thing, and a ghoſt or ſpirit preſiding over the whole world.

To which our reply in general firſt of all is, That all this is nothing but idle romantick fiction; the belief of a Deity, and ſubſtance incorporeal, ſtanding upon none of thoſe imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheiſtick pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and phancies; this hath been already ſufficiently confuted in our anſwer to the firſt atheiſtick argumentation, where we have alſo over and above ſhewed, that there is not only a natural prolepſis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but alſo that the belief thereof is ſupported by the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſubſtantial reaſon, his exiſtence being indeed demonſtrable, with mathematical evidence, to ſuch as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted by the witchcraft of vice and wickedneſs, to the debauching of their underſtandings. It hath been alſo ſhewed, that the opinion of other ghoſts and ſpirits, beſides the Deity, ſprung not merely

From *p.* 654, to 663.

merely from fear and phancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phænomena; true ſenſible apparitions, with the hiſtories of them in all ages, without which the belief of ſuch things could never have held up ſo generally and conſtantly in the world. As likewiſe, that there is no repugnancy at all to reaſon, but that there may be as well aërial and etherial, as there are terreſtrial animals; and that the dull and earthy ſtupidity of men's minds is the only thing, which makes them ſo prone to think, that there is no underſtanding nature ſuperiour to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to diſbelieve the exiſtence of any thing, which themſelves cannot either ſee or feel. Aſſuredly, the Deity is no phancy, but the greateſt reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only neceſſary exiſtent; and conſequently atheiſm is either mere ſottiſhneſs, or elſe a ſtrange kind of irreligious fanaticiſm.

We now further add, that the belief of ghoſts and ſpirits incorporeal, and conſequently of an incorporeal Deity, ſprung neither from any ridiculous miſtake of the abſtract names and notions of mere accidents for ſubſtances, nor from the ſcholaſtick eſſences, ſaid to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of thoſe ſcholaſticks ever dream'd, that there was any univerſal man, or univerſal horſe, exiſting alone by itſelf, and ſeparate from all ſingulars; nor that the abſtract metaphyſical eſſences of men, after they were dead, ſubſiſting by themſelves, did walk up and down amongſt graves, in airy bodies: it being abſolutely impoſſible, that the real eſſence of any thing ſhould be ſeparable from the thing itſelf, or eternal, when that is not ſo. And were the eſſences of all things look'd upon by theſe ſcholaſticks as ſubſtances incorporeal, then muſt they have made all things (even body itſelf) to be ghoſts, and ſpirits, and incorporeal; and accidents alſo (they having their eſſences too) to be ſubſtantial. But in very truth, theſe ſcholaſtick eſſences, ſaid to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible eſſences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And in this ſenſe, it is an acknowledged truth, that the eſſences of things, (as for example, of a ſphere or triangle) are eternal, and ſuch as were never made; becauſe there could not otherwiſe be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of theſe eternal eſſences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal mind, that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually exiſting, or poſſible only, their neceſſary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though theſe eternal eſſences themſelves be no ghoſts nor ſpirits, nor ſubſtances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or *Noemata*, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the neceſſary ſuppoſition of them, (as was before declared) that there is one eternal unmade Mind, and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and ſubſtantial Ghoſt or Spirit, which comprehending itſelf, and all the extent of its own power, the poſſibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the ſame accordingly.

But our atheiſtick argumentator yet further urges, that thoſe ſcholaſticks and metaphyſicians, who, becauſe life or cogitation can be conſidered alone abſtractly, without the conſideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a ſubſtance by itſelf, (and which alſo, after men are dead, can walk amongſt the graves) that theſe (I ſay) do ſo far abuſe thoſe abſtract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make ſubſtances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply alſo, that were the abſtract notions of accidents in general made incorporeal ſubſtances, by thoſe philoſophers aimed at, then muſt they have ſuppoſed all the qualities or affections of bodies, ſuch as whiteneſs and blackneſs, heat and cold, and the like, to have been ſubſtances incorporeal alſo; a thing yet never heard, or thought of. But the caſe is far otherwiſe as to conſcious life or cogitation, though it be an abſtract alſo; becauſe this is no accident of body, as the Atheiſt (ſerving his own hypotheſis) ſecurely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing elſe, but an eſſential attribute of another ſubſtance, diſtinct from body, (or incorporeal;) after the ſame manner, as extenſion or magnitude is the eſſential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now having ſo copiouſly confuted all the moſt conſiderable atheiſtick grounds, we are neceſſitated to diſpatch thoſe that follow, being of leſſer moment, with all poſſible brevity and compendiouſneſs. The four next, which are the fifth, ſixth, ſeventh, and eighth atheiſtick argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to diſprove a corporeal Deity; or from the ſuppoſition, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body, to infer the impoſſibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governour of the whole world: all which therefore ſignify nothing at all to the aſſertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theiſts. Nevertheleſs, though none but Stoicks, and ſuch other Corporealiſts, as are notwithſtanding Theiſts, be directly concerned in an anſwer to them, yet ſhall we, firſt, ſo far conſider the principles of the atheiſtick corporealiſm, contained in thoſe two heads, the fifth and ſixth, as from the abſolute impoſſibility of theſe hypotheſes to demonſtrate a neceſſity of incorporeal ſubſtance, from whence a Deity will alſo follow.

Here, therefore, are there two atheiſtick hypotheſes, founded upon the ſuppoſition, that all is body: the firſt, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the ſecond, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomick, Corporealiſm, and Atheiſm. The former of theſe was the moſt ancient, and the firſt ſciography, or rude delineation of atheiſm. For *Ariſtotle*[1] tells us, that the moſt ancient Atheiſts were thoſe, who ſuppoſed matter or body, that is, bulky extenſion, to be the only ſubſtance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things

[1] Metaphyſ. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 264. Tom. IV. Oper.

things were made, and into which all things are again reſolved; whatſoever is elſe in the world being nothing but the paſſions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the neceſſary conſequence is, That there is no eternal unmade life or underſtanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the univerſe, but eſſentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian atheiſm, which ſuppoſeth whatſoever is in the univerſe to be either the ſubſtance of matter and bulk, or elſe the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called alſo by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not, but that there might be formerly ſome difference amongſt the Atheiſts of this kind; nor are we ignorant, that *Simplicius* and others conceive *Anaximander* to have aſſerted, beſides matter, qualities alſo eternal and unmade, or an homæomery, and ſimilar atomology, juſt in the ſame manner as *Anaxagoras* afterwards did, ſave only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; *Anaximander* ſuppoſing all life and underſtanding whatſoever, all ſoul and mind, to have riſen up, and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of thoſe ſimilar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moiſt and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confeſs, that there is ſome probability for this opinion. Notwithſtanding which, becauſe there is no abſolute certainty thereof, and becauſe all theſe ancient Atheiſts agreed in this, that life and underſtanding are either firſt and primary, or elſe ſecondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of Atheiſm, but rather to make but one kind of Atheiſm of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian, or Anaximandrian.

The ſecond atheiſtick hypotheſis is that form of atheiſm deſcribed under the ſixth head, which likewiſe ſuppoſing body to be the only ſubſtance; and the principle thereof devoid of life and underſtanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatſoever, beſides matter, meerly from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and underſtanding not excepted: which therefore, according to them, being no ſimple primitive and primordial thing, but ſecondary, compounded, and derivative, the meer creature of matter and motion, could not poſſibly be a God or firſt principle in the univerſe. This is that atomick atheiſm called Democritical; *Leucippus* and *Democritus* being the firſt founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it ſuppoſing, beſides body, ſubſtance incorporeal; yet were theſe, as *Laertius* [1] declareth, the firſt, that ever made, ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, *ſenſeleſs atoms, the principles of all things whatſoever, even of life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind.*

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from theſe two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and under-

[1] Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573.

underſtanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoicks, who profeſſed to acknowledge no other ſubſtance beſides body, and yet nevertheleſs had a ſtrong perſuaſion of the exiſtence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the Maker of the whole world, denied that other propoſition of the atheiſtick Corporealiſts, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and underſtanding, they aſſerting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the Maker of the whole mundane ſyſtem; which poſtulatum, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to theſe Stoicks, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithſtanding, be abſolutely incorruptible, as *Origen* often inculcateth:

L. 1. *C. Celſ. p.* 17. Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, ἐκ αἰδαμένοις λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτὸν, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν, καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθεῖρον αὐτόν· *God to the Stoicks is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or deſtroyer.* And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheiſtick argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be abſolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwiſe than by accident only immortal, becauſe of its diviſibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incurſions upon it, or to diſunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal god muſt needs be ſcattered and deſtroyed. And therefore of this Stoical god does the ſame *Origen* thus further write;

P. 169. Ὁ τῶν Στωικῶν Θεὸς, ἅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὁτὲ μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην ὐσίαν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις· οὔδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται ὅτοι τραυῶσαι τὴν Φυσικὴν τῦ Θεῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάυλῃ ἀφθάρλω καὶ ἁπλῆ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτω, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτω· *The God of the Stoicks being a body, hath ſometimes the whole for its hegemonick in the conflagration; and ſometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For theſe men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, ſimple, uncompounded, and indiviſible.* Notwithſtanding which, theſe Stoicks were not therefore to be ranked amongſt the Atheiſts, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theiſts.

But we ſhall now make it evident, that in both theſe atheiſtick corporealiſms, (agreeing in thoſe two things, that body is the only ſubſtance, and that the principles of body are not vital) there is an abſolute impoſſibility; not only becauſe, as *Ariſtotle*[1] objecteth, they ſuppoſed no active principle; but alſo becauſe their bringing of life and underſtanding (being real entities) out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter is alſo the bringing of ſomething out of nothing. And indeed the atomick Atheiſt is here of the two rather the more abſurd and unreaſonable, foraſmuch as he, diſcarding all real qualities, and that for this very reaſon, becauſe nothing can come out of nothing, doth himſelf notwithſtanding, produce life, ſenſe, and underſtanding (unqueſtionable realities) out of meer magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, that is, indeed out of nothing. Wherefore there being an abſolute impoſſibility of both theſe atheiſtick hypotheſes, (neither of which is able to ſolve the phænomenon

[1] Metaphyſic. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 265. Tom. IV. Oper.

nomenon of life and underſtanding) from that confeſſed principle of theirs, that matter, as ſuch, hath no life nor underſtanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there muſt be ſome other ſubſtance beſides body or matter, which is eſſentially vital and intellectual: Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χρῆναι ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ, *becauſe all things cannot poſſibly have a peregrine, adventitious and borrowed life*, but ſomething in the univerſe muſt needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be meerly accidental, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there muſt of neceſſity be ſome ſubſtantial life, which point (that all life is not a meer accident, but that there is life ſubſtantial) hath been of late, with much reaſon and judgment, inſiſted upon, and urged by the writer *of the life of nature*. Neither muſt there be only ſuch a ſubſtantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but alſo ſuch as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatſoever, (none of which could poſſibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and underſtanding.

Which thing the hylozoick Atheiſts being well aware of, namely, that there muſt of neceſſity be both ſubſtantial and eternal unmade life, but ſuppoſing alſo matter to be the only ſubſtance, thought themſelves neceſſitated to attribute to all matter as ſuch, life and underſtanding, though not animaliſh and conſcious, but natural only; they conceiving, that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animaliſh life, not only the ſenſitive in brutes, but alſo the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoick atheiſm, thus bringing all conſcious and reflexive life or animality, out of a ſuppoſed ſenſeleſs, ſtupid, and inconſcious life of nature in matter, and that meerly from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring ſomething out of nothing, which is an abſolute impoſſiblity. Moreover, this hylozoick atheiſm was long ſince, and in the firſt emerſion thereof, ſolidly confuted by the atomick Atheiſts, after this manner: If matter, as ſuch, had life, perception, and underſtanding belonging to it, then of neceſſity muſt every atom, or ſmalleſt particle thereof be a diſtinct percipient by itſelf; from whence it will follow, that there could not poſſibly be any ſuch men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients, and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and underſtanding, one ſoul or mind, one perceiver or thinker in every one. And to ſay, that theſe innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and perſons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing ſo abſurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoiſts ſhould not rather chuſe to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to ſeek ſhelter and ſanctuary for the ſame, under ſuch a pretence. For though voluntary agents and perſons may many of them reſign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can

they not poſſibly reſign up their ſenſe and underſtanding too, ſo as to have all but one artificial life, ſenſe, and underſtanding; much leſs could this be done by ſenſeleſs atoms, or particles of matter ſuppoſed to be devoid of all conſciouſneſs or animality. Beſides which, there have been other arguments already ſuggeſted, which do ſufficiently evince, that ſenſe and underſtanding cannot poſſibly belong to matter any way, either originally or ſecondarily, to which more may be added elſewhere.

And now from theſe two things, that life and underſtanding do not eſſentially belong to matter as ſuch, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, it is demonſtratively certain, that there muſt be ſome other ſubſtance, beſides body or matter. However, the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſts taking it for granted, that the firſt principles of body are devoid of all life and underſtanding, muſt either acknowledge a neceſſity of ſome other ſubſtance beſides body, or elſe deny the truth of that axiom, ſo much made uſe of by themſelves, That *nothing can come out of nothing*. And this was our ſecond undertaking, to ſhew, that from the very principles of the atheiſtick corporealiſm, repreſented in the fifth and ſixth heads, incorporeal ſubſtance is againſt thoſe Atheiſts themſelves demonſtrable.

Our third and laſt was this, That there being undeniably ſubſtance incorporeal, the two next following atheiſtick argumentations, built upon the contrary ſuppoſition, are therefore altogether inſignificant alſo, and do no execution at all. The firſt of which (being the ſeventh) impugning only ſuch a ſoul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed againſt theiſm neither, but only ſuch a form of atheiſm (ſometime before mentioned) as indeed cometh neareſt to theiſm. Which, though concluding all things to have ſprung originally from ſenſeleſs matter, *Night* and *Chaos*; yet ſuppoſes things from thence to have aſcended gradually to higher and higher perfection; firſt, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the fore-mentioned Ariſtophanick tradition, with which agreeth this of [1] *Lucretius*,

Principio genus alituum, variæque volucres;)

afterward men, and in the laſt place gods; and that not only the animated ſtars, but *Jupiter*, or a ſoul of the world, generated alſo out of *Night* and *Chaos*, as well as all other things. We grant indeed, that the true and real Theiſts amongſt the ancient Pagans alſo held the world's animation, and whoſoever denied the ſame, were therefore accounted abſolute Atheiſts. But the world's animation, in a larger ſenſe, ſignifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living ſentient and underſtanding nature eternal, that firſt framed the world, and ſtill preſideth over it: and it is certain, that in this ſenſe all Theiſts whatſoever muſt hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theiſts held the world's

[1] Lib. V. Verſ. 797.

world's animation alſo in a ſtricter ſenſe; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, compleated and made up of ſoul and body together, as other animals are. Which ſoul of this great world-animal was to ſome of them the higheſt or ſupreme Deity, but to others only a ſecondary god, they ſuppoſing an abſtract mind ſuperiour to it. But God's being the ſoul of the world in this latter Paganick ſenſe, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things abſolutely diſclaimed and renounced by us. However, this ſeventh atheiſtick argument is not directed againſt the ſoul of the world in the ſenſe of the Paganick Theiſts neither, (this being, as they think, already confuted,) but in the ſenſe of the atheiſtick Theogoniſts; not an eternal unmade ſoul or mind, but a native or generated one only, ſuch as reſulted from the diſpoſition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the off-ſpring of night and chaos: the Atheiſts here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine theiſm, to take away all ſhadows thereof alſo, and ſo to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any underſtanding being, ſuperiour to themſelves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cauſe of theiſm: nevertheleſs, becauſe this in general is an atheiſtick aſſertion, that there is no life and underſtanding preſiding over the whole world, we ſhall briefly examine the ſuppoſed grounds thereof, which alone will be a ſufficient confutation of it. The firſt of them therefore is this, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body; the ſecond, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and underſtanding; and the laſt, that life and underſtanding are but accidents of bodies reſulting from ſuch a compoſition or contexture of atoms, as produceth ſoft fleſh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the concluſion is, that there can be no life and underſtanding in the whole, becauſe it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only ſubſtance, nor are life and underſtanding accidents reſulting from any modification of dead and lifeleſs matter; nor is blood or brains that, which underſtandeth in us, but an incorporeal ſoul or mind, vitally united to a terreſtrial organized body; which will then underſtand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, ſpiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the univerſe alſo a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though conſiſting of ſoul and body likewiſe, yet have neither fleſh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts ſo organized as ours are. And the moſt perfect mind and intellect of all is not the ſoul of any body, but complete in itſelf, without ſuch vital union and ſympathy with matter. We conclude therefore, that this paſſage of a modern writer[1], *We worms, cannot conceive, how God can underſtand without brains*, is *vox pecudis*, the *language and philoſophy* rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheiſtick argument, is briefly this; that whereas the Deity by Theiſts is generally ſuppoſed to be a living Being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no ſuch living being

[1] Hobbes.

being immortal, and conſequently none perfectly happy. Becauſe all living beings whatſoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at firſt generated, ſo are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no ſimple primitive nature, nor ſubſtantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the diſunion of their parts, or the diſordering of their contexture, vaniſheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happineſs muſt needs be a mere inſignificant word, and but a romantick fiction. Where firſt, this is well, that the Atheiſts will confeſs, that according to their principles, there can be no ſuch thing at all as happineſs, becauſe no ſecurity of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheiſtick argument is likewiſe founded upon the former errour, that body is the only ſubſtance, the firſt principles whereof are devoid of all life and underſtanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot poſſibly reſult from any compoſition of dead and lifeleſs things; and therefore muſt needs be a ſimple and primitive nature. It is true indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living ſoul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; ſince that body, which is now vitally united to a living ſoul, may be diſunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeleſs carcaſe; but the primary or original life itſelf is ſubſtantial, nor can there be any dead carcaſe of a human ſoul. That which hath life eſſentially belonging to the ſubſtance of it, muſt needs be naturally immortal, becauſe no ſubſtance can of itſelf periſh, or vaniſh into nothing. Beſides which, there muſt be alſo ſome, not only ſubſtantial, but alſo eternal unmade Life, whoſe exiſtence is neceſſary, and which is abſolutely unannihilable by any thing elſe; which therefore muſt needs have perfect ſecurity of its own future happineſs; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheiſtick argument.

BUT the Democritick Atheiſt proceeds, endeavouring further to diſprove a God from the phænomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. Firſt therefore, whereas Theiſts commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or firſt unmoved Mover, the Atheiſts contend, on the contrary, that, from the very nature of motion, the impoſſibility of any ſuch firſt unmoved Mover is clearly demonſtrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that *whatſoever is moved, is moved by ſome other thing*; or, that *nothing can move itſelf*; it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no *æternum Immobile*, no *eternal unmoved Mover*; but on the contrary, that there was *æternum Motum*, an *eternal Moved*; or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any firſt mover or cauſe, becauſe, as

as nothing could move itſelf, ſo could nothing ever move another, but what was itſelf before moved by ſomething elſe.

To which we reply, That this axiom, *whatſoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itſelf*, was, by *Ariſtotle*, and thoſe other philoſophers, who made ſo much uſe thereof, reſtrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body locally moved, was ever moved originally from itſelf, but from ſomething elſe. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore *nihil movetur niſi à moto, that no body was ever moved, but by ſome other body*, that was alſo before moved by ſomething elſe; or, that of neceſſity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and ſo backwards, infinitely, without any firſt unmoved or ſelf-moving and ſelf-active mover, as the Democritick Atheiſt fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unqueſtionably it did) from ſomething elſe, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritick Atheiſt here alſo, without any ground, imagines, that were there but one puſh once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thence forward always continue in it, one body ſtill moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Carteſian hypotheſis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving, will as well continue in motion, as a body reſting in reſt, until that motion be communicated and transferred to ſome other body; yet is the caſe different here, where it is ſuppoſed, not only one puſh to have been given to the world at firſt, but alſo the ſame quantity of motion or agitation to be conſtantly conſerved and maintained. But to let this paſs, becauſe it is ſomething a ſubtile point, and not ſo rightly underſtood by many of the Carteſians themſelves, we ſay, that it is a thing utterly impoſſible, that one body ſhould be moved by another infinitely, without any firſt cauſe or mover, which was ſelf-active, and that not from the authority of *Ariſtotle* [1] only, pronouncing ὅτε δυνατὸν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον, &c. *That in the cauſes of motion, there could not poſſibly be an infinite progreſs*; but from the reaſon there ſubjoined by *Ariſtotle*, becauſe, εἴπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, *If there were no firſt unmoved mover, there could be no cauſe of motion at all.* For were all the motion, that is in the world, a paſſion from ſomething elſe, and no firſt unmoved active mover, then muſt it be a paſſion from no agent, or without an action, and conſequently proceed from nothing, and either cauſe itſelf, or be made without a cauſe. Now the ground of the Atheiſt's error here is only from hence, becauſe he taketh it for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to paſs, that, to him, this propoſition, *No body can move itſelf*, is one and the ſame with this, *Nothing can act from itſelf, or be ſelf-active.*

And thus is the atheiſtick pretended demonſtration againſt a God, or firſt cauſe, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifeſt, that there is no conſequence at all in this argument, that becauſe no body can move

[1] Phyſic. Auſcult. Lib. VIII. Cap. V. p. 537. Tom. I. Oper.

move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and lastly, having plainly shewed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritick Atheists themselves, *That no body can move itself*, it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world, (since it could not cause itself) then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not *heterokinesy*, but *autokinesy*, or *self-activity*. For since the local motion of body is essentially *heterokinesy*, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be *autokinesy*, or *self-activity*, *that which is not a passion from any other agent*, but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called *cogitation*. All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immovable mover of the heaven, or vortices. So that *cogitation* is, in order of nature, before *local motion*, and *incorporeal* before *corporeal substance*, the former having a natural *imperium* upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistick argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritick Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens, and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritick Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that *nothing taketh its beginning from itself*, but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is *heterokinesy*, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being

Being as ſuch, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is ſuppoſed to be, becauſe dependent upon ſomething without it: and this is the tenth atheiſtick argumentation.

Where we ſhall firſt conſider that, which the Democritick Atheiſt makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to diſprove all autokineſy or ſelf-activity by, that *Nothing taketh beginning from itſelf*, but *from the action of ſome other thing without it.* Which axiom, if it be underſtood of ſubſtantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unqueſtionably true, it being the ſame with this, *That no ſubſtance, which once was not, could ever poſſibly cauſe itſelf, or bring itſelf into being; but muſt take its beginning from the action of ſomething elſe:* but then it will make nothing at all againſt theiſm. As it is likewiſe true, that no action whatſoever, (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itſelf, or cauſeth itſelf to be, but is always produced by ſome ſubſtantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheiſt neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force againſt theiſm, he ought to underſtand this propoſition thus, that no action whatſoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent; (which is the ſubject of it) but from the action of ſome other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwiſe, than as it is moved and acted upon by ſomething elſe. But this is only to beg the queſtion, or to prove the thing in diſpute, identically, that nothing is ſelf-active, becauſe nothing can act from itſelf. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not poſſibly be any motion or action at all in the univerſe, were there not ſomething ſelf-moving or ſelf-active, for as much as otherwiſe all that motion or action would be a paſſion from nothing, and be made without a cauſe.

And whereas the Atheiſts would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of ſome other thing without it, after this manner; becauſe it is not conceivable, why this cogitation, rather than that, ſhould ſtart up at any time, were there not ſome cauſe for it, without the thinker: here, in the firſt place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occaſioned by the incurſions of ſenſible objects upon us; as alſo, that the concatenations of thoſe thoughts and phantaſms in us, which are diſtinguiſhed from ſenſations, (whether we be aſleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical cauſes in the brain. Notwithſtanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and impoſed upon us from without; and that there is no tranſition in our thoughts at any time, but ſuch as had been before in ſenſe; (which the Democritick Atheiſt avers) this is a thing which we abſolutely deny. For, had we no maſtery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, bandied, and ſtruck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without; then could we not ſteadily and conſtantly carry on any deſigns and purpoſes of life. But on the contrary, that of *Ariſtotle*[1] is moſt true, (as will be elſewhere further proved) that man, and all rational beings, are

[1] Vide Lib. III. ad Nicomach. Cap. III. Cap. IX. & Cap. XII. p. 202, 204. p. 37. Tom. III. & Magnor. Moral. Lib. I.

in ſome ſenſe, ἀρχὴ πράξεων, a *principle of actions*, ſubordinate to the Deity; which they could not poſſibly be, were they not alſo a principle of cogitations, and had ſome command over them; but theſe were all as much determined by cauſes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational ſoul is itſelf an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and reſtleſs deſire, which is as natural and eſſential to us, as our very life, continually raiſing up and protruding new and new ones in us; which are as it were offered to us. Beſides which, we have alſo a further ſelf-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon ſome certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheiſt is here alſo to be taught yet a further leſſon, that an abſolutely perfect mind, (ſuch as the Deity is ſuppoſed to be,) doth not (as *Ariſtotle* writeth of it) ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, *ſometimes underſtand, and ſometime not underſtand:* it being ignorant of nothing, nor ſyllogizing about any thing but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itſelf; and its eſſence and energy being the ſame. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheiſts, who meaſure all perfection by their own ſcantling, this is a thing, that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheiſts, that cogitation itſelf is nothing but local motion or mechaniſm, we could not have thought it poſſible, that ever any man ſhould have given entertainment to ſuch a conceit, but that this was rather a meer ſlander raiſed upon Atheiſts; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomiſts did, upon good reaſon, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or tranſlation from place to place; (there being no other motion beſides this conceivable in bodies) the ancient Atheizers of that philoſophy (*Leucippus* and *Democritus*) not contented herewith, did really carry the buſineſs ſtill on further, ſo as to make cogitation itſelf alſo nothing but local motion. As it is alſo certain, that a modern atheiſtick pretender to wit hath publickly owned this ſame concluſion, that *mind is nothing elſe but local motion in the organick parts of man's body.* Theſe men have been ſometimes indeed a little troubled with the phancy, apparition, or ſeeming of cogitation that is, the conſciouſneſs of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and ſatisfy themſelves worſhipfully with this, that phancy is but phancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in phancy and conſciouſneſs, as there is in local motion. That, which inclined theſe men ſo much to this opinion, was only becauſe they were ſenſible and aware of this, that if there were any other action, beſides local motion admitted, there muſt needs be ſome other ſubſtance acknowledged, beſides body. *Carteſius* indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing elſe but machines; but then he ſuppoſed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and conſequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheleſs, this was juſtly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itſelf ſhould be local motion, and

men

men nothing but machines; this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastick, bigotical, or fanatick Atheist, could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the Atheistick objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a God, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy, (since it could not have any fruition of itself;) and if no understanding Being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaicks, that ἐνδαιμονία ἀύπαρκτον, *happiness is a meer chimæra*, a phantastick notion or fiction of men's minds; a thing, which hath no existence in nature. These are the men, who afterwards argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also in the last place, that there is another of the Atheists dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversly modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather speaks imperfection; it being but a meer whiffling, evanid, and phantastick thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterwards. And thus is the tenth atheistick argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner; if the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistick argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument, (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles,) having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate

intelligibles within itſelf; which intelligibles alſo are eternal, and that mind is no phantaſtick image of ſenſibles, nor the ſtamp and ſignature of them, but archetypal to them; the firſt mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itſelf, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the poſſibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all ſenſible things; mind ſenior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we ſhall refer the reader for an anſwer to this argument, to page 729. and ſo onwards, where the exiſtence of a God, (that is, a mind before the world) is demonſtrated alſo from this very topick, *viz.* the nature of knowledge and underſtanding.

We ſhall in this place only add; that as the Atheiſts can no way ſolve the phænomenon of motion, ſo can they much leſs that of cogitation, or life and underſtanding. To make which yet the more evident, we ſhall briefly repreſent a ſyllabus or catalogue of the many atheiſtick hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As firſt, that ſenſeleſs matter being the only ſubſtance, and all things elſe but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a meer accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no ſubſtantial life or mind any where. In oppoſition to which, we have before proved, that there muſt of neceſſity be ſome ſubſtantial life, and that human ſouls being lives ſubſtantial, and not meer accidental modifications of matter, they are conſequently in their own nature immortal, ſince no ſubſtance of itſelf ever vaniſheth into nothing.

Again, the Democriticks, and other Atheiſts conclude, that life and mind are no ſimple and primitive natures, but ſecondary and compounded things; they reſulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or elſe the combinations of thoſe ſimple elements of magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion; and ſo being made up of that, which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as fleſh is not made out of fleſhy particles, nor bone out of bony, (as *Anaxagoras* of old dreamed) ſo may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeleſs principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or underſtanding at all in it: juſt as ſyllables pronounceable do reſult from combinations of letters, ſome of which are mutes, and cannot by themſelves be pronounced at all, others but ſemi-vocal. And from hence do theſe Atheiſts infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; ſince upon the diſſolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they reſult, they muſt needs vaniſh into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably ſometime heretofore been no life nor underſtanding at all in the univerſe, and there may poſſibly be none again. From whence the concluſion is, that mind and underſtanding is no God, or principle in the univerſe; it being eſſentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they expreſs it in *Plato* [1], θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν, *mortal from mortal things:* as alſo, that the ſouls of men

[1] De Legibus Lib. X. p. 666.

men cannot ſubſiſt ſeparately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a houſe or tree, after the diſſolution thereof, can ſubſiſt by itſelf ſeparately, or appear in ſome other body. But all this foolery of Atheiſts hath been already confuted, we having before ſhewed, that life and underſtanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never poſſibly reſult from meer paſſive bulk, or dead and ſenſeleſs matter, however modified and compounded; becauſe nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any conſequence at all in this, that becauſe fleſh is not made out of fleſhy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and underſtanding may as well be compounded out of things dead and ſenſeleſs: becauſe theſe are no ſyllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moiſt and dry; or elſe magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, however combined together, as letters ſpell them out, and make them up; but they are ſimple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there muſt of neceſſity be ſome eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no neceſſity, that there ſhould be any eternal unmade red, or green, becauſe red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (ſo called) being but ſeveral contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, cauſing thoſe ſeveral phancies in us: and though there be no neceſſity, that there ſhould be eternal motion, becauſe, if there were once no motion at all in metter, but all bodies reſted, yet might motion have been produced by a ſelf-moving or ſelf-active principle: and laſtly, though there be no neceſſity, that there ſhould be eternal unmade matter or body neither, becauſe, had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheleſs, is there an abſolute neceſſity, that there ſhould be eternal unmade life, and mind, becauſe were there once no life nor mind at all, theſe could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeleſs and mindleſs. And though the form of a houſe cannot poſſibly exiſt ſeparately from the matter and ſubſtance thereof, it being a meer accidental thing, reſulting from ſuch a compages of ſtone, timber, and mortar, yet are human ſouls and minds no ſuch accidental forms of compounded matter, but active ſubſtantial things, that may therefore ſubſiſt ſeparately from theſe bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however ſome, that are no Atheiſts, be over prone to conceive life, ſenſe, cogitation, and conſciouſneſs in brutes, to be generated out of dead, ſenſeleſs, and unthinking matter, (they being diſpoſed thereunto by certain miſtaken principles, and ill methods of philoſophy) nevertheleſs is this unqueſtionably in itſelf a ſeed of atheiſm; becauſe if any life, cogitation, and conſciouſneſs, may be produced out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, then can no philoſophy hinder, but that all might have been ſo.

But the Democritick Atheiſts will yet venture further to deny, that there is any thing in nature ſelf-moving or ſelf-active, but that whatſoever moveth and

and acteth, was before moved by ſomething elſe, and made to act thereby; and again, that from ſome other thing, and ſo backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no firſt in the order of cauſes, but an endleſs retro-infinity. But as this is all one, as to affirm, that there is no ſuch thing at all as life in the world, but that the univerſe is a compages of dead and ſtupid matter, ſo has this infinity in the order of cauſes been already exploded for an abſolute impoſſibility.

Nevertheleſs, the Atheiſts will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatſoever, and therefore cogitation, phancy, and conſciouſneſs itſelf, is really nothing elſe but local motion; and conſequently not only brute-animals, but alſo men themſelves meer machines, which is an equal, either ſottiſhneſs or impudence, as to aſſert a triangle to be a ſquare, or a ſphere, a cube, number to be figure, or any thing elſe to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no ſuch thing in ourſelves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature, but local motion and mechaniſm.

Furthermore, the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts univerſally agree in this, that not only ſenſations, but alſo all the cogitations of the mind, are the meer paſſions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies exiſting without upon him; though they do not all declare themſelves after the ſame manner herein. For firſt, the Democriticks conclude, that ſenſe is cauſed by certain groſſer corporeal effluvia, ſtreaming from the ſurfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of the mind, and men's either ſleeping or waking imaginations, proceed from another ſort of ſimulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and ſubtile contexture, coming into the brain, not through thoſe open tubes, or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the ſmaller pores of the body: ſo that, as we never have ſenſe of any thing, but by means of thoſe groſſer corporeal images, obtruding themſelves upon the nerves, ſo have we not the leaſt cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not cauſed by thoſe finer corporeal images, and exuvious membranes, or effluvia, ruſhing upon the brain or contexture of the ſoul. [1] Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, Leucippus *and* Democritus *determined, that as well Noeſis as Aiſtheſis, mental cogitation as external ſenſation, was cauſed by certain corporeal idols, coming from bodies without; ſince neither ſenſation nor cogitation could otherwiſe poſſibly be produced.* And thus does *Laertius* [2] alſo repreſent the ſenſe of theſe atheiſtick philoſophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only cauſes, τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βεληματων ἑκάστων καὶ ἤθους καὶ παθῶν, *of all the motions, paſſions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the ſoul.* So that as we could not have the leaſt ſenſation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwiſe than from thoſe corporeal effluvia, ruſhing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the ſame in us, at ſuch a time; ſo neither could we have

[1] Plutarch de Placit. Philoſ. Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 899. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] *Laertius* does not aſcribe this opinion to *Leucippus*, but only to *Democritus*, Lib. IX. ſegm. 44. p. 573.

have any paſſion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally paſſive to. And this was the ground of the Democritick fate, or neceſſity of all human actions, maintained by them, in oppoſition to the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or *liberty of will*, which cannot be conceived without ſelf-activity, and ſomething of contingency; they ſuppoſing human volitions alſo, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically cauſed and neceſſitated from thoſe effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however *Epicurus* ſometime pretended to aſſert liberty of will againſt *Democritus*, yet, forgetting himſelf, did he alſo here ſecurely philoſophize after the very ſame manner;

Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;
Quæ veniunt veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.
Principiò hoc dico rerum ſimulachra vagari, &c.

Lucret. L. 4. p. 358, 360. [verſ. 726.]

But others there were amongſt the ancient Atomiſts, who could not conceive ſenſations themſelves to be thus cauſed by corporeal effluvia, or exuvious membranes ſtreaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reaſons alledged by them; but only by a preſſure from them upon the optick nerve, by reaſon of a tenſion of the intermedious air, or æther, (being that, which is called light;) whereby the diſtant object is touched and felt, οἷον διὰ βακτηρίας [t], *as it were by a ſtaff*. Which hypotheſis concerning the corporeal part of ſenſe is indeed much more ingenious, and agreeable to reaſon, than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they ſuppoſed ſenſe to be nothing elſe, but ſuch a preſſure from bodies without; ſo did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the reliques and remainders of thoſe motions of ſenſe formerly made, and conſerved afterwards in the brain, (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the ſtriking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves, after that the wind is ceaſed;) melting, fading, and decaying inſenſibly by degrees. So that, according to theſe, knowledge and underſtanding is nothing but failing and decaying ſenſe, and all our volitions but mechanick motions, cauſed from the actions, or truſions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true, that in ſenſation there is always a paſſion antecedent made upon the body of the ſentient from without; yet is not ſenſation itſelf this very paſſion, but a perception of that paſſion: much leſs can mental conception be ſaid to be the action of bodies without, and the meer paſſion of the thinker; and leaſt of all volitions ſuch, there being plainly here ſomething ἐφ' ἡμῖν, *in our own power*, (by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deſerving commendation, or blame,) that is, ſomething of ſelf-activity.

Again, according to the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts, all knowledge and underſtanding is really the ſame thing with ſenſe; the difference between theſe two, to ſome of them, being only this, that what is commonly called ſenſe, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but ſecondary, or fading and decaying ſenſe; but to others, that ſenſe is cauſed by thoſe more vigorous idols, or effluvia from bodies, intromitted through

[t] Vide Plutarch. de Placit. Philoſ. Lib. IV. cap. Lib. VII. Segm. 157. p. 466. Cap. XV. p. 911. Tom. II. Oper. & La-

through the nerves; but underſtanding and knowledge by thoſe more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other ſmaller pores of the body: ſo that both ways underſtanding and knowledge will be but a weaker ſenſe. Now from this doctrine of the atheiſtick Atomiſts, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatſoever is nothing elſe but ſenſe and paſſion from bodies without, this abſurdity firſt of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot poſſibly be any error, or falſe judgment, becauſe it is certain, that all paſſion is true paſſion, and all ſenſe or ſeeming, and appearance, true ſeeming and appearance. Wherefore, though ſome ſenſe and paſſion may be more obſcure than other, yet can there be none falſe, itſelf being the very eſſence of truth. And thus *Protagoras*, one of theſe atheiſtick Atomiſts, having firſt aſſerted, that *knowledge is nothing elſe but ſenſe*, did thereupon admit this as a neceſſary conſequence, that πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθὴς [1], *every opinion is true*; becauſe it is nothing but ſeeming and appearance, and every *ſeeming and appearance is truly ſuch*; *and becauſe it is not poſſible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwiſe than he ſuffers.* Wherefore *Epicurus*, being ſenſible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to ſolve this phænomenon of error and falſe opinion, or judgment, conſiſtently with his own principles, after this manner; that though all knowledge be ſenſe, and all ſenſe true, yet may error ariſe notwithſtanding, *ex animi opinatu* [2], from *the opination of the mind, adding ſomething of its own, over and above, to the paſſion and phancy of ſenſe.* But herein he ſhamefully contradicts himſelf; for if the mind, in judging and opining, can ſuperadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it ſuffers, then is it not a meer paſſive thing, but muſt needs have a ſelf-active power of its own, and conſequently will prove alſo incorporeal; becauſe no body can act otherwiſe, than it ſuffers, or is made to act by ſomething elſe without it. We conclude therefore, that ſince there is ſuch a thing as error, or falſe judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be meer paſſions; but there muſt be ſomething of ſelf-activity in the ſoul itſelf, by means whereof it can give its aſſent to things not clearly perceived, and ſo err.

Again, from this atheiſtick opinion, That all knowledge is nothing elſe but ſenſe, either primary or ſecondary, it follows alſo, that there is no abſolute truth nor falſhood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative, and phantaſtical only, or meer ſeeming, that is, nothing but opinion; becauſe ſenſe is plainly ſeeming, phantaſy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the ſentient only. And here alſo did *Protagoras* [3], according to his wonted freedom, admit this conſequence, that knowledge being ſenſe, there was no abſoluteneſs at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwiſe, than τούτῳ γε τινὶ, *to this and to that man ſo thinking*; that every man did but τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, *opine only his own things*; that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, *every man was the meaſure of things and truth to himſelf*; and laſtly, τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ γε εἶναι ᾧ φαίνεται, *that whatſoever ſeemed to every one, was true to him, to whom it ſeemed.* Neither could *Democritus* himſelf, though a man of more diſcretion than *Protagoras*, diſſemble this conſequence from

[1] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 118. & Laert. Lib. IX. Segm 51. p. 576.

[2] Vide Lucret. L. IV. verſ. 464.

[3] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 116, 119, 122, 126, 129.

from the ſame principle aſſerted by him, that underſtanding is phantaſtical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it ſometimes before he was aware, as in theſe words of his [1], γιγνώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίης ἀπήλλακται· *We ought to know man, according to this rule, that he is ſuch a thing, as hath nothing to do with abſolute truth.* And again, αἰτίῃ (or ἐτεῇ) οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις· *We know nothing abſolutely, concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion.* Agreeably to which, he determined, that men's knowledge was diverſified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them [2]. And *Ariſtotle* judiciouſly obſerving both theſe doctrines, That there is no error or falſe judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is abſolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the ſame, imputeth them both together to *Democritus*, in theſe words of his [3], οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι; *Democritus held, that there was nothing abſolutely true; but becauſe he thought knowledge or underſtanding to be ſenſe, therefore did he conclude, that whatſoever ſeemed according to ſenſe, muſt of neceſſity be true* (not abſolutely, but relatively) *to whom it ſo ſeemed.* Theſe groſs abſurdities did the atheiſtick Atomiſts plunge themſelves into, whilſt they endeavoured to ſolve the phænomenon of cogitation, mind, or underſtanding, agreeably to their own hypotheſis. And it is certain, that all of them, *Democritus* himſelf not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomick phyſiology, which they ſo much pretended to, and never rightly underſtood the ſame; for as much as that, with equal clearneſs, teaches theſe two things at once, that ſenſe indeed is phantaſtical and relative to the ſentient; but that there is a higher faculty of underſtanding and reaſon in us, which thus diſcovers the phantaſtry of ſenſe, and reaches to the abſoluteneſs of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts will further conclude, that the only things or objects of the mind are ſingular ſenſibles, or bodies exiſting without it; which therefore muſt needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and underſtanding whatſoever, this being but a phantaſtick image or repreſentation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and theſe ſenſible things, could not poſſibly be made by any mind or underſtanding, becauſe eſſentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does *Ariſtotle* obſerve [4], concerning both *Democritus* and *Protagoras*, that they did ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα μόνον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ, *ſuppoſe the only things or objects of the mind to be ſenſibles; and that this was the reaſon, why they made knowledge to be ſenſe, and therefore relative and phantaſtical.* But we have already proved, that mind and underſtanding is not the phantaſtick image of ſenſibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is ſenior to the world, and all ſenſible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within

[1] Vide Sextum Empiric. Lib. VII. adverſ. Mathematic. ſeu I. adverſ. Logicos, §. 137. p. 399, 400.

[2] Ibid. p. 399.

[3] Ariſtot. Metaphyſic. Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 312. Tom. IV. Oper.

[4] Metaphyſicor. Lib. IV. Cap. V. p. 313. Tom. IV. Oper.

itſelf; the firſt original mind being an abſolutely perfect being, comprehending itſelf, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all poſſibilities of things, together with the beſt platform of the whole, and producing the ſame accordingly.

But it being plain, that there are, beſides ſingulars, other objects of the mind univerſal, from whence it ſeems to follow, that ſenſibles are not the only things; ſome modern atheiſtick wits have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cauſe, and carry the buſineſs on, that univerſals are nothing elſe but names or words, by which ſingular bodies are called; and conſequently that in all axioms and propoſitions, ſententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at leaſt is univerſal) we do but add or ſubſtract, affirm or deny, names of ſingular bodies; and that reaſon or ſyllogiſm is nothing but the reckoning or computing the conſequences of theſe names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm, that beſides thoſe paſſions or phanſies, which we have from things by ſenſe, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names, by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater ſottiſhneſs or madneſs: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which ſingular bodies are called, as itſelf could not deſerve that name of a ſcience, ſo neither could its truths be the ſame in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the ſeveral diſtant ages and places of the world, muſt be ſuppoſed to have had the ſame ſingular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied thoſe univerſal names.

In the laſt place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheiſts, agreeably to the premiſed principles, and the tenour of their hypotheſis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or underſtanding, as a thing, which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and ſenſeleſs matter; it being, according to them, but a paſſion from ſingular bodies exiſting without, and therefore both junior and inferiour to them; a tumult raiſed in the brain, by motions made upon it from the objects of ſenſe; that which eſſentially includeth in it dependence upon ſomething elſe; at beſt but a thin and evanid image of ſenſibles, or rather an image of thoſe images of ſenſe, a mere whiffling and phantaſtick thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the firſt root and ſource of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and ſolid ſenſeleſs matter, the only ſubſtantial, ſelf-exiſtent, independent thing, and conſequently the moſt perfect and divine. Life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, are to them no ſimple and primitive natures, but ſecondary and derivative, or ſyllables and complexions of things, which ſprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, contextures either of ſimilar or diſſimilar atoms. And as themſelves are juniors to ſenſeleſs matter and motion, and to thoſe inanimate elements, fire, water, air and earth, the firſt and moſt real productions of nature and chance, ſo are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with thoſe other real things of nature, but ſlight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landſkip

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in picture, compared with the real proſpect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering ſteeples, and the ſhady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly diſparaged under thoſe names of notional and artificial. And thus was the ſenſe of the ancient Atheiſts repreſented by *Plato*; Φασὶ τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρότερα Τέχνην· ἣν δὴ παρὰ Φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν, τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσαγορεύομεν· *They ſay, that the greateſt and moſt excellent things of all were made by ſenſeleſs nature and chance; but all the ſmaller and more inconſiderable, by art, mind, and underſtanding; which taking from nature thoſe firſt and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other leſſer things, which are therefore commonly called artificial.* And the mind of theſe Atheiſts is there alſo further declared by that philoſopher after this manner: *The firſt, moſt real, ſolid and ſubſtantial things in the whole world are thoſe elements, fire, water, air and earth, made by ſenſeleſs nature and chance, without any art, mind or underſtanding: and next to theſe the bodies of the ſun, moon, and ſtars, and this terreſtrial globe, produced out of the foreſaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature or chance likewiſe, without any art, mind, or God.* The fortuitous concourſe of ſimilar or diſſimilar atoms begetting this whole ſyſtem and compages of heaven and earth; τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιὰς τινὰς ἀληθείας δ' σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλ' ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷον ἡ γραφικὴ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. *But that afterwards art or mind, and underſtanding, being generated alſo in the laſt place out of thoſe ſame ſenſeleſs and inanimate bodies or elements, (it riſing up in certain ſmaller pieces of the univerſe, and particular concretions of matter called animals) mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are meer images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landskip,* &c. *but above all, thoſe moral differences of juſt and unjuſt, honeſt and diſhoneſt, the meer figments of political art, and ſlight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that conſiſt in nothing, but agreement and diſagreement with ſenſe and appetite:* τὰ γὰρ καλὰ Φύσει μὲν ἄλλα νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν Φύσει· *For, as for things good and honeſt, thoſe, that are ſuch by nature, differ from thoſe, which are ſuch by law; but as for juſt and unjuſt, there is by nature no ſuch thing at all.* The upſhot and concluſion of all is, that there is no ſuch ſcale or ladder in nature as Theiſts and Metaphyſicians ſuppoſe, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and ſenſe above inanimate matter, of reaſon and underſtanding above ſenſe; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of deſcent from higher and greater perfection, downward to leſſer and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no ſuch ſcale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, becauſe, according to that hypotheſis, it would follow, that every the ſmalleſt and moſt contemptible animal, that could ſee the ſun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than the ſun itſelf; a thing ridiculouſly abſurd; or elſe, according

De Leg. L. 10. p. 889. [P. 665, 666.]

to *Cotta's* [1] inſtance; *Idcircò formicam anteponendam eſſe huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quòd in urbe ſenſus ſit nullus, in formica non modo ſenſus, ſed etiam mens, ratio, memoria. That therefore every ant or piſmire were far to be preferred before this moſt beautiful city of* Rome, *becauſe in the city there is no ſenſe; whereas an ant hath not only ſenſe, but alſo mind, reaſon and memory*; that is, a certain ſagacity ſuperiour to ſenſe. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no ſuch ſcale or ladder in nature, no ſuch climbing ſtairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole univerſe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the ſame uniform matter, under ſeveral forms, dreſſes, and diſguiſes; or variegated by diverſity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of ſuch beings, as have phancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but ſome of ſportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer *Gamaieus* or pretty toys; but by reaſon of this phancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in ſenſeleſs matter: as they will alſo be all of them quickly transformed again into other ſeemingly dull, unthinking and inanimate ſhapes. Hitherto the ſenſe of Atheiſts.

But the pretended grounds of this atheiſtick doctrine, (or rather madneſs) have been already alſo confuted, over and over again. Knowledge and underſtanding is not a meer paſſion from the thing known, exiſting without the knower, becauſe to know and underſtand, as *Anaxagoras* [2] of old determined, is κρατεῖν, to *maſter* and *conquer* the thing known, and conſequently not meerly to ſuffer from it, or paſſively to lie under it, this being κρατεῖσθαι, to be *maſtered* and *conquered* by it. The knowledge of univerſal theorems in ſciences is not from the force of the thing known exiſting without the knower, but from the active power, and exerted vigour or ſtrength of that, which knows. Thus *Severinus*, *Boëthius*; *Videſne, ut in cognoſcendo, cuncta ſuâ potius facultate, quàm eorum, quæ cognoſcuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus exiſtat, neceſſe eſt, ut ſuam quiſque operam, non ex alienâ, ſed ex propriâ poteſtate perficiat. See you not how all things, in knowing, uſe their own power and faculty rather, than that of the thing known? For ſince judgment is the action of that, which judgeth, every thing muſt of neceſſity perform its own action, by its own power, ſtrength, and faculty, and not by that of another.* Senſe itſelf is not a mere paſſion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the ſentient, for if it were ſo, then would a looking-glaſs, and other dead things ſee; but it is a perception of a paſſion made upon the body of the ſentient, and therefore hath ſomething of the ſoul's own ſelf-activity in it. But underſtanding, and the knowledge of abſtract ſciences is neither primary ſenſe, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of ſenſe; not ſympathetical, but unpaſſionate, the Noemata of the mind being things diſtinct from the Phantaſmata of ſenſe and imagination; which are but a kind of confuſed cogitations. And though the objects of ſenſe be only ſingular bodies, exiſting without the ſentient, yet are not theſe ſenſibles therefore the only things and cogitables;

Conf. l. 5. Pro. 4. [Lib. V. p. 132.]

[1] Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. Lib. III. Cap. IX. p. 3061. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] Apud Ariſtot. de Animâ, Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 48. Tom. II. Oper.

cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in w ayof passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by *Boëthius* his *Philosophick Muse*, after this manner: *Boet. Conf. L. 5. M. 4. [P. 132.]*

Quondam porticus attulit,
Qui sensus & imagines
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Mos est æquore paginæ
Pressas figere literas.
Nihil motibus explicat,
Notis subdita corporum,
Rerum reddit imagines,
Cernens omnia notio?
Aut quæ cognita dividit?
Alternumque legens iter,
Nunc decidit in infima;
Veris falsa redarguit?
Longe causa potentior
Impressas patitur notas.
Et vires animi movens,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Ad motus similes vocans,
Obscuros nimium senes,
E corporibus extimis,
Ut quondam celeri stylo
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Sed mens si propriis vigens
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Cassaque in speculi vicem
Unde hæc sic animis viget,
Quæ vis singula prospicit?
Quæ divisa recolligit?
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Tum sese referens sibi
Hæc est efficiens magis,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Præcedit tamen excitans
Vivo in corpore passio.
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Quas intus species tenet,
Notis applicat exteris.

It is true indeed, that the Νοητὸν, or *thing understood*, is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that Νοῦς, *Mind* or *Intellect*, was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them, Ἓν and Τ' ἀγαθὸν, *One* and *the good*, as the Νοητὸν or *Intelligible* thereof. But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one Θεῖον or *divinity*, and the first of those three (superiour to that which is properly called by them, Mind or intellect) is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibilities of things, their relations to one another, and verities; a Mind before sense, and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superiour to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be some-

thing

thing ſelf-active and hylarchical, ſomething that can act both from itſelf, and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, are no ſyllables or complexions of things, ſecondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and underſtanding; but ſimple, primitive, and uncompounded natures: they are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but ſubſtantial things. For which cauſe ſouls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itſelf can be generated out of ſomething elſe: and therefore are they both alike (in ſome ſenſe) principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect ſouls and minds, were at firſt created by one perfect, omnipotent, underſtanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and underſtanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere ſenſeleſs matter or bulky extenſion. And conſequently, the things, which belong to ſouls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as ſuch, muſt not have leſs, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of juſt and unjuſt, honeſt and diſhoneſt, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and ſoft, hot and cold, moiſt and dry. He, that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyſter, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paſte or pye-cruſt, hath not the reaſon or underſtanding of a man in him. There is unqueſtionably a ſcale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity, one above another, as of life, ſenſe, and cogitation, above dead, ſenſeleſs, and unthinking matter; of reaſon and underſtanding above ſenſe, *&c.* And if the ſun be nothing but a maſs of fire, or inanimate ſubtile matter agitated, then hath the moſt contemptible animal, that can ſee the ſun, and hath conſciouſneſs and ſelf-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it, than that whole fiery globe; as alſo than the materials (ſtone, timber, brick and mortar) of the moſt ſtately ſtructure, or city. Notwithſtanding which, the ſun in other regards, and as its vaſtly extended light and heat hath ſo great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be ſaid to be a far more noble and uſeful thing in the univerſe, than any one particular animal whatſoever. Wherefore there being plainly a ſcale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unqueſtionably, in way of deſcent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impoſſible for a greater perfection to be produced from a leſſer, as for ſomething to be cauſed by nothing. Neither are the ſteps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or loweſt round thereof is ſtupid and ſenſeleſs matter, devoid of all life and underſtanding; ſo is the head, top, and ſummity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itſelf, and all poſſibilities of things. A perfect underſtanding Being is the beginning and head of the ſcale of entity; from whence things gradually deſcend downward; lower and lower, till they end in ſenſeleſs matter. Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος, *Mind is the oldeſt of all things*, ſenior to the elements,

elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewiſe, according to the ſame ancient Theiſts, it is Κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, *by nature lord over all*, or hath a natural *imperium* and dominion over all, it being the moſt hegemonical thing. And thus was it alſo affirmed by *Anaxagoras*, Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, *that mind is the ſovereign king of heaven and earth.*

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheiſts, who derive the original of all things from ſenſeleſs matter, devoid of all manner of life, can no way ſolve the phænomenon of cogitation (life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind) no more than they can that of local motion. And the reaſon, why we have inſiſted ſo much upon this point, is, becauſe theſe Atheiſts do not only pretend to ſolve this phænomenon of cogitation without a God, and ſo to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but alſo to demonſtrate the impoſſibility of its exiſtence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and underſtanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a paſſion from ſingular bodies exiſting without the knower; and if life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of ſenſeleſs matter, then could no mind or underſtanding Being poſſibly be a God, that is, a firſt principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did *Plato* anciently make the very ſtate of the controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts principally to conſiſt in this very thing, *viz.* Whether life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, were juniors to body, and ſprung out of ſenſeleſs matter, as accidental modifications thereof, or elſe were ſubſtantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the paſſages before cited, he thus concludeth; κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα εἶδεσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· ἔοικε δὲ καὶ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἆρ' οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγήν τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὁπόσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων· *Theſe men ſeem to ſuppoſe fire, water, air and earth, to be the very firſt things in the univerſe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but ſoul and mind to have ſprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only ſeem to ſuppoſe this, but alſo in expreſs words declare the ſame. And thus (by* Jupiter*) have we diſcovered the very fountain of that atheiſtick madneſs of the ancient phyſiologers, to wit, their making inanimate bodies ſenior to ſoul and mind.* And accordingly that philoſopher addreſſes himſelf, to the confutation of atheiſm, no otherwiſe than thus, by proving ſoul not to be junior to ſenſeleſs body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it[3]; ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο δὲ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς, οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς οὐσίας ψυχὴν ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύσαντι μὲν ὀλίγα ξύμπαντες, οὗ τὲ ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τὲ ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει· *That which is the firſt cauſe of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheiſtick doctrine ſuppoſes not to have been firſt made; but what is indeed the*

Pl. L. 10. De Leg. [p. 666.]

[3] Ibid. p. 667.

the laſt thing, to be the firſt. And hence is it, that they err concerning the eſſence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing ſoul is, and what power it hath, as alſo eſpecially concerning its generation and production, that it was firſt of all made before body, it being that, which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof. But if ſoul be firſt in order of nature before body, then muſt thoſe things, which are cognate to ſoul, be alſo before the things, which appertain to body; and ſo mind and underſtanding, art and law, be before hard and ſoft, heavy and light; and that, which theſe Atheiſts call nature, (the motion of inanimate bodies) junior to art and mind, it being governed by the ſame. Now that ſoul is in order of nature before body, this philoſopher demonſtrates only from the topick or head of motion, becauſe it is impoſſible, that one body ſhould move another infinitely, without any firſt cauſe or mover; but there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething ſelf-moving and ſelf-active, or which had a power of changing itſelf, that was the firſt cauſe of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of ſoul, that it is ſuch a thing, as can move or change itſelf (in which alſo the eſſence of life conſiſteth) he thus inferreth [1], ἱκανώτατα δέδειχται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως· *It is therefore ſufficiently demonſtrated from hence, that ſoul is the oldeſt of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it.* And his concluſion is [2], ὀρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερον, τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχάσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν· *It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that ſoul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to ſoul; ſoul being that, which ruleth, and body that, which is ruled. From whence it follows, that the things of ſoul alſo are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth and profundity.* Now it is evident, that *Plato* in all this underſtood, not only the mundane ſoul, or his third divine hypoſtaſis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal univerſe, but alſo all other particular lives and ſouls whatſoever, or that whole rank of beings called ſoul; he ſuppoſing it all to have been at firſt made before the corporeal ſyſtem, or at leaſt to have been in order of nature ſenior to it, as ſuperiour and more excellent, (that which ruleth being ſuperiour to that which is ruled) and no ſoul or life whatſoever, to be generated out of ſenſeleſs matter.

Wherefore we muſt needs here condemn that doctrine of ſome profeſſed Theiſts and Chriſtians of latter times, who generate all ſouls, not only the ſenſitive in brutes, but alſo the rational in men, out of matter; for as much as hereby, not only that argument for the exiſtence of a God, from ſouls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that ſenſeleſs matter might be the original of all things, if life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, ſprung out of it; but alſo the Atheiſt will have an advantage to prove the impoſſibility of a God from hence; becauſe if life and underſtanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are

[1] P. 668. [2] P. 669.

are they no ſubſtantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could poſſibly be a God, or firſt cauſe of all things, it being not ſo much as able to ſubſiſt by itſelf. Moreover, if mind, as ſuch, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then muſt it needs be in its own nature corruptible alſo, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not poſſibly be, according to this hypotheſis, any other God, than ſuch a *Jupiter*, or ſoul of the world, as the atheiſtick Theogoniſts acknowledged, that ſprung out of Night, Chaos, and Non-entity, and may be again ſwallowed up into that dark abyſs. Senſeleſs matter therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and underſtanding, it muſt needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the caſe be much different, as to ſome others, who, though indeed they do not profeſſedly generate the rational, but only the ſenſitive ſoul, both in men and brutes; yet do nevertheleſs maintain the human ſoul itſelf to be but a meer blank, or white ſheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was ſcribbled upon it by the objects of ſenſe; and knowledge, or underſtanding, to be nothing but the reſult of ſenſe, and ſo a paſſion from ſenſible bodies exiſting without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and underſtanding to be, in its own nature, junior to ſenſe, and the very creature of ſenſibles; ſo do they alſo imply the rational ſoul, and mind itſelf, to be as well generated as the ſenſitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan-doctrine, that men differ no otherwiſe from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the uſe of ſpeech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth, that any life or ſoul, any cogitation or conſciouſneſs, ſelf-perception and ſelf-activity, can ſpring out of dead, ſenſeleſs and unactive matter, the ſame can never poſſibly have any rational aſſurance, but that his own ſoul had alſo a like original, and conſequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reaſon, but that all lives may be ſo, they being but higher degrees in the ſame kind; and neither life, nor any thing elſe, can be in its own nature indifferent, to be either ſubſtance or accident, and ſometimes one, and ſometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and conſciouſneſs, is accidental, generable and corruptible; or elſe none at all.

That, which hath inclined ſo many to think the ſenſitive life, at leaſt, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that ſtrange Protean transformation of matter into ſo many ſeemingly unaccountable forms and ſhapes, together with the ſcholaſtick opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat

and cold, &c. according to thoſe phancies, which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, diſtinct from its ſubſtance and modifications; ſo may life, ſenſe, and cogitation, be in like manner qualities of matter alſo, generable and corruptible. But theſe real qualities of body, in the ſenſe declared, are things, that were long ſince juſtly exploded by the ancient Atomiſts, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom *Laertius* [1] hath recorded, that they did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, *quite caſhier and baniſh qualities out of their philoſophy*; they reſolving all corporeal phænomena, and therefore thoſe of heat and cold, light and colours, ſite and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended ſubſtance, *viz.* more or leſs magnitude of parts, figure, ſite, motion or reſt, (or the combinations of them,) and thoſe different phancies cauſed in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but ſubſtance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democriticks and Epicureans did moſt ſhamefully contradict themſelves, when, pretending to reject and explode all thoſe entities of real qualities, themſelves nevertheleſs made life and underſtanding ſuch real qualities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion or reſt: now it is mathematically certain, that theſe, however combin'd together, can never poſſibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but muſt of neceſſity be a ſubſtantial thing. We ſpeak not here of that life (improperly ſo called) which is, in vulgar ſpeech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a ſoul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and deſtroyable, without the deſtruction of any real entity; there being nothing deſtroyed, nor loſt to the univerſe, in the deaths of men and animals, as ſuch, but only a diſunion, or ſeparation made of thoſe two ſubſtances, ſoul and body, one from another. But we ſpeak here of the original life of the ſoul itſelf, that this is ſubſtantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is ſtrange, that any men ſhould perſuade themſelves, that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath ſenſe or perception in it, ſhould not be as ſubſtantial, as that ſtupid and ſenſeleſs matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is alſo but a meer paſſive thing) efficiently produce ſoul, any more than ſoul matter; no finite, imperfect ſubſtance being able to produce another ſubſtance out of nothing. Much leſs can ſuch a ſubſtance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that, which hath a higher. There is a ſcale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the univerſe, one above another, and the production of things cannot poſſibly be in way of aſcent from lower to higher, but muſt of neceſſity be in way of deſcent from higher to lower. Now to produce any one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the ſcale of the univerſe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheiſtical; and by the ſame reaſon, that one

3 higher

[1] Lib. X. Segm. 44. p. 621.

higher rank or degree in this ſcale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the reſt be ſo produced alſo. Wherefore we have great reaſon to ſtand upon our guard here, and to defend this poſt againſt the Atheiſts; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently reſult from dead and ſenſeleſs body; or that ſouls, being all ſubſtantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the ſame, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection againſt this ſubſtantiality of ſouls ſenſitive, as well as rational, is from that conſequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent ſubſiſtence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This ſeeming very abſurd, that the ſouls of brutes alſo ſhould be immortal, or ſubſiſt after the deaths of the reſpective animals: but eſpecially to two ſorts of men; firſt, ſuch as ſcarcely in good earneſt believe their own ſoul's immortality; and ſecondly, ſuch religioniſts, as conclude, that if irrational, or ſenſitive ſouls ſubſiſt after death, then muſt they needs go preſently either into heaven or hell. And *R. Carteſius* was ſo ſenſible of the offenſiveneſs of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the neceſſity of this diſjunction, that either brutes have nothing of ſenſe or cogitation at all, or elſe they muſt have ſome other ſubſtance in them, beſides matter, he choſe rather to make them meer ſenſeleſs machines, than to allow them ſubſtantial ſouls. Wherein, avoiding a leſſer abſurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himſelf into a greater; ſcarcely any thing being more generally received, than the ſenſe of brutes. Though in truth all thoſe, who deny the ſubſtantiality of ſenſitive ſouls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought conſequently, according to reaſon, to do as *Carteſius* did, deprive them of all ſenſe. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phænomena, that brutes are not meer ſenſeleſs machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice ſo far to prevail with us, as to hinder our aſſent to that, which ſound reaſon and philoſophy clearly dictates, that therefore they muſt have ſomething more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, That life and cogitation cannot poſſibly riſe out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, to abandon it, or deny our aſſent thereunto, becauſe we find it attended with ſome difficulty not eaſily extricable by us, or cannot free all the conſequences thereof from ſome inconvenience or abſurdity, ſuch as ſeems to be in the permanent ſubſiſtence of brutiſh ſouls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithſtanding, *Plato* and the ancient Pythagoreans propoſed this following hypotheſis; That ſouls, as well ſenſitive as rational, being all ſubſtantial, but not ſelf-exiſtent, (becauſe there is but one fountain and principle of all things,) were therefore produced or cauſed by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the reſpective animals; it being indecorous, that this divine, miraculous, creative power ſhould conſtantly lacquey by, and attend upon natural generations; as alſo incongruous, that ſouls ſhould be ſo much

juniors to every atom of duſt, that is in the whole world; but either all of them from eternity, according to thoſe, who denied the novity of the world; or rather, according to others, who aſſerted the *coſmogonia*, in the firſt beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being alſo natural to ſouls, as ſuch, to actuate and enliven ſome body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith; theſe, as ſoon as created, were immediately inveſted with certain thin and ſubtle bodies, or put into light ethereal or aereal chariots and vehicles; wherein they ſubſiſt, both before their entrance into other groſs terreſtrial bodies, and after their egreſs out of them. So that the ſouls, not only of men, but alſo of other animals, have ſometimes a thicker, and ſometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we underſtand *Bœthius*, not only of the rational, but alſo of the other inferiour ſenſitive ſouls, in theſe verſes of his [1];

Tu cauſis animas paribus vitaſque minores
Provehis, & levibus ſublimes curribus aptans,
In cælum terramque ſeris.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or ſouls, at their very firſt creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, ſowed into the groſs terreſtrial matter, are thin, aereal and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*, after he had ſpoken of the ſouls of dæmons and men, in this manner; L. 5. p. 290. ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις τισι χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν· *And every ſoul muſt of neceſſity have, before theſe mortal bodies, certain eternal and eaſily moveable bodies, it being eſſential to them to move.* There is indeed mention made by the ſame *Proclus*, and others, of an opinion of ἄλογοι δαίμονες, *irrational* or *brutiſh dæmons*, or *dæmoniack aereal* brutes; of which he ſometimes ſpeaks L. 4. p. 288 doubtfully, as εἴπερ γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ θεουργοὶ, *If there be any irrational dæmons, as the Theurgiſts affirm.* But the diſpute, doubt, or controverſy here only was, Whether there were any ſuch irrational dæmons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from theſe words of *Ammonius* upon the Porphyrian *Iſagoge*; οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν εἶναί τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δέ φασι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι· *Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational dæmons immortal*; but others, that all theſe *irrational, or brutiſh dæmons are mortal.* Where, by *irrational dæmons immortal*, ſeem to be underſtood ſuch, as never deſcend into terreſtrial bodies, (and theſe are there diſclaimed by *Ammonius*;) but the *mortal* ones, ſuch as act alſo upon groſs terreſtrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if *Ammonius* ſhould have ſaid, There are no other brutiſh, or irrational dæmons, than only the ſouls of ſuch brute animals, as are here amongſt us, ſometimes acting only aereal bodies. Thus, according to the ancient Pythagorick hypotheſis, there is neither any new ſubſtantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entity deſtroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but alſo no ſoul nor life; God, after the firſt creation, neither making any new ſubſtance, nor yet

[1] De Conſolat. Philoſoph. Lib. III. p. 69.

yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conſerved in being, and which could not be well uſed and placed in the univerſe; and afterward never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions and ſecretions, or anagrammatical tranſpoſitions of præ- and poſt-exiſting things, the ſame ſouls and lives being ſometimes united to one body, and ſometimes to another; ſometimes in thicker, and ſometimes in thinner clothing; and ſometimes in the viſible, ſometimes in the inviſible; (they having aereal, as well as terreſtrial vehicles;) and never any ſoul quite naked of all body. And thus does *Proclus* complain of ſome, as ſpurious Platoniſts, οἱ φθείροντες τὸ ὄχημα ἀναλκάζουσι ποτε παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, *Who, deſtroying the thinner vehicles of ſouls, were therefore neceſſitated ſometimes to leave them in a ſtate of ſeparation from all body, or without any corporeal indument.* Which Cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by *Pythagoras*, was before fully repreſented by us out of *Ovid*; though that tranſmigration of human ſouls there, into ferine bodies, hath not been by all acknowledged, as a genuine part thereof. And the ſame was likewiſe inſiſted upon by *Virgil*, *Georg. L.* 4. as alſo owned and confirmed by *Macrobius* for a great truth; *Conſtat ſecundum veræ rationis aſſertionem, quam nec* Cicero *neſcit, nec* Virgilius *ignorat, dicendo,* [p. 161.]

In Tim. p. 330.

Somn. Scip. l. 2. *c.* 12.

* *Nec morti eſſe locum*; ——

Conſtat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, ſed eorum, quæ interire videntur, ſolam mutari ſpeciem. It is manifeſt, according to reaſon and true philoſophy, which neither Cicero, *nor* Virgil *were unacquainted with, (the latter of theſe affirming, that there is no place at all left for death;) I ſay, it is manifeſt, that none of thoſe things, that to us ſeem to die, do abſolutely periſh within the living world, but only their forms changed.*

Now, how extravagant ſoever this hypotheſis ſeem to be, yet is there no queſtion, but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find ſome countenance and ſhelter for it in the Scripture; eſpecially that place, which hath ſo puzzled and non-plus'd interpreters, *Rom.* viii. 19. *For the earneſt expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifeſtation of the ſons of God. For the creature was made ſubject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reaſon of him, who hath ſubjected the ſame in hope. Becauſe the creature itſelf alſo ſhall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth, and travelleth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourſelves alſo, which have the firſt-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourſelves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies.* Where it is firſt of all evident, that the κτίσις, *creature*, or *creation* ſpoken of, is not the very ſame with the τέκνα or υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the children or ſons of God*; but ſomething diſtinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it muſt of neceſſity be underſtood, either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or elſe of both theſe together,

* Georg. Lib. IV. verſ. 221.

gether. Now, though it be readily acknowledged, that there is a proſopopœia here, yet cannot all thoſe expreſſions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be underſtood of the inanimate creation only, or ſenſeleſs matter; *viz.* that this hath ἀποκαραδοκίαν, *an earneſt expectation* of ſome future good to itſelf; that it is now made ſubject ματαιότητι, *to vanity*, fruſtration and diſappointment of deſire; and φθορᾷ, *to corruption* and death; and that οὐχ ἑκοῦσα, *not willingly*, but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ' ἐλπίδι too, *in hope*, notwithſtanding, of ſome further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συν-ενάζειν and συνωδίνειν, *groan* and *travel* in pain together, till it be at length delivered from the *bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.* Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of ſenſeleſs bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into ſmoke, water into vapour, vapour into ſnow or hail, graſs into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I ſay, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity deſtroyed, all the ſubſtance of matter ſtill remaining intirely the ſame, without the leaſt diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing, but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in reſt; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by ſomething elſe, as of itſelf to reſt. It is all nothing, but change of figure, diſtance, ſite, and magnitude of parts, cauſing ſeveral ſenſations, phancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, That all ſuch-like mutations, and alternate viciſſitudes in inanimate bodies, ſhall at length quite ceaſe; theſe groaning in the mean time, and travelling in pain to be delivered from the toilſome labour of ſuch reſtleſs motion, and to be at eaſe and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the eaſe and quiet of ſenſeleſs matter, they would thereby, *ipſo facto*, petrify the whole corporeal univerſe, and conſequently the bodies of good men alſo after the reſurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of ſome, that the whole terreſtrial globe ſhall at laſt be vitrified, or turned into tranſparent cryſtal, as if it alſo groaned in the mean time for this. For whatſoever change ſhall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reaſonable to think, that it will not be made for the ſake of the ſenſeleſs matter, or the inanimate bodies themſelves, to which all is alike; but only for the ſake of men and animals, the living ſpectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their uſe and delight. Neither indeed can thoſe words, for the creature *itſelf ſhall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God*, be underſtood of any other, than animals; for as much as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being cloathed, inſtead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only ſuch as conſiſt of ſoul and body. And that πᾶσα κτίσις, that *whole creation*, which is ſaid afterwards to groan and travel in pain together, may be well underſtood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be

be ſenſible of evil or miſery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would *interpret* this place of the lower animal creation only, which is ſenſible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or againſt its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapſe of ſouls) made ſubject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, miſery, and death, in thoſe groſs terreſtrial bodies; in the manifeſtation of the ſons of God, when they, inſtead of theſe mortal bodies, ſhall be clothed with celeſtial and immortal ones, then ſhall this creature alſo have its certain ſhare in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in ſome meaſure of ſuch a liberty, by being freed in like manner from theſe their groſs terreſtrial bodies, and now living only in thin aereal and immortal ones; and ſo a period put to all their miſeries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleaſure in the deſtruction of the living, but created whatſoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itſelf. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; becauſe the πᾶσα κτίσις, *the whole creation*, will not ſuffer that: and therefore a Pythagoriſt would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of ſcripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutiſh animals below men ſhall not be utterly annihilated in the conſummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite ſtript of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there ſhall be a continuation of this ſpecies or rank of being. And not only ſo neither; as if there ſhould ſtill be a conſtant ſucceſſion of ſuch alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but alſo, that the individuals themſelves ſhall continue the ſame, for as much as otherwiſe there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And laſtly, that theſe very ſouls of brutes, which at this time groan and travel in pain, ſhall themſelves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; ſince otherwiſe they ſhould be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themſelves, but others. But enough of this Pythagorick hypotheſis, which ſuppoſing all manner of ſouls, ſenſitive as well as rational, to be ſubſtantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their diſtinct natures, allows them certain thin aereal *Ochemata*, or vehicles, to ſubſiſt in, when theſe groſs terreſtrial ones ſhall fail them.

But let theſe aereal vehicles of the ſouls of brutes go for a whimſey, or meer figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terreſtrial bodies only, by means whereof they muſt needs be, immediately after death, quite deſtitute of all body; they ſubſiſting nevertheleſs, and not vaniſhing into nothing, becauſe they are not meer accidents, but ſubſtantial things: we ſay, that in this caſe, though the ſubſtances of them remain, yet muſt they needs continue in a ſtate of inſenſibility and inactivity, unleſs perhaps they be again afterwards united to ſome other terreſtrial bodies. Becauſe though intellection be the energy of the rational ſoul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the ſenſitive, always conjoined with it; ſenſe being, as *Ariſtotle* [1] hath rightly determined,

[1] De Animâ Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 27. Tom. II. Oper.

mined a complication of ſoul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving inſtruments. Wherefore we ſay, that if the irrational and ſenſitive ſouls in brutes, being ſubſtantial things alſo, be after death quite deſtitute of all body, then can they neither have ſenſe of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but muſt continue for ſo long a time, in a ſtate of inſenſibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the leſs impoſſible, becauſe no man can be certain, that his own ſoul in ſleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, *&c.* hath always an uninterrupted conſciouſneſs of itſelf; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reaſon to doubt, but that the ſenſitive ſouls of ſuch animals, as lie dead or aſleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of ſummer, do for that time continue in a ſtate of inactivity and inſenſibility. Upon which account, though theſe ſouls of brutes may be ſaid in one ſenſe to be immortal, becauſe the ſubſtance of them, and the root of life in them, ſtill remains; yet may they, in another ſenſe, be ſaid alſo to be mortal, as having the exerciſe of that life, for a time at leaſt, quite ſuſpended. From whence it appears, that there is no reaſon at all for that fear and ſuſpicion of ſome, that if the ſouls of brutes be ſubſtantial, and continue in being after death, they muſt therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that ſuppoſed poſſibility of their awakening again afterwards, in ſome other terreſtrial bodies, this ſeemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the courſe of nature, when the ſilk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reaſon to doubt, but that the ſame ſoul, which before acted the body of the ſilk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Chriſtian theologers an emblem of the reſurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two ſeveral opinions, concerning the ſubſtantial ſouls of brutes, ſuppoſed therefore to have a permanent ſubſiſtence after death; one of *Plato*'s and the *Pythagoreans*, that when they are diveſted of theſe groſs terreſtrial bodies, they live, and have a ſenſe of themſelves, in thin aereal ones; the other of ſuch, as exploding theſe aereal vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terreſtrial bodies, affirm the ſubſtances of them, ſurviving death, to continue in a ſtate of inactivity and inſenſibility, ſleep, ſilence, or ſtupor. But now, to ſay the truth, there is no abſolute neceſſity, that theſe ſouls of brutes, becauſe ſubſtantial, ſhould therefore have a permanent ſubſiſtence after death to all eternity; becauſe though it be true, that no ſubſtance once created by God will of itſelf ever vaniſh into nothing, yet is it true alſo, that whatſoever was created by God out of nothing, may poſſibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is ſaid, that the immortality of the human ſoul is demonſtrable by natural reaſon, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its ſubſtantiality is ſo demonſtrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more periſh or vaniſh into nothing, than the ſubſtance of matter itſelf: and not that it is impoſſible either for it, or matter

ter, by the divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the aſſurance, that we have of our own ſoul's immortality, muſt depend upon ſomething elſe beſides their ſubſtantiality, namely, a faith alſo in the divine goodneſs, that he will conſerve in being, or not annihilate, all ſuch ſubſtances created by him, whoſe permanent ſubſiſtence is neither inconſiſtent with his own attributes, nor the good of the univerſe, as this of rational ſouls unqueſtionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and puniſhments, and conſequently fit objects for the divine juſtice to diſplay itſelf upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the caſe may be otherwiſe as to the ſouls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore uncapable of reward and puniſhment; that though they will not naturally of themſelves vaniſh into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the reſpective animals, and had ſome enjoyment of themſelves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be abſolutely the beſt, then doubtleſs is it ſo. And to this ſeemeth agreeable the opinion of *Porphyrius* [1], amongſt the philoſophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or ſoul to be reſolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and reſumed into the Deity, and ſo annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though poſſibly there may be another interpretation of that philoſopher's meaning here, *viz.* that all the ſenſitive ſouls of brutes are really but one and the ſame mundane ſoul, as it were, outflowing and variouſly diſplaying itſelf, and acting upon all the ſeveral parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itſelf. But we have ſufficiently retunded the force of that objection againſt the ingenerability of all ſouls, and the ſubſtantiality of thoſe of brutes alſo, from their conſequent permanence after death; we having ſhewed, that, notwithſtanding this their ſubſtantiality, there is no abſolute neceſſity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or elſe, that if they do continue to ſubſiſt, (God annihilating no ſubſtance) unleſs they have aëreal vehicles to act, they muſt remain in a ſtate of inactivity and inſenſibility, ſilence or ſleep.

Now therefore, if no ſouls, no life, nor cogitation, could poſſibly be ever generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, they being not mere accidents, but ſubſtantial things, which muſt in this caſe have come from nothing; then either all ſouls exiſted of themſelves from eternity, or elſe there muſt of neceſſity be ſome eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theiſts, That no ſoul or mind, no life or underſtanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the ſole fountain of life and underſtanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by ſundry teſtimonies; but it may ſufficiently appear from thoſe verſes of *Virgil*, firſt in his ſixth *Æneid*, where, after he had ſpoken of God, as a Spirit and Mind diffuſed throughout the whole world, he addeth,

[1] Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, Par. I. §. XXII. p. 227. §. XXIV. p. 228. & aliàs.

[1] *Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,*
Et quæ marmoreo fert monſtra ſub æquore pontus,

That *from thence are the lives of all men and beaſts, birds flying in the air, and monſters ſwimming in the ſea.* And again in his *Georgicks*, where, after theſe words,

[2] ——— *Deum namque ire per omnes*
Terraſque, tractuſque maris, cœlumque profundum,

That *God paſſeth through all tracts of earths, ſeas, and heavens*, he ſubjoineth,

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque ſibi tenues naſcentem arceſſere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, & reſoluta referri,
Omnia, nec morti eſſe locum.

And from hence, not only men, but alſo all manner of brute animals and beaſts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or ſouls, as alſo at their deaths they render the ſame back again to him, in whoſe hand or cuſtody they remain undeſtroyed; ſo that there is no place any where in the world left for death. This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theiſts, however ſome of late have deviated and ſwerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the ſole fountain of lives and ſouls.

And it is a truth ſo evident, that life being ſubſtantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there muſt therefore of neceſſity be ſome eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoick Atheiſts themſelves (in this far wiſer than the Atomicks) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheleſs being ſtrongly poſſeſſed with that atheiſtick prejudice, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body, they attribute this firſt original unmade life and underſtanding to all matter as ſuch (but without animal conſciouſneſs) as an eſſential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they phancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modificated lives of animals and men, as ſuch, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the baſis, upon which they ſtand, being ſubſtantial, is alſo eternal and incorruptible. Theſe Hylozoiſts therefore, to avoid a Deity, ſuppoſe every atom of ſenſeleſs matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniſcient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before ſenſe, and underived from ſenſibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomick Atheiſts, who make all knowledge, ſenſe, or

[1] Verſe 728. [2] Lib. IV. Verſe 221.

or the product thereof) though without any animal conſciouſneſs and ſelf-perception.

But as nothing can be more prodigiouſly abſurd, than thus to attribute infallible omniſcience to every atom of matter; ſo is it alſo directly contradictious to ſuppoſe perfect knowledge, wiſdom, or underſtanding, without any conſciouſneſs or ſelf-perception, conſciouſneſs being eſſential to cogitation: as alſo, that the ſubſtantial and fundamental life in men and other animals ſhould never periſh, and yet notwithſtanding their ſouls and perſonalities in death utterly vaniſh into nothing. Moreover, this hypotheſis can never poſſibly ſolve the phænomenon of men and animals neither; not only becauſe no organization or modification of matter whatſoever could ever produce conſciouſneſs and ſelf-perception in what was before inconſcious; but alſo becauſe every ſmalleſt atom thereof being ſuppoſed to be a percipient by itſelf, and to have a perfect life and underſtanding of its own, there muſt be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap of commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Laſtly, whereas theſe Hylozoick Atheiſts make every atom of matter omniſcient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or aſſert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without ſenſe, and underived from ſenſibles; we demand of them, where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For ſince they proceed not in a way of paſſion from ſenſibles exiſting without, nor could reſult from thoſe atoms neither, as comprehending themſelves, they muſt needs come from nothing, and many of them, at leaſt, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot poſſibly be any other original, by the wit of man deviſed, of knowledge and underſtanding, than from an abſolutely perfect and omnipotent being, comprehending itſelf, and the extent of its own infinite power, or all poſſibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one ſuch omnipotent being, and therefore no more than one original, and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoick atheiſm is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the ſimple Deity, one perfect underſtanding Being, into matter, and all the ſeveral atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifeſt, that theſe Atheiſts are ſo far from being able to diſprove a God from this topick of cogitation, knowledge or underſtanding, that they cannot poſſibly ſolve the phænomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his exiſtence. For, firſt, if no life or cogitation, ſoul or mind, can poſſibly ſpring out of matter or body, devoid of life and underſtanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth and thickneſs; then is it ſo far from being true, that all life and underſtanding is junior to ſenſeleſs matter, and the offſpring thereof, that of neceſſity either all lives and ſouls were ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, or elſe there muſt be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there muſt be an eternal knowledge before ſenſe and ſenſibles; which is that

that hath printed the ſtamps and ſignatures of itſelf, upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and underſtanding in ourſelves is not a meer paſſion from ſingular ſenſibles or bodies exiſting without us, as the forementioned Atheiſts alſo conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge, as ſuch, is in its own nature junior to ſenſibles, and the meer creature of them, and conſequently no creator;) there being nothing, which comes to us from the objects of ſenſe without, but only local motion and preſſure, and there being other objects of the mind, beſides ſingular ſenſibles; not only all univerſals, but alſo ſuch intelligibles, as never were, nor can be in ſenſe. Now, if our human knowledge and underſtanding be not a paſſion from things exiſting without us; then can it have no other original than in way of participation, from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful being, comprehending itſelf, and in itſelf all things; all the poſſibilities of things before they were made, their reſpects and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent being, together with the poſſibilities of things contained in it is the firſt Νοητὸν, *intelligible*, or *object of mind and underſtanding*, by which all other ſingulars are underſtood. And were there no ſuch perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful being, there could have been no mind or underſtanding at all. As alſo, were there no perfect mind, *viz.* that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itſelf, and all poſſibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge, and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, muſt needs have ſprung from nothing. And thus is the exiſtence of a God again demonſtrated from that phænomenon of knowledge or underſtanding.

HAving quite routed and vanquiſhed the Atheiſts main body, we ſhall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and ſcattered forces, *viz.* their objections againſt Providence, their queries, and their arguments from intereſt, with a breath or two. Their firſt objection is againſt providence, as to the fabrick of the world, from the faultineſs of the mundane ſyſtem, intellectually conſidered, and in order to ends; *Quia tantâ ſtat prædita culpâ* [1]; That *becauſe it is ſo ill-made*, therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheiſt takes it for granted, that whoſoever aſſerts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore *ipſo facto* ſuppoſe all things to be well-made, and as they ſhould be. And this doubtleſs was the ſenſe of all the ancient theologers, however ſome modern Theiſts deviate therefrom; theſe concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to conſiſt in goodneſs, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reaſon of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of ſuch as have a ſuperiour over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irreſiſtibly powerful, to have a will abſolutely indifferent

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. Verſ. 183.

different to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itſelf, or to will nothing becauſe it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the ſole reaſon of all its actions, nay, the very rule or meaſure of goodneſs, juſtice, and wiſdom itſelf. And this is ſuppoſed by them to be the liberty, ſovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore ſuch Theiſts as theſe would think themſelves altogether unconcerned in theſe atheiſtick objections againſt Providence, or in defending the fabrick of the world, as faultleſs, they being as ready as the Atheiſts themſelves, to acknowledge, that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it muſt be ſaid to be well, becauſe ſo made, but pretending nevertheleſs, that this is no impeachment at all of the exiſtence of a God, *Quià Deus non tenetur ad optimum, becauſe God is no way bound or obliged to the beſt*; he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do theſe Theiſts here elſe, than whilſt they deny the fortuitous motion of ſenſeleſs matter to be the firſt original of all things, themſelves in the mean time enthrone fortuitouſneſs and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an abſolute ſovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controverſy betwixt the Atheiſts and theſe Theiſts ſeems to be no other than this, whether ſenſeleſs matter fortuitouſly moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, ſuch as is altogether undetermined by goodneſs, juſtice and wiſdom, be the ſovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly we mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in ſuch an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of ſenſeleſs atoms furiouſly agitated, or of a rapid whirl-wind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it ſhould be more deſirable to be under the empire of ſenſeleſs atoms, fortuitouſly moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodneſs, juſtice, and wiſdom, armed with omnipotence; becauſe the former could harbour no hurtful or miſchievous deſigns againſt any, as the latter might. But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodneſs, juſtice and wiſdom, is ſo far from being the higheſt liberty, ſovereignty and dominion, the greateſt perfection, and the divineſt thing of all, that it is indeed nothing elſe but weakneſs and impotency itſelf, or brutiſh folly and madneſs. And therefore thoſe ancients, who affirmed, that Mind was Lord over all, and the ſupreme King of heaven and earth, held at the ſame time, that Good was the ſovereign monarch of the univerſe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, becauſe Mind is that, which orders all things for the ſake of Good; and whatſoever doth otherwiſe, was, according to them, not Νῦς, but Ἄνοια, not *Mens*, but *Dementia*, and conſequently no God. And thus does *Celſus* in *Origen* declare the nature of God, ὁ γὰρ τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχιγέτης· *God is not the preſident or head of irregular and irrational luſt or appetite, and of looſe erratick diſorderlineſs, but of the juſt and righteous nature.* And though this were there miſapplied by him againſt the Chriſtian doctrine of the reſurrection (not underſtood) yet is the paſſage highly approved by *Origen*; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that P. 240.

as the general ſenſe of Chriſtians too [1], Φαμὲν ὅτι ὐ δύναλαι αἰχρά ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσαι ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεὸς, εἰ γὰρ αἰχρόν τι δρᾶ ὁ Θεὸς, ὐκ ἔσι Θεὸς· *We Chriſtians* (who hold the reſurrection) *ſay as well as you, that God can do nothing, which is in itſelf evil, inept, or abſurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God.* And again [2], ὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βὰλεται, ἀναιρέτικον τυγχάνου τῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεὸν, *God willeth nothing unbecoming himſelf, or what is truly indecorous; foraſmuch as this is inconſiſtent with his Godſhip.* And to the ſame purpoſe *Plotinus*, * ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατα τὴν αὐτῦ ὐσίαν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτῦ ἢ τὸ δίκαιον συνεφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, πῦ ἂν εἴη· *The Deity acteth according to its own nature and eſſence; and its nature and eſſence diſplayeth goodneſs and juſtice: For if theſe things be not there, where ſhould they elſe be found?* And again, elſewhere, Θεὸς ὅπερ ἔχρην εἶναι, ὐ τοίνυν ὅτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδα ὅτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει· *God is eſſentially that, which Ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be ſuch as he is: and this firſt Ought to be is the principle of all things whatſoever, that ought to be.* Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived, as meer arbitrarineſs, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent, (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance) but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodneſs, juſtly and wiſely diſpenſing itſelf, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodneſs, juſtice, and wiſdom; or decorouſneſs, fitneſs, and Ought itſelf, willing; ſo that the Τὸ Βέλτιςον, that, which is abſolutely the beſt, is νόμος ἀπαράβαλος, *an indiſpenſable law to it, becauſe its very eſſence.* God is μέτρον πάντων, an *impartial balance*, lying even equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the moſt juſt and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the beſt, in any way of ſervility, (as men fondly imagine this to be contrary to his liberty) much leſs by the law and command of any ſuperiour (which is a contradiction) but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot poſſibly deviate from, no more than ungod itſelf. In concluſion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheiſt's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of neceſſity muſt all things be well-made, and as they ſhould be; *& vice verſâ.* But no Atheiſt will ever be able to prove, that either the whole ſyſtem of the world, could have been better made, or that ſo much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

So likewiſe, *p.* 247. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὐδὲν ὅτός τε παράλογον ὅτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάζεσθαί ἐςιν ὁ Θεος. *According to us alſo, God can do nothing, that is abſurd, or beſides Reaſon.*

* *P.* 265. [Libro de Provid. Ennead. III. Lib. II. Cap. XIII.] *P.* 743. [Ennead. VI. Lib. VIII. Cap. IX.]

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reaſons of, they being made by a knowledge far ſuperiour and tranſcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination, but ſlowly diſcovering the intrigues and contrivances of providence therein; witneſs the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatick veſſels, and other things, (without which the mechanick ſtructure of the bodies of animals cannot be underſtood) all but ſo lately brought to light; wherefore we muſt not conclude, that whatſoever we cannot find out the reaſon of, or the uſe, that

[1] P. 246. [2] P. 247.

that it ſerveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We ſhall give one inſtance of this; the *inteſtinum cæcum*, in the bodies of men and other animals, ſeems, at firſt ſight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know, that any anatomiſt or phyſiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or diſcovered its uſe: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, theſe two both together are a moſt artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.

The firſt atheiſtick inſtance of the faultineſs of things, in the frame of nature, is from the conſtitution of the heavens, and the diſpoſition of the æquator and ecliptick, interſecting each other in an angle of three and twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terreſtrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwiſe it might be [1]. But this is built upon a falſe ſuppoſition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropicks, was utterly uninhabitable by reaſon of the extremity of heat. And it is certain, that there is nothing, which doth more demonſtrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the moſt convenient ſite or diſpoſition, that could be deviſed, as will appear, if the inconveniences of other diſpoſitions be conſidered, eſpecially theſe three; firſt, If the axes of thoſe circles ſhould be parallel, and their plains coincident; ſecondly, If they ſhould interſect each other in right angles; and thirdly, (which is a middle betwixt both) If they ſhould cut one another in an angle of forty five degrees. For it is evident, that each of theſe diſpoſitions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terreſtrial inhabitants, in reſpect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that theſe two circles ſhould continue thus, to keep the ſame angular interſection, when phyſical and mechanick cauſes would bring them ſtill nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a providence alſo.

In the next place, the Atheiſt ſuppoſes, that, according to the general perſuaſion of Theiſts, the world and all things therein were created only for the ſake of man [2], he thinking to make ſome advantage for his cauſe from hence. But this ſeemeth, at firſt, to have been an opinion only of ſome ſtrait-laced Stoicks, though afterward indeed recommended to others alſo, by their own ſelf-love, their over-weaning, and puffy conceit of themſelves. And ſo fleas and lice, had they underſtanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men alſo, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the maker thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well ſaid to have been made principally, (though not only) for man. For we ought not to monopolize the divine goodneſs to ourſelves, there being other animals ſuperiour to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this viſible creation; and it being reaſonable to think, that even the lower animals likewiſe, and whatſoever hath conſcious life, was made

Thus Plato. μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα. De L g. D. p. 903.

[1] Vide Lucret. Lib. V. verſ. 201. [2] Id. Lib. II. verſ. 174, 175.

made partly alſo, to enjoy itſelf. But Atheiſts can be no fit judges of worlds being made well or ill, either in general, or reſpectively to mankind, they having no ſtanding meaſure for well and ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themſelves, and what their own good or evil conſiſteth in. That was at firſt but a froward ſpeech of ſome ſullen diſcontented perſons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, ſelfiſh, and partial appetites, they would revenge themſelves, by railing upon nature (that is, Providence) and calling her a ſtepmother only to mankind, whilſt ſhe was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals [1]; and though this be elegantly ſet off by *Lucretius* [2], yet is there nothing but poetick flouriſh in it all, without any philoſophick truth; the advantages of mankind being ſo notoriouſly conſpicuous above thoſe of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheiſt would conclude the God of the Theiſt to be either impotent or envious; it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the neceſſity of imperfect beings, and the incompoſſibility of things; but that the divine art and ſkill moſt of all appeareth in bonifying theſe evils, and making them, like diſcords in muſick, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular perſons.

Moreover, a great part of thoſe evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own phancy and opinions, according to that of the moraliſt [3], Ταράσσει τὰς ἀνθρώπους ὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα. *It is not things themſelves, that diſturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things.* And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from theſe, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleaſure, according to that Socratick fable [4], That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tyed them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the part ſo affected, (as *Socrates* alſo) Τὸ ἀλγῶν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει, *It goes no further than the leg where it is.* But this is many times very ſerviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind; upon which all our happineſs dependeth. To the Atheiſts, who acknowledge no *malum culpæ*, *no evil of fault*, (*turpitude*, or *diſhoneſty*) death is the greateſt and moſt tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypotheſis, be nothing leſs than an abſolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theiſts, which makes all ſouls ſubſtantial, no life of itſelf (without divine annihilation) will ever quite vaniſh into nothing, any more than the ſubſtance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platoniſts have been here ſo kind, even to the ſouls of brutes alſo, as that they might not be left in a ſtate of inactivity and inſenſibility after death, as to beſtow upon them certain ſubtile bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwiſe, but that *Ariſtotle*, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his ſecond

[1] Vide Plin. Hiſt. Natur. Proem. Lib. VII.
[2] Lib. V. verſ. 223.
[3] Epictet. in Enchiridio, Cap. V. Vide etiam M. Antoninum, lib. IV. §. 3. p. 97. & lib. V. §. XIX. p. 159.
[4] Apud Platon. in Phædone, p. 376.

ſecond book, *De Gen. An. c.* 3. [1] where, after he had declared the ſenſitive ſoul to be inſeparable from body, he addeth, πάσης δὴ ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, ἕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις· *All ſouls therefore ſeem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themſelves differ in dignity and nobility, ſo do theſe bodies of theirs differ from one another.* And afterwards calling this ſubtile body πνεῦμα, or a ſpirit, he affirmeth it to be, ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, *analogous to the element of the ſtars.* Only as *Galen*, and S. *Auſtin*, and others, have conceived, *Ariſtotle* deviated here from the *Pythagoreans* in this, that he ſuppoſed the ſenſitive ſoul itſelf to be really nothing elſe, but this very ſubtile and ſtar-like body, and not a diſtinct ſubſtance from it, uſing it only as a vehicle. Nevertheleſs, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational ſoul to be really diſtinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-exiſting; and conſequently ſhould acknowledge alſo its after-immortality. But whatſoever *Ariſtotle*'s judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human ſoul is nothing but a withdrawing into the tyring-houſe, and putting off the clothing of this terreſtrial body. So that it will ſtill continue after death, to live to God, whether in a body, or without it. Though, according to *Plato*'s expreſs doctrine, the ſoul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus; ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἐπιτεταγμένη σώματι, τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ· *the ſoul is always conjoined with a body, but ſometimes of one kind, and ſometimes of another*; which many Chriſtian doctors alſo, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Chriſtian faith aſſures us, that the ſouls of good men ſhall at length be clothed with ſpiritual and heavenly bodies, ſuch as are, in *Ariſtotle*'s language, ἀνάλογα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, *analogous to the element of the ſtars.* Which Chriſtian reſurrection therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as *Celſus* [2] reproached it, σκωλήκων ἐλπὶς, *the meer hope of worms.* And thus much ſhall ſuffice, in way of confutation, of the firſt atheiſtick objection againſt Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the ſecond chapter.

De Leg. 10. *p.* 903. [P. 672]

The thirteenth atheiſtick argument, or ſecond objection againſt Providence, is from the ſeeming confuſion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the prophane: nay, that many times the worſer cauſes and men prevail againſt the better, as is intimated in that paſſage of the poet [3], though in the perſon of a Theiſt,

Victrix cauſa Deo placuit, ſed victa Catoni;

And that the unjuſt and ungodly often flow in all kind of proſperity, whilſt the innocent and devout worſhippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adverſity. Whereas, were there a God and Providence, as they conceive, prophane and irreligious perſons would be preſently thunderſtruck from heaven, or otherwiſe made remarkable objects of divine vengeance,

[1] P. 618. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Apud Origen. contra Celſum, Lib. V. p. 240.

[3] Lucan. Lib. I. Verſ. 131.

geance, as alſo the pious miraculouſly protected and reſcued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this conſideration hath too much puzzled and ſtaggered weak minds in all ages. Becauſe [1] *ſentence againſt an evil work is not executed ſpeedily, therefore is the heart of the ſons of men fully ſet in them to do evil.* And the Pſalmiſt himſelf [2] was ſometime much perplexed with this phænomenon, the proſperity of the ungodly, who *ſet their mouths againſt heaven, and whoſe tongue walketh through the earth*; ſo that he was tempted to think, *he had cleanſed his heart in vain, and waſhed his hands in innocency*; (till at length, entring into the ſanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his ſoul fixed in a firm truſt and confidence upon divine providence; *Whom have I in heaven but thee*, &c. *My fleſh and my heart faileth, but God is the ſtrength of my heart, and my portion for ever.*) For as ſome will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune ſteer all *(the fool hath ſaid in his heart, there is no God* [3];) ſo will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below, *(how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Moſt High?* [4]) or elſe will not ſo far humble himſelf, or diſturb his own eaſe and quiet, as to concern himſelf in our low human affairs.

Thus did ſome in Plato *from hence conclude,* εἶναι μὲν Θεὸς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων· De Leg. 10. [P. 664.]

Firſt of all therefore, we here ſay, that it is altogether unreaſonable to require, that divine Providence ſhould miraculouſly interpoſe upon every turn in puniſhing the ungodly, and preſerving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the courſe of nature, (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent buſineſs) but rather carry things on ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ, in a ſtill and ſilent path, and ſhew his art and ſkill in making things of themſelves fairly unwind, and clear up at laſt into a ſatisfactory cloſe. Paſſion and ſelf-intereſt is blind, or ſhort-ſighted; but that, which ſteers the whole world, is no fond, pettiſh, impatient and paſſionate thing, but an impartial, diſintereſted, and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheleſs, it is certain, that ſometimes we have not wanted inſtances, in caſes extraordinary, of a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, *God appearing, as it were, miraculouſly upon the ſtage*, and manifeſting himſelf in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful ſervants from imminent dangers or evils threatned; as the ſame is often done alſo by a ſecret and undiſcerned over-ruling of the things of nature. But it muſt be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of divine providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof ſlower; according to that of *Euripides* [5], which yet has a tang of prophaneneſs in the expreſſion,

Μέλλει τὸ Θεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον φύσει,

The Deity is ſlow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it. For it is not from ſlackneſs and remiſneſs in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-ſuffering, he willing, that men ſhould repent, or elſe to teach us patience by his example (as *Plutarch* [6] ſuggeſteth) or that

[1] Eccleſ. viii. 11.
[2] Pſal. lxxiii.
[3] Pſal. xiv. 1.
[4] Pſal. lxxii. 20.
[5] In Oreſte, Verſ. 420.
[6] De ſera Numinis Vindictâ, Tom. II. Oper. P. 550.

that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as *Plutarch* [1] ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for *Dionysius* the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withall at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of divine displeasure: according to that of the poet [2], *Rarò antecedentem scelestum, &c. It is seldom, that wickedness altogether scapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot*; and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans [3],

Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλεῶσι μύλοι, ἀλεῶσι δὲ λεπτά.

Mills of the Gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to powder grind.

and, *Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands.*

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of divine displeasure upon them: but as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing, that [4] οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν, *There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil*; so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and Providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of *Plutarch* [5] therefore is most true here, εἷς ἓν ὁ λόγος ὁ τὴν θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιρῶντα θάτερον, *That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, divine providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other.* But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatick poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for a while swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment [6]. The evolution of the world, as *Plotinus* calls it [7], is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a *truer poem*; and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which

[1] Ibid. p. 557.
[2] Horat. Odar. Lib. III. Od. II.
[3] Vide Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 548. Vide Platon. in Apolog. Socratis, p. 369. & de Republic. Lib. X. p. 518.
[4] Ubi supra, p 560.
[5] Vide Plutarch. ubi supra, p. 554.
[6] Ennead. III. Lib. II. Cap. XVI. p. 267. Oper.

which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent ſenſe; and will at laſt make it appear, that a thread of exact juſtice did run through all, and that rewards and puniſhments are meaſured out in geometrical proportion.

Laſtly, It is in itſelf fit, that there ſhould be ſomewhere a doubtful and cloudy ſtate of things, for the better exerciſe of virtue and faith. For as there could have been no *Hercules*, had there not been monſters to ſubdue; ſo were there no ſuch difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to aſſault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occaſions and objects to exerciſe itſelf upon. Here have we therefore ſuch a ſtate of things, and this world is, as it were, a ſtage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by *faith*, and not by *ſight*; that faith, which is *the ſubſtance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not ſeen*; a belief in the goodneſs, power, and wiſdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. *The juſt ſhall live by his faith.*

We have now ſufficiently confuted the ſecond atheiſtick objection alſo, againſt Providence, as to the conduct and œconomy of human affairs. Nevertheleſs this is a large field, and much more might be ſaid in defence of Providence, both as to theſe and other inſtances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a ſupplement of what remains, we ſhall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have profeſſedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabrick and œconomy of the world; but eſpecially the learned and ingenious author[1] of the *Divine Dialogues*. Only we ſhall here add ſome few conſiderations, not ſo much for the confutation of Atheiſts, as for the better ſatisfaction of ſuch Religioniſts, who, too eaſily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in queſtion the divine attribute of goodneſs in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Chriſtian faith.

Firſt therefore we ſay, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to conſider the parts of the world alone by themſelves; and then, becauſe we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one ſhould attend only to this earth, which is but the loweſt and moſt dreggy part of the univerſe; or blame plants, becauſe they have not ſenſe; brutes, becauſe they have not reaſon; men, becauſe they are not dæmons or angels; and angels, becauſe they are not gods, or want divine perfection. Upon which account, God ſhould either have made nothing at all, ſince there can be nothing beſides himſelf abſolutely perfect, or elſe nothing but the higher rank of angelical beings, free from mortality, and all thoſe other evils, that attend mankind, or ſuch fine things as *Epicurus* his gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions[2], where there was neither bluſtering winds, nor any low'ring clouds, nor nipping froſts, nor ſcorching heat, nor night, nor ſhadow, but the

[1] Dr. *Henry More.* [2] Vide Lucret. Lib. III. Ver. 19.

the calm and uncloudcd æther, always smiling with gentle serenity. whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no musick nor harmony at all, in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best, that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing, which hath been so well insisted upon by *Plotinus*, that we cannot speak better to it, than in his words: Ὅλον γὰρ τὶ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ, καὶ ταῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσάυτως προσφόρους· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τότε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμότττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοπόμενον, μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένος ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χώρις λαβόντα, ἴσον εἰ, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· *God made the whole most beautiful, entire, compleat, and sufficient; all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever therefore, from the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer. For we ought to consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only, taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed* Thersites. *But that, which God made, was the whole as one thing; which he that attends to, may hear it speaking to him after this manner: God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and compleat, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable dæmons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants, and variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend at most no further than to the seas; as if the whole air, and æther, and heaven, in the mean time, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office.* And again, afterwards, Ὥσπερ τεκτήνης ὁ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ ὀφθαλμὸς ποιεῖ, ἅτως ὁ δ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεὸς εἰργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεὸς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, ὁ φυτόν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς ὁ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχῇ, ὁ δ' ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ ἢ εἴτις δράμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· *As an artificer would not make*

P. 256. [Lib. II. de Providentiâ, Ennead. III. lib. II. cap. III.]

make all things in an animal to be eyes; ſo neither has the divine λόγος, or ſpermatick reaſon of the world, made all things gods; but ſome gods, and ſome dæmons, and ſome men, and ſome lower animals; not out of envy, but to diſplay its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful ſpectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, becauſe he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had ſuited his colours to every part reſpectively, giving to each ſuch as belonged to it. Or elſe are we like thoſe, who would blame a comedy or tragedy, becauſe they were not all kings or heroes, that acted in it, but ſome ſervants and ruſtick clowns introduced alſo, talking after their rude faſhion. Whereas the dramatick poem would neither be compleat, nor elegant and delightful, were all thoſe worſer parts taken out of it.

Again, We cannot certainly conclude, that the works of God and his creation do not tranſcend thoſe narrow limits, which vulgar opinion and imagination ſets them, that commonly terminates the univerſe, but a little above the clouds, or at moſt ſuppoſes the fixed ſtars, being all faſtned in one ſolid ſphere, to be the utmoſt wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much leſs ought we, upon ſuch groundleſs ſuppoſitions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, becauſe it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheiſtick infinity of diſtant worlds; nor can we admit that *Carteſian*, ſeemingly more modeſt, indefinite extenſion of one corporeal univerſe, which yet really, according to that philoſopher's meaning, hath *nullos fines, no bounds nor limits at all.* For we perſuade ourſelves, that the corporeal world is as uncapable of a poſitive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time; there being no magnitude ſo great, but that more ſtill might be added to it. Nevertheleſs, as we cannot poſſibly imagine the ſun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part ſo big as we know it to be; ſo much more may the whole corporeal univerſe far tranſcend thoſe narrow bounds, which our imagination would circumſcribe it in. The new celeſtial phænomena, and the late improvements of aſtronomy and philoſophy made thereupon, render it ſo probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the ſun a fixed ſtar in the centre of that *vortex*, wherein it moves, that many have ſhrewdly ſuſpected, that there are other habitable globes, beſides this earth of ours, (which may be ſailed round about in a year or two) as alſo more ſuns, with their reſpective planets, than one. However, the diſtance of all the fixed ſtars from us being ſo vaſt, that the diameter of the great orb makes no diſcernible parallax in the ſite of them; from whence it is alſo probable, that the other fixed ſtars are likewiſe vaſtly diſtant from one another: this, I ſay, widens the corporeal univerſe to us, and makes thoſe *flammantia mœnia mundi*, as *Lucretius* [1] calls them, *thoſe flaming walls of the world*, to fly away before us. Now, it is not reaſonable to think, that all this immenſe vaſtneſs ſhould lie waſte, deſert, and uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praiſe the Creator thereof, ſave only this one ſmall ſpot of earth. *In my father's houſe* (ſaith our Saviour) *are many manſions.* And *Baruch*, (chapter iii. appointed by our church to be read publickly) *O Iſrael, how great*

[1] Lib. I. verſ. 73, 74.

great is the houſe of God, and how large is the place of his poſſeſſion? Great and hath no end, high and unmeaſurable. Which yet we underſtand not of an abſolute infinity, but only ſuch an immenſe vaſtneſs, as far tranſcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We ſhall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of providence, and the juſtice thereof, as to the œconomy of mankind, we muſt look both forwards and backwards, or beſides the preſent, not only upon the future, but alſo the paſt time. Which rule is likewiſe thus ſet down by *Plotinus*; οὐδ' ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτε φησὶ βλέπειν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους, καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον· *Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of Providence, we ought to look back upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future.* Indeed he, and thoſe other philoſophers, who were religious, underſtood this ſo, as to conclude a pre-exiſtent ſtate of all particular ſouls, wherein they were at firſt created by God pure, but by the abuſe of their own liberty degenerated, to be a neceſſary hypotheſis, for the ſolving that phænomenon of the depraved ſtate of mankind in general here in this life. And not only ſo, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account alſo of thoſe different conditions of particular perſons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different fates here, deriving them all, ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, *from their ſeveral demeanors heretofore in a pre-exiſtent ſtate.* And there have not wanted Chriſtian doctors, who have complied with theſe philoſophers in both. But our common Chriſtianity only agrees thus far, as to ſuppoſe a kind of imputative pre exiſtence in *Adam*, in whom all were created pure, and ſo conſequently involved in his after-miſcarriage, to ſolve the pravity of human nature; upon which account we are all ſaid to be, φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς [1], *by nature children of wrath.* But as for the different conditions of perſons, and their ſeveral fates, more diſadvantageous to ſome than others, this indeed the generality of Chriſtian doctors have been content to reſolve, only into an occult, but juſt Providence. And thus does *Origen* himſelf ſometimes modeſtly paſs it over, as in his third book againſt *Celſus**, πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀναλροφῆς τοιάυτης γεγενῆσθαι, ὡς μηδὲ φαντασίαν ἐπιβραπῆναι τῶν κρειττόνων λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἥττους ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι ἀκολάστων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυόσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαιμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις· πίπλειν δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ εὐχερές· *It happeneth to many, ſo to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very probable, that there are cauſes of theſe things in the reaſons of providence, though they do not eaſily fall under human notice.*

P. 264. [Ennead. III. Lib. II. Cap. XIII.]

Thus Hierocles, ἐκ ἀμελεῖται ὁ ἀγαθὸς νῦν γινόμενος, κἂν παλαιῶν μνημάτων ἐφέλκηται ζίσματα, 157.

* P. 134.

But there is yet a third atheiſtick objection againſt Providence behind, That *it is impoſſible any one Being ſhould animadvert and order all things in the diſtant places of the world at once; and, were this poſſible, yet would ſuch infinite negotioſity be very uneaſy and diſtractious to it, and altogether inconſiſtent*

[1] Eph. ii. 3.

ſiſtent with happineſs. Nor would a being, irreſiſtibly powerful, concern itſelf in the good or welfare of any thing elſe, it ſtanding in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good-will ariſing from indigency and imbecility. Wherefore ſuch a being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itſelf, and its own happineſs, utterly regardleſs of all other things.

To which the reply is, firſt, That though ourſelves, and all created beings, have but a finite animadverſion, and narrow ſphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the caſe muſt be the ſame with the Deity, ſuppoſed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀπειροδύναμον, *that hath no manner of defect*, either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere *idolum ſpecus, an idol of the cave or den*; men meaſuring the Deity by their own ſcantling and narrowneſs. And indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourſelves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the ſun an animal, and had life co-extended with its rays and light, it would ſee and perceive every atom of matter, that its outſtretched beams reached to, and touched. Now all created beings are themſelves, in ſome ſenſe, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and ſenſibly perceive all theſe its own effluxes and emanations. Men themſelves can order and manage affairs in ſeveral diſtant places at once, without any diſturbance; and we have innumerable notions of things in our mind, that lie there eaſily together, without crouding one another, or cauſing any diſtraction to us [1].

Nevertheleſs, the minds of weak mortals may here be ſomewhat eaſed and helped, by conſidering what hath been before ſuggeſted; that there is no neceſſity God Almighty ſhould ἀυτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, *do all things himſelf immediately and drudgingly*; but he may have his inferiour miniſters and executioners under him, to diſcharge him of that ſuppoſed encumberment. As firſt of all, an artificial plaſtick nature, which, without knowledge and animal conſciouſneſs, diſpoſes the matter of the univerſe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reaſon, why we did before inſiſt ſo much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that divine providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as reſulting only from the fortuitous motions of ſenſeleſs matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be ſuppoſed to do every thing itſelf immediately and miraculouſly, without the ſubſervient miniſtry of any natural cauſes, which would ſeem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but alſo an operoſe, cumberſome, and moliminous buſineſs. And thus did *Plato* [2] acknowledge, that there were, ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις χρῆται ὁ Θεός· *Certain cauſes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes uſe of, as ſubſervient to himſelf in the mundane œconomy.* Beſides which, thoſe inſtincts alſo impreſſed upon animals, and which they are paſſive to, directing them to act for ends either not underſtood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good and

[1] Vide Xenophontem de Memorabilib. Socratis, Lib. I. p. 575.

[2] In Timæo, §. XXXVI. p. 256.

and the good of the universe, are another part of that divine fate, which, inserted into things themselves, is the servant and executioner of Providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands; dæmoniack or angelick beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also *Plato* thus; τούτοις εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προσεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρώταλον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως· *There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God, who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them.* All which inferiour causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose. P. 903. [De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 671.]

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And indeed the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little: [1] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τὰς μεγάλας φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθας εὖ κεῖσθαι· *as architects affirm, that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little.* Neither can generals of armies, nor governours of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanick artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well as the great. Μὴ τοίνυν (saith the forementioned philosopher [2]) τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομεν ποτὲ ξυνητῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅτῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται· *Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferiour to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent.* Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of divine Providence in the world is the oeconomy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by *Plato* contracted into this compendium; οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πετλευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μεταλιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον χείρου δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, &c. *There is no other work left for the supreme Governour of all, than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser*; or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner, as might best render νικῶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, *virtue victorious, and triumphant over vice.* And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractious thing. P. 903. [p. 672.]

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals, than contracted self-love, and that all good-will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and lastly therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have

[1] Plato de Legib. Lib. X. p. 671. [2] Ibid.

have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs [1], That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet; whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves, than this ἀπραξία, *this having nothing to do*; and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect Being, is altogether as easy to it, as its essence.

The atheistick queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, *If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, If he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production thereof looking, as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold, nor fasten upon any thing.*

To the first therefore we say, That the reason, why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy, besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though *Plotinus* [2] were so shy of that, γελοῖον ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, *It is ridiculous to say, that God made the world, that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him.* But the chief reason of his saying so was, because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world meerly to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it. But the Atheist demands, What hurt *had it been for us never to have been made?* and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists; *What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing?* And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge; Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But

[1] Vide Diogen. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 139 p. 661.

[2] Libro contra Gnosticos, Ennead. II. Lib. IX. Cap. IV. p. 202.

But this queſtion may be taken in two different ſenſes; either, *Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodneſs are eternal?* or elſe, ſecondly, *If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithſtanding, why was it not ſooner, but ſo lately made?* In both which queries the atomick Atheiſts take it for granted, that the ſyſtem of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we ſay, that the reaſon, why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodneſs in the divine will, but becauſe there is an abſolute impoſſibility in the thing itſelf; or becauſe the neceſſity and incapacity of ſuch an imperfect being hindered. For we muſt confeſs, that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it ſhould certainly have been ſo. And juſt thus does *Philoponus*, in his confutation of *Proclus* his arguments for the world's eternity, declare himſelf, and no otherwiſe: P. 4. [Edit. Trincavell.] Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἀΐδιον ὑποληθέμενοι, ὅτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, ὅτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γενομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα· *Ourſelves alſo ſuppoſing the world not to have been eternal, do neither aſcribe this to any defect either of goodneſs or of power in the Deity, but only to the impoſſibility of the thing itſelf.* Where, in the following words, he gives a two-fold account of this impoſſibility of the world's eternity; ὅτι τε τὸ ἄπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ διεξίτηλον εἶναι, ἀδύνατον ἦν· καὶ ὅτι συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει· *Firſt, becauſe there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the paſt duration of the world hath been; and ſecondly, becauſe that, which is made, or brought into being by another, as a diſtinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker.* Where it is probable, that *Philoponus*, being a Chriſtian, deſigned not to oppoſe the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to aſſert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itſelf God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we ſee, how thoſe atheiſtick exceptions againſt the novity of the divine creation, as if God muſt therefore either have ſlept from eternity, or elſe have at length contracted a ſatiety of his former ſolitude, and the like, do of themſelves quite vaniſh into nothing. But then, as to the ſecond ſenſe of the queſtion, *Why the world, though it could not poſſibly be from eternity, yet was no ſooner, but ſo lately made?* we ſay, that this is an abſurd queſtion; both becauſe time was made together with the world, and there was no *ſooner* or *later* before time; and alſo becauſe whatſoever had a beginning, muſt of neceſſity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not poſſibly have been ſo made by God in time, as not to be once but five or ſix thouſand years old, and no more; as now it is.

And as for the third and laſt query; *How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, eſpecially if incorporeal?* we reply; firſt, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and eſſentially depending on him, who, by his abſolute power alſo, could annihilate whatſoever he created;

he muſt needs have a deſpotick power over all; and every thing whatſoever be naturally ſubject and obſequious to him. And ſince no body can poſſibly move itſelf, that, which firſt moved matter, muſt of neceſſity be incorporeal; nor could it move it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by truſion or pulſion, they being before moved, but muſt do it by another kind of action, ſuch as is not local motion, nor heterokineſy, but autokineſy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheiſts, that an incorporeal Deity could not poſſibly move the matter of the world, becauſe it would run through it, and could not faſten or lay hold thereupon, is abſurd, becauſe this moves matter not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as ſuch, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unqueſtionably certain, even from our own ſouls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, meerly by will and thought. And a perfect mind, preſiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irreſiſtibly, and with infinitely more eaſe, move the whole corporeal univerſe, meerly by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.

The laſt head of atheiſtick argumentation is from intereſt. And firſt, the Atheiſts would perſuade, that it is the *intereſt of mankind in general, and of every particular perſon, that there ſhould be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may puniſh, whom he pleaſes, eternally after death.*

To which our firſt reply is, that if there be a God, and ſouls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwiſe, that will alter the caſe, nor afford the Atheiſts any relief againſt thoſe two imagined evils of theirs. For things are ſullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wiſh them to be; and men will at laſt diſcover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wiſhing is no proving; and therefore this atheiſtick argument from intereſt is no argument at all againſt the exiſtence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wiſh, and vain deſire of befotted Atheiſts.

In the next place, this wiſh of Atheiſts is altogether founded upon a miſtaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the moſt deſirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodneſs, juſtice, and wiſdom itſelf omnipotent. His will is not meer will, ſuch as hath no other reaſon beſides itſelf; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the τὸ δέον, or *Ought itſelf*, decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God puniſh any, out of a delight in puniſhment, or in the evil and ſuffering of the perſons puniſhed; but to thoſe, who are not ἀνίατοι, *altogether incurable*, δίκη ἰατρεία, *his puniſhment is phyſick*, in order to their recovery and amendment; ſo that the ſource and fountain thereof is goodneſs to the

the perſons themſelves puniſhed. But to ſuch as are incurable, the puniſhment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of juſtice in God doth not at all claſh with the attribute of goodneſs, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the ſame. Goodneſs and juſtice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodneſs being fondneſs, nor his juſtice cruelty; but he being both good in puniſhing, and juſt in rewarding and diſpenſing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the intereſt of none, that there ſhould be no God nor immortality, unleſs perhaps of ſuch deſperately and incurably wicked perſons, who abandoning their true intereſt of being good, have thereupon no other intereſt now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God, is to be without hope in the world; for Atheiſts can have neither faith, nor hope, in ſenſeleſs matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an underſtanding being have never ſo much enjoyment of itſelf for the preſent, yet could it not poſſibly be happy, without immortality, and ſecurity of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheiſts conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life periſhes and vaniſhes into nothing; and conſequently alſo, that εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, happineſs is a thing, that hath no exiſtence in nature, a meer figment and chimæra, or idle wiſh and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the intereſt of mankind, that this hypotheſis ſhould be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impoſſibility of being ever happy.

God is ſuch a being, as if he could be ſuppoſed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not deſperately engaged in wickedneſs, no not Atheiſts themſelves, could poſſibly more wiſh for, or deſire. To believe a God, is to believe the exiſtence of all poſſible good and perfection in the univerſe; it is to believe, that things are as they ſhould be, and that the world is ſo well framed and governed, as that the whole ſyſtem thereof could not poſſibly have been better. For peccability ariſes from the neceſſity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themſelves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itſelf have been excluded; and though ſin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtleſs moſt for the good of the whole, that it ſhould not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing, which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatſoever happineſs his being is capable of, *and ſuch things, as eye hath not ſeen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive.* Infinite hopes lie before us, from the exiſtence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own ſouls immortality; and nothing can hinder or obſtruct theſe hopes, but our own wickedneſs of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the moſt hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things, that poſſibly can be. And to this purpoſe is that of *Linus* [z],

[z] Apud Jamblichum de Vitâ Pythagor. Cap. XXVII. p. 117, 118.

Ἐλπεσθω

Ἔλπεσθαι χρὴ παντ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐς' οὐδὲν Ἄελπτον·
Ῥάδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, κ) ἀνήυυτον οὐδέν.

Wherefore, as for *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, whoſe encomiums the Atheiſts here ſo loudly ſing forth, we ſay, that however they have made ſo great a noiſe in the world, and have been ſo much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated ſophiſts, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the laſt atheiſtick argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil ſovereigns, and to perſuade them, that theiſm or religion is abſolutely inconſiſtent with their intereſt; their reaſons for which are theſe three following. Firſt, becauſe the civil ſovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can ſignify little. Secondly, becauſe ſovereignty is in its own nature abſolutely indiviſible, and muſt be either infinite, or none at all; ſo that divine laws (natural and revealed) ſuperiour to it, circumſcribing it, would conſequently deſtroy it. Wherefore religion and theiſm muſt of neceſſity be diſplaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in. Thirdly and laſtly, private judgment of good and evil, juſt and unjuſt, is alſo contradictious to the very being of a body politick; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reaſon, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conſcience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, juſt and unjuſt, and therefore altogether inconſiſtent with true politicks; that can admit of no private conſciences, but only one publick conſcience of the law.

In way of anſwer to the firſt of which, we muſt here briefly unravel the atheiſtick ethicks and politicks. The foundation whereof is firſt laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not ſo much as any the leaſt ſeeds, either of politicalneſs, or ethicalneſs at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy; (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, ſave what reſulteth from fear, imbecillity, and indigency) nothing of publick and common concern, but all private and ſelfiſh; appetite and utility, or the deſires of ſenſual pleaſure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only meaſures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally juſt or unjuſt, nothing in itſelf ſinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath *jus ad omnia, a right to every thing*, whatſoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himſelf judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. *Si occidere cupis, jus habes*; *if thou deſireſt to kill, thou haſt then naturally a right thereunto*; that is, a liberty to kill without any ſin or injuſtice. For *jus* and *lex*, or *juſtitia*, *right* and *law*, or *juſtice*, in the language of theſe atheiſtick politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being

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a belluine liberty, not made, or left by juſtice, but ſuch as is founded in a ſuppoſition of its abſolute non-exiſtence. Should therefore a ſon not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but alſo exquiſitely torture them, taking pleaſure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable ſhrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of ſin or injuſtice at all in this, nor in any thing elſe; becauſe juſtice is no nature, but a meer factitious and artificial thing, made only by men, and civil laws. And, according to theſe men's apprehenſions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or ſhackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, juſtice and morality, theſe being to them nothing but reſtraints and hinderances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature abſolutely diſſociates and ſegregates men from one another, by reaſon of the inconſiſtency of thoſe appetites of theirs, that are all carried out only to private good, and conſequently, that every man is, by nature, in a ſtate of war and hoſtility againſt every man.

In the next place therefore, theſe atheiſtick politicians further add, that though this their ſtate of nature, which is a liberty from all juſtice and obligation, and a lawleſs, looſe, or belluine right to every thing, be in itſelf abſolutely the beſt; yet nevertheleſs by reaſon of men's imbecillity, and the equality of their ſtrengths, and inconſiſtency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worſt; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no ſecurity of their lives, much leſs of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not poſſible, that all men ſhould have dominion, (which were indeed the moſt deſirable thing, according to theſe principles) ſo the generality muſt needs be ſenſible of more evil in ſuch a ſtate of liberty with an univerſal war againſt all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and ſlaſhing, and juſtling againſt one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it neceſſary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to chuſe a leſſer evil, for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to ſubmit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a ſociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only ſo, but alſo for the ſecurity of all, that others ſhould obſerve ſuch rules as well as themſelves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whoſe will being the will of them all, ſhould be the very rule, and law, and meaſure of juſtice to them.

Here therefore theſe atheiſtick politicians, as they firſt of all ſlander human nature, and make a villain of it; ſo do they, in the next place, reproach juſtice and civil ſovereignty alſo, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and baſtardly brat of fear; or elſe a leſſer evil, ſubmitted to meerly out of neceſſity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reaſon of men's natural imbecillity. So that according to this

this hypotheſis, juſtice and civil government are plainly things not good in themſelves, nor deſireable, (they being a hinderance of liberty, and nothing but ſhackles and fetters,) but by accident only, as neceſſary evils: and thus do theſe politicians themſelves ſometimes diſtinguiſh betwixt good and juſt, that *bonum amatur per ſe, juſtum per accidens*; *good is that, which is loved for itſelf, but juſt by accident.* From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men muſt of neceſſity be ἄκοντες δίκαιοι, *unwillingly juſt*, or not with a full and perfect, but mixt will only; juſt being a thing, that is not ſincerely good, but ſuch as hath a great daſh or doſe of evil blended with it. And this was the old atheiſtick generation of juſtice, and of a body politick, civil ſociety, and ſovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypotheſis (which he looks upon as the only true ſcheme of politicks) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book *de Cive*, yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheiſtick politicians and philoſophers before *Plato*'s time; who repreſents their ſenſe concerning the original of juſtice, and civil ſociety in this manner:

De Rep. l. 2. *p.* 358, 359. [P. 442. Edit. Ficini.] ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πέφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασι τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν· πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλας ἀδικῶσι τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μήτ' ἀδικεῖν, μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· *I am to declare firſt what juſtice is, according to the ſenſe of theſe philoſophers, and from whence it was generated. They ſay therefore, that by nature, lawleſs liberty, and to do that, which is now called injuſtice, and injury to other men, is good; but to ſuffer it from others, is evil. But of the two, there is more of evil in ſuffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had claſhed a good while, doing and ſuffering injury, the greater part, who by reaſon of their imbecillity were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the buſineſs amongſt themſelves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor ſuffer injury, but to ſubmit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in thoſe laws, by the name of juſt.* And then is it added; καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ ὄσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου τοῦτο, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενον τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· *And this is, according to theſe philoſophers, the generation and eſſence of juſtice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the beſt and the worſt. The beſt, to exerciſe a lawleſs liberty of doing whatſoever one pleaſe to other men without ſuffering any inconvenience from it; and the worſt to ſuffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Juſtice therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both theſe, is loved, not as that which is good in itſelf, but only by reaſon of men's imbecillity, and their inability to do injuſtice. For as much as he, that had ſufficient power, would never enter into ſuch compacts, and ſubmit to equality and ſubjection. As for example, if a man had* Gyges *his magical ring, that he could do whatſoever he liſted, and not be ſeen or taken notice of by any, ſuch*

a one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor ſubmit to laws of equality and ſubjection. Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded alſo by ſome of theſe old atheiſtick philoſophers, that juſtice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, *Not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him, that is juſt, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whoſe vaſſal he is.* And it is well known, that after *Plato*'s time, this hypotheſis concerning juſtice, that it was a meer factitious thing, and ſprung only from men's fear and imbecillity, as a leſſer evil, was much inſiſted on by *Epicurus* alſo.

But let us in the next place ſee, how our modern atheiſtick philoſophers and politicians, will manage and carry on this hypotheſis, ſo as to conſociate men by art into a body politick, that are naturally diſſociated from one another, as alſo make juſtice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. Firſt of all therefore, theſe artificial juſtice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us, that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themſelves, and either ſimply renounce it, or transfer the ſame upon ſome other perſon; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themſelves, afterwards, to make uſe thereof. Thus a late writer[1], men *may by ſigns declare, Velle ſe non licitum ſibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure anteà feciſſe poterant; That it is their will, it ſhall no longer be lawful for them, to do ſomething, which before they had a right to do*; and this is called by him, a ſimple renunciation of right. And further, ſaith he, they *may declare again Velle ſe non licitum ſibi amplius fore alicui reſiſtere*, &c. *That it is their will, it ſhall be no longer lawful for them, to reſiſt this or that particular perſon, whom before they might lawfully have reſiſted*; and this is called a tranſlation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make uſe of ſuch liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his meer will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not ſo in itſelf; but only ſuſpend the exerciſe of ſo much of his liberty, as he thought good. But however, could a man by his will oblige himſelf, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, becauſe then might he, by his will, diſoblige himſelf again, and make the ſame lawful as before. For what is made meerly by will, may be deſtroyed by will. Wherefore, theſe politicians will yet urge the buſineſs further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the eſſence of injuſtice is nothing elſe but *dati repetitio*[2], the *taking away of that, which one had before given.* To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to ſtand to his own act, ſo that it ſhould be really unjuſt and unlawful for him, at any time, upon ſecond thoughts, voluntarily to undo, what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheiſts here plainly render injuſtice a meer ludicrous thing, when they tell us[3], that it is nothing but ſuch an abſurdity in life, as it is in diſputation, when a man denies a propoſition, that he had before granted;

[1] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, Cap. II. §. IV. [2] Id. ibid. Cap. III. §. III. [3] Id. ibid.

which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an abſurdity, as a diſputant. That is, injuſtice is no abſolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. As when a man ſpeaking Latin, obſerves not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injuſtice in him, as a Latiniſt or grammarian; ſo when one, who lives in civil ſociety, obſerves not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the falſe Latin of a citizen, and nothing elſe. According to which notion of injuſtice, there is no ſuch real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withſtand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the ſame. But theſe political jugglers and enchanters will here caſt yet a further miſt before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, ſay they, may unqueſtionably oblige themſelves, and make things unjuſt and unlawful to them, that were not ſo before. Wherefore, injuſtice is again defined by them, and that with more ſpecioufneſs, to be the breach of covenants. But though it be true, that if there be natural juſtice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary ſuppoſition, that there is nothing naturally unjuſt, this cannot be unjuſt neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural juſtice, are nothing but meer words and breath; (as indeed theſe atheiſtick politicians themſelves, agreeably to their own hypotheſis, call them) and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, theſe juſtice-makers are themſelves at laſt neceſſitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men ſhould ſtand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjuſt or unlawful; for if it be ſo, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then muſt there be ſomething naturally unjuſt and unlawful. So that this is not to make juſtice, but clearly to unmake their own hypotheſis, and to ſuppoſe juſtice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a groſs abſurdity in diſputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But theſe their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a meer mockery; themſelves again acknowledging them to be no laws, becauſe law is nothing but the word of him, who hath command over others; but only concluſions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conſervation and defence of themſelves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they, who have courage and generoſity in them, according to this hypotheſis, would never ſubmit to ſuch ſneaking terms of equality and ſubjection, but venture for dominion; and reſolve either to win the ſaddle, or loſe the horſe. Here therefore do our atheiſtick politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they firſt deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and laſtly, the obligation both of theſe laws of nature, and of covenants themſelves, again, from the law, command, and ſanction of the civil ſovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifeſt, how vain the attempts of theſe politicans are, to make juſtice artificially, when there is no ſuch thing naturally; (which is indeed no leſs than to make ſomething out of nothing)

thing) and by art to conſociate into bodies politick thoſe, whom nature had diſſociated from one another; a thing as impoſſible, as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a ſtately palace or caſtle out of ſand. Indeed the ligaments, by which theſe politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not ſo good as cob-webs; they being really nothing, but meer will and words: for if authority and ſovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleaſure.

Neither indeed are theſe atheiſtick politicians themſelves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial juſtice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politick, to conſociate thoſe together, and unite them into one, who are naturally diſſociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging, that *covenants without the ſword, being but words and breath, are of no ſtrength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politick together.* Wherefore, they plainly betake themſelves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil ſovereign really to reign only in fear [1]. And this muſt needs be their meaning, when they ſo conſtantly declare all obligation, juſt and unjuſt, to be derived only from law; they by law there underſtanding *a command directed to ſuch as by reaſon of their imbecillity are not able to reſiſt:* ſo that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of puniſhment threatned [2]. Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of puniſhment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the ſafety of his prince and country; and they, who could reaſonably promiſe themſelves impunity, would be altogether diſobliged, and conſequently might juſtly break any laws, for their own advantage. An aſſertion ſo extravagant, that theſe confounded politicians themſelves are aſhamed plainly to own it, and therefore diſguiſe it, what, they can by equivocation; themſelves ſometimes alſo confeſſing ſo much of truth, that *Pæna non obligat, ſed obligatum tenet* [3], *puniſhment does not oblige, but only hold thoſe to their duty, who were before obliged.* Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil ſovereigns reign only in the fear of their own ſword, then is that right of theirs ſo much talked of, indeed nothing elſe but might, and their authority, force; and conſequently ſucceſsful and proſperous rebellion, and whatſoever can be done by power, will be *ipſo facto* thereby juſtified. Laſtly, were civil ſovereigns, and bodies politick, meer violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vaniſh into nothing, becauſe nature will prevail againſt force and violence; whereas men conſtantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, ſince it is plain, that ſovereignty and bodies politick can neither be meerly artificial, nor yet violent things, there muſt of neceſſity be ſome natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, ſuch as may both really oblige ſubjects to obey the lawful commands of ſovereigns, and ſo-

[1] Hobbes, Leviathan, Cap. XV I.
[2] Id. Element. de Cive, Cap. XV. §. V.
[3] Id. ibid. Cap. XIV. §. II.

vereigns in commanding to ſeek the good and welfare of their ſubjects; whom theſe atheiſtick politicians, (by their infinite and belluine right) quite diſcharge from any ſuch thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural juſtice; and ſomething of a common and publick, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himſelf is founded in juſtice; and of this is the civil ſovereignty alſo a certain participation. It is not the meer creature of the people, and of men's wil's, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleaſure; but hath a ſtamp of divinity upon it, as may partly appear from hence, becauſe that *jus vitæ & necis*, that *power of life and death*, which civil ſovereigns have, was never lodged in ſingulars, before civil ſociety; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city; were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and ſubjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is *Cicero*'s[1], *Una civitas deorum atque hominum, one city of gods and men*) had not God made ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, *ruling and being ruled*, ſuperiority and ſubjection, with their reſpective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil ſovereign is no Leviathan, no beaſt, but a God, (*I have ſaid ye are gods*[2]:) he reigns not in meer brutiſh force and fear, but in natural juſtice and conſcience, and in the right and authority of God himſelf. Nevertheleſs, we deny not, but that there is need of force and fear too, to conſtrain thoſe to obedience, to whom the conſcience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil ſovereign's own ſword alone ſufficient for this neither, unaſſiſted by religion, and the fear of an inviſible Being omnipotent, who ſeeth all things, and can puniſh ſecret, as well as open tranſgreſſors, both in this life, and after death. Which is a thing ſo confeſſedly true, that Atheiſts have therefore pretended religion to have been at firſt a meer political figment. We conclude therefore, that the civil ſovereign reigneth not, meerly in the fear of his own power and ſword; but firſt in the juſtice, and authority, and then in the power and fear alſo of God Almighty. And thus much for the firſt atheiſtick pretence, from the intereſt of civil ſovereigns.

To their ſecond, that ſovereignty is eſſentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconſiſtent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply; that the right and authority of civil ſovereigns is not, as theſe our atheiſtick politicians ignorantly ſuppoſe, a meer belluine liberty, but it is a right eſſentially founded in the being of natural juſtice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is ſuch a right, as ſuppoſes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but meer will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey, but by natural juſtice; commands, as ſuch, not creating obligation, but preſuppoſing it. For, if perſons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would ſignify any thing to them. Wherefore, the firſt original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural juſtice, as many ſuppoſe, ariſe from the will and poſitive command of God, only

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. LXII. p. 3043. Tom. IX. Oper. [2] Pſalm lxxxii. 6.

only by reaſon of puniſhments threatened, and rewards promiſed; the conſequence of this would be, that no man was good and juſt, but only by accident, and for the ſake of ſomething elſe; whereas the goodneſs of juſtice or righteouſneſs is intrinſecal to the thing itſelf, and this is that, which obligeth, (and not any thing foreign to it) it being a different ſpecies of good from that of appetite, and private utility, which every man may diſpenſe withal. Now there can be no more infinite juſtice, than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite meaſure. Juſtice is eſſentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite *jus*, right or authority. If there be any thing in its own nature juſt and obliging, or ſuch, as ought to be done; then muſt there of neceſſity be ſomething unjuſt, or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatſoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending univerſally to all, even to that of the Deity itſelf. The right and authority of God himſelf, who is the ſupreme ſovereign of the univerſe, is alſo in like manner bounded and circumſcribed by juſtice. God's will is ruled by his juſtice, and not his juſtice ruled by his will; and therefore God himſelf cannot command, what is in its own nature unjuſt. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, ſo that the arbitrary will of the commander ſhould be the very rule of juſtice itſelf to others, and conſequently might oblige to any thing, is an abſolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it ſuppoſing nothing to be in its own nature juſt or unjuſt; which if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore the Atheiſts, who would flatter civil ſovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of juſtice and conſcience, and, upon that pretence, prejudice them againſt religion, do as ill deſerve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed abſolutely diveſting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing, but meer brutiſh force and belluine liberty. And could civil ſovereigns utterly demoliſh and deſtroy conſcience and religion in the minds of men, (which yet is an abſolute impoſſibility) they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themſelves, they would certainly bury themſelves alſo in the ruins of them. Nevertheleſs, thus much is true; That they, in whom the ſovereign legiſlative power of every polity is lodged, (whether ſingle perſons, or aſſemblies;) they, who make civil laws, and can reverſe them at pleaſure, though they may unqueſtionably ſin againſt God, in making unjuſt laws, yet can they not ſin politically or civilly, as violators or tranſgreſſors of thoſe laws cancelled and reverſed by them, they being ſuperiour to them. Nor is this all; but theſe ſovereign legiſlative powers may be ſaid to be abſolute alſo in another ſenſe, as being ἀνυπεύθυνοι, *unjudicable*, or uncenſurable by any human court; becauſe, if they were ſo obnoxious, then would that court or power, which had a right to judge and cenſure them, be ſuperiour to them; which is contrary to the hypotheſis. And then, if this power were again judicable by ſome other, there muſt either be an infinite progreſs, or endleſs circulation, (a thing not only abſurd, but alſo utterly inconſiſtent with government and property; becauſe, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination

determination of controverſies;) or elſe at laſt, all muſt be devolved to the multitude of ſingulars, which would be a diſſolution of the body politick, and a ſtate of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the ſecond atheiſtick pretence alſo, for the *inconſiſtency of religion with civil ſovereignty.*

Their third and laſt follows; *That private judgment of good and evil is contradictious to civil ſovereignty, and a body politick, this being one artificial man, that muſt be all governed by one reaſon and will.* But conſcience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, *&c.* To which we reply, That it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of theſe atheiſtick politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, ſuch as is abſolutely inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a publick or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which alſo every man is judge for himſelf. For if this were ſo, then, whenever any man judged it moſt for his private utility to diſobey laws, rebel againſt ſovereigns, nay, to poiſon or ſtab them, he would be unqueſtionably bound by nature, and the reaſon of his own good, as the higheſt law, to do the ſame. Neither can theſe atheiſtick politicians be ever able to bring men out of this ſtate of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or meer enchantments of words, as *artificial juſtice*, and an *artificial man*, and a *common perſon* and *will*, and a *publick conſcience*, and the like. Nay, it is obſervable, that themſelves are neceſſitated, by the tenour of theſe their principles, caſuiſtically to allow ſuch private judgment and will, as is altogether inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully reſiſt in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards juſtly defend themſelves by force. Nor indeed can this private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be poſſibly otherwiſe taken away, than by natural juſtice, which is a thing not of a private, but of a publick and common nature; and by conſcience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil ſovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private intereſt. Wherefore conſcience alſo is, in itſelf, not of a private and partial, but of a publick and common nature; it reſpecting divine laws, impartial juſtice and equity, and the good of the whole, when claſhing with our own ſelfiſh, good, and private utility. This is the only thing, that can naturally conſociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politick, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconſiſtent with the ſame; agreeably to that of *Plato*'s [1], τὸ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾷ, That, *which is of a common and publick nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, ſegregates and diſſociates.* It is true indeed, that particular perſons muſt make a judgment in conſcience for themſelves, (a publick conſcience being nonſenſe and ridiculous,) and that they may alſo err therein: yet is not the rule neither, by which conſcience judgeth, private; nor itſelf unaccountable, unleſs in ſuch miſtaken fanaticks, as profeſſedly follow private impulſes; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or elſe his revealed will, things more publick

[1] De Legib. Lib. IX. p. 660.

lick than the civil laws of any country, and of which others alſo may judge. Nevertheleſs, we deny not, but that evil perſons may, and do ſometimes make a pretence of conſcience and religion, in order to ſedition and rebellion, as the beſt things may be abuſed; but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conſcience obliging, though firſt to obey God, yet, in ſubordination to him, the laws of civil ſovereigns alſo. To conclude, conſcience and religion oblige ſubjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil ſovereigns, or legiſlative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, intereſt, and utility; but, when theſe ſame ſovereign legiſlative powers command unlawful things, conſcience, though it here obliges to *obey God, rather than man*, yet does it, notwithſtanding, oblige not to reſiſt. *Rom.* xiii. *Whoſoever reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God, and they that reſiſt ſhall receive to themſelves damnation.* And *Matthew* xxvi. *All they, that take the ſword, ſhall periſh with the ſword.* Here is *the patience and the faith of the ſaints.* And thus does religion *give unto* Cæſar *the things that are* Cæſar's, *as well as unto God the things that are God's.*

And now, having fully confuted all the atheiſtick grounds, we confidently conclude, That the firſt original of all things was neither ſtupid and ſenſeleſs matter fortuitouſly moved, nor a blind and neſcient, but orderly and methodical plaſtick nature; nor a living matter, having perception or underſtanding natural, without animal ſenſe or conſciouſneſs; nor yet did every thing exiſt of itſelf neceſſarily from eternity, without a cauſe. But there is one only neceſſary exiſtent, the cauſe of all other things; and this an abſolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wiſe, and powerful; who hath made all, that was fit to be made, and according to the beſt wiſdom, and exerciſeth an exact providence over all: whoſe name ought to be hallowed, and ſeparated from all other things; *To whom be all honour, and glory, and worſhip, for ever and ever. Amen.*

THE END.

THE

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V. Further proved, that this *Strato* was an Atheiſt, and of a different form from *Democritus*, he attributing an energetick nature, but without ſenſe and animality, to all matter. 108

VI. That *Strato*, not deriving all things from a meer fortuitous principle, as the Democritick Atheiſts did, nor yet acknowledging any one plaſtick nature to preſide over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture

mixture of chance and plaſtick nature both together, in the ſeveral parts of matter, muſt therefore needs be an hylozoïck Atheiſt. Page 108

VII. That the famous *Hippocrates* was neither an hylozoïck nor Democritick Atheiſt, but rather an Heraclitick corporeal Theiſt. 109

VIII. That *Plato* took no notice of the hylozoïck atheiſm, nor of any other, ſave what derives the original of all things from a meer fortuitous nature; and therefore either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian atheiſm, which latter will be next declared. 110

IX. That it is hardly imaginable, there ſhould have been no philoſophick Atheiſts in the world before *Democritus* and *Leucippus*; *Plato* obſerving alſo, that there have been ſome or other in all ages ſick of the atheiſtick diſeaſe: and *Ariſtotle* affirming many of the firſt philoſophers to have aſſigned only a material cauſe of the mundane ſyſtem, without either intending, or efficient cauſe. They ſuppoſing matter to be the only ſubſtance, and all other things nothing but the paſſions and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible. 111

X. The doctrine of which Materialiſts may be more fully underſtood from thoſe exceptions, which *Ariſtotle* makes againſt them. His firſt exception; that they aſſigned no cauſe of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably. 112

XI. *Ariſtotle*'s ſecond exception, that theſe Materialiſts aſſigned no cauſe, τὸ Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, *of well and fit*; that is, gave no account of the orderly regularity of things. *Anaxagoras* ſaid to be the firſt Ionick philoſopher, who made Mind and Good a principle of the univerſe. *ibid.*

XII. Concluded from hence, that theſe Materialiſts in *Ariſtotle* were downright Atheiſts, not merely becauſe they held all ſubſtance to be body, foraſmuch as *Heraclitus* and *Zeno* did the like, and yet are not therefore numbered amongſt the Atheiſts (theſe ſuppoſing the whole world to be an animal, and their fiery matter originally intellectual;) but becauſe they made ſtupid matter, devoid of all underſtanding and life, to be the only principle. Page 113

XIII. And ſuppoſed every thing, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter, to be generable and corruptible; and conſequently, that there could be no other God, than ſuch as was native and mortal. That thoſe ancient theologers and theogoniſts, who generated all the gods out of Night and Chaos without exception, were only verbal Theiſts, but real Atheiſts; ſenſeleſs matter being to them the higheſt Numen. *ibid.*

XIV. The difference obſerved betwixt *Ariſtotle*'s atheiſtical Materialiſts and the Italick philoſophers; the former determining all things, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter, to be made or generated; but the latter, that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; they thereupon both deſtroying the qualities and forms of bodies, and aſſerting the ingenerability and incorporeity of ſouls. 114

XV. How *Ariſtotle*'s atheiſtick Materialiſts endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italick philoſophers, that *Nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing.* And that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt amongſt the Ionicks, who yielded ſo far to that principle, as from thence to aſſert incorporeal ſubſtance, and the pre-exiſtence of qualities and forms; he conceiving them to be things really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter. 116

XVI. The error of ſome writers, who from *Ariſtotle*'s affirming, that the ancient philoſophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer them, to have been all Theiſts; and that *Ariſtotle* contradicts

dicts himself in representing many of them as Atheists. That the ancient Atheists did generally κοσμοποιεῖν, *assert the world to have been made*, or have had a beginning; as, on the other hand, some Theists did maintain its ante-eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought therefore here to distinguish betwixt the system of the world, and the bare substance of the matter; all Atheists contending the matter to have been not only eternal, but also such independently upon any other being. Page 117

XVII. Some of the ancients concluded this materialism, or hylopathian atheism, to have been at least as old as *Homer*; who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods: and that this was indeed the ancientest of all atheisms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derives the original of them all from Night and Chaos. A description of this atheistick hypothesis in *Aristophanes*; that Night and Chaos first laid an egg, out of which sprung forth Love, which afterwards mingling again with a Chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals and all the gods. 120

XVIII. That, notwithstanding this, in *Aristotle*'s judgment, not only *Parmenides*, but also *Hesiod*, and other ancients, who made Love senior to the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheists; they understanding by this Love an active principle or cause of motion in the universe; which therefore could not result from an egg of the Night, nor be the offspring of Chaos, but must be something in order of nature before matter. *Simmias Rhodius* his *Wings* a poem in honour of this divine or heavenly Love. This not that Love neither, which was the offspring of *Penia* and *Porus* in *Plato*. In what rectified and refined sense it may pass for true theology, that Love is the supreme Deity, and original of all things. Page 121

XIX. That however *Democritus* and *Leucippus* be elsewhere taxed by *Aristotle* for this very thing, the assigning only a material cause of the universe; yet were they not the persons intended by him in the forementioned accusation, but certain ancienter philosophers, who also were not Atomists, but asserters of qualities, or hylopathians. 123

XX. That *Aristotle*'s atheistic Materialists were indeed all the first Ionick philosophers before *Anaxagoras*, *Thales* being the head of them. But that *Thales* being acquitted from this imputation of atheism by several good authors, his next successor, *Anaximander*, is rather to be accounted the ἀρχηγὸς, or *prince* of this atheistick philosophy. *ibid.*

XXI. A passage out of *Aristotle* objected, which at first sight seems to make *Anaximander* a divine philosopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that mistake. But that this, well considered, proves the contrary, that *Anaximander* was the chief of the old atheistick philosophers. 124

XXII. That it is no wonder, if *Anaximander* called senseless matter Τὸ Θεῖον, or *the divinity*, since to all Atheists that must needs be the highest Numen. And how this may be said to be immortal, and to govern all: with the concurrent judgment of the Greek scholiasts upon this place. 126

XXIII. A further account of the Anaximandrian philosophy, from whence it appeareth to have been purely atheistical. 127

XXIV. That as the vulgar have always been ill judges of Theists and Atheists, so have learned men commonly supposed fewer Atheists than indeed there were. *Anaximander* and *Democritus* Atheists both alike, though philosophizing

ſophizing different ways: and that ſome paſſages in *Plato* reſpect the Anaximandrian form of atheiſm, rather than the Democritical. Page 129

XXV. The reaſon, why *Democritus* and *Leucippus* new-modell'd atheiſm into this atomick form. 131

XXVI. That beſides the three forms of atheiſm already mentioned, we ſometimes meet with a fourth, which ſuppoſes the univerſe to be, tho' not an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one regular plaſtick nature in it, but devoid of underſtanding and ſenſe, which diſpoſes and orders the whole. 131

XXVII. That this form of atheiſm, which makes one ſenſeleſs plaſtick and plantal nature to preſide over the whole, is different from the hylozoïck, in that it takes away all fortuitouſneſs; ſubjecting all things univerſally to the fate of this one methodical unknowing nature. 123

XXVIII. Poſſible, that ſome in all ages might have entertained this atheiſtical conceit, that all things are diſpenſed by one regular and methodical ſenſeleſs nature; nevertheleſs it ſeemeth to have been chiefly aſſerted by certain ſpurious Heracliticks and Stoicks. Upon which account this coſmo-plaſtick atheiſm may be called pſeudo-Zenonian. 133

XXIX. That, beſides the philoſophick Atheiſts, there have been always in the world enthuſiaſtick and fanatick Atheiſts; though indeed all Atheiſts may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to be both enthuſiaſts and fanaticks, as being meerly led by an Ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, or *irrational impetus*. 134

XXX. That there cannot eaſily be any other form of atheiſm beſides theſe four already mentioned; becauſe all Atheiſts are Corporealiſts, and yet not all Corporealiſts Atheiſts; but only ſuch of them as make the firſt principle not to be intellectual. *ibid.*

XXXI. A diſtribution of atheiſms producing the forementioned *quaternio*, and ſhewing the difference, that is betwixt them. Page 136

XXXII. That they are but meer bunglers at atheiſm, who talk of ſenſitive and rational matter ſpecifically differing. And that the canting aſtrological Atheiſts are not at all conſiderable, becauſe not underſtanding themſelves. 137

XXXIII. Another diſtribution of atheiſms, that they either derive the original of all things from a meerly fortuitous principle, and the unguided motion of matter; or elſe from a plaſtick, regular, and methodical, but ſenſeleſs nature. What Atheiſts denied the eternity of the world, and what aſſerted it. 138

XXXIV. That of theſe four forms of atheiſm, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical, are the principal: which two being once confuted, all atheiſm will be confuted. 142

XXXV. Theſe two forms of atheiſm being contrary to each other, that we ought in all reaſon to inſiſt rather, upon the atomick: nevertheleſs we ſhall elſewhere confute the hylozoick alſo; and further prove againſt all Corporealiſts, that no cogitation nor life can belong to matter. 145

XXXVI. That in the mean time, we ſhall not neglect the other forms of atheiſm, but confute them all together, as they agree in one principle. As alſo, by way of digreſſion here inſiſt largely upon the plaſtick life of nature, in order to a fuller confutation, as well of the hylozoick, as the coſmo-plaſtick atheiſm. 146

1. That theſe two forms of atheiſm, are not therefore condemned by us, meerly becauſe they ſuppoſe a life of nature, diſtinct from the animal life: however

however this be a thing altogether exploded by ſome profeſſed Theiſts, therein ſymbolizing too much with the Democritick Atheiſts. *Page* 146

2. That if no plaſtick artificial nature be admitted, then one of theſe two things muſt be concluded; that either all things come to paſs by fortuitous mechaniſm or material neceſſity (the motion of matter unguided) or elſe that God doth ἀυτεργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himſelf immediately and miraculouſly; framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands: foraſmuch as divine laws and commands cannot execute themſelves, nor be alone the proper efficient cauſes of things in nature. 147

3. To ſuppoſe the former of theſe, that all things come to paſs fortuitouſly, by the unguided motion of matter, and without the direction of any Mind, a thing altogether as irrational as impious; there being many phænomena both above the mechanick powers, and contrary to the laws thereof. That the mechanick Theiſts make God but an idle ſpectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wiſdom altogether uſeleſs and inſignificant. *Ariſtotle*'s judicious cenſure of this fortuitous mechaniſm, and his deriſion of that conceit, that material and mechanical reaſons are the only philoſophical. 148

4. That it ſeems neither decorous in reſpect of God, nor congruous to reaſon, that he ſhould ἀυτεργεῖν ἅπαντα, *do all things himſelf immediately and miraculouſly*, without the ſubſerviency of any natural cauſes. This further confuted from the ſlow and gradual proceſs of things in nature, as alſo from thoſe errors and bungles, that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irreſiſtible. 149

5. Reaſonably inferred from hence, that there is an artificial or plaſtick nature in the univerſe, as a ſubordinate inſtrument of divine providence, in the orderly diſpoſal of matter: but not without a higher providence alſo preſiding over it; foraſmuch as this plaſtick nature cannot act elective ly or with diſcretion. Thoſe laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanick Theiſts themſelves ſuppoſe, really nothing elſe, but a plaſtick nature, or ſpermatick reaſons. 150

6. The agreeableneſs of this doctrine with the ſentiments of the beſt philoſophers of all ages. *Anaxagoras*, though a profeſſed Theiſt, ſeverely cenſured both by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* as an encourager of atheiſm, meerly becauſe he uſed material and mechanical cauſes, more than mental and final. Phyſiologers and aſtronomers, for the ſame reaſon alſo, vulgarly ſuſpected of atheiſm in *Plato*'s time. 151

7. The plaſtick artificial nature no occult quality, but the only intelligible cauſe of that, which is the grandeſt of all phænomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things; which the mechanick Theiſts, however pretending to ſolve all phænomena, give no account of. A God or infinite Mind aſſerted by theſe, in vain and to no purpoſe. 154

8. Two things here to be performed; to give an account of the plaſtick artificial nature; and then, to ſhow how the notion thereof is miſtaken and abuſed by Atheiſts. The firſt general account of this nature according to *Ariſtotle*, that it is to be conceived as art it ſelf acting inwardly and immediately upon the matter; as if harmony living in the muſical inſtruments ſhould move the ſtrings thereof without any external impulſe. 155

9. Two pre-eminences of nature above human art; firſt, that whereas human art acts upon the matter without, cumberſomely or moliminouſly, and in a way of tumult or hurlyburly;

nature, acting upon the ſame from within more commandingly, doth its work eaſily, cleverly and ſilently. Human art acteth on matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. *Page* 155

10. The ſecond pre-eminence of nature, that whereas human artiſts are often to ſeek and at a loſs, anxiouſly conſult and deliberate, and upon ſecond thoughts mend their former work; nature is never to ſeek or unreſolved what to do, nor doth ſhe ever repent of what ſhe hath done, and thereupon correct her former courſe. Human artiſts themſelves conſult not as artiſts, but always for want of art; and therefore nature, though never conſulting nor deliberating, may notwithſtanding act artificially and for ends. Concluded, that what is by us called Nature, is really the divine art. 156

11. Nevertheleſs, that nature is not the divine art pure and abſtract, but concreted and embodied in matter: the Divine art not archetypal but ectypal. Nature differs from the Divine art or wiſdom, as the manuary opificer from the architect. 155

12. Two imperfections of nature, in reſpect whereof it falls ſhort of human art. Firſt, that though it act for ends artificially, yet it ſelf neither intends thoſe ends, nor underſtands the reaſon of what it doth; for which cauſe it cannot act elective ly. The difference betwixt ſpermatick reaſons and knowledge. That nature doth but ape or mimick the divine art or wiſdom; being it ſelf not maſter of that reaſon, according to which it acts, but only a ſervant to it, and drudging executioner thereof. 156

13. Proved, that there may be ſuch a thing as acteth artificially, though it ſelf do not comprehend that art and reaſon, by which its motions are governed. Firſt from muſical habits; the dancer reſembles the artificial life of nature. *Page* 157

14. The ſame further evinced from the inſtincts of brute animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their own good and the good of the univerſe, without any reaſon of their own. Theſe inſtincts in brutes but paſſive impreſſes of the divine wiſdom, and a kind of fate upon them. 158

15. The ſecond imperfection of nature, that it acteth without animal phancy, συναίσθησις, *con-ſenſe*, or *conſciouſneſs*, and hath no expreſs ſelf-perception and ſelf-enjoyment. *ibid.*

16. Whether this energy of the plaſtick nature be to be called cogitation or no, nothing but a logomachy, or contention about words. Granted, that what moves matter vitally, muſt needs do it by ſome energy of its own, diſtinct from local motion; but that there may be a ſimple vital energy, without that duplicity, which is in ſynæſtheſis, or clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs. Nevertheleſs, that the energy of nature may be called a certain drouſy, unawakened, or aſtoniſhed cogitation. 159

17. Several inſtances, which render it probable, that there may be a vital energy without ſynæſtheſis, clear and expreſs con-ſenſe or conſciouſneſs. 160

18. Wherefore the plaſtick nature, acting neither knowingly nor phantaſtically, muſt needs act fatally, magically and ſympathetically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not meer cogitation in the mind of God, but an energetick and effectual principle in it. And this plaſtick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or of the corporeal world. What magick is, and that nature, which acteth fatally, acteth alſo

alſo magically and ſympathetically. *Page* 161

19. That nature, though it be the divine art, or fate, yet for all that, is neither a god, nor goddeſs, but a low and imperfect creature, it acting artificially and rationally, no otherwiſe than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent philoſophick ſenſe; nor for ends, than a ſaw or hatchet in the hands of a ſkilful mechanick. The plaſtick and vegetative life of nature, the loweſt of all lives, and inferiour to the ſenſitive. A higher providence, than that of the plaſtick nature, governing the corporeal world it ſelf. *ibid.*

20. Notwithſtanding which, foraſmuch as the plaſtick nature is a life, it muſt needs be incorporeal. One and the ſelf-ſame thing having in it an entire model and platform of the whole, and acting upon ſeveral diſtant parts of matter, cannot be a body. And though *Ariſtotle* himſelf do no where declare this nature to be either corporeal or incorporeal, (which he neither clearly doth concerning the rational ſoul) and his followers commonly take it to be corporeal; yet, according to the genuine principles of that philoſophy, muſt it needs be otherwiſe. 165

21. The plaſtick nature being incorporeal, muſt either be a lower power lodged in ſouls, which are alſo conſcious, ſenſitive or rational; or elſe a diſtinct ſubſtantial life by it ſelf, and inferiour ſoul. That the Platoniſts affirm both; with *Ariſtotle*'s agreeable determination; that nature is either part of a ſoul, or not without ſoul. *ibid.*

22. The plaſtick nature, as to the bodies of animals, a part, or lower power, of their reſpective ſouls. That the phænomena prove a plaſtick nature or *archeus* in animals; to make which a diſtinct thing from the ſoul, would be to multiply entities without neceſſity. The ſoul endued with a plaſtick nature, the chief formatrix of its own body, the contribution of other cauſes not excluded. *Page* 166

23. That, beſides the plaſtick in particular animals, forming them as ſo many little worlds, there is a general plaſtick or artificial nature in the whole corporeal univerſe, which likewiſe, according to *Ariſtotle*, is either a part and lower power of a conſcious mundane ſoul, or elſe ſomething depending thereon. 167

24. That no leſs according to *Ariſtotle*, than *Plato* and *Socrates*, our ſelves partake of life from the life of the univerſe, as well as we do of heat and cold from the heat and cold of the univerſe. From whence it appears, that *Ariſtotle* alſo held the world's animation, which is further undeniably proved. An anſwer to two the moſt conſiderable places in that philoſopher objected to the contrary. That *Ariſtotle*'s firſt immoveable mover was no ſoul, but a perfect intellect abſtract from matter, which he ſuppoſed to move only as a final cauſe, or as being loved; and beſides this, a mundane ſoul and plaſtick nature to move the heavens efficiently. Neither *Ariſtotle*'s nature nor mundane ſoul the ſupreme Deity. However, though there be no ſuch mundane ſoul, as both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* conceived, yet may there be, notwithſtanding, a plaſtick or artificial nature depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 168

25. No impoſſibility of other particular plaſticks: and though it be not reaſonable to think every plant, herb and pile of graſs, to have a plaſtick or vegetative ſoul of its own, nor the earth to be an animal; yet may there

poſſibly be one plaſtick artificial nature preſiding over the whole terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be ſeverally organized and framed, and all things performed, which tranſcend the power of fortuitous mechaniſm. *Page* 171

26. Our ſecond undertaking, which was to ſhow, how groſly thoſe Atheiſts (who acknowledge this artificial plaſtick nature, without animality,) miſunderſtand it, and abuſe the notion, to make a counterfeit God Almighty, or Numen of it; to the excluſion of the true Deity. Firſt, in their ſuppoſing that to be the firſt and higheſt principle of the univerſe, which is the laſt and loweſt of all lives, a thing as eſſentially derivative from, and dependent upon, a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. Secondly, in their making ſenſe and reaſon in animals to emerge out of a ſenſeleſs life of nature, by the meer modification and organization of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one ſingle inconſcious life to advance into redoubled conſciouſneſs and ſelf-enjoyment. Thirdly, in attributing (ſome of them) perfect knowledge and underſtanding to this life of nature, which yet themſelves ſuppoſe to be devoid of all animal ſenſe and conſciouſneſs. Laſtly, in making this plaſtick life of nature to be meerly corporeal; the hylozoïſts contending, that it is but an inadequate conception of body as the only ſubſtance, and fondly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of a God is nothing but ſuch an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole univerſe, miſtaken for an entire ſubſtance by it ſelf the cauſe of all things. And thus far the digreſſion. 172

XXXVIII. That though the confutation of the atheiſtick grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reſerved for the laſt part of this diſcourſe, yet we, having reaſon to violate thoſe laws, crave the reader's pardon for this prepoſterouſneſs. A conſiderable obſervation of *Plato*'s, *That it is not only groſs ſenſuality, which inclines men to atheize, but alſo an affectation of ſeeming wiſer than the generality of mankind. As likewiſe, that the Atheiſts making ſuch pretence to wit, it is a ſeaſonable and proper undertaking, to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations.* And we hope to make it appear, that the Atheiſts are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheiſm are nonſenſe and impoſſibility. *Page* 174

CHAP. IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of anſwer to the firſt atheiſtick argument; and the grand objection againſt the naturality of this idea (as eſſentially including unity or onelineſs in it) from the Pagan polytheiſm, removed. Proved, that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one ſupreme Deity. A fuller explication of whoſe polytheiſm and idolatry intended; in order to the better giving an account of Chriſtianity.

I. THE either ſtupid inſenſibility, or groſs impudence of Atheiſts, in denying the Word of God to have any ſignification; or that there is any other idea anſwering to it, beſides the meer phantaſm of the ſound. The diſeaſe called by the philoſopher Ἀπολίθωσις τῦ νοητικῦ, *the petrification, or dead inſenſibility of the mind.* 192

II. That the Atheiſts themſelves muſt needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwiſe, when they deny

deny his exiſtence, they ſhould deny the exiſtence of nothing. That they have alſo the ſame idea of him in general with the Theiſts; the one denying the very ſame thing, which the others affirm Page 194

III. A lemma, or preparatory propoſition to the idea of God, That though ſome things be made or generated, yet it is not poſſible, that all things ſhould be made, but ſomething muſt of neceſſity exiſt of it ſelf from eternity unmade, and be the cauſe of thoſe other things, that are made. *ibid.*

IV. The two moſt oppoſite opinions concerning what was ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, or unmade, and the cauſe of all other things made; one, that it was nothing but ſenſeleſs matter, the moſt imperfect of all things. The other, that it was ſomething moſt perfect, and therefore conſciouſly intellectual. The aſſerters of this latter opinion, Theiſts, in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe; of the former, Atheiſts. So that the idea of God in general is, a perfect conſciouſly underſtanding Bieing (or Mind,) ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, and the cauſe of all other things. 194, 195

V. Obſervable, that the Atheiſts, who deny a God, according to the true Idea of him, do notwithſtanding often abuſe the word, calling ſenſeleſs matter by that name; they meaning nothing elſe thereby but only a firſt principle, or ſelf-exiſtent, unmade thing: according to which notion of the word God, there can be no ſuch thing at all as an Atheiſt, no man being able to perſuade himſelf, that all things ſprung from nothing. 195

VI. In order to a more punctual declaration of this divine idea, the opinion of thoſe taken notice of, who ſuppoſe two ſelf-exiſtent, unmade principles, God and Matter: according to which, God, not the Principle of all things, nor the ſole Principle, but only the chief. 196, 197

VII. Theſe Materiarians, imperfect and miſtaken Theiſts. Not Atheiſts, becauſe they ſuppoſe the world made and governed by an animaliſh, ſentient and underſtanding nature; whereas no Atheiſts acknowledge conſcious Animality to be a firſt principle, but conclude it to be all generable and corruptible: nor yet genuine Theiſts, becauſe they acknowledge not omnipotence in the full extent thereof. A latitude therefore in theiſm; and none to be condemned for abſolute Atheiſts, but ſuch as deny an eternal, unmade Mind, the framer and governour of the whole world. 198, 199

VIII. An abſolutely perfect Being, the moſt compendious idea of God: which includeth in it, not only neceſſary exiſtence, and conſcious intellectuality, but alſo omni-cauſality, omnipotence, or infinite power. Wherefore God the ſole Principle of all things and Cauſe of matter. The true notion of infinite power. And that Pagans commonly acknowledge omnipotence, or infinite power, to be included in the idea of God. 200, 201

IX. That abſolute perfection implies yet ſomething more than knowledge and power. A vaticination in men's minds of a higher good than either. That, according to *Ariſtotle*, God is better than knowledge; and hath morality in his nature, wherein alſo his chief happineſs conſiſteth. This borrowed from *Plato*, to whom the higheſt Perfection, and ſupreme Deity, is goodneſs it ſelf, ſubſtantial, above Knowledge and Intellect. Agreeably with which, the Scripture makes God, and the ſupreme Good, Love. This not to be underſtood of a ſoft, fond, and partial love; God being rightly called alſo an impartial Law, and the Meaſure of all things. Atheiſts alſo ſuppoſe goodneſs to be included in the idea of that God, whoſe exiſtence they deny.

deny. This Idea here more largely declared. Page 202, 203, &c.

X. That this forementioned idea of God essentially includeth unity, onelineſs, or ſolitariety in it; ſince there cannot poſſibly be more than one abſolutely Supreme, one Cauſe of all things, one Omnipotent, and one infinitely Perfect. *Epicurus* and his followers profeſſedly denied a God, according to this notion of him. 207

XI. The grand objection againſt the idea of God, as thus eſſentially including onelineſs and ſingularity in it, from the polytheiſm of all nations formerly, (the Jews excepted) and of all the wiſeſt men, and philoſophers. From whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is not natural, but artificial, and owes its original to laws and arbitrary inſtitutions only. An enquiry therefore here to be made concerning the true ſenſe of the Pagan polytheiſm; the objectors ſecurely taking it for granted, that the Pagan polytheiſts univerſally aſſerted many, unmade, ſelf-exiſtent, intellectual beings and independent deities, as ſo many partial cauſes of the world. 208, 209.

XII. The irrationality of which opinion, and its manifeſt repugnancy to the phænomena, render it leſs probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan Polytheiſts. 210

XIII. That the Pagan deities were not all of them univerſally look'd upon as ſo many unmade, ſelf-exiſtent beings, unqueſtionably evident from hence; becauſe they generally held a *Theogonia*, or *generation of gods*. This point of the Pagan theology inſiſted upon by *Herodotus*, the moſt ancient proſaïck Greek writer. In whom the meaning of that Queſtion, *Whether the gods were generated or exiſted all from eternity*, ſeems to have been the ſame with this of *Plato*'s, *Whether the world were made or unmade*. 211

Certain alſo, that amongſt the Heſiodian gods, there was either but one ſelf-exiſtent, or elſe none at all. *Heſiod*'s Love ſuppoſed to be the eternal God, or the active Principle of the univerſe. 212

That the Valentinian thirty gods, or *Æons* (having the greateſt appearance of independent deities) were all derived from one ſelf-originated Being, called *Bythus*, or an *unfathomable Depth*. 213

That, beſides the Manichæans, ſome Pagans did indeed acknowledge a ditheiſm, or duplicity of unmade gods, one the principle of good, the other of evil. (Which the neareſt approach, that can be found, to the ſuppoſed polytheiſm.) *Plutarchus Chæronenſis* one or the chief of theſe, though not ſo commonly taken notice of by learned men. His reaſons for this opinion propoſed. 213, *&c.*

Plutarch's pretence, that this was the general perſuaſion of all the ancient philoſophers and Pagan nations. His grounds for imputing it to *Plato* examined and confuted. 218, *&c*,

The true account of the Platonick origin of evils, from the neceſſity of imperfect things. 220

Pythagoras, and other philoſophers, purged likewiſe from this imputation. 221

That the Egyptians probably did but perſonate evil, (the confuſion, and alternate viciſſitude of things in this lower world,) by *Typhon*. The only queſtion concerning the *Arimanius* of the Perſian Magi. This, whether a ſelf-exiſtent principle, or no, diſputed. 222

Plutarch and *Atticus* the only profeſſed aſſerters of this doctrine among the Greek philoſophers; (beſides *Numenius* in *Chalcidius*:) who therefore probably the perſons cenſured for it by *Athanaſius*. 223, 224

Ariſtotle's exploſion and confutation of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, *many principles*. 225

That a better judgment may be made of

of the Pagan deities, a general ſurvey of them. They all reduced to five heads; The ſouls of men deceaſed, or hero's, the animated ſtars and elements, dæmons, accidents and things of nature perſonated; and laſtly, ſeveral perſonal names given to one ſupreme God, according to the ſeveral manifeſtations of his power and providence in the world; miſtaken, for ſo many ſubſtantial deities, or ſelf-exiſtent minds. 226, &c.

Pagans acknowledging omnipotence, muſt needs ſuppoſe one ſovereign *Numen*. *Fauſtus* the Manichæan, his conceit, that the Jews and Chriſtians paganized in the opinion of monarchy. With St. *Auſtin*'s judgment of the Pagans thereupon. 231, 232

XIV. Concluded, that the Pagan polytheiſm muſt be underſtood of created, intellectual beings, ſuperiour to men, religiouſly worſhipped. So that the Pagans held both many gods, and one God, in different ſenſes; many inferiour deities ſubordinate to one Supreme. Thus *Onatus* the Pythagorean, in *Stobæus*. The Pagans Creed in *Maximus Tyrius*; *One God the King and Father of all*, and *many gods the ſons of gods*. The Pagan Theogonia thus to be underſtood, of many gods produced by one God. 233, 234

This Pagan Theogonia really one and the ſame thing with the Coſmogonia. *Plato*'s Coſmogonia a Theogonia, 234, &c.

Heſiod's Theogonia the Coſmogonia. 238

The Perſians and Egyptians in like manner, holding a Coſmogonia, called it a Theogonia. 239

This Pagan Theogonia, how by ſome miſtaken. *ibid.*

Both this Theogonia and Coſmogonia of the ancient Pagans to be underſtood of a temporary production. *ibid.*

That *Plato* really aſſerted the newneſs or beginning of the world. 240, 241

Amongſt the Pagans, two ſorts of Theogoniſts, atheiſtick and divine. *Plato* a divine Theogoniſt. 242, 243

Other Pagan Theogoniſts, Theiſts, or aſſerters of an unmade Deity. 244, 245, &c.

Theſe divine Theogoniſts alſo made Chaos and Night ſenior to the Gods; that is, to the generated ones. 248

The Orphick *Cabala* of the world's production from Chaos (or Night) and Love; originally Moſaical. 249

Other Pagan Theiſts neither Theogoniſts, nor Coſmogoniſts; they holding the eternity of the world, and of the gods: as *Ariſtotle* and the junior Platoniſts. 250, &c.

Theſe notwithſtanding acknowledged all their eternal gods ſave one, to be γενητὰς, that is, *to have been derived from that One*; and that there was, in this ſenſe, but εἷς Θεὸς ἀγένητος, *one* only *unmade*, or *ſelf-exiſtent God*. 253, 254

Neceſſary here to ſhew, how the Pagans did put a difference betwixt the one ſupreme, unmade Deity, and their other many inferiour generated gods. 255

This done, both by proper names, and appellatives emphatically uſed. 256, &c.

Θεοὶ, or *gods*, often put for inferiour gods only, in way of diſtinction from the Supreme. 261

Τὸ Θεῖον and Το Δαιμόνιον alſo the ſupreme Deity. 263

Other full and emphatical deſcriptions of the ſupreme God, amongſt the Pagans. 264, 265

XV. Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan Polytheiſts held only a plurality of inferiour deities ſubordinate to one Supreme. Firſt, becauſe after the emerſion of Chriſtianity, and its conteſt with Paganiſm, no Pagan ever aſſerted many independent Deities, but all profeſſed to acknowledge one Sovereign, or Supreme. 265

Apollonius Tyanæus, ſet up amongſt the Pagans for a rival with our Saviour Chriſt. 266, &c.

He,

He, though ſtyled by *Vopiſcus* a true friend of the gods, and though a ſtout champion for the Pagan polytheiſm, yet a profeſſed acknowledger of one ſupreme Deity. Page 269, 270

Celſus the firſt publick writer againſt Chriſtianity, and a zealous Polytheiſt; notwithſtanding freely declareth for one firſt and greateſt omnipotent God. *ibid.*

The next and moſt eminent champion for the Pagan cauſe, *Porphyrius*, an undoubted aſſerter of one ſupreme Deity. Who, in *Proclus*, not only oppoſeth that evil principle of *Plutarch* and *Atticus*, but alſo contendeth, that even matter it ſelf was derived from one perfect Being. 271

Hierocles the next eminent antagoniſt of Chriſtianity, and champion for the Pagan Gods, did, in the cloſe of his *Philalethes*, (as we learn from *Lactantius*) highly celebrate the praiſes of the one ſupreme God, the parent of all things. 271, *&c.*

Julian, the emperor, a zealous contender for the reſtitution of Paganiſm, plainly derived all his Gods from one. 274, 275

This true of all the other oppoſers of Chriſtianity, as *Jamblichus*, *Syrianus*, *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, &c. *Maximus Madaurenſis*, a Pagan philoſopher in St. *Auſtin*, his profeſſion of one ſovereign *Numen* above all the Gods. The ſame alſo the ſenſe of *Longinianus*. 275, 276

The Pagans in *Arnobius* univerſally diſclaim the opinion of many unmade Deities, and profeſs the belief of an omnipotent God. 276, 277

Theſe Pagans acknowledged by others of the fathers alſo, to have held one ſovereign *Numen*. 279, *&c.*

But of this more afterwards, when we ſpeak of the Arians.

XVI. That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganiſm, made after Chriſtianity, (as might be ſuſpected) but that the doctrine of the moſt ancient Pagan Theologers, and greateſt promoters of polytheiſm, was conſonant hereunto; which will be proved from unſuſpected writings. 281

Concerning the Sibylline Oracles, two extremes. 282, *&c.*

That *Zoroaſter*, the chief promoter of polytheiſm in the Eaſt, profeſſed the acknowledgment of one ſovereign Deity, (and that not the ſun neither, but the maker thereof) proved from *Eubulus* in *Porphyry*. 285, 286

Zoroaſter's ſupreme God *Oromaſdes*. 287

Of the Triplaſian *Mithras*. 288

The Magick, or Chaldaick Trinity. 289

The Zoroaſtrian Trinity, *Oromaſdes*, *Mithras*, and *Arimanes*. Thus the Perſian *Arimanes* no ſubſtantial evil principle, or independent god. 290

Concerning the reputed Magick or Chaldaick Oracles. 292, 293

XVII. That *Orpheus*, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanick polytheiſm, clearly aſſerted one ſupreme *Numen*. The hiſtory of *Orpheus* not a mere romance. 294, 295

Whether *Orpheus* were the Father of the poems called Orphical. 296, 297

Orpheus his polytheiſm. 298

That *Orpheus*, notwithſtanding, aſſerted a divine monarchy, proved from Orphick Verſes, recorded by Pagans: there being other Orphick Verſes counterfeit. 300, 301

In what ſenſe *Orpheus*, and other myſtical Theologers amongſt the Pagans, called God Ἀρρενόθηλυν, *Hermaphrodite*, or of both ſexes, male and female together. 304

Orpheus his recantation of his polytheiſm a fable; he at the ſame time acknowledging both one unmade God, and many generated gods and goddeſſes. 305

That

That beſides the opinion of monarchy, a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate was alſo another part of the Orphick *Cabala*. *Orpheus* his trinity, *Phanes*, *Uranus*, and *Chronus*. Page 306

The grand arcanum of the Orphick theology, that *God is all things*; but in a different ſenſe from the Stoicks. 306, Page 307

God's being all, made a foundation of Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry. 308

XVIII. That the Egyptians themſelves, the moſt polytheiſtical of all nations, had an acknowledgment amongſt them of one ſupreme Deity. The Egyptians the firſt Polytheiſts. That the Greeks and Europeans derived their gods from them, and, as *Herodotus* affirmeth, their very names too. A Conjecture, that Ἀθηνᾶ of the Greeks was Νήϊθ or Νηΐθαὶς, the tutelar god of the city *Sais*; a colony whereof the Athenians are ſaid to have been. And that *Neptune*, the Roman ſea-god, was derived from the Egyptian *Nephthus*, ſignifying the *maritime parts*. Of the Egyptians worſhipping brute animals. 309, 310

Notwithſtanding this multifarious polytheiſm and idolatry of the Egyptians, that they had an acknowledgment of one ſupreme God, probable firſt, from that great fame, which they had for their wiſdom. *Egypt* a ſchool of literature before *Greece*. 311

The Egyptians, though attributing more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet of all nations the moſt conſtant aſſerters of the Coſmogonia, or novity and beginning of the world: nor did they think the world to have been made by chance, as the Epicureans; *Simplicius* calling the Moſaick hiſtory of the creation an Egyptian fable. 312, 313

That beſides the pure and mixt mathematicks, the Egyptians had another higher philoſophy, appears from hence; becauſe they were the firſt aſſerters of the immortality and tranſmigration of ſouls, which *Pythagoras* from them derived into *Greece*. Certain therefore, that the Egyptians held incorporeal ſubſtance. Page 313, 314

That the Egyptians, beſides their vulgar and fabulous, had another arcane and recondite Theology. Their *Sphinges*, and *Harpocrates*, or *Sigalions*, in their Temples. 314, 315

This arcane theology of the Egyptians concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by allegories and hieroglyphicks. This doubtleſs a kind of metaphyſicks concerning God; as one perfect being, the original of all things. 316

An objection from *Chæremon* (cited by *Porphyrius*, in an epiſtle to *Anebo*, an Egyptian Prieſt,) fully anſwered by *Jamblichus*, in the perſon of *Abammo*, in his Egyptian Myſteries. 317, 318

That monarchy was an eſſential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians, may be proved from the Triſmegiſtick Writings, though not at all genuine, (as the *Pœmander*, and *Sermon in the Mount*, concerning regeneration;) becauſe, though they had been all forged by Chriſtians never ſo much, yet being divulged in thoſe ancient times, they muſt needs have ſomething of truth in them: this at leaſt, That the Egyptians acknowledged one ſupreme Deity; or otherwiſe they would have been preſently exploded. 319, 320

That *Caſaubon*, from the detection of forgery in two or three at the moſt of theſe Triſmegiſtick books, does not reaſonably infer them to have been all Chriſtian cheats: thoſe alſo not excepted, that have been cited by ancient fathers, but ſince loſt. 320, 321

That there was one *Theuth* or *Thoth*, (called by the Greeks *Hermes*) an inventor of letters and ſciences amongſt the ancient Egyptians, not reaſonably to be doubted. Beſides whom, there is

ſaid to have been a ſecond *Hermes*, ſurnamed *Triſmegiſt*, who left many volumes of philoſophy and theology behind him, that were committed to the cuſtody of the prieſts. Page 321, *&c.*

Other books alſo written by Egyptian prieſts, in ſeveral ages ſucceſſively, called Hermaical, (as *Jamblichus* informeth us) becauſe entitled *(pro more)* to *Hermes*, as the preſident of learning. 322

That ſome of thoſe old Hermaick Books remained in the cuſtody of the Egyptian prieſts, till the times of *Clemens Alexandrinus*. 323

Hermaick Books taken notice of formerly, not only by Chriſtians, but alſo by Pagans and philoſophers. *Jamblichus* his teſtimony of them, that they did really contain Hermaical opinions, or Egyptian learning. Fifteen of theſe Hermaick Books publiſhed together at *Athens* before St. *Cyril*'s time. 324, 325

All the philoſophy of the preſent Hermaick Books not merely Grecanick, as *Caſaubon* affirmeth. That nothing periſheth; old Egyptian philoſophy, derived by *Pythagoras*, together with the tranſmigration of ſouls, into *Greece*. 326, 327

The *Aſclepian Dialogue*, or *Perfect Oration*, (ſaid to have been tranſlated into *Latin* by *Apuleius*) vindicated from being a Chriſtian forgery. 328

An anſwer to two objections made againſt it; the latter whereof from a prophecy taken notice of by St. *Auſtin*, *That the temples of the Egyptian Gods ſhould ſhortly be full of the ſepulchres of dead men.* *ibid.*

Petavius his further ſuſpicion of forgery, becauſe, as *Lactantius* and St. *Auſtin* have affirmed, the Chriſtian *Logos* is herein called a ſecond God, and the firſt begotten Son of God. The anſwer, that *Lactantius* and St. *Auſtin* were clearly miſtaken, this being there affirmed only of the viſible and ſenſible world. 329, 330

That beſides the *Aſclepian Dialogue*, others of the preſent Triſmegiſtick Books contain Egyptian doctrine. Nor can they be all proved to be ſpurious and counterfeit. This the rather inſiſted on, for the vindication of the ancient fathers. Page 331, 332

Proved that the Egyptians, beſides their many gods, acknowledged one firſt Supreme, and univerſal Deity, from the teſtimonies of *Plutarch*, *Horus Apollo*, *Jamblichus*, (affirming that *Hermes* derived all things, even matter it ſelf, from one divine Principle) laſtly of *Damaſcius* declaring, that the Egyptian philoſophers at that time had found in the writings of the ancients, that they held one Principle of all things, praiſed under the name of the Unknown Darkneſs. 334, *&c.*

The ſame thing proved from their vulgar religion and theology; *Hammon* being a proper name for the ſupreme God amongſt them; and therefore ſtyled the Egyptian *Jupiter*. 337

Though this word *Hammon* were probably at firſt the ſame with *Ham* or *Cham* the ſon of *Noah*, yet will not this hinder, but that it might be uſed afterwards by the Egyptians for the ſupreme God. 338

The Egyptian God *Hammon* neither confined by them to the ſun, nor to the corporeal world, but, according to the notation of the word in the Egyptian language, a hidden and inviſible Deity. This farther confirmed from the teſtimony of *Jamblichus*. 339

This Egyptian *Hammon* more than once taken notice of in Scripture. 339, 340

That the Egyptians acknowledged one univerſal *Numen*, farther proved from that famous inſcription upon the Saitick temple, *I am all, that was, is, and ſhall be*, and *my veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.* That this cannot be underſtood of ſenſeleſs matter, nor of the corporeal univerſe, but of a divine Mind, or Wiſdom, diffuſing it ſelf thorough all. The

The *peplum*, or *veil*, eaſt over the ſtatue as well of the Saitick as Athenian *Minerva*, hieroglyphically ſignified the inviſibility and incomprehenſibility of the Deity which is veiled in its works. From what *Proclus* addeth to this inſcription beyond *Plutarch*, *And the ſun was the fruit which I produced*; evident, that this was a Demiurgical Deity, the creator of the ſun and of the world. Page 341, 342

How that paſſage of *Hecatæus* in *Plutarch* is to be underſtood, *That the Egyptians ſuppoſed the firſt God and the univerſe to be the ſame*, viz. becauſe the ſupreme Deity diffuſeth it ſelf thorough all things. Τὸ πᾶν a name of God alſo amongſt the Greek philoſophers. 343

That *Pan*, to the Arcadians and other vulgar Greeks, was not the corporeal world, as ſenſeleſs and inanimate, but as proceeding from an intellectual Principle diffuſing it ſelf through all; from *Macrobius* and *Phornutus*. *Socrates* his prayer to *Pan*, as the ſupreme God, in *Plato*'s *Phædrus*. 343, 344

Our Saviour Chriſt called the Great *Pan* by dæmons. 345

How the old Egyptian theology, that God is all things, is every where inſiſted upon in the Triſmegiſtick Writings. 346, 347

That the ſupreme God was ſometimes worſhipped by the Egyptians under other proper, perſonal names, as *Iſis*, *Oſiris* and *Serapis*, &c. 349, *&c.*

Recorded in *Euſebius*, from *Porphyrius*, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual *Demiurgus*, or *Maker of the world*, under the name of *Cneph*, whom they pictured, putting forth an Egg out of his mouth. This *Cneph* ſaid to have produced another God, whom the Egyptians called *Ptha*, the Greeks, *Vulcan*, the Soul of the world, and artificial Plaſtick Nature. The teſtimony of *Plutarch*, that the Thebaites worſhipped only one eternal and immortal God under this name of *Cneph*. 412

Thus, according to *Apuleius*, the Egyptians worſhipped one and the ſame ſupreme God, under many different names and notions. *ibid.*

Probable, that the Egyptians diſtinguiſhed hypoſtaſes in the Deity alſo. *Kircherus* his Egyptian hieroglyphick of the trinity. An intimation in *Jamblichus* of an Egyptian trinity, *Eiθon*, *Emeph*, or *Hemphta*, (which is the ſame with *Cneph*,) and *Ptha*. Page 413

The doctrine of God's being all, made by the Egyptians a foundation of polytheiſm and idolatry, they being led hereby to perſonate and deify the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature; (which, in the language of the *Aſclepian Dialogue*, is to call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God,) the wiſe amongſt them nevertheleſs underſtanding, that all was but one ſimple Deity, worſhipped by piece-meal. This allegorically ſignified by *Oſiris* his being diſmembred and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, and then made up one again by *Iſis*. 354, 355

XIX. That the poets many ways deprav'd the Pagan theology, and made it to have a more Ariſtocratical appearance. 355, *&c.*

Notwithſtanding which, they did not really aſſert many ſelf-exiſtent and independent Gods, but one only unmade; and all the reſt generated or created. *Homer*'s Gods not all eternal and unmade, but generated out of the ocean; that is, a watry Chaos. *Homer*'s Theogonia, as well as *Heſiod*'s, the Coſmogonia, and his generation of gods, the ſame thing with the production or creation of the world. 357, 358

Nevertheleſs, *Homer* diſtinguiſhed, from all thoſe generated gods, one unmade God, the father or creator of them and of the world. 359

Homer thus underſtood by the Pagans themſelves, as *Plutarch*, *Proclus* and *Ariſtotle*. 359, 360

Though *Heſiod*'s gods, properly ſo called, were all of them generated, yet did he ſuppoſe alſo one unmade God, the maker of them, and of the world. 360, 361

Pindar likewiſe a divine Theogoniſt; an aſſerter of one unmade Deity (and no more) the cauſe of all things; yet nevertheleſs, of many generated gods, beſides his one God to be worſhipped far above all the other gods. Page 361, 362

The ſuſpicion, which *Ariſtotle* ſometime had of *Heſiod*, and *Plato* of *Homer*, ſeems to have proceeded from their not underſtanding that Moſaick *Cabala*, followed by them both, of the world's being made out of a watry Chaos. 362

That famous paſſage of *Sophocles*, concerning one God the maker of heaven, earth and ſeas, (cited by ſo many ancient fathers) defended as genuine. 363

Clear places in the extant tragedies of *Euripides* to the ſame purpoſe; with other remarkable ones cited out of his now inextant tragedies: beſides the teſtimonies of other Greek poets. 363, *&c.*

The conſent of Latin poets alſo, in the monarchy of the whole. 365

XX. After the poets of the Pagans, their philoſophers conſidered. That *Epicurus* was the only reputed philoſopher, who pretending to acknowledge gods, yet profeſſedly oppoſed monarchy, and verbally aſſerted a multitude of eternal, unmade deities, but ſuch as had nothing to do either with the making or governing of the world. He therefore clearly to be reckoned amongſt the Atheiſts. All the Pagan philoſophers, who were Theiſts, (a few Ditheiſts excepted) univerſally aſſerted a mundane monarchy. 369, 370

Pythagoras, a polytheiſt as much as the other Pagans; nevertheleſs a plain acknowledger of one ſupreme God, the maker of the univerſe. 371

Pythagoras his *Dyad* no evil god, or dæmon ſelf-exiſtent, as *Plutarch* ſuppoſed. 372

But this Dyad of his, whether matter or no, derived from a Monad. One ſimple Unity the cauſe of all things. Page 372, 373

That *Pythagoras*, acknowledging a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, did therefore ſometimes deſcribe God as a Monad, ſometimes as a Mind, and ſometimes as the Soul of the world. 373

The Pythagorick Monad and firſt God the ſame with the Orphick Love, ſeniour to *Japhet* and *Saturn*, and the oldeſt of all the gods, a ſubſtantial thing. But that Love, which *Plato* would have to be the youngeſt of the gods, (the daughter of *Penia*, or *Indigency*, and a parturient thing,) nothing but a creaturely affection in ſouls, perſonated and deified. *Parmenides* his Love, the firſt created god, or lower ſoul of the world, before whoſe production, neceſſity is ſaid to have reigned; that is, the neceſſity of material motions undirected for ends, and good. 374, 375

That *Pythagoras* called the ſupreme Deity not only a Monad, but a Tetrad, or Tetractys alſo. The reaſons for this given from the myſteries in the number *Four*, trifling. More probability of a late conjecture, that the Pythagorick Tetractys was not the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, not altogether unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins. 375, 376

Xenophanes a plain aſſerter both of many gods, and of one God, called by him, One and All. *Simplicius* his clear teſtimony for this theoſophy of *Xenophanes*, out of *Theophraſtus*. *Xenophanes* miſrepreſented by *Ariſtotle*, as an aſſerter of a ſpherical corporeal god. 377, 378

Heraclitus, though a cloudy and confounded philoſopher, and one who could not conceive of any thing incorporeal, yet both a hearty moraliſt, and a zealous aſſerter of one ſupreme Deity. 378, 379

The Ionick philoſophers before *Anaxagoras*, being all of them Corporealiſts, and ſome of them Atheiſts; that *Anaxagoras*

Anaxagoras was the firſt, who aſſerted an incorporeal mind to be a principle, and though not the cauſe of matter, yet of motion, and of the regularity of things. The world, according to him, not eternal, but made, and out of preexiſtent ſimilar atoms; and that not by chance, but by Mind or God. This Mind of his purely incorporeal, as appeareth from his own words, cited by *Simplicius*. Page 380

Probable, that *Anaxagoras* admitted none of the inferiour Pagan gods. He condemned by the vulgar for an Atheiſt, becauſe he ungodded the ſtars, denying their animation, and affirming the ſun to be but a maſs of fire, and the moon an earth. This diſliked alſo by *Plato*, as that, which in thoſe times would diſpoſe men to Atheiſm. 381

Anaxagoras farther cenſured, both by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, becauſe, though aſſerting mind to be a principle, he made much more uſe of material than of mental and final cauſes; which was looked upon by them as an atheiſtick tang in him. Nevertheleſs *Anaxagoras* a better Theiſt than thoſe Chriſtian philoſophers of later times, who quite baniſh all mental cauſality from the world. 382, 383

XXI. *Parmenides* his acknowledgment of one God the cauſe of Gods. Which ſupreme Deity, by *Parmenides*, ſtyled One-all immoveable. That this is not to be taken phyſically, but metaphyſically and theologically; proved at large. The firſt principle of all, to theſe ancients, one, a ſimple unity or monad. This ſaid to be all, becauſe virtually containing all, and diſtributed into all; or becauſe all things are diſtinctly diſplayed from it. Laſtly, the ſame ſaid to be immoveable, and indiviſible, and without magnitude, to diſtinguiſh it from the corporeal univerſe. 383, *&c.*

Ἓν τὸ πᾶν, One All, taken in different ſenſes; by *Parmenides* and *Xenophanes*, *&c.* divinely, for the ſupreme Deity, (one moſt ſimple Being, the original of all things;) but by others in *Ariſtotle* atheiſtically, as if all things were but one and the ſame matter diverſly modified. But the One-all of theſe latter, not immoveable but moveable; it being nothing elſe but body: whereas the One-all-immoveable is an incorporeal Deity. This does *Ariſtotle*, in his Metaphyſicks, cloſe with, as good divinity. That there is one incorporeal immoveable principle of all things. *Simplicius* his obſervation, that though divers philoſophers maintained a plurality or infinity of moveable principles, yet none ever aſſerted more than one immoveable. Page 385, 386

Parmenides in *Plato* diſtinguiſhes three divine hypoſtaſes, the firſt whereof called by him, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one all*; the ſecond, ἓν πάντα, *one all things*; and the third, ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one and all things*. 386, *&c.*

But that *Parmenides* by his One-all-immoveable really underſtood the ſupreme Deity, yet farther unqueſtionably evident from the verſes cited out of him by *Simplicius*; wherein there is alſo attributed thereunto a ſtanding eternity, or duration, different from that of time. 388

The only difference betwixt *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*, that the former called his One-all-immoveable, finite; the latter, infinite; this in words rather than reality: the diſagreeing agreement of theſe two philoſophers fully declared by *Simplicius*. *Meliſſus* his language more agreeable with our preſent theology. Though *Anaximander*'s Infinite were nothing but ſenſeleſs matter, yet *Meliſſus* his Infinite was the true Deity. 389

That *Zeno Eleates*, by his One-all-immoveable, meant not the corporeal world neither, no more than *Meliſſus*, *Parmenides*, and *Xenophanes*; but the Deity, evident from *Ariſtotle*. *Zeno*'s demon-

demonſtration of one God, from the idea of a moſt powerful and perfect being, in the ſame *Ariſtotle*. Page 390

Empedocles his firſt principle of all things, τὸ ἕν, or a unity likewiſe, beſides which he ſuppoſed contention and friendſhip to be the principles of all created beings; not only plants, brutes, and men, but gods alſo. 391, *&c.*

Empedocles his original of all the evil both of human ſoul and dæmons, from this νεῖκος, *Diſcord* and *Contention*, together with the ill uſe of their liberty. 393

XXII. The doctrine of divers other Pythagoreans alſo the ſame; as *Philolaus*, *Archytas*, *Ocellus*, *Ariſtæus*, *&c.* *Timæus Locrus* his God the creator of gods. *Onatus* his many gods, and his one God, the *Coryphæus* of the gods. *Euclides Megarenſis* his one the very Good. *Antiſthenes* his many popular gods, but one natural God. *Diogenes Sinopenſis* his God that filleth all things. 393, *&c.*

XXIII. That *Socrates* aſſerted one God, undeniable from *Xenophon*. 398, 399

But that he diſclaimed all the other inferiour gods of the Pagans, and died, as a martyr, for one only God, in this ſenſe, a vulgar error. 400

What the impiety imputed to him by his adverſaries, appeareth from *Plato*'s *Euthyphro*, viz. that he freely and openly condemned thoſe fables of the gods, wherein wicked and unjuſt actions were imputed to them. 401

That *Plato* really aſſerted one only God and no more, a vulgar error likewiſe; and that thirteenth epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, wherein he declared himſelf to be ſerious, only when he began his epiſtles with God, and not with gods, (though extant in *Euſebius* his time,) ſpurious and ſuppoſititious. He worſhipping the ſun and other ſtars alſo (ſuppoſed to be animated) as inferiour gods. Page 402

Nevertheleſs, undeniably evident, that *Plato* was no polyarchiſt, but a monarchiſt, no aſſerter of many independent gods, or principles, but of one original of all things; one firſt God, one greateſt God, one Maker of the world and of the gods. 403, 404

In what ſenſe the ſupreme God, to *Plato*, the cauſe and producer of himſelf, (out of *Plotinus*;) and this notion not only entertained by *Seneca* and *Plotinus*, but alſo by *Lactantius*, that *Plato* really aſſerted a Trinity of univerſal divine hypoſtaſes, that have the nature of principles. The firſt hypoſtaſis in *Plato*'s Trinity properly αὐτόθεος, the *original Deity*, the cauſe and king of all things: which alſo ſaid by him to be ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, or ὑπερούσιος, *above eſſence*. 407

Xenophon, though with other Pagans he acknowledged a plurality of gods, yet a plain aſſerter alſo of one ſupreme and univerſal Numen. 408

XXIV. *Ariſtotle* a frequent acknowledger of many gods. And whether he believed any dæmons or no, which he ſometimes mentions (though ſparingly) and inſinuates them to be a kind of aërial animals, more immortal than men; yet did he unqueſtionably look upon the ſtars, or their intelligences, as gods. 408, *&c.*

Notwithſtanding which, *Ariſtotle* doth not only often ſpeak of God ſingularly, and of the divinity emphatically, but alſo profeſſedly oppoſes that imaginary opinion of many independent principles, or unmade deities. He confuting the ſame from the phænomena or the compages of the world, which is not ἐπεισοδιώδης, but all uniform, and agreeably conſpiring into one harmony. 410, 411

Ariſtotle's ſupreme Deity, the firſt immoveable

moveable mover. The difference here betwixt *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*; *Plato*'s original of motion; a ſelf-moving ſoul *Ariſtotle*'s an immoveable mind. But this difference not ſo great as at firſt ſight it ſeems; becauſe *Ariſtotle*'s immoveable Mind doth not move the heavens efficiently, but only finally, or as being loved. Beſides which, he muſt needs ſuppoſe another immediate mover, which could be nothing but a ſoul of them. Page 412

Ariſtotle's immoveable Mind not only the cauſe of motion, but alſo of well and fit; all the order, pulchritude and harmony, that is in the world, called therefore by *Ariſtotle* the *ſeparate good* thereof. This together with nature, (its ſubordinate inſtrument) the efficient cauſe of the whole mundane ſyſtem: which however co-eternal with it, yet is, in order of nature, junior to it. 413, 414

Ariſtotle and other ancients, when they affirm Mind to have been the cauſe of all things, underſtood it thus, that all things were made by an abſolute wiſdom, and after the beſt manner. The divine will, according to them, not a meer arbitrary, humourſome, and fortuitous thing, but decency and fitneſs it ſelf. 415

From this paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s, that the Divinity is either God, or the work of God, evident, that he ſuppoſed all the gods to have been derived from one, and therefore his intelligences of the ſpheres. 415

That according to *Ariſtotle*, this ſpeculation of the Deity conſtitutes a particular ſcience by it ſelf, diſtinct from phyſiology and geometry: the former whereof (phyſiology) is converſant about what was inſeparable and moveable, the ſecond (geometry) about things immoveable, but not really ſeparable; but the third and laſt (which is theology) about that, which is both immoveable and ſeparable, an incorporeal Deity. 416

Four chief points of *Ariſtotle*'s theology or metaphyſicks, concerning God; firſt, that though all things are not eternal and unmade, yet ſomething muſt needs be ſuch, as likewiſe incorruptible, or otherwiſe all might come to nothing. Secondly, that God is an incorporeal ſubſtance, ſeparate from ſenſibles, indiviſible and devoid of parts and magnitude. Thirdly, that the divine intellect is the ſame with its intelligibles, or containeth them all within it ſelf; becauſe the divine mind, being ſenior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not then look abroad for its objects without it ſelf. The contrary to which ſuppoſed by Atheiſts. Laſtly, that God being an immoveable ſubſtance, his act and energy is his eſſence; from whence *Ariſtotle* would infer the eternity of the world. Page 416, 417

Ariſtotle's creed and religion contained in theſe two articles, firſt, that there is a Divinity which comprehends the whole nature, or univerſe. And ſecondly, that beſides this, there are other particular inferiour gods; but that all other things, in the religion of the Pagans, were fabulouſly ſuperadded hereunto for political ends. 417

Speuſippus, *Xenocrates*, and *Theophraſtus*, monarchiſts. 418

XXV. The Stoicks no better metaphyſicians than *Heraclitus*, in whoſe footſteps they trode, admitting of no incorporeal ſubſtance. The qualities of the mind alſo, to theſe Stoicks, bodies. 419, 420

But the Stoicks, not therefore Atheiſts; they ſuppoſing an eternal unmade Mind, (though lodged in matter) the maker of the whole mundane ſyſtem. 420

The Stoical argumentations for a God not inconſiderable, and what they were. 421. 422

The Stoical god, not a meer plaſtick and

and methodical, but an intellectual fire. The world, according to them, not a plant, but animal; and *Jupiter* the ſoul thereof. From the ſuppoſed onelineſs of which *Jupiter*, they would ſometimes infer, the ſingularity of the world: (*Plutarch* on the contrary affirming, that though there were fifty, or an hundred worlds, yet would there be, for all that, but one *Zeus* or *Jupiter*.) Page 423

Nevertheleſs the Stoicks as polytheiſtical as any ſect. But ſo, as that they ſuppoſed all their gods, ſave one, to be not only native, but alſo mortal; made out of that one, and reſolved into that one again: theſe gods being all melted into *Jupiter*, in the conflagration. 424, 425

Wherefore during the intervals of ſucceſſive worlds, the Stoicks acknowledged but one ſolitary Deity, and no more; *Jupiter* being then left all alone, and the other gods ſwallowed up into him. Who therefore not only the creator of all the other gods, but alſo the decreator of them. 425, 426

The Stoicks, notwithſtanding this, regious worſhippers of their many gods; and thereby ſometime derogated from the honour of the Supreme, by ſharing his ſovereignty amongſt them. 426, 427

Nevertheleſs, the ſupreme God praiſed and extolled by them far above all the other gods; and acknowledged to be the ſole maker of the world. 427, *&c.*

Their profeſſing ſubjection to his laws as their greateſt liberty: 430

And to ſubmit their wills to his will in every thing, ſo as to know no other will, but the will of *Jupiter*. *ibid.*

Their pretending to look to God, and to do nothing without a reference to him; as alſo to truſt in him and rely upon him. 431

Their praiſing him as the author of all good. *ibid.*

Their addreſſing their devotions to him alone, without the conjunction of any other god; and particularly imploring his aſſiſtance againſt temptations. Page 432

Cleanthes his excellent and devout hymn to the ſupreme God. 433

XXVI. *Cicero*, though affecting to write in the way of the new academy, yet no ſceptick as to theiſm. Nor was he an aſſerter of many independent deities. *Cicero*'s gods (the makers of the world) the ſame with *Plato*'s eternal gods, or trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate. This language the Pagans in St. *Cyril* would juſtify, from that of the Scripture, *Let us make man.* 434, 435, *&c.*

Varro's threefold theology, the fabulous, the natural, and the civil or popular; agreeably to *Scævola* the pontifex his three ſorts of gods, poetical, philoſophical, and political. The former condemned by him as falſe; the ſecond, though true, ſaid to be above the capacity of the vulgar; and therefore a neceſſity of a third or middle betwixt both; becauſe many things true in religion, not fit for the vulgar to know. *Varro*'s ſupreme Numen, the great Soul or Mind of the whole world: his inferiour gods, parts of the world animated. Image-worſhip condemned by him, as diſagreeable to the natural theology. 438, 439

Seneca, a Pagan polytheiſt, but plain aſſerter of one ſupreme Numen, excellently deſcribed by him. That in his book of Superſtition (now loſt) he did as freely cenſure the civil theology of the Romans, as *Varro* had done the fabulous or theatrical. 440

Quintilian, *Pliny*, *Apuleius*, their clear acknowledgments of one ſovereign univerſal Deity. *Symmachus*, (a great ſtickler for paganiſm) his aſſertion, that it was one and the ſame thing, which was worſhipped

worſhipped in all religions, though in different ways. Page 440, 441

The writer *De Mundo*, though not *Ariſtotle*, yet a Pagan. His cauſe that containeth all things, and God from whom all things are. Which paſſage being left out in *Apuleius* his Latin verſion, gives occaſion of ſuſpicion, that he was infected with *Plutarch*'s Ditheiſm, or at leaſt held matter to be unmade. 442

Plutarch, a prieſt of *Apollo*, however unluckily ingaged in thoſe two falſe opinions, of an evil principle, and matter unmade, yet a maintainer of one ſole principle of all good. 443

Dio Chryſoſtomus, a Sophiſt, his clear teſtimony, βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον, *that the whole world was under a kingly government* or *monarchy*. *ibid.*

Galen's true hymn to the praiſe of him, that made us, in his book *De uſu Partium*. 444

Maximus Tyrius his ſhort account of his own religion; one ſupreme God the monarch of the whole world, and three ſubordinate ranks of inferiour gods, the ſons and friends of God, and his miniſters in the government of the world. 444, 445

A moſt full and excellent deſcription of the ſupreme God in *Ariſtides* his firſt oration, or hymn to *Jupiter*, wherein he affirmeth, all the ſeveral kinds of gods to be but a defluxion and derivation from *Jupiter*. 445, 446

All the latter philoſophers after Chriſtianity, (though maintainers of the world's eternity, yet) agreed in one ſupreme Deity, the cauſe of this world, and of the other gods. Excellent ſpeculations in them concerning the Deity, eſpecially *Plotinus*; who, though deriving matter and all from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods; he ſuppoſing, the grandeur and majeſty of the ſupreme God to be declared by the multitude of gods under him. *Themiſtius*; that the ſame ſupreme God was worſhipped by Pagans, Chriſtians, and all nations, though in different forms; and that God was delighted with this variety of religions. Page 446, 447

The full teſtimony of St. *Cyril*, that the Greek philoſophers univerſally acknowledged one God, the maker of the univerſe, from whom were produced into being certain other gods, both intelligible and ſenſible. *ibid.*

XXVII. This not only the opinion of philoſophers and learned men, but alſo the general belief of the vulgar amongſt the Pagans. A judgment of the vulgar and generality, to be made from the poets. *Dio Chryſoſtomus* his affirmation, That all the poets acknowledged one firſt and greateſt God, the father of all the rational kind, and the king thereof. 447

The teſtimony of *Ariſtotle*, That all men acknowledged kingſhip or monarchy amongſt the gods: Of *Maximus Tyrius*, that notwithſtanding ſo great a diſcrepancy of opinion in other things, yet throughout all the gentile world, as well the unlearned as learned, did univerſally agree in this, that there was one God the king and father of all, and many gods the ſons of that one God: Of *Dio Chryſoſtomus* alſo to the ſame purpoſe; he intimating likewiſe, that of the two, the acknowledgment of the one ſupreme God, was more general than that of the many inferiour gods. 448, 449

That the ſenſe of the vulgar Pagans herein is further evident from hence, becauſe all nations had their ſeveral proper names for the one ſupreme God; as the Romans *Jupiter*, the Greeks *Zeus*, the Africans and Arabians *Hammon*, the Scythians *Pappæus*, the Babylonians *Bel*, *&c.* *ibid.*

True, that *Origen*, though allowing Chriſtians to uſe the appellative names

for God in the languages of the ſeveral nations, yet accounted it unlawful for to call him by thoſe proper names; becauſe not only given to idols, but alſo contaminated with wicked rites and fables: according to which, they ſhould be indeed rather the names of a dæmon than of a God. Notwithſtanding which, he does not deny, thoſe Pagans ever to have meant the ſupreme God by them, but often acknowledge the ſame. But *Lactantius* indeed denies the Capitoline *Jupiter* to be the ſupreme God, and that for two reaſons. Firſt, becauſe he was not worſhipped without the partnerſhip of *Minerva* and *Juno*, his daughter and wife. Granted here, that there was a mixture of the fabulous or poetical theology with the natural to make up the civil. But that wiſe men underſtood theſe to be but three ſeveral names or notions of one ſupreme God. This confirmed from *Macrobius*. Page 450

Voſſius his conjecture, that in this Capitoline Trinity there was a further myſtery aimed at, of three divine hypoſtaſes. This Roman trinity derived from the Samothracian *Cabiri*. Which word being Hebraical, gives cauſe to ſuſpect this tradition of a trinity among the Pagans to have ſprung from the Hebrews. 451

Lactantius his ſecond reaſon, becauſe *Jupiter* being *Juvans Pater*, was a name below the dignity of the ſupreme God. The anſwer, that the true etymon thereof was *Jovis Pater*, the Hebrew Tetragrammaton. *ibid.*

That the Capitoline *Jupiter* was the ſupreme God, evident from thoſe titles of *Optimus Maximus*; and of *Omnipotens* by the pontifices in their publick ſacrifices. *Seneca*'s teſtimony, that the ancient Hetrurians by *Jupiter* meant the mind and ſpirit, maker and governour of the whole word. The Roman ſoldiers acclamation in *Marcus Aurelius* his German expedition, (*To* Jove *the god of gods, who alone is powerful*) according to *Tertullian*, a teſtimony to the Chriſtians God. Page 452, 453

That as the learned Pagans in their writings, ſo likewiſe the vulgar in their common ſpeech, when moſt ſerious, often uſed the word God, ſingularly and emphatically, for the Supreme, proved from *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, and *Lactantius*: together with the teſtimony of *Proclus*, that the one ſupreme God was more univerſally believed throughout the world, than the many gods. 453, 454

That *Kyrie Eleeſon* was anciently a Pagan litany to the ſupreme God, proved from *Arianus*. The ſupreme God often called by the Pagans alſo Κύριος, or *the Lord*. 454, 455

That even the moſt ſottiſhly ſuperſtitious, idolatrous, and polytheiſtical amongſt the Pagans, did, notwithſtanding, generally acknowledge one ſupreme Deity; fully atteſted and elegantly declar'd by *Aurelius Prudentius* in his Apotheoſis. 455

However, ſome of the ancient Pagans were ſaid to have acknowledged none but viſible and corporeal gods, yet as they conceived theſe to be endued with life and underſtanding, ſo did they ſuppoſe one ſupreme amongſt them, as either the whole heaven or æther animated, or the ſubtle fiery ſubſtance, that pervadeth all things, the God of the Heracliticks and Stoicks; or the ſun the Cleanthæan god. 455, 456

Though *Macrobius* refer ſo many of the Pagan gods to the ſun, and doubtleſs himſelf looked upon it as a great god, yet does he deny it to be *omnipotentiſſimum Deum*, the *moſt omnipotent God of all*; he aſſerting a Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſuperiour to it, in the Platonick way. 456, 457

That the Perſians themſelves, the moſt notorious ſun-worſhippers, did, notwithſtanding,

withſtanding acknowledge a Deity ſuperiour to it, and the maker thereof; proved from *Eubulus*. As alſo that the Perſians countrey-*Jupiter* was not the ſun, confirmed from *Herodotus*, *Xenophon*, *Plutarch*, and *Curtius*. *Cyrus* his Lord God of heaven, who commanded him to build him a houſe at Jeruſalem; the ſame with the God of the Jews. Page 458

That as (beſides the Scythians) the Ethiopians in *Strabo*, and other barbarian nations, anciently acknowledged one ſovereign Deity; ſo is this the belief of the generality of the Pagan world to this very day. 458, 459

XXVIII. Beſides *Themiſtius* and *Symmachus*, aſſerting one and the ſame thing to be worſhipped in all religions, though after different ways, and that God Almighty was not diſpleaſed with this variety of his worſhip; *Plutarch*'s memorable teſtimony, that as the ſame ſun, moon, and ſtars, are common to all, ſo were the ſame gods. And that not only the Egyptians, but alſo all other Pagan nations worſhipped one reaſon and providence ordering all; together with its inferiour ſubſervient powers and miniſters, though with different rites and ſymbols. 459, 460

Titus Livius alſo of the ſame perſuaſion, that the ſame immortal gods were worſhipped every where; (namely, one ſupreme, and his inferiour miniſters) however the diverſity of rites made them ſeem different. 460

Two Egyptian Philoſophers, *Heraiſcus* and *Aſclepiades*, profeſſedly inſiſting upon the ſame thing, not only as to the Egyptians, but alſo the other Pagan nations: the latter of them, (*Aſclepiades*) having written a book entitled, *The ſymphony, or harmony of all theologies or religions*, to wit, in theſe two fundamentals, that there is one ſupreme God, and beſides him, other inferiour gods, his ſubſervient miniſters to be worſhipped. From whence *Symmachus* and other Pagans concluded, that the differences of religion were not to be ſcrupulouſly ſtood upon, but every man ought to worſhip God according to the law and religion of his own country. The Pagans ſenſe thus declared by *Stobæus*, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him together with the world. Page 461

XXIX. That the Pagan Theiſts muſt needs acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, further evident from hence; becauſe they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, actuated and governed by one ſoul. To deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheiſt, all one, in the ſenſe of the ancient Pagans. Againſt *Gaſſendus*, that *Epicurus* denied the world's animation, upon no other account, but only becauſe he denied a providential deity. This whole animated world, or the ſoul thereof, to the Stoicks, and others, the Πρῶτος Θεὸς, the *firſt and higheſt God*. 462

Other Pagan theologers, who though aſſerting likewiſe the world's animation, and a mundane ſoul, yet would not allow this to be the ſupreme Deity, they conceiving the firſt and higheſt God to be no ſoul, but an abſtract and immoveable mind ſuperiour to it. And to theſe, the animated world and mundane ſoul but Δεύτερος Θεὸς, *a ſecond God*. 463

But the generality of thoſe, who went higher than the ſoul of the world, acknowledged alſo a principle ſuperiour to Mind or intellect, called, τὸ ἓν and τ' ἀγαθὸν *the one, and the good*; and ſo aſſerted a Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate, Monad, Mind, and Soul. So that the animated world or ſoul thereof was to ſome of theſe, but τρίτος Θεὸς, *the third God*. *ibid.*

The Pagans, whether holding ſoul, or mind, or monad, to be the higheſt,

acknowledged only one in thoſe ſeveral kinds, as the head of all; and ſo always reduced the multiplicity of things to a unity, or under a monarchy. Page 464

Obſerved, that to the Pagan theologers univerſally, the world was no dead thing, or meer machine and automaton, but had life or ſoul diffuſed thorough it all; thoſe being taxed by *Ariſtotle* as Atheiſts, who made the world to conſiſt of nothing, but monads or atoms, dead and inanimate. Nor was it quite cut off from the ſupreme Deity, how much ſoever elevated above the ſame: the forementioned trinity, of Monad, Mind, and Soul, being ſuppoſed to be moſt intimately united together, and indeed all but one entire divinity; diſplayed in the world; and ſupporting the ſame. 464, 465

XXX. The ſenſe of the Hebrews in this controverſy. That according to *Philo*, the Pagan polytheiſm conſiſted not in worſhipping many independent gods, and partial creators of the world, but, beſides the One ſupreme, other created beings ſuperiour to men. 465, 466

That the ſame alſo was the ſenſe of *Flavius Joſephus*, according to whom, this the doctrine of *Abraham*; that the ſupreme God was alone to be religiouſly worſhipped, and no created thing with him. *Ariſtæus* his aſſertion in *Joſephus*, that the Jews and Greeks worſhipped one and the ſame ſupreme God, called by the Greeks *Zene*, as giving life to all. 466, 467

The latter Rabbinical writers generally of this perſuaſion, that the Pagans acknowledging one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, worſhipped all their other gods, as his miniſters, or as mediators and interceſſors betwixt him and them. And this condemned by them for עבירה זרה *ſtrange worſhip* or *idolatry*. The firſt commandment thus interpreted by *Maimonides*, and *Baal Ikkarim*; *Thou ſhalt not ſet up, beſides me, any inferiour gods as mediators, nor religiouſly worſhip my miniſters or attendants*. The miſcarriage of *Solomon* and other kings of *Iſrael* and *Judah* this, that believing the exiſtence of the one ſupreme God, they thought it was for his honour, that his miniſters alſo ſhould be worſhipped. *Abravanel* his ten ſpecies of idolatry, all of them but ſo many ſeveral modes of creature-worſhip; and no mention amongſt them made, of many independent gods. Page 467, *&c.*

Certain places of Scripture alſo interpreted by Rabbinical writers to this purpoſe; that the Pagan nations generally acknowledged one ſovereign Numen. 469, 470

The Jews, though agreeing with the Greeks and other Pagans in this, that the ſtars were all animated, nevertheleſs denied them any religious worſhip. 470, 471

XXXI. This ſame thing plainly confirmed from the New Teſtament; that the Gentiles or Pagans, however Polytheiſts and Idolaters, were not unacquainted with the true God. Firſt from the epiſtle to the Romans, where that, which is knowable of God, is ſaid to have been manifeſt amongſt the Pagans; and they to have known God, though they did not *glorify him as God, but hold the truth in unrighteouſneſs*; by reaſon of their polytheiſm and idolatry (or image-worſhip) the latter of which accounted by the Jews the greateſt enormity of the Pagans, as is proved from *Philo:* and this the reaſon, why their polytheiſm called alſo idolatry. Plainly declared by St. *Paul*, that the Pagan ſuperſtition conſiſted not in worſhipping many independent gods and creators, but in joining creature-worſhip ſome way or other with the worſhip of the Creator. Παρὰ τὸν Κτίσαντα, how to be underſtood; and in what ſenſe, the

the Pagans, though acknowledging the Creator, might be ſaid to have worſhipped the creature, beyond him. Page 471, 472

Again, from St. *Paul*'s oration to the Athenians, where their *unknown God* is ſaid to be that ſame God, whom St. *Paul* preached, *who made the world and all things in it.* And theſe Athenian Pagans are affirmed εὐσεβεῖν, religiouſly and devoutly to worſhip this true God. 473, 474

Laſtly, that *Aratus* his *Zeus* was the true God, whoſe offspring our ſouls are, proved not only from the context of that poet himſelf, undeniably, and from the ſcholiaſt upon him, but alſo from St. *Paul*'s poſitive affirmation. Nor was *Aratus* ſingular in this; that ancient prayer of the Athenians, commended by *M. Antoninus* for its ſimplicity, (Ὗσον, ὗσον ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, *rain, rain, O gracious* Jupiter, *&c.*) no otherwiſe to be underſtood. And how that other paſſage of St. *Paul*, *That in the wiſdom of God, the world by wiſdom knew not God*, does not at all claſh herewith. 475, 476

XXXII. In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and making it the better appear, that the polytheiſm thereof was not contradictious to the acknowledgment of one ſupreme omnipotent Numen; three things to be conſidered. Firſt, that much of their polytheiſm was but ſeeming and phantaſtical only, and really nothing but the polyonymy of one God. Secondly, That their real and natural polytheiſm conſiſted only in religiouſly worſhipping, beſides this one ſupreme univerſal Numen, many other particular and inferiour created Beings; as animated ſtars, dæmons, and heroes. Thirdly, that they worſhipped both the ſupreme and inferiour gods, in ſtatues, images, and ſymbols; theſe were alſo ſometimes abuſively called gods. To one or other of which three heads, all the Pagan polytheiſm referrible. Page 477

For the better perſuading, that much of the Pagan polytheiſm, was really nothing, but the polyonymy of one ſupreme God, or the worſhipping him under ſeveral perſonal names; to be remembered again, what was before ſuggeſted; that the Pagan nations generally, beſides their vulgar, had another more arcane theology, which was the theology of wiſe men and of truth. That is, beſides both their fabulous and poetical, their political and civil theology, they had another natural and philoſophick one. This diſtinction of the vulgar and civil theology, from the natural and real, owned by the Greeks generally, and amongſt the Latins, by *Scævola* the pontifex, *Varro*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others. *ibid.*

That the civil theology of the Pagans differed from the natural and real, by a certain mixture of fabuloſity in it. Of the Romans ſuffering the ſtatue of *Jupiter*'s nurſe to be kept in the very capitol, as a religious monument. *Jupiter*'s nativity, or his having a father and a mother, atheiſtically fabulous; poets themſelves acknowledging ſo much of the natural and true theology, that *Jupiter* being the father of gods and men, the maker of the whole world, was himſelf eternal and unmade. 478

That the civil as well as poetical theology had ſome appearance of many independent deities alſo; they making ſeveral ſupreme, in their ſeveral territories and functions; one chief for one thing, and another for another. But according to the natural and philoſophick theology, the theology of wiſe men and of truth, all theſe but poetical, commentitious, fictitious, and phantaſtick gods; ſuch as had no diſtinct ſubſtantial eſſences of their own; and therefore really to be accounted nothing elſe,

elſe, but ſeveral names or notions of one ſupreme God. Page 478, 479

Certain, that the Egyptians had ſeveral proper and perſonal names for that one ſupreme univerſal *Numen*, that comprehends the whole world, according to ſeveral notions of it, or its ſeveral powers: as *Ammon*, *Phtha*, *Oſiris*, *Neith*, *Cneph*; to which may be added *Serapis* and *Iſis* too. Beſides *Jamblichus*, *Damaſcius* his teſtimony alſo to this purpoſe; concerning the Egyptian theology. This the pattern of the other, eſpecially European theologies, the Greek and Roman. 479, 480

That the Greeks and Romans alſo often made more gods of one, or affected a polyonomy of the ſame gods, evident from thoſe many proper and perſonal names beſtowed, firſt upon the ſun, (of which *Macrobius*) who therefore had this epithet of πολυώνυμος, given to him; and then upon the moon, ſtyled alſo polyonymous, as well as her brother the ſun; and laſtly upon the earth, famous likewiſe for her many names, as *Veſta*, *Cybele*, *Ceres*, *Proſerpina*, *Ops*, &c. Wherefore not at all to be doubted, but that the ſupreme God, or ſovereign *Numen* of the whole world, was much more polyonymous. This title given to him alſo, as well as to *Apollo* in *Heſychius*. He thus invoked by *Cleanthes*. *Zeno*, the writer *De Mundo*, *Seneca*, *Macrobius*, clearly confirm the ſame. *Maximus Madaurenſis* in St. *Auſtin* his full acknowledgment thereof. 480, 481

The firſt inſtances of the polyonymy of the ſupreme God, amongſt the Pagans in ſuch names as theſe; Βρυνταῖος, Ὕπατος Πολιεὺς, Μειλίχιος, Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Σωτὴρ, &c. And amongſt the Latins, *Victor*, *Invictus*, *Opitulus*, *Stator*, *Tigillus*, *Centupeda*, *Almus*, *Ruminus*, &c. Again, Ἀνάγκη, Εἱμαρμένη, Πεπρωμένη, Μοῖρα, Ἀδράστεια, all ſeveral names of the one ſupreme God, as likewiſe were *Clotho*, *Lacheſis*, and *Atropos*, in the writer *De Mundo*. And amongſt the Latins, not only Fate, but alſo Nature and Fortune too, as *Cicero* and *Seneca* affirm. Page 482

But beſides theſe, there were other proper names of the ſupreme God, which had a greater ſhew and appearance of ſo many ſeveral gods, they having their peculiar temples, and ſeveral appropriated rites of worſhip. And firſt, ſuch as ſignify the Deity, according to its more univerſal nature. As for example, *Pan*; which not the corporeal world inanimate, or endued with a ſenſeleſs nature only, but a rational, or intellectual principle diſplaying it ſelf in matter, framing the world harmoniouſly, and being, in a manner, all things. This alſo the univerſal paſtor and ſhepherd of all mankind. 483

Again *Janus*; firſt invoked by the Romans in their ſacrifices, and never omitted. The moſt ancient God, and firſt beginning of all things. Deſcribed by *Ovid*, *Martial*, and others, as a univerſal *Numen*. Concluded by St. *Auſtin* to be the ſame with *Jupiter*, the Soul or Mind of the whole world. The word *Janus* probably derived from Ζανός the Ætolian *Jupiter*. 483, 484

Genius alſo, one of the twenty ſelect Roman gods, according to *Feſtus*, a univerſal *Numen*; that God, who is the begetter of all things. And, according to *Varro* in St. *Auſtin*, the ſame with *Jupiter*. 484, 485

That *Chronos*, or *Saturn*, no particular Deity but a univerſal *Numen* alſo, which comprehends the whole nature of the world, affirmed by *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſenſis*. The word *Saturn* Hetrurian (and originally from the Hebrew סתר) ſignifies *hidden*; called by the Latins *Deus Latius*, the *Hidden God*; whence *Italy Latium*, and the Italians Latins; as worſhippers of this hidden God, or the occult Principle of all things. This, according to *Varro*, he, that produceth out of himſelf the hidden ſeeds and forms of all things, and

and ſwalloweth them up into himſelf again; which, the devouring of his male children. This *Sinus quidam Naturæ, &c. a certain inward and deep receſs of Nature* containing all things within it ſelf; as God was ſometimes defined by the Pagans. This to St. *Auſtin* the ſame with *Jupiter*; as likewiſe was *Cælus*, or *Uranus*, in the old inſcription, another name of God too. The poetick theology of *Jupiter*'s being the ſon of *Saturn*, and *Saturn* the ſon of *Cælus*; an intimation (according to *Plato*) of a Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes univerſal. Page 485, 486

Though *Minerva* or *Athena* were ſometimes confined to a narrower ſenſe, yet was it often taken for a name of God alſo, according to his univerſal notion; it being to *Athenagoras* the divine wiſdom diſplaying it ſelf through all things. This excellently deſcribed by *Ariſtides*, as the firſt-begotten off-ſpring of the original Deity or the Second divine hypoſtaſis, by which all things were made; agreeably with the Chriſtian theology. 486, 487

Aphrodite Urania, or the *Heavenly Venus*, another name of God alſo, according to his univerſal notion; it being the ſame with that love, which *Orpheus*, and other philoſophers in *Ariſtotle*, made the firſt original of all things. *Plato*'s diſtinction of an elder and a younger *Venus*: the former, the daughter of *Uranus*, without a mother, or the heavenly *Venus*: ſaid to be ſenior to *Japhet* and *Saturn*. The latter, afterwards begotten from *Jupiter* and the nymph *Dione*, the vulgar *Venus*. *Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, called by the oriental nations, *Mylitta*; that is, the *mother of all things*. Temples in *Pauſanias* dedicated to this *Heavenly Venus*. This deſcribed by *Æſchylus*, *Euripides*, and *Ovid*, as the ſupreme Deity, and the creator of all the gods. God Almighty alſo thus deſcribed, as a *Heavenly Venus*, or *Love*, by *Sev. Boethius*. To this *Urania*, or the *Heavenly Venus*, another *Venus* in *Pauſanias* near a-kin; called Ἀποστροφία or *Verticordia*; as converſive of men's minds upwards, from unchaſte love, or unclean luſt. 488, 489

Though *Vulcan*, according to the common notion of him, a ſpecial god, yet had he ſometimes a more univerſal conſideration. *Zeno* in *Laertius*, that the ſupreme God is called *Vulcan* as acting in the artificial fire of nature. Thus the Soul of the world ſtyled by the Ægyptians *Phtha*; which, as *Jamblichus* tells us, was the ſame with the Greeks *Hephæſtus*, or *Vulcan*. Page 489, 490

Beſides all which names of the ſupreme God, *Seneca* informs us, that he was ſometimes called alſo *Liber Pater*, becauſe the parent of all things; ſometimes *Hercules*, becauſe his force is unconquerable; and ſometimes *Mercury*, as being reaſon. number, order and knowledge. 490

But beſides this polyonymy of God, according to his univerſal notion, there were other *dii ſpeciales*, or *ſpecial gods* alſo, amongſt the Pagans; which likewiſe were really but ſeveral names of one and the ſame ſupreme Deity, *variè utentis ſua poteſtate*, (as *Seneca* writeth) *diverſly uſing his power*, in particular caſes, and in the ſeveral parts of the world. Thus *Jupiter*, *Neptune* and *Pluto* (miſtaken by ſome Chriſtians, for a trinity of independent gods) though three civil gods, yet were they really but one and the ſame natural and philoſophick god; as acting in thoſe three parts of the world; the heaven, the ſea, the earth and hell. *Pluto* in *Plato*'s *Cratylus*, a name for that part of divine providence, which is exerciſed in the government of ſeparate ſouls after death.

This ſtyled by *Virgil* the Stygian *Jupiter*. But to others, *Pluto* together with *Ceres*, the manifeſtation of the Deity, in this whole terreſtrial globe. The celeſtial and terreſtrial *Jupiter* but one

one God. *Zeus* and *Hades* one and the ſame to *Orpheus*. *Euripides* doubtful whether God ſhould be invoked by the name of *Zeus*, or *Hades*. *Hermeſianax* the Colophonian poet, makes *Pluto* the firſt of thoſe many names of God, ſynonymous with *Zeus*. Page 490, 491

Neptune alſo, another ſpecial god, a name of the ſupreme Deity, as acting in the ſeas only. This affirmed by *Xenocrates* in *Stobæus*, *Zeno* in *Laertius*, *Balbus* and *Cotta* in *Cicero*, and alſo by *Maximus Tyrius*. 492

The Statue of *Jupiter* with three eyes, in *Pauſanias*; ſignifying, that according to the natural theology, it was one and the ſame God, ruling in thoſe three ſeveral parts of the world, the heaven, the ſea, and the earth; that was called by three names, *Jupiter*, *Neptune* and *Pluto*. Wherefore, ſince *Proſerpina* and *Ceres* are the ſame with *Pluto*, and *Salacia* with *Neptune*, concluded, that all theſe, though ſeveral poetical and political gods, yet were but one and the ſame natural and philoſophick God. 492, 493

Juno alſo, another ſpecial God, a name of the ſupreme Deity, as acting in the air. Thus *Xenocrates* and *Zeno*. The Pagans in St. *Auſtin*, that God, in the æther, is called *Jupiter*, in the air, *Juno*. So *Minerva* likewiſe, when taken for a ſpecial God, a name of the ſupreme God, according to that particular conſideration of him, as acting in the higher æther. From whence, St. *Auſtin* diſputeth againſt the Pagans. *Maximus Tyrius*, of theſe and many other gods of the Pagans, that they were but θεῖα ὀνόματα, *divine names*. 493, 494

Yet many other ſpecial gods amongſt the Pagans, which alſo were really nothing but divine names, or names of God, as variouſly exerciſing his power, or beſtowing ſeveral gifts; as in corn and fruit, *Ceres*; in wine, *Bacchus*; in medicine, *Æſculapius*; in traffick, *Mercury*; in war, *Mars*; in governing the winds, *Æolus*; *&c.* Page 494

That not only philoſophers did thus interpret the many poetical and political gods, into one and the ſame natural God; but the poets themſelves alſo ſometimes openly broached this more arcane, free and true theology; as *Hermeſionax* amongſt the Greeks, and *Valerius Soranus* amongſt the Latins. 494, 495

That St. *Auſtin* making a large enumeration of the other ſpecial gods, amongſt the Pagans, affirmeth of them univerſally, that, according to the ſenſe of the Pagan doctors, they were but one natural god, and all really the ſame with *Jupiter*. 495, 496

Apuleius, in his book *De Deo Socratis*, either not rightly underſtood by that learned and induſtrious philologer, *G. I. Voſſius*, or elſe not ſufficiently attended to. His deſign there plainly to reduce the Pagans civil Theology into a conformity with the natural and philoſophick; which he doth as a Platoniſt, by making the *dii conſentes* of the Romans, and other inviſible gods, to be all of them nothing but the divine ideas; and ſo the off-ſpring of one higheſt God. An occaſion for this phancy, given by *Plato*, where he calls his ideas animals.

Nor was *Apuleius* ſingular herein; *Julian* in his book againſt the Chriſtians going the very ſame way; and no otherwiſe underſtood by St. *Cyril*, than as to make the inviſible gods worſhipped by the Pagans to be the divine ideas. A phancy of the ſame *Julian*, who oppoſed the incarnation of the eternal Word, that *Æſculapius* was firſt of all the idea of the medicinal art, generated by the ſupreme God, in the intelligible world; which afterwards, by the vivifick influence of the ſun, was incarnated, and appeared in human form about *Epidaurus*. And that this Pagan doctrine, older than Chri-

Chriſtianity, proved out of *Philo*, writing of a ſun, and moon intelligible, as well as ſenſible, religiouſly worſhipped by the Pagans; that is, the ideas of the archetypal world. And thus were theſe ideas of the divine Intellect, νοητοὶ θεοὶ, *intelligible gods*, to *Plotinus* alſo. Page 496, &c. 501

Wherefore *Julian*, *Apuleius*, and thoſe others, who thus made all the Pagan inviſible gods to be nothing elſe but the divine ideas, the patterns of things in the archetypal world, ſuppoſed them not to be ſo many independent deities, nor really diſtinct ſubſtances, ſeparate from one another, but only ſo many partial conſiderations of one God. *Julian* before affirming them, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι αὐτὸς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ. *As to have been generated out of him; ſo alſo to coexiſt with him, and inexiſt in him.* 501, 502

That the Pagans appointed ſome particular god or goddeſs by name, to preſide over every thing; (there being μηδὲν ἄθεον, *nothing at all without a god to them*) appeareth from that catalogue of their ignoble, or petty gods, collected by St. *Auſtin* out of *Varro*. Now it is incredible, that they ſhould think all theſe to be ſo many ſingle, ſubſtantial ſpirits of each ſex, really exiſting apart in the world: they muſt therefore needs take them to be ſo many partial conſiderations of the Deity, either in the way of the more high-flown Platoniſts, as his ideas exemplarily and virtually containing all things; or elſe in that more common and eaſy way of the generality; as ſo many ſeveral denominations of him, according to the ſeveral manifeſtations of his power and providence; or, as the Pagans in *Euſebius* declare themſelves, thoſe ſeveral virtues and powers of the ſupreme God, themſelves perſonated and deified. Which yet, becauſe they were not executed, without the ſubſervient miniſtry of created ſpirits, angels or demons appointed to preſide over ſuch things; therefore might theſe alſo, collectively taken, be included under them. Page 502, 503

But for the fuller clearing of this point, that the Pagan polytheiſm was in great part nothing but the polyonymy of one God, two things here to be taken notice of. Firſt, that the Pagan theology univerſally ſuppoſed God to be diffuſed thorough all, to permeate and pervade all, and intimately to act all. Thus *Horus Apollo* of the Egyptians. Thus, among the Greeks, *Diogenes* the Cynick, *Ariſtotle* the Italick, and Stoical philoſophers. Thus the Indian Brachmans before *Strabo*. Thus alſo the Latin Poets; and *Seneca*, *Quintilian*, *Apuleius* and *Servius*, beſides others. 503, 504

That *Anaxagoras* and *Plato* alſo, though neither of them confounded God with the world, but affirmed him to be unmingled with any thing, yet concluded him in like manner to permeate and pervade all things. *Plato*'s etymology of δίκαιον, as taken for a name of God, to this purpoſe in his *Cratylus*. Where a fragment of *Heraclitus*, and his deſcription of God agreeably hereunto; a moſt ſubtle and ſwift ſubſtance, that permeates and paſſes through every thing, by which all things are made. But *Plato* diſclaiming this corporeity of the Deity, will neither have it fire, nor heat; but a perfect Mind, that paſſes through all things unmixedly. 505

Wherefore no wonder, if the Pagans ſuppoſing God to be diffuſed through all things, called him in the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature, by ſeveral names, as in the earth, *Ceres*; in the ſea, *Neptune*; &c. This account of the Pagan polytheiſm given by *Paulus Oroſius*, That whilſt they believed God to be in many things, they indiſcreetly made many gods of him. 505, 506

Further to be obſerved, that many of the

the Pagan theologers ſeemed to go yet a ſtrain higher, they ſuppoſing God not only to pervade all things, but alſo to be himſelf all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology ran ſo high, evident from the Saitick inſcription. A ſtrong tang hereof in *Æſchylus*; as alſo in *Lucan*. Neither was this proper to thoſe, who held God to be the Soul of the world, but the language alſo of thoſe other more refined philoſophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, *&c.* they affirming God to be One and All, with which agreeth the author of the Aſclepian Dialogue, that God is *Unus Omnia*, *one all things*; and that before things were made, he did then κρύπτειν *hide them*, or occultly contain them all within himſelf. In like manner *Orpheus*. Page 506, 507

This not only a further ground of the polyonymy of one God, according to the various manifeſtations of himſelf in the world, but alſo of another ſtrange phænomenon in the Pagan theology, their perſonating the inanimate parts of the world, and natures of things, and beſtowing the names of gods and goddeſſes upon them. Thus *Moſchopulus* before cited, and *Arnobius*. This *Plutarch* thinks to have been done at firſt metonymically only, the effects of the gods being called gods; as the books of *Plato*, *Plato*. And thus far not diſliked by him. But himſelf complaineth, that afterwards it was carried on further by ſuperſtitious religioniſts, and not without great impiety. Nevertheleſs, that inanimate ſubſtances, and the natures of things, were formerly deified by the ancient Pagans, otherwiſe than metonymically, proved from *Cicero*, *Philo*, and *Plato*. For they ſuppoſing God to pervade all things, and to be all things, did therefore look upon every thing as ſacred or divine; and theologize the parts of the world and natures of things; titularly making them gods and goddeſſes. But eſpecially ſuch things, as wherein human utility was moſt concerned, and which had moſt of wonder in them. Page 507, 510

This properly the phyſiological theology of the Pagans, their perſonating and deifying the natures of things, and inanimate ſubſtances. That the ancient poetick fables of the gods were many of them, in their firſt and true meaning, thus phyſiologically allegorical, and not mere herology, affirmed againſt *Euſebius*. *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chryſippus*, famous for thus allegorizing the fables of the gods. *Chryſippus* his allegorizing an obſcene picture of *Jupiter* and *Juno* in *Samos*. *Plato*, though no friend to theſe poetick fables, yet confeſſes ſome of them to have contained allegories in them: the ſame doth alſo *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*; and *Cicero* likewiſe, who affirmeth this perſonating and deifying the natures of things, to have filled the world with ſuperſtition. 510, 512

Againſt *Euſebius* again, That the whole theology of the Pagans conſiſted not in thus deifying the natures of things, and inanimate bodies; becauſe he, that acknowledgeth no animant God, acknowledgeth no God at all, but is a downright Atheiſt. 512

Neither ought this phyſiological theology of the Pagans, that conſiſted in perſonating and deifying the natures of things and inanimate bodies, to be confounded with that natural and philoſophical theology of *Varro*, *Scævola* and others, which admitted of no other but animant gods, and ſuch as really exiſted in nature: for which cauſe it was called natural, in oppoſition to the fictitious and phantaſtick poetick gods. 512

St. *Auſtin*'s juſt cenſure and condemnation of the Pagans, for their thus theologizing of phyſiology, or fictitiouſly perſonating and deifying the natures of things. 512, 513

But though the Pagans did thus verbally perſonate and deify the things of

nature, yet did not the intelligent a-mongſt them therefore count theſe true and proper gods. *Cotta* in *Cicero*, 'though 'we call corn *Ceres*, and wine *Bacchus*, 'yet was there never any one ſo mad, as to 'take that for a God, which himſelf feeds 'upon and devours.' The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the invoking whereof they might expect benefit to themſelves; and therefore nothing inanimate. This proved from *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Lucretius*, *Cicero* and *Plutarch*. Wherefore theſe natures of things deified, but fictitious and phantaſtick gods. Nor can any other ſenſe be made of them than this, that they were really but ſo many ſeveral names of one ſupreme God, as ſeverally manifeſted in his works: according to that Egyptian theology, that God may be called by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. With which agreeth *Seneca*, that there may be as many names of God, as there are gifts and effects of his; and the writer *De Mundo*, that God may be denominated from every nature, he being the cauſe of all things. Page 513, 515

Wherefore theſe deified natures of things were not directly worſhipped by the intelligent Pagans, but only relatively to the ſupreme God, or in way of complication with him only; and ſo not ſo much themſelves, as God worſhipped in them. The Pagans pretence, that they did not look upon the world with ſuch eyes as oxen and horſes do, but with religious eyes, ſo as to ſee God in every thing. They therefore worſhipped the inviſible Deity, in the viſible manifeſtations of himſelf; God and the world together. This ſometimes called *Pan* and *Jupiter*. Thus was the whole world ſaid to be the greateſt God, and the circle of the heavens worſhipped by the Perſians; not as inanimate matter, but as the viſible manifeſtation of the Deity, diſplayed from it, and pervaded by it. When the Roman ſea-captains ſacrificed to the waves, their worſhip intended to that God, who ſtilleth the waves, and quieteth the billows. Page 515, 516

Theſe Pagans alſo apprehended a neceſſity of permitting men to worſhip the inviſible God in his viſible works. This account given by them in *Euſebius*. *Plato* himſelf approved of worſhipping the inviſible God in the ſun, moon, and ſtars, as his viſible images. And though *Maximus Tyrius* would have men endeavour to riſe above the ſtarry heavens, and all viſible things, yet does he allow the weaker to worſhip God in his progeny. And *Socrates* perſuades *Euthydemus* to be contented herewith. Beſides which, ſome Pagans worſhipping the elements, directed their intention to the ſpirits of thoſe elements, as *Julian* in *Ammianus*, (theſe being ſuppoſed alſo to be animated) or elſe to thoſe dæmons, whom they conceived to inhabit them, or preſide over them. Page 516, 518

XXXIII. Further to be obſerved, that amongſt thoſe natures of things, ſome were merely accidental, as hope, love, deſire, memory, truth, virtue, piety, faith, juſtice, concord, clemency, victory, eccho, night. Acording to which, the vulgar Athenians ſuppoſed St. *Paul* to have deified *Anaſtaſis*, or made a goddeſs of the reſurrection, as well as a God of *Jeſus*. Vices alſo ſometimes thus deified by them, as Contumely and Impudence, (to whom were temples dedicated at *Athens*) though to the end, that theſe things might be deprecated. Theſe accidents ſometimes deified under counterfeit proper names, as Pleaſure under the name of *Volupia*, and *Lubentina Venus*; Time under the name of *Chronos* or *Saturn*; Prudence, or Wiſdom, under the names of *Athena*, or *Minerva*; againſt which, *Origen* in his anſwer to *Celſus*.

Cicero himſelf allowed of dedicating temples to mind, virtue, piety, faith, *&c.* Page 518, 520

But ſuch accidents and affections of things deified could not poſſibly be accounted true and proper gods, they having not ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, any *real ſubſiſtence*, or *ſubſtantial eſſence* of their own. And thus does *Origen* again diſpute againſt *Minerva*'s godſhip, as tropologized into prudence. As he doth alſo elſewhere, upon the ſame ground, againſt that of Memory, the mother of the muſes, and that of the graces; he concluding, theſe and ſuch like therefore, to be nothing but figments of the Greeks, they being things perſonated, and feigned with human members. Thus the Pagans condemned by *Prudentius* alſo, for feigning things incorporeal, with counterfeit members. Theſe gods plainly exploded by *Cotta*, or *Cicero* in diſguiſe; as having only *vim rerum*, but not *deorum*, *the force of things*, but not *of gods* in them; or being but *naturæ rerum*, and not *figuræ deorum*. 520, 521

Wherefore the true meaning of theſe deified natures of things could be no other than this, that God was to be acknowledged and worſhipped in all things; or, as the Pagans themſelves declare it, that the force of every thing was, both governed by God, and it ſelf divine. *Pliny* of this breaking and crumbling of the Deity into parts, every one worſhiping that in God, and for a god, which himſelf moſt ſtood in need of. This dividing of the ſimple Deity, and worſhipping it brokenly by parcels and piecemeal, as manifeſted in all the ſeveral things of nature, and parts of the world, juſtly cenſured, and elegantly perſtringed, by *Prudentius* againſt *Symmachus*. Where *Prudentius* grants, that *Symmachus*, who declared, that it was one thing, which all worſhipped; when he ſacrificed to Victory, did ſacrifice to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory. This, in the Egyptian allegory, *Oſiris* mangled and cut in pieces by *Typhon*. Victory and Virtue, as well as *Neptune*, *Mars* and *Bellona*, but ſeveral names or notions of *Jupiter*, in the prologue of *Plautus* his *Amphitryo*. Page 521, 522

Voſſius his opinion, that theſe deified accidents, and natures of things, as well as the other Pagan inviſible Gods, were commonly look'd upon by the vulgar, as ſo many ſingle, ſubſtantial minds, or ſpirits created by the ſupreme God, and appointed to preſide over thoſe ſeveral things reſpectively. Where it is acknowledged, that neither the political, nor the poetical gods of the Pagans, were taken, ſo much as by the vulgar, for ſo many independent deities. 523, 524

Probable, that by theſe gods the wiſer Pagans ſometimes underſtood dæmons in general, or collectively; that is, whoſoever they were, that were appointed to preſide over thoſe ſeveral things, or diſpenſe them. As *Æolus* in *Arrianus* ſeems to be taken for the dæmons appointed by God Almighty to preſide over the winds. 524, 525

Lactantius his reaſon, why the *Conſentes* and ſelect gods, vulgarly worſhipped by the Romans, could not be ſingle dæmons or angels. 525

And from *Ariſtotle*'s obſervation, againſt *Zeno*, That, according to law, or civil theology, one God was chief for one thing, and another for another, concluded, that theſe political gods were not properly the ſubſervient miniſters of the Supreme; and therefore could be nothing but ſeveral names and notions of one natural God, according to his various powers and effects. 525, 526

And thus does *Voſſius* himſelf afterwards confeſs, that, according to the natural theology, all the Pagan gods were but ſeveral denominations of one God. Where, notwithſtanding, this

learned and induſtrious philologer ſeems to take the natural and philoſophick theology for the phyſiological, he making the god thereof the nature of things. Whereas the natural theology was the true, and real, and philoſophical, oppoſed both to the fictions of the poets, and the inſtitutes of law-makers and politicians. As *Varro* affirmeth, that in cities thoſe things were worſhipped and believed, according to falſe opinions, which had no nature, nor real ſubſiſtence, neither in the world, nor without it. The God of the Pagans not the nature of things, which could be the Numen of none but of Atheiſts; but an underſtanding Being, the great Mind, or Soul of the whole world, pervading all things. Thus unqueſtionably true, that the many poetical and political gods were but ſeveral names or notions of one natural, real, and true God. Beſides which, there were other inferiour miniſters of this ſupreme God, acknowledged to be the inſtruments of his providence, and religiouſly worſhipped alſo. A brief, but full account, of the Pagans natural theology, ſet down by *Prudentius*. Page 526, 527

And when the more high-flown Pagans referred theſe poetical and political gods to the divine ideas, or patterns of things in the archetypal world; which, beſides the Platoniſts, the Egyptians in *Celſus* are ſaid to have done, making the brute animals worſhipped by them, but ſymbols of the eternal ideas; they hereby made theſe gods to be but ſo many partial conſiderations of one God neither, as being all things, or containing in himſelf the cauſes of all things; as *Julian* himſelf declareth in his ſixth oration. 527, 528

An anacephalæoſis, that much of the Pagan polytheiſm was but the polyonymy of one God; he being worſhipped under ſeveral names. Firſt, according to ſeveral general notions of him; as of *Janus*, *Genius*, *Saturn*, *Minerva*, *Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, or Love, and others before declared. So alſo of *Summanus*, according to S. *Auſtin*, and *Themis*, afterwards to be mentioned. Page 528, 529

And ſecondly, according to other more particular notions of them, (in their ſpecial gods) as acting in ſome parts of the world only, or exerciſing ſome particular powers. 529, 530

And laſtly, as pervading all things, and being all things, or the cauſe of all things, he was thereupon called by the name of every thing, or every thing by his name. The Pagans in S. *Auſtin*; that their anceſtors were not ſo ſottiſh, as not to underſtand, that thoſe things of nature were but divine gifts, and not themſelves gods. And the Pagans in *Euſebius*; that the inviſible God, the cauſe of all things, ought to be worſhipped in his viſible effects, wherein he hath diſplayed himſelf. 530

Though the two former kinds of theſe gods only called by *Athanaſius* poetical and fictitious, he oppoſing them to thoſe of the third ſort, that were natural and real things; yet may theſe alſo be well called poetical, fictitious, and phantaſtical gods too; becauſe though themſelves were real things, exiſting in nature, yet was their perſonation, and deification, meer fiction, fancy and poetry. And accordingly, were they before called by *Origen* Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, *meer figments of the Greeks.* 530, 531

XXXIV. Of thoſe Pagans, who ſuppoſed the ſupreme God to be the whole animated world. Hitherto ſhewed, that even the moſt refined of the Pagans agreed in theſe two things. Firſt, in breaking and crumbling the one ſimple Deity, and multiplying it into many gods; or parcelling it out into ſeveral particular notions, according to its ſeveral powers and virtues (Πολυώνυμον being,

being, to theſe Pagans, the ſame thing with Πολυδύναμον.) And then, in theologizing the whole world, perſonating and deifying the natures of things, accidents, and inanimate bodies. They ſuppoſing God to pervade all things, and himſelf to be in a manner all things: therefore every thing to the religious, ſacred and divine; and God to be worſhipped in all. Page 531, 532

We ſhall now add, that both thoſe forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, were carried on farther by thoſe Pagan theologers, who had no higher notion of the ſupreme Deity, than as the ſoul of the world. For firſt, whereas the more refined Pagans ſuppoſed God to pervade all things unmixedly; theſe mingled and confounded him with the whole world; ſome of them ſuppoſing him alſo to be a ſubtile body. 532, 533

Again, whereas the other more ſublimated Pagans affirmed God ſo to be all, as nevertheleſs to be ſomething alſo above all; theſe concluded him to be nothing higher than the animated world. 533

And though they ſuppoſed, that as well in this mundane animal, as in other animals, there was ſomething principal and hegemonical, (whether the ſun, or æther, or fire,) which therefore was emphatically called God; yet did they conceive the whole matter thereof to be animated, and ſo to be all God. Not barely as matter, but by reaſon of the ſoul thereof. 534, 535

Now if the whole world animated be the ſupreme God, then muſt all the parts and members of the world be the parts and members of one God; but not themſelves therefore properly ſo many gods. This affirmed by *Origen*, as the true ſenſe of theſe Pagans, againſt that unwary aſſertion of *Celſus*, that if the whole were god, then muſt the ſeveral parts thereof needs be gods. Page 535

Wherefore though theſe Pagans deified the parts of the world and natures of things, as well as the powers of the mundane ſoul; yet did not the intelligent amongſt them worſhip them ſeverally, as ſo many true and proper gods, but only as the parts and members of one great animal or god; or rather worſhip the great mundane Soul (the life of the whole world) in them all. This proved from S. *Auſtin*. 536, 537

The ſame plainly declared alſo by the Pagans in *Athanaſius*, that not the divided parts of the world were by them accounted ſo many ſeveral gods, but the whole, made up of them all, one God; which yet might be worſhipped in its ſeveral parts. 537

The Pagans being thus divided, as to their opinions, concerning the natural and true theology; ſome of them worſhipped the world as the body of God, but others only as his image or temple. Thus *Plutarch*, though diſliking the deifying of inanimate things, did notwithſtanding approve of worſhipping God in the whole world, as his moſt ſacred temple. And the Perſian Magi, allowing of no artificial temples, made with mens hands, worſhipped God *ſub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, as conceiving the whole world to be his natural temple. For the ſame reaſon did they condemn alſo artificial ſtatues and images, concluding fire, earth, and water, and the like parts of the world, to be the natural images of the Deity. Thus *Dino* in *Clemens Alexandrinus*. This difference amongſt the Pagan theologers noted by *Macrobius*. Thus were all the Pagans world-worſhippers, in different ſenſes; but not as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or elſe as his temple or image. 537, 539

Fur-

Furthermore, the Pagans univerſally acknowledging the world to be an animal, thoſe of them, who ſuppoſed it not to be the firſt and higheſt God, conceiv'd it to be either a ſecond, or elſe a third God; and ſo worſhipped it, not only as a temple or image, but alſo as the ſon of the firſt God. *Celſus* pretended the Chriſtians to have called their *Jeſus*, the *Son of God*, in imitation of theſe Pagans, who ſtyled the world ſo. Page 539, 540

Thus have we made it fully to appear, that, according to the ſaying of *Antiſthenes*, the many popular gods of the Pagans were but one and the ſame natural God; or, according to that of *Euclides*, their many gods were but many names. So that neither their poetical, nor yet their political theology, was looked upon by them as true and natural. 540

Nevertheleſs, the wiſer Pagans generally concluded, that there ought to be another theology, beſides the natural, fitly calculated for the vulgar, and having a mixture of falſhood and fabuloſity in it. *Varro* and *Scævola* agreed, that the vulgar being uncapable of the true and natural theology, it was expedient for them to be deceived in their religion. *Strabo* alſo, that the vulgar cannot by philoſophick reaſon, and truth, be carried on to piety; but this muſt be done by ſuperſtition, and by the help of fables, and prodigious relations. The ſame partly acknowledged by *Syneſius* for true. *Plato* alſo, that it is hard to find out God, but impoſſible to declare him to the vulgar; and therefore a neceſſity of a civil theology, diſtinct from the natural and philoſophical. 540, 542

XXXV. We come now to the next thing propoſed, that, beſides this ſeeming and phantaſtick polytheiſm of the Pagans, which was nothing but the polyonymy of one God, they had another real polytheiſm, even in their natural and philoſophick theology it ſelf. But this not of ſelf-exiſtent gods, but generated or created ones only. Thus, according to *Plutarch*, one higheſt unmade God is the maker and father of all the other gods, generated or derived from him. And *Proclus* concludes, all the gods to derive their godſhip from the firſt God; who therefore is the fountain of the Godhead. Page 542, 543

Theſe inferiour Pagan gods ſtyled by *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſubſtantial powers, in way of oppoſition to thoſe other poetical and political gods, that were not ſubſtantial or real, but only ſeveral names or notions of one ſupreme God. Thoſe ſubſtantial powers (as divination and prophecy was by them imparted to men) ſaid to be all ſubject to that one ſovereign Deity, called *Themis*, placed by Pagan theologers in the throne of *Jupiter*. This *Themis* alſo another name or notion of the ſupreme God, beſides thoſe before mentioned. Poetry and phantaſtry intermingled by the Pagans with their natural or philoſophick theology. 543, 544

Thus the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different ſenſes. *Onatus* and *Plotinus*, that the majeſty of the ſupreme God conſiſteth in having multitudes of gods dependent on him, and ruled by him; and that the honour done to them redounds to him. The gods of the original Pagans, not meer dead ſtatues and images, but living underſtanding beings, repreſented by them. That Chriſtians aſſerted no ſolitary Deity, as Pagans pretended, but agreed with this of *Seneca*, that God hath generated or created, innumerable underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, miniſters of his kingdom; the only difference being this, that they gave them no religious worſhip: out of *Lactantius*. 544, 546

XXXVI.

XXXVI. That beſides the inferiour gods, generally received by all the Pagans, (namely, animated ſtars, dæmons, and heroes,) the more refined of them, who accounted not the animated world the ſupreme Deity, acknowledged a Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, ſuperiour to them all. Which doctrine affirmed by *Plotinus* to have been very ancient, and no invention of *Plato*'s. Page 546

Parmenides an aſſerter of a trinity, long before *Plato*. This imputed to the Pythagoreans, by *Moderatus* in *Simplicius*, and *Jamblichus* in *Proclus*. Before *Pythagoras*, *Orpheus* had his trinity, *Phanes*, *Uranus*, and *Chronus*; the ſame with *Plato*'s three kings or principles. Probable, that *Pythagoras* and *Orpheus* derived the ſame from the theology of the Egyptian *Hermes*. Some footſteps of ſuch a trinity, in the Mithraick myſteries, amongſt the Perſians, and the Zoroaſtrian Cabala. The ſame expreſly declared in the Magick or Chaldaic oracles. A trinity of gods worſhipped anciently by the Samothracians, and called by an Hebrew name *Cabiri*, the *mighty gods*. From thence the Roman Capitoline trinity derived; the ſecond whereof, *Minerva*, or the divine wiſdom. The *Ternary*, a number uſed by the Pagans, in their religious rites, as myſterious. 546, 547

It being no way probable, that ſuch a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſhould have ſprung from human wit, we may reaſonably aſſent to what *Proclus* affirmeth, that it was at firſt Θεοπαράδοτος Θεολογία, a *theology of divine tradition* or *revelation*; as having been firſt imparted to the Hebrews, and from them communicated to other nations. Nevertheleſs, as this divine Cabala was but little underſtood by theſe Pagans, ſo was it by many of them depraved and adulterated. 547, 548

This called univerſally by them, a trinity of gods; or a firſt, ſecond, and third god: by ſome a trinity of cauſes, and of principles, and of opificers. The tradition of the three gods, in *Proclus*, ancient and famous. *Numenius* his three gods, called by him, the father, the ſon, and the nephew, (or grandſon.) *Nous* or Intellect, to *Plotinus*, a ſecond god: as alſo the world an image of all the three gods. *Plotinus* and *Porphyrius*, their ecſtatick union with the firſt of theſe three gods. Page 548, 549

That *Philo*, a religious Jew, and zealous oppoſer of the Pagan polytheiſm, called, notwithſtanding, the divine Word alſo a ſecond god. This not agreeable to the principles of Chriſtianity. Nevertheleſs S. *Auſtin* partly excuſes this language in the Pagans. 549, 550

And they perhaps the more excuſable, becauſe they ſometimes called alſo thoſe three hypoſtaſes, taken all together, the firſt god. 551

Nor was this trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ill-languaged only by the Pagans, but alſo the Cabala thereof much depraved and adulterated by ſome Platoniſts and Pythagoreans. As firſt, ſuch as made the world to be the third god. Such a trinity, a confounding of God and creature together. 551, 552

And that this an adulterated notion of the trinity, evident from hence; becauſe no reaſon, why theſe philoſophers ſhould ſtop here, ſince the ſun, moon and ſtars, and their other generated gods, differ not in kind, but only in degree, from the world. 552

Neither will this excuſe them, that they underſtood this chiefly of the ſoul of the world; ſince if there were ſuch a mundane ſoul, as together with the world made up one animal, this it ſelf muſt needs be a creature alſo. *ibid.*

This probably the reaſon, why *Philo*, though acknowledging the divine Word,

Word, as a ſecond god, and ſecond cauſe, yet no where ſpeaketh of a third god; leſt he ſhould thereby ſeem to deify the whole created world. Though he call God alſo, in ſome ſenſe, the ſoul of the world too, (whether meaning thereby his firſt, or his ſecond god.) So that *Philo* ſeems to have acknowledged only a duality, and not a trinity, of divine hypoſtaſes. Page 552, 553

Another depravation of this Θεοπαράδοτος Θεολογία, *theology of divine tradition*, or Cabala of the trinity, that ſome of theſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, concluding all thoſe ſeveral ideas of the divine intellect, or archetypal world, to be ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances, animals, and gods; have thereby made their ſecond hypoſtaſis, not one, but a heap of innumerable gods and hypoſtaſes; and conſequently deſtroyed their trinity. 553

Though *Philo* again here Platonized ſo far, as to ſuppoſe an incorporeal heaven and earth, and an intelligible ſun, moon, and ſtars, to have been made before the corporeal and ſenſible; yet does he no where declare them to be ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances and animals, much leſs gods; but on the contrary cenſures that for Pagan idolatry. This pretence of worſhipping the divine ideas, in all ſenſible things, that which gave ſanctuary and protection to the fouleſt and ſottiſheſt of all the Pagan idolatries; the Egyptians worſhipping brute animals thus, and the Greeks the parts of the world inanimate, and natures of things. 554

A third depravation or adulteration of the divine Cabala of the trinity, by *Proclus* and other latter Platoniſts, aſſerting an innumerable company of Henades, particular unities, ſuperiour to the firſt *Nous*, or Intellect, their ſecond hypoſtaſis; as alſo innumerable *Noes*, ſubſtantial Minds or Intellects, ſuperiour to the firſt *Pſyche*, their third hypoſtaſis. Page 555

Theſe *Noes* ſeem to be aſſerted by *Plotinus* alſo; as likewiſe the *Henades* and *Agathotetes* were by *Simplicius*. 555, 556

A ſwarm of innumerable Pagan gods from hence; beſides their intelligible gods; or ideas, particular *Henades* and *Noes*, unities and intellects. *ibid.*

Now ſince theſe particular *Henades* and *Noes* of theirs muſt needs be creatures; the trinity of *Proclus* and ſuch others, nothing but a ſcale or ladder of nature, wherein God and the creature are confounded together; the juncture or commiſſure betwixt them being no where diſcernible; as if they differed only in degrees: a groſs miſtake and adulteration of the ancient Cabala of the trinity. 556, 557

This that Platonick, or rather Pſeudo-Platonick trinity, by us oppoſed to the Chriſtian, *viz.* ſuch a trinity, as confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature; bringing the Deity, by degrees, down lower and lower, and at length ſcattering it into all the animated parts of the world; a foundation for infinite polytheiſm, coſmolatry or world-idolatry, and creature-worſhip. Hence the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans the fitteſt men to be champions for Paganiſm againſt Chriſtianity. 557, 558

Concerning the Chriſtian Trinity, three things to be obſerved. Firſt, that it is not a trinity of meer names and words, nor logical notions, or inadequate conceptions of God; this doctrine having been condemned by the Chriſtian church, in *Sabellius* and others; but a trinity of hypoſtaſes, ſubſiſtences, or perſons. 558, 559

The ſecond thing obſervable in the Chriſtian Trinity, that though the ſecond hypoſtaſis thereof were begotten from the firſt, and the third proceedeth both from

from the first and second; yet neither of them creatures. First, because not made ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων, or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, but both of them co-eternal with the father. Secondly, because all necessarily existent, and unannihilable. Thirdly, because all of them universal, or infinite, and creatures of all other particular beings. Page 559

The third observable as to the Christian Trinity, that the three hypostases thereof are all truely and really one God; not only by reason of agreement of will, but also of a mutual περιχώρησις and ἐνύπαρξις, *permeation* of each other, and *inexistence*. Though no instance of the like unity to be found elsewhere in nature; yet since two distinct substances, corporeal, and incorporeal, make one man and person in our selves, much more may three divine hypostases be one God. *ibid.*

Though much of mystery in the Christian Trinity, yet nothing of plain contradiction to reason therein; that is, no nonsense, and impossibility. The ill design of those, who represent the Christian Trinity as absolutely contradictious to reason, that they may thereby debauch men's understandings, and make them swallow down other things, which unquestionably are such. 560

The Christian Trinity much more agreeable to reason, than the Pseudo-Platonick, in the three particulars before mentioned. First, its making their third hypostasis the animated world, or mundane soul. Which, not only too great a leap betwixt the second and third, but also a gross debasement of the Deity, and confounding it with the creature; a foundation for world-idolatry, and worshipping inanimate things, as parts and members of God. *ibid.*

God to *Origen*, but *quasi anima mundi*, as it were the soul of the world, and not truly and properly such. All the perfection of this notion to be attributed to God, but not the imperfection thereof. Page 560, 561

Certain, that, according to the more refined Platonists, their third divine hypostasis, not a mundane, but supramundane soul, and the δημιουργὸς, or *opificer* of the whole world. So to *Amelius*, *Porphyrius*, and *Plotinus*. A double soul of the world to *Plato* likewise. The third hypostasis, to these, no creature, but a creator. 562

So in their second particular, (whereby the forementioned Pseudo-Platonick trinity, no trinity) its making all the ideas and archetypal paradigms of things, so many hypostases, animals, and gods. This a monstrous extravagancy. Not to be doubted, but that *Plato* well understood these ideas to be nothing but *Noëmata*, or conceptions of the divine mind, existing no-where apart by themselves; however called οὐσίαι, *essences* or *substances*, because not such accidental and evanid things as our human thoughts are, they being the standing and eternal objects of all science: As also ζῶα, or *animals*; to signify, that they were not meer dead forms, as pictures upon paper, or carved statues. And thus did not only *Amelius* understand St. *John*, concerning the *Logos*, whatsoever was made was life in him, but also divers of the ancient fathers, Greek and Latin. This deifying of ideas but a piece of Pagan poetry. 562, 563

Lastly, whereas *Proclus* and others intermingle many particular gods with those three universal hypostases, and *Henades* and *Agathotetes*, unities and goodnesses, substantial above the first intellect; and *Noes*, particular minds or intellects, above the first soul; this hypothesis of theirs altogether irrational and absurd; there being nothing essentially goodness, wisdom, and sanctity, but the three divine hypostases, all other beings having only

only a participation thereof. Thus *Origen* expreſly; who therefore acknowledgeth no higher rank of created beings, than ſuch as the Platoniſts call Souls, that are ſelf-moveable, vitally unitable to bodies, and peccable. With whom agreeth S. *Jerom*, and others of the fathers, that God is the only impeccable Being; but all underſtanding creatures, free-willed, and lapſable. Page Page 564, 565

An opinion of *Simplicius*, that even in that rank of beings called Souls (though not eſſentially immutable, but ſelf-moveable) ſome are of ſo high a pitch, as that they can never degenerate, nor ſink or fall into vicious habits. Inſomuch that he makes a queſtion, whether *Proæreſis* belong to them or no. 565, 566

But whatever is to be thought of this, *Origen* too far in the other extreme, in denying any other ranks of ſouls above human; and ſuppoſing all the difference, that is now betwixt the higheſt angels, and men, to have proceeded only from their merits, and different uſes of their free will; his reaſon being this, becauſe God would be otherwiſe a *Proſopoleptes*, or accepter of perſons. This alſo extended by him to the ſoul of our Saviour Chriſt; as not partially choſen to that dignity, but for its faithful adherence to the divine word in a præ-exiſtent ſtate; which he would prove from Scripture. But if a rank of ſouls below human, and ſpecifically differing from them, as *Origen* himſelf confeſſes thoſe of brutes to be; no reaſon, why there might not alſo be other ranks or ſpecies ſuperiour to them. 566, 567

But leaſt of all can we aſſent to *Origen*, when from this principle, that all ſouls are eſſentially endued with free will, and therefore in their nature peccable, he infers thoſe endleſs circuits of ſouls, upwards and downwards, and conſequently denies them any fixed ſtate of holineſs and happineſs by divine grace: an aſſertion contrary to the tenour and promiſes of the goſpel. Thus perhaps that to be underſtood, that *Chriſt brought life and immortality to light through the goſpel*; not as if he were the firſt, who taught the ſoul's immortality, a thing believed before by the Phariſaick Jews, and generality of Pagans; but becauſe theſe held their endleſs tranſmigrations and circuits, therefore was he the firſt, who brought everlaſting life and happineſs to light. Page 567, 568

That *Origen*, a man well ſkilled in the Platonick learning, and ſo much addicted to the dogmata thereof, would never have gone ſo far into that other extreme, had there been any ſolidity of reaſon for either thoſe *Henades*, or *Noes*, of the latter Platoniſts. This opinion all one, as if a Chriſtian ſhould ſuppoſe, beſides the firſt perſon, or father, a multitude of particular paternities, ſuperiour to the ſecond perſon; and alſo beſides the one Son, or Word, a multitude of particular ſons or words, ſuperiour to the third, the Holy Ghoſt. This plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, and to introduce a company of ſuch creaturely gods, as imply a contradiction in their very notion. 568

Laſtly, this not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick ſchool neither, but a private opinion only of ſome late doctors. No footſteps of thoſe *Henades* and *Agathotetes* to be found any where in *Plato*; nor yet in *Plotinus*. This language little older than *Proclus*. Nor does *Plato* ſpeak of any abſtract or ſeparate mind, ſave only one; his ſecond things about the ſecond, being ideas; as his thirds about the third created beings. *Plotinus* alſo doubtful and ſtaggering about theſe *Noes*, he ſeeming ſometimes to make them but the heads or ſummities of ſouls. Wherefore

this Pſeudo-Platonick trinity to be exploded, as confounding the differences betwixt God and the creature. Whereas the Chriſtian Trinity homogeneal, all Deity or Creator; all other things being ſuppoſed to be the creatures of thoſe three hypoſtaſes, and produced by their joint-concurrence and influence; they being all really but one God. Page 568, 570

Nevertheleſs, theſe forementioned depravations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, not to be charged upon *Plato* himſelf, nor all the other ancient Platoniſts and Pythagoreans; ſome of which approached ſo near to the Chriſtian Trinity, as to make their three hypoſtaſes all truly divine, and creators, other things being the creatures of them. *ibid.*

Firſt therefore, *Plato* himſelf, in his *Timæus*, carefully diſtinguiſheth betwixt God and the creature, and determineth the bounds of each, after this manner. That the firſt is that, which *always is, and was never made*; the ſecond, that which is *made and had a beginning*, but truely *is not*. His meaning here perverted by junior Platoniſts, whom *Boetius* alſo followed. Where *Plato* takes it for granted, that whatſoever hath a temporary and ſucceſſive duration, had a beginning; and whatſoever had no beginning, hath no ſucceſſive, but permanent duration: and ſo concludes, that whatſoever is eternal, is God; but whatſoever exiſts in time, and hath a beginning, creature. 570, 572

Now to *Plato*, more eternal gods than one. Which not ideas or *Noemata*, but true ſubſtantial things; his firſt, ſecond, and third, in his epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, or trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, the makers or creators of the whole world. *Cicero*'s gods, by whoſe providence the world and all its parts were framed. 572, 573

The ſecond hypoſtaſis in *Plato*'s trinity, to wit, Mind or Intellect, unqueſtionably eternal, and without beginning. The ſame affirmed by *Plotinus* alſo of the third hypoſtaſis, or *Pſyche*, called the Word of the ſecond, as the ſecond, the Word of the firſt. *Porphyrius* his teſtimony to this purpoſe in S. *Cyril*; where alſo Mind, or the ſecond divine hypoſtaſis, (though ſaid to have been begotten from the firſt, yet) called αὐτοπάτωρ, and αὐτογέννητον, *its own-parent*, and its *own-offspring*, and ſaid to have ſprung out αὐτογόνως, *ſelf-begottenly*. Page 573, 574

This myſterious riddle expounded out of *Plotinus*. The plain meaning thereof no more than this, that though this ſecond hypoſtaſis proceeded from the firſt, yet was it not produced by it after a creaturely manner, nor arbitrariouſly by will and choice, but in way of natural and neceſſary emanation. Thus have ſome Chriſtians ventured to call the *Logos*, αὐτόθεον, and *ex ſeipſo Deum, God from himſelf*. 574, 575

Dionyſius Petavius, having declared the doctrine of *Arius*, that the Father was the only eternal God, and the Son, or Word, a creature, made in time, and out of nothing; concludes it undeniably manifeſt from hence, that *Arius* was a germane, true, and genuine Platoniſt. Whereas it is moſt certain from hence, that *Arius* was no Platoniſt at all; and that *Petavius* himſelf did not well underſtand the Platonick doctrine. Had *Plato* denied the eternity of his ſecond hypoſtaſis, called *Nous*, he muſt have denied the eternity of Wiſdom and Underſtanding itſelf; this being to him that wiſdom by which God himſelf is wiſe, and whereby he made the world. With which agreeth alſo *Athanaſius*; our *Lord is wiſdom*, and not *ſecond to any other wiſdom*: and, *the Father of the Word is not himſelf Word*: and, *that was not Word and Wiſdom, which produced Word and Wiſdom.*

dom. This in oppoſition to *Arius*, who maintained another word and wiſdom, ſenior to that word and wiſdom in Chriſt. Theſe Platoniſts, ſo far from denying the eternity of the word, that they rather attributed too much to it, in making it ſelf-begotten. Wherefore *Plato*, aſſerting the eternity of his ſecond hypoſtaſis, *Nous* or *Logos*, and not of the world, did thereby, according to *Athanaſius* his own doctrine, make it to be no creature. Page 575

Nor is there any force at all in that teſtimony of *Macrobius*, cited by *Petavius*, to the contrary, wherein the firſt hypoſtaſis is ſaid to have created Mind from it ſelf, and the ſecond to have created Soul; becauſe theſe ancient Pagans did not confine the word *creare* to ſuch a narrow ſenſe, as Chriſtians commonly do; but uſed it generally for all manner of production. *Petavius* his miſtake, chiefly from that ſpurious trinity of the latter Platoniſts, whoſe third god is by themſelves called ποίημα, *a creature.* But this not the doctrine of the ancients. 576

Nevertheleſs, ſome more reaſon to doubt, whether *Plato*'s third hypoſtaſis were eternal, becauſe in his *Timæus*, he generates the mundane Soul, this controverſy decided, by ſuppoſing a double Pſyche, ἐγκόσμιον, and ὑπερκόσμιον, *a mundane* and *ſupra-mundane* ſoul; the firſt of theſe called by *Plotinus*, a heavenly *Venus*, and a ſeparate ſoul. Wherefore, though the lower *Venus*, or mundane ſoul, according to *Plato*, made in time together with the world; yet the higher divine Soul, or heavenly *Venus*, the ſon of *Ckronus* without a mother, his third hypoſtaſis, eternal, and without beginning. 576, 577

This further evident from hence, becauſe *Plato*, in his epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, affirmeth as well of the ſecond and third, as of the firſt, that in all thoſe things that are cognate to our human ſoul, (or creaturely) there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, *nothing like thereunto.* 577

Secondly, the three hypoſtaſes of *Plato*'s trinity, not only all eternal, but alſo neceſſarily exiſtent, and abſolutely unannihilable. Nor could the firſt any more exiſt without the ſecond and third, than the ſun without its primary light, and ſecondary ſplendour. Theſe alſo, according to *Plotinus*, the three principles of the univerſe; ſo that there could be neither more, nor fewer. They who called the ſecond *autopator*, ſignified thereby the neceſſity of its exiſtence. Page 577, 578

Thirdly, theſe three Platonick hypoſtaſes, as eternal and neceſſary, ſo likewiſe univerſal, or comprehenſive of the whole world, that is, infinite and omnipotent. Therefore called principles and cauſes, and opificers. Though *Nous*, or *Mind*, vulgarly looked upon as the higheſt principle of all things, yet *Plato* ſet before it one moſt ſimple Good. When *Nous*, ſaid by *Plato* to be γενέσης, of the *ſame kind* with the firſt Cauſe of all things, this all one as if he had affirmed it to be ὁμοούσιον, *co-eſſential* or *con-ſubſtantial* with it 578, 579

Plato's third hypoſtaſis, *Pſyche* or the *ſuperiour*, *mundane Soul*, called by him *Zeus*, from ζῆν, as alſo the Cauſe and Fountain of life, and the Prince and King of all things. And when ſaid to be ἔκγονος, *the Offſpring of the higheſt Mind*, thereby made conſubſtantial with it alſo. So that *Plato*'s whole trinity *Homoouſian.* 579

Though by the *Demiurgus* or *Opificer Plato* commonly meant the ſecond hypoſtaſis, Mind or Intellect; yet *Atticus*, *Amelius*, *Plotinus* and others, called the third, or the higher *Pſyche* alſo, by that name. Wherefore, according to the genuine Platonick, and Parmenidian trinity, all the three hypoſtaſes joint-creatures of the whole world. Thus *Ficinus* often, and *Proclus*. *Porphyrius* his affirmation, that the Deity, according to

to *Plato*, extends to three hypoſtaſes Page 579

Certain therefore, that *Arius* did not Platonize, but rather *Athanaſius* and the Nicene fathers; who, notwithſtanding, made not *Plato*, but the Scriptures, their foundation. The genuine trinity of *Plato* and *Parmenides*, a middle betwixt that of *Sabellius*, and that of *Arius*; it being neither a trinity of words and names as the former; nor an heteroouſious trinity, a confuſed jumble of God and the creature together; but homoouſious and homogeneal: all eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent, infinite or omnipotent, and creator. 579, 580

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the moſt refined Platonick and Parmenidian trinity does either agree, or diſagree, with the Scripture and Chriſtian doctrine, two things further to be obſerved concerning it. Firſt, that the Platoniſts univerſally aſſerted an eſſential dependence of their ſecond and third hypoſtaſes upon the firſt, as alſo a gradual ſubordination in them. Thus *Plotinus*; *Chronos*, or the ſecond hypoſtaſis, is in a middle ſtate betwixt his father, who is greater, and his ſon, who is inferiour. And that in this eternal generation or emanation no progreſs upward, but all downward, and a gradual deſcent. 580, 581

More of the dependence and gradual ſubordination of the ſecond and third hypoſtaſes of the Platonick trinity to the firſt. Each following hypoſtaſis called ἴχνος and τύπος and εἰκὼν, and εἴδωλον, and μίμημα of that before it. *Philo*'s offenſive expreſſion, that the *Logos*, or *Word*, is the ſhadow of God. This gradation commonly illuſtrated by the ἔκλαμψις, or ἀπαύγασμα, the *effulgency*, or *out-ſhining ſplendour of the ſun*. 581, 582

The ſame further manifeſted from the ſeveral diſtinctive characters given to each hypoſtaſis, in the true Platonick, or Parmenidian trinity. The firſt, ἓν πρὸ πάντων, *one before all things*; the ſecond, ἓν πάντα, *one all things*, as to their diſtinct ideas; the third, ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one really producing all things*. The firſt, Unity and Goodneſs eſſential; the ſecond, Underſtanding and Wiſdom; the third, ſelf-active Love and Power. The firſt, or Father ἀνενέργητος, *above action*; the ſecond or Son, the *Demiurgus*, *the Maker or contriving Architect of the world*, but an immoveable nature; the third a moveable Deity, and the immediate governour of the whole world. *Amelius* his diſtinction of them into τὸν ὄντα τὸν ἔκοντα, τὸν ὁρῶντα. 582, 583

The greateſt difficulty in the diſtinctive characters of theſe three Platonick hypoſtaſes; that Underſtanding, Reaſon and Wiſdom, ſhould be made peculiar to the ſecond, as if the firſt were therefore devoid of Mind, Reaſon and Wiſdom. This an arcanum of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology; that whereas *Anaxagoras*, *Ariſtotle*, and the vulgar, make Mind and Underſtanding the oldeſt of all things, and the higheſt principle in the univerſe; this ſuppoſes Mind, Knowledge and Wiſdom, to be not the firſt, but ſecond. Partly becauſe there is multiplicity in Knowledge, but there muſt be unity before multiplicity. And partly becauſe there muſt be Νοητὸν before Νῆς, *an Object* or *Intelligible* before *Intellect*. As alſo, becauſe Intellection, or Knowledge, is not the higheſt good, or happineſs; and therefore to be ſome ſubſtantial thing, in order of nature ſuperiour to Mind. Hence concluded, that the ſupreme Deity is better than *Logos*, *Reaſon*, *Word*, or *Intellect*. That not *Logos*, from whence Logos is derived. Thus *Philo*; The God before Reaſon, or Word, better than all the rational nature. But this difficulty common to Platoniſm with Chriſtianity; which likewiſe makes Word, or Reaſon and Wiſdom, not

the

the firſt, but ſecond hypoſtaſis. Thus does *Athanaſius* deny, that there is any word, reaſon, or wiſdom, before the Son of God. What then? Is the firſt hypoſtaſis therefore ἄνους and ἄλογος, *devoid of reaſon and mind? Plotinus* his attempt to anſwer this; that the firſt hath φῶς ἁπλοῦν, *a ſimple light*, different from that multiform light of knowledge. Again, that the firſt is νόησις αὐτή, *intelligence itſelf*, and therefore ſuperiour to intellect, or that which hath intellection. (For ἡ νόησις ὁ νοεῖ, *intelligence it ſelf doth not underſtand.*) Beſides which, another attempt alſo to ſolve this difficulty. Page 585, 586

The ground of this Platonick dependence and ſubordination in the divine hypoſtaſes; becauſe there is but one fountain of the Godhead; ſo that the ſecond muſt needs differ from the firſt, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, *the ſplendor from the ſun.* 586, 587

Though the ſecond hypoſtaſis ſaid to have been begotten from the firſt; yet this not to be taken for ſuch a generation, as that of men, where three men, (father, ſon, and grandſon) all adult, have no eſſential dependence upon one another, nor gradual ſubordination. This but an imperfect generation. 587

Furthermore, the Platoniſts would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or ſubordination of hypoſtaſes, from hence, becauſe by this means, not ſo great a leap or jump in the creation, as otherwiſe there muſt be; nor the whole Deity ſcrewed up to ſuch a diſproportionate height, as would render it uncapable of having any intercourſe with the lower world. Were the whole Deity, either one ſimple Monad, or elſe an immoveable Mind, it could have no ſuch liberty of will as is commonly attributed to it, nor be affectible with any thing here below; nor indeed any fitter object for men's devotion, than an adamantine rock. Whereas all the phænomena of the Deity ſolvable by this Platonick gradation. Page 587, 588

As alſo, according to this hypotheſis, ſome reaſonable ſatisfaction to be given, why juſt ſo many divine hypoſtaſes, and neither fewer, nor more. 588

The ſecond thing to be obſerved, concerning the genuine Platonick, or Parmenidian trinity; that though the hypoſtaſes thereof be called three Natures, and three Principles, and three Opificers, and three Gods; yet they all really make up but one Divinity. For the world, being created by all three, and yet having but one creation, they muſt needs be all one Creator. *Porphyrius* in S. *Cyril* explicitly, that, according to *Plato*, the eſſence of the Deity extendeth to three hypoſtaſes. 588, 589

Platoniſts further add, that were it not for this eſſential dependence, and ſubordination, the three divine hypoſtaſes muſt needs be three co-ordinate gods; and no more one god, than three men are one man, or three ſuns one ſun. Whereas the ſun, its ſplendor, and derivative light, may all well be accounted one and the ſame thing. 589, 590

Theſe Platoniſts therefore ſuppoſe ſo cloſe a union, and ſo near a conjunction, betwixt their three hypoſtaſes; as no where elſe to be found in nature. *Plotinus*, that there is nothing between them, and that they are only not the the very ſame. They acknowledge alſo their Perichoreſis or mutual inexiſtence. The three hypoſtaſes one divinity to the Platoniſts, in the ſame manner, as the centre, radious diſtance immoveable, and moveable circumference of a ſphere, all one ſphere. The firſt infinite Goodneſs, the ſecond infinite Wiſdom, the third infinite active Love, and power ſubſtantial. 590, 591

From this full account of the true and

and genuine Platonick trinity, its both agreement and diſagreement with the Chriſtian, plainly appeareth. Firſt, its agreement in the three fundamental things before mentioned; and conſequently its diſcrepance from Arianiſm. Page 591, 592

Secondly, its diſagreement notwithſtanding, from the now-recited doctrine, in that it ſuppoſes the three hypoſtaſes not to have one and the ſame ſingular eſſence, nor yet an abſolute coequality, but a gradual ſubordination, and eſſential dependence. Upon which account, ſaid by ſome, to ſymbolize with Arianiſm, however different from it in the main point. 592

Beſides which, the beſt of the Platoniſts, ſometimes guilty of extravagant expreſſions. *Plotinus* his ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, *that our human ſoul is of the ſame ſpecies with the mundane ſoul*, or *third hypoſtaſis*; that being but the elder ſiſter. Which indeed is to make it co-eſſential or conſubſtantial with us men, as S. *Auſtin* underſtood it. This a foundation for creature-worſhip or idolatry. Why the Arians by *Conſtantine* called Porphyrianiſts. But this doctrine, as repugnant to *Plato*, ſo elſewhere contradicted by *Plotinus* himſelf. 593, 594

That notwithſtanding, a Platonick Chriſtian would apologize for *Plato* and the genuine Pythagoreans, after this manner. Firſt, that having no ſcriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct them in the darkneſs of this myſtery, and to guide their language, they the more excuſable, if not always uniform, and ſometimes extravagent. More to be wondred at, that they ſhould approach ſo near the Chriſtian truth. 594, 595

And for their gradual ſubordination of hypoſtaſes, and dependence of the ſecond and third upon the firſt; that theſe Platoniſts herein the more excuſable, becauſe the majority of Chriſtian doctors, for the firſt three centuries, ſeem to have aſſerted the ſame. Page 595, 596

The Platonick Chriſtians further apology; that the Platoniſts intention in ſubordinating their three hypoſtaſes, only to exclude a plurality of co-ordinate independent gods. That none of *Plato*'s three hypoſtaſes, creatures, but that the eſſence of the godhead belongeth to them all; they being all eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent, infinite, or omnipotent, and creators. Therefore in the ſenſe of the *Nicene* council, conſubſtantial and co-equal. The eſſence of the godhead, wherein all the three hypoſtaſes agree, as well to the fathers, as Platoniſts, general and univerſal. 596, 597

Beſides which, the genuine Platoniſts would acknowledge alſo, all their three hypoſtaſes to be homoouſian, co-eſſential or conſubſtantial, yet in a further ſenſe, as making up one entire divinity: as the root, ſtock and branches co-eſſential to a vine. The Trinity not ſo undivided, as if three were not three in it. The inequality and ſubordination in the Platonick Trinity, within the Deity it ſelf only, and in the relation of the hypoſtaſes to one another; they being *ad extrà* all one and the ſame God, jointly concurring in the ſame actions, and in that reſpect, devoid of inequality. 597, 598

Furthermore, the Platonick Chriſtian would urge, that according to the principles of Chriſtianity it ſelf, there muſt needs be ſome dependence and ſubordination in theſe hypoſtaſes, in their relation to one another; a priority and poſteriority of order and dignity: that which is originally of it ſelf, having ſome kind of priority and ſuperiority, over that which is wholly derived from it. The ſecond and third hypoſtaſes, not ſo omnipotent as the firſt, becauſe not able to beget or produce that.

Hence

Hence firſt ſtyled by *Macrobius*, the *moſt omnipotent of all.* Sundry paſſages in Scripture favouring this hypotheſis, as alſo orthodox fathers. *Athanaſius* his reſemblances to the original light and the ſecondary ſplendour; to the fountain and the ſtream, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour. The equality aſſerted by the orthodox, in way of oppoſition to the Arian inequality of God and creature; that they equally God, or uncreated. Notwithſtanding which, ſome inequality amongſt them allowed by *Petavius* and others, as this God, and that perſon. Page 599, 600

However, no neceſſity of any more inequality and ſubordination in the Platonick, than in the Chriſtian Trinity; they being but infinite goodneſs, and infinite wiſdom, and infinite active love, and power ſubſtantial. Another hypotheſis of ſome Platoniſts, hinted by S. *Auſtin* out of *Porphyry*, which makes the third hypoſtaſis a middle betwixt the firſt and ſecond; and implies, not ſo much a gradation, as a circulation in the trinity. 600, 601

As for the Platoniſts ſuppoſing their three hypoſtaſes (though one entire divinity) to have their diſtinct ſingular eſſences, without which they conceive they could be nothing but three names; the Platonick Chriſtian would make this apology, that the orthodox fathers themſelves were generally of this perſuaſion, that the eſſence of the Godhead, wherein all the three perſons agree, not one ſingular, but only one common or univerſal eſſence. Their diſtinction to this purpoſe, betwixt οὐσία and ὑπόστασις· that the former was common or generical, the latter ſingular or individual. *Theodoret*, *Baſil*, and many others. *Petavius* his acknowledgment, that the Greeks univerſally agreed herein. 601, 602

The opinion of *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Cyril*, *Damaſcen*, and others, that the perſons of the Trinity no otherways one, than as three individuals under the ſame ſpecies, or as three men agree in the ſame common humanity. Theſe the chief aſſerters of an abſolute, independent, and unſubordinate co equality. This the only fault, that S. *Cyril* finds in the Platoniſts, that they did not aſſert ſuch a conſubſtantiality. Whereas this trinity, tritheiſm; the three perſons thereof being no more one God, than three men are one man; however this certain, that theſe fathers did not ſuppoſe, the three hypoſtaſes of the trinity to have all the ſame ſingular eſſence. Another extreme, that ſprung up afterwards in the room of the former tritheiſm, and owned by no other authority, than of a Lateran council. Page 603, 604

And that this ſameneſs of ſingular eſſence was not aſſerted by the Nicene fathers, and firſt oppoſers of *Arius*; firſt, clearly acknowledged by *Petavius*: 604, 605

But this further evident from hence; becauſe the ſame orthodox fathers, who oppoſed Arianiſm, did alſo condemn Sabellianiſm; which aſſerted, Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, to be but one hypoſtaſis, that is, to have but one and the ſame ſingular eſſence; and conſequently acknowledged no other Trinity than of names or words. 605

It appeareth alſo from hence, becauſe the word Homoouſious had never any other ſenſe, than to ſignify the agreement of things numerically differing, in ſome common and general nature or eſſence. S. *Baſil*, that the ſame thing is not homoouſious, co-eſſential, or conſubſtantial with it ſelf; but always one thing with another. Τὸ ὁμοούσιον the ſame with συγγένεια in *Plotinus*. So alſo in *Athanaſius*, he affirming the branches to be homoouſious

moousious and congenerous with the root. Besides which, ὁμογενὴς, ὁμοειδὴς, and ὁμοφυὴς, used by *Athanasius*, and others, as synonymous with ὁμοούσιος. None of which words signify an identity of singular essence, but general or universal only. The council of *Chalcedon*, that our Saviour Christ, as to his humanity, was homoousious or consubstantial with us men. Thus does *Athanasius* deny, the Son or Word, as such, to be homoousious or consubstantial with creatures; as also he affirmeth men to be consubstantial with one another, every son consubstantial and co-essential with his father. Page 605, 606

Moreover the sense of the Nicene fathers, in their consubstantiality, may more fully appear from the doctrine of *Arius* opposed by them; which made the Son a creature, and therefore (as *Athanasius* writeth) ἑτεροούσιον or ἀλλοτριούσιον, of a different essence or substance from the father. Proved clearly from *Athanasius*, that by the consubstantiality of the word was meant no more, than its being not a creature, or uncreated. 606, 608

Further proof, out of *Athanasius*, that by consubstantiality is not meant a sameness of singular, but only of general essence. As also out of S. *Austin*. 608, 611

Lastly, that the homoousian fathers did not assert, against *Arius*, a sameness of singular essence, evident from their disclaiming those two other words, ταυτοούσιον, and μονοούσιον, (as having a Sabellian sense in them,) the former by *Epiphanius*, the latter by *Athanasius*. So that they, who asserted the Son to be homoousious, consubstantial with the Father, denied him to be monoousious, or tautoousious, that is, to have the same singular essence. 612, 613

From all these considerations, concluded by the Platonick Christian, that as the genuine Trinity of *Plato* agreed with that of the orthodox Christians, in being not heteroousian, but homoousian, co-essential or consubstantial; not made up of God and creature, but all homogeneal of uncreated, or creator: so did the Trinity of the first orthodox Anti-Arians herein agree with the Platonick Trinity, that it was not monoousian, or tautoousian, one and the same singular essence, under three names or notions only; but really three hypostases or persons. Page 612

Nevertheless, here remaineth a question to be answered; whether *Athanasius*, the Nicene fathers, and all the first Anti-Arians did therefore assert the same thing with *Greg. Nyssen*, *Cyril*, and others, that the three persons in the Trinity were but three co-ordinate individuals, under the same species, having only a specifick unity or identity, (besides consent of will;) or that they all agree in the uncreated Nature only. This grosly asserted in the dialogues of the Trinity, vulgarly imputed to *Athanasius*, and to that purpose also, that three men are not three men, but only then, when they dissent from one another in will and opinion. But these dialogues pseudepigraphous. Nevertheless to be granted, that *Athanasius* himself, in that book of the common essence of the persons, seems to lay something too much stress upon this common nature, essence, or substance, of the three persons, as to the making of them all but one God. However, it is certain, he does not there rely upon that alone; and elsewhere acknowledgeth it to be insufficient. The true reason, why *Athanasius* laid so great a stress upon the Homoousiotes, not because this alone would make them one God, but because they could not possibly be one God without it. For if the Father be uncreated, and the Son a creature, then can

can they not both be one God. Several paſſages of *Athanaſius* cited to this purpoſe. Thoſe expreſſions in him of one Godhead, and the ſameneſs of the Godhead, and one eſſence or ſubſtance in the Trinity, not ſo to be underſtood, as if the three perſons were but ſeveral names, notions, or modes of one thing. Page 612, 616

Wherefore, though *Athanaſius* lay his foundation in this εἰδικὴ ἑνότης, *common ſpecifick unity of the perſons*, (which is their conſubſtantiality,) in order to their being one God; yet does he ſuperadd other conſiderations alſo thereunto. As firſt of all this, that they are not three principles, but only one; the eſſence of the father being the root and fountain of the Son and Spirit; and the three hypoſtaſes, gathered together under one head. Where *Athanaſius* implies, that, were they perfectly co-ordinate and independent, they would not be one, but three gods. 616

In the next place, he further addeth, that theſe three hypoſtaſes are not three ſeparated disjoined things, but indiviſibly united; as the ſplendour is indiviſible from the ſun, and wiſdom from him that is wiſe. That neither of theſe perſons could be without the other; nor any thing come between them: they ſo immediately conjoined together, as that there is a kind of συνέχεια, or *continuity* betwixt them. 616, 617

Thirdly, *Athanaſius* goes yet higher; affirming theſe three hypoſtaſes, not only to be indiviſibly conjoined, but alſo to have a mutual inexiſtence in each other. This afterwards called an Emperichoreſis. That of our Saviour, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, therefore quarrelled at by the Arians, becauſe they conceived of things incorporeal, after a corporeal manner. That the Godhead of the Son, is the Godhead of the Father; and the Father exerciſes a providence over all, in the Son. Page 617, 619

Laſtly, *Athanaſius* alſo in ſundry places, ſuppoſes the three divine hypoſtaſes to make up one entire divinity; as the fountain and the ſtream make up one entire river; the root, ſtock, and branches, one entire tree. Accordingly the word *Homoouſios* uſed by *Athanaſius*, in a further ſenſe, not only to ſignify things agreeing in one common and general eſſence, but alſo ſuch as eſſentially concur to the making up of one entire thing. That the three hypoſtaſes do outwardly, or *ad extrà*, produce all, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, *one and the ſelf-ſame action*; the Father, by the Word, in the Holy Spirit, doing all things. That all this doctrine of *Athanaſius* would have been readily aſſented to by *Plato* and his genuine followers. The Platonick Chriſtian therefore concludeth, that there is no ſuch real difference betwixt the genuine Platonick trinity, and that of the firſt orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, as ſome conceive. From which notwithſtanding that tritheiſtick Trinity, of S. *Greg. Nyſſen*, *Cyril*, and others, of three co-ordinate individuals under the ſame ſpecies, (as three men) ſeems to have been a deviation. 619, 620

Hitherto the Platonick Chriſtians apology, for the genuine Platonick Trinity; or endeavour to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church: where nothing is aſſerted by our ſelves, but all ſubmitted to the judgment of the learned in theſe matters. And whatſoever in *Plato*'s trinity ſhall be found diſcrepant from the ſenſe of the firſt orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, utterly diſclaimed by us. *Athanaſius* a great inſtrument of divine providence, for preſerving the Chriſtian Church from lapſing into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Chriſtianity. *ibid.*

The reaſon of this apology, for the genuine

genuine Platonick trinity; becauſe it is againſt the intereſt of Chriſtianity, that this ſhould be made more diſcrepant from the Chriſtians, than indeed it is. Moreover certain, that this genuine Platonick trinity was Anti-Arian; or rather the Arian Anti-Platonick. Wherefore *Socrates* wondered, that *Georgius* and *Timotheus* Preſbyters ſhould adhere to the Arian faction; when one of them was accounted much a Platoniſt, the other an Origeniſt. Page 620, 621

Furthermore, Platonick Pagans, after Chriſtianity, highly approved of the beginning of St. *John*'s Goſpel concerning the *Logos*, as exactly agreeing with their Platonick doctrine. Thus *Amelius* in *Euſebius*, and others. A Platoniſt in S. *Auſtin*, that it deſerved to be writ in golden letters, and ſet up in ſome eminent places in every Chriſtian church. But that, which is moſt of all conſiderable, to juſtify this apology, the generality of Chriſtian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, looked upon this Platonick trinity, if not as really the ſame thing with the Chriſtian, yet as approaching ſo near thereunto, that it differed chiefly in circumſtances, or manner of expreſſion. Thus *Juſtin Martyr*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Origen*, St. *Cyprian*, or the author of the book *De Spiritu Sancto*, *Euſebius Cæſarienſis*, and, which is moſt of all to the purpoſe, *Athanaſius* himſelf, he giving a ſignal teſtimony thereunto. To which may be added S. *Auſtin* and *Theodoret*. S. *Cyril*, though blaming the Platonick ſubordination, (himſelf ſuppoſing the Trinity to be three co-ordinate individuals, under the ſame ſpecifick nature of the Godhead) yet acknowledges, that *Plato* was not altogether ignorant of the truth, *&c.* But that *Plato*'s ſubordination, of his ſecond hypoſtaſis to the firſt, was not (as the Arian) of a creature to the Creator; already made unqueſtionably evident. Page 621, 625

Wherefore a wonderful providence of Almighty God here to be taken notice of; that this doctrine, of a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, ſhould be entertained in the Pagan world before Chriſtianity, as it were to prepare a way for the reception of it amongſt the learned. Which the junior Platoniſts were ſo ſenſible of, that beſides their other adulterations of the Platonick trinity before mentioned, (for the countenancing of their polytheiſm and idolatry) they at length innovated and altered the whole Cabala, now no longer acknowledging a trinity, but at leaſt a quaternity of divine hypoſtaſes; namely, before and beſides the trinity, another hypoſtaſis ſuperiour thereunto, and ſtanding alone by it ſelf. This firſt ſtarted by *Jamblichus*, carried on by *Proclus*, taken notice of by St. *Cyril*: beſides which, *Proclus* alſo added other phantaſtick trinities of his own. 625, 627

Another advantage of this Platonick trinity, extending to the preſent time; perhaps not unintended alſo by divine providence, to abate the confidence of thoſe conceited wits, who ſo boldly decry the Trinity for nonſenſe, abſolute contradiction to reaſon, and impoſſibility, when they ſhall find, that the beſt and freeſt wits amongſt the Pagans, though having no Scripture-revelation to impoſe upon them, were yet fond of this hypotheſis. 627

And now it ſufficiently appears, that the ancient Platoniſts and Pythagoreans were not to be taxed for polytheiſts and idolaters, in giving religious worſhip to their three divine hypoſtaſes. One grand deſign of Chriſtianity, to free the world from idolatry and creature-worſhip: and this the reaſon, why the ancient fathers ſo zealouſly oppoſed Arianiſm, becauſe it thwarted that

that deſign, it paganizing and idolatrizing that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world. One remarkable paſſage of *Athanaſius* to this purpoſe. Page 627, 629

Where firſt obſervable, that *Athanaſius* expreſly affirmeth the Pagans to have worſhipped only one uncreated, and many created Gods. Thus *Greg. Naz.* that there was but one divinity amongſt the Pagans alſo. And *Irenæus*, that they attributed the firſt place of the Deity to one ſupreme God, the maker of this univerſe. And ſecondly, that to *Athanaſius*, and all thoſe other fathers, who charged the Arians with idolatry, this was ſuppoſed not to conſiſt in worſhipping many independent and ſelf-exiſtent Gods, but in giving religious worſhip to creatures: as the Arians gave a religious worſhip to the Son or Word, ſuppoſed by themſelves to be but a creature. 629, 630

But if Arians guilty of polytheiſm or idolatry, for beſtowing religious worſhip upon the Son or Word, as a creature, (though the chief of creatures, and that, by which all others were made) much more they guilty hereof, who religiouſly worſhipped other inferiour beings. *Athanaſius*; That no creature the object of religious worſhip, and that the Orthodox worſhipped the divinity in the humanity of our Saviour Chriſt. *Neſtorius* branded with the name of a man-worſhipper. Some ſuppoſe that neceſſary to idolatry, which is impoſſible, to worſhip more than one, as omnipotent, or with mental *latria*. 630, 632

And now have we ſufficiently anſwered the objection againſt the naturality of the idea of a God, as including onelineſs in it, from the Pagan polytheiſm. What farther here intended concerning the ſame, (as a foundation for our defence of Chriſtianity) differred, to make room for a confutation of all the atheiſtick arguments.

CHAP. V.

A particular confutation of all the atheiſtick grounds.

THE firſt atheiſtick argument; That there is no idea of God. That in anſwer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; *viz.* a perfect, underſtanding Being, unmade, or ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, and the cauſe of all other things, In which, nothing unconceivable, nor contradictious. That theſe confounded Atheiſts themſelves, who deny, that there is any idea of God at all, muſt notwithſtanding, of neceſſity, ſuppoſe the contrary; becauſe otherwiſe, denying his exiſtence, they ſhould deny the exiſtence of nothing. And that they agree alſo with Theiſts in the ſame idea; the one denying the exiſtence of that, which the other aſſerteth, That an underſtanding Nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing onelineſs and ſingularity in it, not only largely defended and made good againſt that objection from the Pagan polytheiſm; but alſo proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural *prolepſis* or *anticipation* in their minds concerning the real and actual exiſtence of ſuch a Being. Atheiſts but monſters, and anomalies of mankind. This a ſufficient confutation of the firſt atheiſtick argument. Page 633, 634.

Nevertheleſs, That Atheiſts may not pretend, any of their ſtrength to be concealed; all their particular exceptions againſt the idea of God here declared, being five. Their firſt exception, That we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not ſubject to ſenſe; much leſs any evidence of the exiſtence thereof. The anſwer. Firſt, That whereas the Atheiſts ſuppoſe Senſe

to

to be the only Knowledge, or at leaſt original Knowledge; Senſe, as ſuch, is not Knowledge, or Underſtanding; becauſe if it were, then every one, that ſees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would underſtand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved alſo from that atomick philoſophy, (which the Epicurean Atheiſts ſo much pretend to,) that there is a higher faculty of the ſoul, which judges of ſenſe, detects the phantaſtry thereof, reſolves ſenſible things into intelligible principles, &c. No paſſion able to make a judgment, either of it ſelf, or of other things. The confounded *Democritus* himſelf ſometimes acknowledged Senſe to be but ſeeming and phantaſy, and not to reach to the abſolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, becauſe unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own phantaſms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts of many things, that never were in Senſe, and whereof we have no genuine phantaſms. Atheiſts attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, That there is nothing in the underſtanding, which was not before in Senſe, falſe and atheiſtical. Men having a notion of a perfect, underſtanding Being, the cauſe of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheiſts, notwithſtanding, would here perſuade them, that they have none, and that the thing is a non-entity, merely becauſe they have no ſenſible idea, or phantaſm thereof. And ſo may they as well prove, not only Reaſon and Underſtanding, Appetite and Volition, to be non-entities, but alſo Phancy and Senſe it ſelf; neither of theſe falling under Senſe, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as ſome miſtaken Theiſts ſuppoſe, yet his eſſence chiefly conſiſting in Mind and Underſtanding, this of him could not poſſibly be ſubject to Senſe. But that there is alſo ſubſtance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is inſenſible, and that the Deity is ſuch, will be elſewhere demonſtrated. Page 634, 637

Though the evidence of ſingular bodies exiſting, depend upon the information of Senſe, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from Senſe alone, but a complication of Reaſon and Underſtanding with it. Senſe phantaſtical, not reaching to the abſolute truth of things; and obnoxious to deluſion. Our own imaginations, taken for ſenſations and realities, in ſleep, and by melancholized perſons, when awake. Atomick Atheiſts themſelves aſſert the exiſtence of ſuch things, as they have no ſenſe of; atoms, membranes, or exuvious images of bodies, nay incorporeal ſpace. If the exiſtence of nothing, to be acknowledged, which falls not under Senſe, then not the exiſtence of Soul and Mind. God the great Mind, that rules the whole univerſe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The exiſtence of that God, whom no eye can ſee, demonſtrated by reaſon from his effects. 637, 638

The ſecond atheiſtick pretence againſt the idea of God, and his exiſtence, from Theiſts own acknowledging him to be incomprehenſible; from whence they infer him to be a non-entity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right ſenſe, that whatſoever is altogether unconceivable, is either in it ſelf, or at leaſt to us, Nothing. How that of *Protagoras*, That every man is the meaſure of all things to himſelf, in his ſenſe falſe. Whatſoever any man's ſhallow underſtanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be preſently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheleſs, according to *Ariſtotle*, the Soul and Mind in a manner all things. This a cryſtalline globe, or notional world, that hath ſome image

in it of whatſoever is contained in the real globe of being. Page 638

But this abſolutely falſe; That whatſoever cannot be fully comprehended by us, is therefore utterly unconceivable and conſequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend our ſelves, nor have ſuch an adequate conception of any ſubſtance, as perfectly to maſter and conquer the ſame. That of the Scepticks ſo far true, That there is ſomething incomprehenſible in the eſſence of every thing, even of body it ſelf. Truth bigger than our Minds. Proper to God Almighty, (who alone is wiſe,) perfectly to comprehend the eſſences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the ſame by our imperfect minds; as we may ſee and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclaſp it all round within our Arms. This therefore a falſe theorem of the Atheiſts, That whatſoever cannot be fully comprehended by Men's imperfect underſtandings, is an abſolute non-entity. 638, 639

Though God more incomprehenſible than other things, becauſe of his tranſcendent perfection, yet hath he alſo more of conceptibility: as the ſun, dazzling our ſight, yet hath more of viſibility alſo, than any other object. The dark incomprehenſibility of the Deity, like the azure obſcurity of the tranſparent æther, not any thing abſolutely in it ſelf, but only relative to us. 639, 640

This incomprehenſibility of the Deity, ſo far from being an argument againſt its exiſtence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehenſible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by ſome internal congruity. The ſcantneſs and imperfection of our narrow underſtandings muſt needs make them aſymmetral or incommenſurate to what abſolutely perfect. Page 640

Nature it ſelf intimates, that there is ſomething vaſtly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by thoſe paſſions implanted in us, of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecſtaſy and pleaſing horrour. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow veſſels of our minds, muſt be otherwiſe apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or ſwallowed up, and loſt in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the ſame; becauſe our ſelves being imperfect, muſt needs be incommenſurate thereunto. Thus no reaſon at all, in the ſecond atheiſtick pretence, againſt the idea of God, and his exiſtence; from his confeſſed incomprehenſibility. *ibid.*

The third follows, that infinity, ſuppoſed to be eſſential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly unconceivable, and therefore an impoſſibility and non-entity. Some paſſages of a modern writer to this purpoſe. The meaning of them, That there is nothing of philoſophick truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other ſenſe in the words, than only to ſignify the veneration and aſtoniſhment of men's own minds. That the word infinite ſignifies nothing in the thing it ſelf ſo called, but only the inability of our underſtandings, and admiration. And ſince God, by Theiſts, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an unconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to atheiſm, That we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheiſts, all one as to ſay, that he is a non-entity. 640, 641

Anſwer. This argument, That there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoterick Atheiſts only; but repugnant to the

the ſenſe of the ancients. *Anaximander*'s ἄπειρον, *infinite matter*, though *Meliſſus* his Ἄπειρον *the true Deity*. Formerly both Theiſts and Atheiſts agreed in this; that there muſt be ſomething or other infinite, either an infinite Mind, or infinite matter. The ancient Atheiſts alſo aſſerted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheiſts confute or contradict Atheiſts. Page 641, 642

That the modern Atheiſts do no leſs contradict plain reaſon alſo, and their very ſelves, than they do their predeceſſors, when they would diſprove a God from hence, becauſe there can be nothing infinite. For firſt, certain, that there was ſomething or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning: becauſe, if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheiſts can be ſo ſottiſh, as in good earneſt to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards ſenſleſs matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them, who aſſert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument againſt the exiſtence of a God; becauſe infinite duration without beginning, an impoſſibility. 642, 643

A conceſſion to the Atheiſts of theſe two things; That we neither have a phantaſm of any infinite, becauſe there was never any in ſenſe; and that infinity is not fully comprehenſible by finite underſtandings neither. But ſince, mathematically certain, that there was ſomething infinite in duration, demonſtrated from hence, againſt Atheiſts, That there is ſomething really exiſting, which we have neither any phantaſm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our Minds. *ibid.*

Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no phantaſm, nor full comprehenſion of them, ſo have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are non-entities. Number infinite in *Ariſtotle*, only in a negative ſenſe, becauſe we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reaſon alſo there cannot poſſibly be any number poſitively infinite, ſince one or more may always be added. No magnitude ſo great neither, but that a greater may be ſuppoſed. By infinite ſpace, to be underſtood nothing but a poſſibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by divine power; or that the world could never be made ſo great, as that God was not able to make it ſtill greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, ſeems to be miſtaken for an actual infinity of ſpace. Laſtly, no infinity of time paſt, becauſe then there muſt needs be time paſt, which never was preſent. An argument of a modern Writer. Reaſon therefore concludes, neither world, nor time, to have been infinite in paſt duration. Page 643, 644

Here will the Atheiſt think he has got a great advantage for diſproving the exiſtence of a God; they, who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away alſo the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwiſe, than by a ſucceſſive flux of infinite time.

But we ſay, that this affordeth a demonſtration of a God; becauſe, ſince both the world and time had a beginning, there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething, whoſe duration is not ſucceſſive; but permanent, which was the Creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheiſts can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon *nunc-ſtans*; as if this ſtanding eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time ſtanding ſtill; and as if all duration muſt needs be the ſame with ours, *&c.* 644, 645

Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which ſignify nothing in the thing it ſelf, but only the idle progreſs of our minds, or our own ignorance

rance, ſtupid aſtoniſhment and veneration: not mere attributes of honour and complement, but attributes belonging to the Deity, (and that alone) of the moſt philoſophick truth. And though we have no adequate comprehenſion thereof, yet muſt we have ſome notion of that, which we can demonſtrate to be long to ſomething. Page 645, 646

But the thing, which the Atheiſts principally quarrel with, is infinite power, or omnipotence; which they pretend alſo to be utterly unconceivable, and impoſſible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheiſts have the joint ſuffrage of the ancients alſo, who concerned themſelves in nothing more than diſproving omnipotence, or infinite power. *ib.*

This omnipotence, either wilfully or ignorantly miſrepreſented by Atheiſts, as if it were a power of doing things contradictious. An irony of a modern Atheiſt, that God could turn a tree into a ſyllogiſm. The abſurd Doctrine of *Carteſius*, that God could have made twice two not to have been four; or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and deſtroy another; infinite will and power, infinite underſtanding and wiſdom. To ſuppoſe God to underſtand and be wiſe only by will, really to give him no underſtanding at all. God not ſo omnipotent, as that he can deſtroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wiſdom. Infinite power, that which can do all that is poſſible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very eſſence of poſſibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theiſts. Abſurd for Atheiſts to ſay, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is unconceivable. *ibid.* 646

But becauſe Atheiſts look upon infinity as ſuch a *mormo*, we ſhall take off the vizard from it; by declaring, that it is really nothing elſe but perfection. Infinite underſtanding and knowledge, perfect underſtanding, without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things poſſible. Infinite duration, perfection of eſſence. Becauſe infinity, perfection; therefore nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the eſſence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite, which is not ſo every way, or a perfect Being. Page 647, 648

Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection firſt in order of nature, as the rule and meaſure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want of perfection. A ſcale, or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea, which we have of a Being abſolutely perfect, the meaſure of them. Without which, we could not take notice of imperfection, in the moſt perfect of all thoſe things which we ever had ſenſe of. *Boëthius*; That whatſoever is imperfect in any kind, implies ſomething in that kind perfect, from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incompleat and imperfect; but deſcended downward, from what was abſolutely perfect, by ſteps and degreees, lower and lower. 648

Wherefore, ſince infinite the ſame with perfect, we having a notion of the latter muſt needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the ſenſe poſitive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which, in order of nature is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things uncapable of true infinity; infinity being here a mere imaginary thing and nonentity, can be only conceived by the

negation of finite, as nothing is, by the negation of ſomething. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, ſuch as never was not, and could produce all things poſſible, or conceivable. Page 648, 649

The fourth atheiſtick pretence againſt the idea of God; That it is an arbitrarious compilement of contradictious notions. Where firſt we deny not, but that as ſome religioniſts extend the divine power to things contradictious, ſo may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence, that theology it ſelf is therefore contradictious, no more than that philoſophy is ſo, becauſe ſome philoſophers alſo hold contradictious things; or that nothing is abſolutely true, neither in divinity, nor philoſophy, but all ſeeming and phantaſtical; according to the Protagorean doctrine. 649, 650

But though it be true, that whatſoever really implies a contradiction, is a non-entity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuſe, when whatſoever men's ſhallow underſtandings cannot reach to, is therefore preſently cried down by them, as an impoſſibility, or nothing. As when the Atheiſts, and Materialiſts, explode incorporeal ſubſtance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honour, expreſſing the veneration of men's minds, but ſignifying nothing in nature, nor having any philoſophick truth. But the Atheiſts true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are, which they impute to all theology, may appear from a paſſage of a modern writer: namely ſuch as theſe; when God is ſaid to perceive ſenſible things, and yet to have no organs of ſenſe; as alſo to underſtand, and yet to have no brains. The undiſguiſed meaning of the writer, that religion is not philoſophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary conſtitution; nor God a ſubject of philoſophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and phancies; and his attributes ſignifying neither true nor falſe, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion, towards what they fear. And ſo may any thing be ſaid of God, no matter what, ſo it be agreeable to civil law. But when men miſtake attributes of honour for attributes of philoſophick truth; that is, when they will ſuppoſe ſuch a thing as a God really to exiſt; then is all abſurd nonſenſe and contradiction. God's underſtanding without brains, no contradiction. 650, 651

Certain, That no ſimple idea, as of a triangle, or a ſquare, can be contradictious to it ſelf; much leſs can the idea of a perfect Being, the moſt ſimple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictious, would render the whole a non-entity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity, as demonſtrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle, or a ſquare; and therefore can neither be contradictious to it, nor one another. 652

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, not only not contradictious, but alſo all neceſſarily connected together. *ibid.*

In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but ſo many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame perfect Being, taken into our minds, as it were by piece-meal. *ibid.*

The idea of God, neither fictitious, nor factitious. Nothing arbitrarious in it; but a moſt natural and ſimple idea, to which not the leaſt can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheleſs, may there be different apprehenſions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect Being, not underſtanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a ſphere. *ibid.* 653

Concluded therefore, that the attri-

butes of God, no confounded nonſenſe of religiouſly aſtoniſhed minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtſhip, and complement; but the attributes of neceſſary philoſophick truth; and ſuch as do not only ſpeak the devotion of men's hearts, but alſo declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheiſtick writer ill-placed. (Though no doubt but ſome, either out of ſuperſtition, or ignorance, may attribute ſuch things to the Deity, as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheiſtick pretence againſt the idea of God, confuted. Page 653, 654

In the next place, the Atheiſts think themſelves concerned, to give an account of this unqueſtionable phænomenon; the general perſuaſion of the exiſtence of a God, in the minds of men, and their propenſity to religion; whence this ſhould come, if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonſenſe of aſtoniſhed minds, and partly to the impoſture of politicians. Or elſe to theſe three things; to men's fear, and to their ignorance of cauſes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil ſovereigns. 654

In the firſt of theſe atheiſtick origins of religion; That mankind, by reaſon of their natural imbecillity, are in continual ſolicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this paſſion of fear raiſes up in them for an object to it ſelf, a moſt affrightful phantaſm; of an inviſible, underſtanding Being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards ſtanding in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worſhipping the creature of their own fear and phancy. 654

The ſecond atheiſtick origin of theiſm and religion; That men having a natural curioſity to inquire into the cauſes of things, whereſoever they can diſcover no viſible and natural cauſes, are prone to feign cauſes inviſible and ſupernatural. As *Anaxagoras* ſaid, never to have betaken himſelf to a God, but only when he was at a loſs for neceſſary material cauſes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the cauſes of all, or moſt things, have betaken themſelves to a God, as to a refuge and ſanctuary for their ignorance. 654, 655

Theſe two accounts of the phænomenon of religion; from men's fear and ſolicitude, and from their ignorance of cauſes and curioſity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a *mormo* or bugbear, raiſed up by men's fear, in the darkneſs of their ignorance of cauſes. The opinion of other ghoſts and ſpirits alſo deduced from the ſame original. Men's taking things caſual for prognoſticks, and being ſo addicted to omens, portents, prophecies, &c. from a phantaſtick and timorous ſuppoſition, that the things of this world are not diſpoſed of by nature, but by ſome underſtanding perſon. 655

But leſt theſe two accounts of the phænomenon of religion ſhould prove inſufficient; the Atheiſts ſuperadd a third, imputing it alſo to the fiction and impoſture of civil ſovereigns; who perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in ſubjection, have thereupon dextrouſly laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cheriſhed thoſe ſeeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of Ghoſts and ſpirits, miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publickly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their deſigns, have perſuaded the people, that themſelves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of ſtate; to keep men buſily employed; entertain their

minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for ſubjection and ſociety. Page 655, 656

All this not the invention of modern Atheiſts. But an old atheiſtick cabal; That the gods made by fear. *Lucretius*; That the cauſes of religion, terrour of mind and darkneſs; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of cauſes, as alſo, that the opinions of ghoſts proceeded from men's not knowing how to diſtinguiſh their dreams, and other frightful phancies from ſenſations. 656, 657

An old atheiſtick ſurmize alſo; That religion a political invention. Thus *Cicero*; The Atheiſts in *Plato*, That the Gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. *Critias*, one of the thirty tyrants of *Athens*, his poem to this purpoſe. 657, 658

That the folly and falſeneſs of theſe three atheiſtick pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifeſted. Firſt, as to that of fear and phancy. Such an exceſs of fear, as makes any one conſtantly believe the exiſtence of that, for which no manner of ground, neither in ſenſe, nor reaſon, highly tending alſo to his own diſquiet; nothing leſs than diſtraction. Wherefore, the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheiſts, to be frighted out of their wits, and diſtempered in their brains; only a few of themſelves, who have eſcaped this panick terror, remaining ſober, or in their right ſenſes. The ſobriety of Atheiſts, nothing but dull ſtupidity, and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can ſee or feel. 658

True, that there is a religious fear, conſequent upon the belief of a God; as alſo, that the ſenſe of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds, by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None leſs ſolicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and vertuous; who place not their chief happineſs in things aliene, but only in the right uſe of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheiſts wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheiſts, from building all their politicks and juſtice upon the foundation of fear. Page 658, 659

The Atheiſts grand error here; That the Deity, according to the general ſenſe of mankind, nothing but a *terriculum*, a *formidable*, *hurtful* and *undeſirable* thing. Whereas men every where agree in that divine attribute of goodneſs and benignity. *ibid.*

Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worſt ſenſe, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeneſs. This condemned by *Ariſtotle* in the Poets, (he calling them therefore lyars) by *Plutarch* in *Herodotus*, as ſpoken univerſally; *Plutarch* himſelf reſtraining the ſenſe thereof to his evil principle. *Plato*'s aſcribing the world to the divine goodneſs, who therefore made all things moſt like himſelf. The true meaning of this proverb; That the Deity affecteth to humble and abaſe the pride of men. *Lucretius* his hidden force, that hath, as it were, a ſpite to all overſwelling greatneſſes, could be no other than the Deity. Thoſe amongſt Chriſtians, who make the worſt repreſentation of God, yet phancy him kind and gracious to themſelves. 659, 660

True, that religion often expreſſed by the fear of God. Fear *prima menſura Deitatis*, *the firſt impreſſion that religion makes upon men in this lapſed ſtate.* But this not a fear of God, as miſchievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary Being, but as juſt, and an impartial puniſher of wickedneſs. *Lucretius* his acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conſcience of duty. A natural diſcrimination of good and evil, with a ſenſe of an impartial juſtice preſiding over the world, and both

both rewarding and puniſhing. The fear of God, as either a hurtful, or arbitrary and tyrannical being, (which muſt needs be joined with ſomething of hatred) not religion, but ſuperſtition. Fear, faith, and love; three ſteps and degrees of religion, to the ſon of *Sirach*. Faith better defined in ſcripture, than by any ſcholaſticks. God ſuch a Being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wiſhed for. Page 660, 661

The reaſon, why Atheiſts thus miſtake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and conſequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter diſpoſing them ſo much to think, that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature, as reſtraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence, or good-will, but what ariſes from imbecillity, indigency, and fear. Their friendſhip at beſt no other than *mercatura utilitatum*. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheiſtick hypotheſis) could not have ſo much as that ſpurious love or benevolence to any thing, becauſe ſtanding in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus *Cotta* in *Cicero*. All this aſſerted alſo by a late pretender to politicks; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding, than his irreſiſtible power; nor men any obligation to obey him, but only from their imbecillity and fear, or becauſe they cannot reſiſt him. Thus do Atheiſts transform the Deity into a monſtrous ſhape; an omnipotent Being, that hath neither benevolence nor juſtice in him. This indeed a *mormo*, or bug-bear. 661, 662

But as this a falſe repreſentation of theiſm, ſo the atheiſtick ſcene of thing moſt uncomfortable, hopeleſs and diſmal, upon ſeveral accounts. True, that no ſpiteful deſigns in ſenſeleſs atoms; in which regard, *Plutarch* preferred even this atheiſtick hypotheſis before that of an omnipotent, miſchievous Being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in ſenſeleſs atoms. *Epicurus* his confeſſion, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material neceſſity of all things, aſſerted by the other atheiſtick phyſiologers, before himſelf. But he not at all mending the matter, by his ſuppoſed free will. The panick fear of the *Epicureans*, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being diſſolved into a Chaos. Atheiſts running from fear plunge themſelves into fear. Atheiſm, rather than theiſm, from the impoſture of fear, diſtruſt, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them deſire, there ſhould be no God. Page 663, 664

Thus the Atheiſts, who derive the origin of religion from fear, firſt put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a *mormo* or bugbear, the creature of fear and phancy. More likely of the two, that the opinion of a God, ſprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of theſe true, it owing its being to the impoſture of no paſſion, but ſupported by the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt reaſon. Nevertheleſs, a natural *prolepſis*, or *anticipation* of a God alſo, in men's minds, preventing reaſon. This called by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, a vaticination. 664, 665

The ſecond atheiſtick pretence to ſolve the phænomenon of religion, from the ignorance of cauſes, and men's innate curioſity (upon which account the Deity ſaid by them to be nothing but an aſylum of ignorance, or the ſanctuary of fools,) next to be confuted. 665

That the Atheiſts, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate theſe two together, fear, and ignorance of cauſes; making theiſm the ſpawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raiſes bugbears and ſpectres. *Epicurus* his

his reaſon, why he took ſuch great pains in the ſtudy of phyſiology; that by finding out the natural cauſes of things, he might free men from the terrour of a God, that would otherwiſe aſſault their minds. Page 665

The Atheiſts thus dabbling in phyſiology, and finding out material cauſes for ſome of thoſe phænomena, which the unſkilful vulgar ſolve only from a Deity; therefore confident, that religion had no other original, than this ignorance of cauſes: as alſo, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we ſhall make it manifeſt, that philoſophy and the true knowledge of cauſes lead to a Deity; and that Atheiſm, from ignorance of cauſes, and want of philoſophy. 665, 666

For firſt, no Atheiſt, who derives all from ſenſeleſs matter, can poſſibly aſſign any cauſe of himſelf, his own ſoul or mind; it being impoſſible, that life and ſenſe ſhould be naturally produced from what dead and ſenſeleſs; or from magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions. An Atheiſtick objection, nothing to the purpoſe; that laughing and crying things are made out of not-laughing and crying principles: becauſe theſe reſult from the mechaniſm of the body. The Hylozoiſts never able neither, to produce animal ſenſe, and conſciouſneſs, out of what ſenſeleſs and inconſcious. The Atheiſts, ſuppoſing their own life and underſtanding, and all the wiſdom that is in the world, to have ſprung meerly from ſenſeleſs matter, and fortuitous motions; groſsly ignorant of cauſes. The philoſophy of our ſelves, and true knowledge of the cauſe of our own ſoul and mind, brings to God. 666, 667

Again, Atheiſts ignorant of the cauſe of motion, by which they ſuppoſe all things done; this phænomenon being no way ſolvable, according to their principles. Firſt, undeniably certain, that motion not eſſential to all body or matter as ſuch, becauſe then there could have been no mundane ſyſtem, no ſun, moon, earth, &c. all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain alſo, that dead and ſenſeleſs matter, ſuch as that of *Anaximander*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, cannot move it ſelf ſpontaneouſly, by will or appetite. The Hylozoiſts further conſidered elſewhere. *Democritus* could aſſign no other cauſe of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any firſt cauſe or mover. Thus alſo a modern writer. To aſſert an infinite progreſs in the cauſes of motion, according to *Ariſtotle*, to aſſign no cauſe thereof at all. *Epicurus*, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality, of gravity. Which, as abſurd in infinite ſpace, and without any centre of reſt; ſo indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cauſe. The motion of body, from the activity of ſomething incorporeal. Though motion taken for tranſlation, be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the *vis movens*, a mode, or energy, of ſomething that is incorporeal, and ſelf-active. The motion of the whole corporeal univerſe, originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cauſe of motion, another ground of atheiſm. Page 667, 669

Thirdly, the Atheiſts alſo ignorant of the cauſe of that grand phænomenon, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the *regular and artificial frame of the mundane ſyſtem*, and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They, who boaſt they can give cauſes of all things, without a God, able to give no cauſe of this, but only, that it happened by chance ſo to be. This, either to make the abſence of a cauſe, a cauſe; (chance being but the abſence of an intending cauſe) or their own very ignorance of the

the cauſe, and they know not why, to be a cauſe; or to make one contrary, the cauſe of another; (confuſion of order and harmony, chance of art and ſkill,) or laſtly, to deny it to have any cauſe at all, ſince they deny an intending cauſe. Page 669

But here the Atheiſts make ſeveral pretences for this their ignorance. Firſt, that the world is not ſo well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the beſt manner. But this a twelfth atheiſtick argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reaſon, why ſome modern Theiſts give Atheiſts ſo much advantage here, as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilſt the ancient Pagan Theiſts ſtood their ground, and generouſly maintained, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is abſolutely the beſt, in order to the good of the whole, (ſo far as the neceſſity of things would admit) the meaſure and rule of nature, and providence. 669, 670

Again, the Atomick and Epicurean Atheiſts pretend, that though many things ſerve for uſes, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for thoſe uſes; becauſe things that happen by chance, may have uſes conſequent. Thus *Lucretius*, and the old atheiſtick philoſophers before *Ariſtotle*, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The anſwer, that when things conſiſt of many parts, all artificially proportioned together, with much curioſity, as for example, the eye; no man who conſiders the anatomy thereof, and its whole ſtructure, can reaſonably conclude, that it happened ſo to be made; and the uſe of ſeeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the uſe of ſeeing. But to maintain, that not only eyes happened to be ſo made, and the uſe of ſeeing followed, but alſo ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and ſimilar, (without any of which, the whole would be inept or uſeleſs) all their ſeveral uſes, un-intended, following; groſs inſenſibility, and ſtupidity. *Galen* of the uſe of parts. Page 671, 672

Democritus his dotages; countenanced alſo by *Carteſius* his book of Meteors, (firſt written with deſign to ſolve all thoſe phænomena without a God,) but unſucceſsfully. Nevertheleſs we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the moſt frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanick powers are taken in, ſo far as they will ſerviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but alſo vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world. *ibid.*

Again, Atheiſts further pretend, that though it may well ſeem ſtrange, that matter fortuitouſly moved, ſhould, at the very firſt, fall into ſuch a regularity and harmony, as is now in the world; yet not at all ſtrange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, ſhould after innumerable other inept, and diſcongruous forms, at length fall into ſuch a ſyſtem as this. They ſay therefore, that the earth, at firſt, brought forth divers monſtrous and irregular ſhapes of animals; ſome wanting feet, ſome hands, ſome without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimæras; mixtly boviform, and hominiform animals. Though *Epicurus*, aſhamed to own theſe, would ſeem to exclude them, but without reaſon. But becauſe we have now no ſuch irregular ſhapes pro-

duced

duced out of the earth, they ſay, that the reaſon is, becauſe none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only ſuch as happened to be fitly made. Thus *Epicurus*, and the Atheiſts before *Ariſtotle*. They alſo add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongſt which, they pretend, not one of a thouſand, or of ten thouſand, hath ſo much regularity in it as this of ours. Laſtly, they preſage likewiſe, that this world of ours ſhall not always continue ſuch, but after a while, fall into confuſion and diſorder again; and then we may have Centaurs, Scylla's and Chimæra's as before. Page 672, 674

Nevertheleſs, becauſe this univerſal and conſtant regularity of things, for ſo many ages together, is ſo puzzling; they would perſuade us that the ſenſeleſs atoms, playing and toying up and down, from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught, by the neceſſity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialneſs and methodicalneſs. 674, 675

To all which atheiſtick pretences replied, firſt, That this is an idle dream, or impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane ſyſtem; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular ſhapes of animals: not only becauſe no tradition of any ſuch thing; but alſo becauſe no reaſon poſſibly to be given, why ſuch ſhould not be produced out of the earth ſtill, though they could not continue long. That alſo another atheiſtick dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confuſion and nonſenſe again. And as their infinite worlds an impoſſibility, ſo their aſſertion of the irregularity of the ſuppoſed other worlds well enough anſwered, by a contrary aſſertion; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed ſtar a ſun, having all more or fewer ſuch habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them deſert or uninhabited, there would not be found ſo much as one ridiculous or inept ſyſtem amongſt them all; the divine act being infinite. Page 675

Again, that the fortuitous motions of ſenſeleſs atoms ſhould, in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting as regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wiſdom: this atheiſtick fanaticiſm. 675, 676

No more poſſible, that dead and ſenſeleſs matter, fortuitouſly moved, ſhould at length be taught, and neceſſitated by it ſelf, to produce this artificial ſyſtem of the world; than that a dozen or more perſons, unſkilled in muſick, and ſtriking the ſtrings as it happened, ſhould at length be taught, and neceſſitated to fall into exquiſite harmony; or that the letters in the writings of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, though having ſo much philoſophick ſenſe, ſhould have been all ſcribbled at random. More philoſophy in the great volume of the world, than in all *Ariſtotle*'s and *Plato*'s works; and more of harmony than in any artificial compoſition of vocal muſick. That the divine art and wiſdom hath printed ſuch a ſignature of it ſelf upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit. 676, 677

But in the next place, the Atheiſts will, for all this undertake to demonſtrate, that things could not poſſibly be made by any intending cauſe, for ends and uſes; as eyes for ſeeing, ears for hearing; from hence, becauſe things were all in order of time as well as nature, before their uſes. This argument ſeriouſly propounded by *Lucretius* in this manner; if eyes were made for the uſe of ſeeing, then of neceſſity muſt ſeeing have been before eyes: but there was no ſeeing before eyes; therefore could not eyes be made for the ſake of ſeeing. 677, 678

Evident, that the logick of theſe Atheiſts

Atheiſts differs from that of all other mortals; according to which, the end, for which any thing is deſignedly made, is only in intention firſt, but in execution laſt. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and ſenſe of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies; but it doth not therefore follow, that the maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatſoever would be uſeful for animals, and ſo make them bodies intentionally for thoſe uſes. That argument ought to be thus framed: whatſoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of ſeeing, that end muſt needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual exiſtence of that which is made for it: but there could be no knowledge of ſeeing before there were eyes; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the ſake of ſeeing. Page 678

This the true ſcope of the premiſed atheiſtick argument, however diſguiſed by them in the firſt propounding. The ground thereof, becauſe they take it for granted, that all knowledge is derived from ſenſe, or from the things known, pre-exiſting without the knower. And here does *Lucretius* triumph. The controverſy therefore at laſt reſolved into this; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things: for if ſo, it muſt be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not, in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the maker thereof. 679

But Atheiſts will except againſt the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; That it is unreaſonable to think, there ſhould be no cauſe in nature for the common phænomena thereof; but a God thus introduced to ſolve them. Which alſo, to ſuppoſe the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cauſe of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore the opinion of final cauſality for things in nature but an *idolum ſpecûs*. Therefore rightly baniſhed, by *Democritus*, out of phyſiology. Page 679, 680

The anſwer: Two extremes here to be avoided, one of the atomick Atheiſts, who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of ſenſleſs matter; another of bigotical religioniſts, who will have God to do all things himſelf immediately, without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous, but alſo an artificial nature, ſubſervient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer, and drudging executioner thereof. True, that ſome philoſophers have abſurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheleſs, this no idol of the cave, or den, to ſuppoſe the ſyſtem of the world to have been framed by an underſtanding Being, according to whoſe direction, nature, though not it ſelf intending, acteth. *Balbus* his deſcription of this artificial nature in *Cicero*. That there could be no Mind in us, were there none in the univerſe. That of *Ariſtotle* true, that there is more of art in ſome things of nature, than in any thing made by men. Now the cauſes of artificial things, as a houſe or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently purſued by *Ariſtotle*. No more can the things of nature be rightly underſtood, or the cauſes of them fully aſſigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They, who baniſh final or mental cauſality from philoſophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horſes. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheiſts, to ſolve the phænomena of ani-

mals, without mental cauſality. *Democritus* and *Epicurus* ſo cautious, as never to pretend, to give an account of the formation of the fœtus. *Ariſtotle*'s judgment here to be preferred before that of *Democritus*. Page 680, 683

But nothing more ſtrange, than that theſe Atheiſts ſhould be juſtified in this their ignorance by profeſſed Theiſts and Chriſtians; who atomizing likewiſe in their phyſiology, contend, that this whole mundane ſyſtem reſulted only from the neceſſary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. Theſe mechanick Theiſts more immodeſt than the atomick Atheiſts themſelves; they ſuppoſing theſe their atoms, though fortuitouſly moved, yet never to have produced any inept ſyſtem, or incongruous forms; but from the very firſt, all along, to have ranged themſelves ſo orderly, as that they could not have done it better, had they been directed by a perfect Mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phænomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only ſome metaphyſical arguments; which, though never ſo good, yet by reaſon of their ſubtlety, cannot do ſo much execution. The Atheiſts gratified to ſee the cauſe of theiſm thus betrayed, by its profeſſed friends; and the grand argument for the ſame totally ſlurred by them. 683, 684

As this great inſenſibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; ſo are there ſundry phænomena, partly above the mechanick powers, and partly contrary to the ſame, which therefore can never be ſolved, without mental and final cauſality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in reſpiration, the ſyſtole and diaſtole of the heart (being a muſcular conſtriction and relaxation) to which might be added others in the macrocoſm; as the interſection of the planes of the equator and ecliptick; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. *Carteſius* his confeſſion, that, according to mechanick principles, theſe ſhould continually come nearer and nearer together; which ſince they have not done, final or mental cauſality here to be acknowledged, and becauſe it was beſt it ſhould be ſo. But the greateſt phænomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which theſe mechaniſts never able to give any account of. Of that poſthumous piece of *Carteſius*, *De la Formation du Fœtus*. Page 684, 685

Pretended, that to aſſign final cauſes, is to preſume our ſelves to be as wiſe as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counſels. But the queſtion, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is abſolutely beſt in every caſe, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be ſo; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends, otherwiſe than would have reſulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No preſumption, nor intruſion into the ſecrets of God Almighty, to ſay, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the ſake of ſeeing. *Anaxagoras* his abſurd aphoriſm, that man was therefore the moſt ſolert of all animals, becauſe he chanced to have hands. Far more reaſonable to think, (as *Ariſtotle* concludeth) that becauſe man was the wiſeſt of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one, that hath muſical ſkill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to beſtow muſical ſkill. 685

In the laſt place, mechanick Theiſts pretend, and that with ſome more plauſibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty, to perform all thoſe mean and trivial offices of nature, himſelf immediately. This anſwered again; That though

though the divine wiſdom it ſelf contrived the ſyſtem of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior miniſter and executioner. *Proclus* his deſcription hereof. This nature, to *Proclus*, a god or goddeſs; but only as the bodies of the animated ſtars were called gods, becauſe the ſtatues of the gods. Page 685, 686

That we cannot otherwiſe conclude, concerning theſe mechanick Theiſts, who derive all things in the mundane ſyſtem, from the neceſſary motions of ſenſeleſs matter, without the direction of any Mind, or God; but that they are imperfect Theiſts, or have a certain tang of the atheiſtick enthuſiaſm, (the ſpirit of infidelity) hanging about them. 687

But theſe mechanick Theiſts counterbalanced by another ſort of Atheiſts, not fortuitous, nor mechanical; namely, the Hylozoiſts, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of underſtanding, and deride *Democritus* his rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life; they attributing life to all matter as ſuch, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetick nature being taken alone by it ſelf as a compleat ſubſtance. Theſe Hylozoiſts, never able to ſatisfy that phænomenon, of the one agreeing and conſpiring harmony throughout the whole univerſe; every atom of matter, according to them, being a diſtinct percipient; and theſe unable to confer notions with one another. 687

Nor can the other Coſmo-plaſtick Atheiſts (to whom the whole world, but one huge plant, or vegetable, endowed with a ſpermatick, artificial nature, orderly diſpoſing the whole, without ſenſe or underſtanding,) do any thing towards the ſolving of this, or any other phænomena; it being impoſſible, that there ſhould be any ſuch regular nature, otherwiſe than as derived from, and depending on a perfect mind. Page 687

Beſides theſe three phænomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conſpiring harmony of the whole, (no way ſolvable by Atheiſts) here further added, that thoſe, who aſſerted the novity of the world, could not poſſibly give an account neither of the firſt beginning of men, and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. *Ariſtotle* ſometimes doubtful, and ſtaggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at firſt by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; becauſe no reaſon to be given, why chance ſhould not as well produce the ſame out of the earth ſtill. *Epicurus* his vain pretence, that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether firſt generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-ſhells, ſuppoſed by theſe Atheiſts themſelves, to have been produced in a tender, infant-like ſtate, ſo that they could neither ſupply themſelves with nouriſhment, nor defend themſelves from harms. A dream of *Epicurus*, that the earth ſent forth ſtreams of milk after thoſe her new-born infants and nurſlings, confuted by *Critolaus* in *Philo*. Another precarious ſuppoſition, or figment, of *Epicurus*; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any bluſtering winds. *Anaximander*'s way of ſolving this difficulty; that men were firſt generated and nouriſhed in the bellies of fiſhes, 'till able to ſhift for themſelves; and then diſgorged upon dry land. Atheiſts ſwallow any thing rather than a God. 688, 689

Wherefore here being *dignus vindice nodus*, *a* Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς reaſonably introduced, in the Moſaick Cabala, to

ſolve the ſame. It appearing, from all circumſtances put together, that this whole phænomenon ſurpaſſes, not only the mechanick, but alſo the plaſtick powers; there being much of diſcretion therein. However, not denied, but that the miniſtry of ſpirits (created before man, and other terreſtrial animals) might be here made uſe of. As in *Plato*, after the creation of immortal ſouls by the ſupreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior Gods. Page 689, 690

Furthermore, Atheiſts no more able to ſolve that ordinary phænomenon, of the conſervation of ſpecies, by the difference of ſexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence alſo, ſuperiour, as well to the plaſtick, as mechanick nature. *ibid.*

Laſtly, other phænomena, as real, though not phyſical; which Atheiſts cannot poſſibly ſolve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural juſtice or honeſty, and obligation; the foundation of politicks, and the mathematicks of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous ſelf-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but alſo that, which makes men deſerve commendation and blame. Theſe not commonly diſtinguiſh'd as they ought. *Epicurus* his endeavour to ſolve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madneſs and frenzy. 690, 691

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheiſtick pretence, to ſolve the phænomenon of theiſm, from the fiction and impoſture of politicians; we having proved, that philoſophy and the true knowledge of cauſes infer the exiſtence of a God. Nevertheleſs, this is to be here further anſwered. 691

That ſtateſmen and politicians could not have made ſuch uſe of religion, as ſometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil ſovereigns in all the diſtant places of the world could not have ſo univerſally conſpired, in this one piece of ſtate-craft or cozenage; nor yet have been able to poſſeſs the minds of men every where, with ſuch a conſtant awe and dread of an inviſible nothing. The world would long ſince have diſcovered this cheat, and ſuſpected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a God; at leaſt governours themſelves would have underſtood it; many of which, notwithſtanding, as much awed with the fear of this inviſible nothing, as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practiſed. But religion, now as much in credit as ever, though ſo long ſince decried by Atheiſts for a political cheat. That Chriſtianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil ſovereigns, and conquered the perſecuting world, by ſuffering deaths and martyrdoms. This pre-ſignified by the prophetick ſpirit. Page 691, 692

Had the idea of God been an arbitrarious figment, not conceivable, how men ſhould have univerſally agreed in the ſame, and the attributes belonging thereunto: (this argument uſed by *Sextus*:) nor that civil ſovereigns themſelves ſhould ſo univerſally have jumped in it. 692, 693

Furthermore; Not conceivable, how this thought, or idea of a God, ſhould have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The ſuperficialneſs of Atheiſts, in pretending, that politicians, by telling men of ſuch a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words, but only the phantaſms of the ſounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obſtetricious; not the filling of the ſoul as a veſſel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling

kindling of it from within. Words ſignify nothing to him, that cannot raiſe up within himſelf the notions, or ideas, correſpondent to them. However, the difficulty ſtill remains; how ſtateſmen themſelves, or the firſt inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a non-entity. Page 693, 694

Here the Atheiſts pretend, that there is a feigning power in the ſoul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of non-entities; as of a golden mountain, or a Centaur: and that by this, an idea of God might be framed, though there be no ſuch thing. Anſwer; That all the feigning power of the ſoul conſiſteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exiſt apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation, which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of theſe fictitious ideas, though it have no actual, yet hath it a poſſible entity. The Deity it ſelf, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is, or was always contained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a poſitive idea of that, which hath no poſſible entity. 694, 695

The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exiſt ſeverally, apart in the world; becauſe then it would be a mere arbitrarious thing, and what every one pleaſed; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifeſted. 695

Again; ſome attributes of the Deity, nowhere elſe to be found in the whole world; and therefore muſt be abſolute non-entities, were there no God. Here the painter muſt feign colours, and create new cogitation, out of nothing. *ibid.*

Laſtly, upon ſuppoſition, that there is no God, it is impoſſible, not only that there ſhould be any for the future, but alſo that there ſhould ever have been any; whereas all fictitious ideas muſt have a poſſible entity, ſince otherwiſe they would be unconceivable, and no ideas. Page 695

Wherefore, ſome Atheiſts will further pretend, that beſides this power of compounding things together, the ſoul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God exiſting, nor yet poſſible, the idea of him might be fictitiouſly made; thoſe attributes, which are no where elſe to be found, ariſing by way of amplification or augmentation of ſomething found in men. 695, 696

Anſwer; firſt, that, according to the principles of theſe Atheiſts, that all our conceptions are nothing but paſſions from objects without, there cannot poſſibly be any ſuch amplifying power in the ſoul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus *Protagoras* in *Plato*; No man can conceive any thing but what he ſuffers. Here alſo, (as *Sextus* intimateth, the Atheiſts guilty of that fallacy, called a circle or *diallelus*. For having firſt undiſcernedly made the idea of imperfection from perfection, they then go about again, to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which, as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abſtraction of all imperfection. Laſtly, finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite ſpace, ſaid to conſiſt of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cauſe it could never be actually infinite. *Gaſſendus* his objection

objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned, as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together, or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity. Page 696, 697

The conclusion; that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea, of a non-entity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 697

Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived, not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too. 697, 698

Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable, and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right. 698

But religion in its own nature, a stiff, inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God, and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed, rather than men. For this cause, atheistick politicians of latter times, declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the Leviathan; to wit, of him, who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheists natural God; the Leviathan or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three Atheistick pretences, to solve the phænomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted. Page 698, 700

But because, besides those ordinary phænomena, before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones, that cannot be solved by Atheists, which therefore they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governours, (*viz.* apparitions, miracles, and prophecies;) the reality of these here also to be briefly vindicated. 700

First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and phancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony, than they ought. *ibid.*

That some Atheists sensible hereof have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the meer creatures of imagination; as if a strong phancy could produce real substances, or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will rather believe the greatest impossibilities, than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduce one supreme Ghost of the whole world. 700, 701

Democritus yet further convinced; that there were invisible beings superiour to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols)

idols) but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the exiſtence of them, than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terreſtrial, but alſo aëreal and æthereal animals; and that all thoſe vaſt regions of the univerſe above were not deſert and uninhabited. Here ſomething of the fathers, aſſerting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards. Page 701, 702

To this phænomenon of apparitions may be added thoſe two others, of witches and demoniacks; both of theſe proving, that ſpirits are not phancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as alſo, that there are ſome impure ſpirits, a confirmation of the truth of Chriſtianity. The confident exploders of witchcraft ſuſpicable for atheiſm. As for Demoniacks or Energumeni, certain from *Joſephus*, that the Jews did not take theſe Dæmons or Devils for bodily diſeaſes, but real ſubſtances, poſſeſſing the bodies of men. Nor probable, that they ſuppoſed, as the Gnoſticks afterward, all diſeaſes to be the infeſtation of evil ſpirits; nor yet, (as ſome think) all Dæmoniacks to be madmen. But when there were any unuſual and extraordinary ſymptoms, in any bodily diſtemper, but eſpecially that of madneſs, they ſuppoſing this to be ſupernatural, imputed it to the infeſtation of ſome Devil. Thus alſo the Greeks. 702, 704

That Dæmoniacks and Energumeni are a real phænomenon; and that there are ſuch alſo in theſe times of ours, aſſerted by *Fernelius* and *Sennertus*. Such maniacal perſons, as not only diſcover ſecrets, but alſo ſpeak languages, which they had never learned, unqueſtionably Dæmoniacks or Energumeni. That there have been ſuch in the times ſince our Saviour, proved out of *Pſellus*; as alſo from *Fernelius*. This for the vindication of Chriſtianity, againſt thoſe, who ſuſpect the Scripture-dæmoniacks for figments. Page 704, 706

The ſecond extraordinary phænomenon propoſed; that of miracles, and effects ſupernatural. That there have been ſuch things amongſt the Pagans, and ſince the times of Chriſtianity too, evident from their records. But more inſtances of theſe in ſcripture. 706

Two ſorts of miracles. Firſt, ſuch, as, though they cannot be done by ordinary cauſes, yet may be effected by the natural power of inviſible ſpirits, angels, or dæmons. As illiterate Dæmoniacks ſpeaking Greek. Such amongſt the Pagans that miracle of the whetſtone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, ſuch as tranſcend the natural power of all ſecond cauſes, and created beings. 706, 707

That late *Politico-Theological Treatiſe*, denying both theſe ſorts of miracles, inconſiderable, and not deſerving here a confutation. 707

Suppoſed in *Deut.* that miracles of the former ſort might be done by falſe prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore miracles alone not ſufficient to confirm every doctrine. *ibid.*

Accordingly in the New Teſtament do we read of τέρατα ψεύδους, *lying miracles*; that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lye, and by the power of Satan, *&c.* God permitting it, in way of probation of ſome, and puniſhment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worſhip or idolatry, inſtead of juſtifying the ſame, themſelves condemned by it. 708

Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to *Moſes*'s law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Suppoſed in *Deut.* that God would not permit falſe prophets to do miracles, ſave

ſave only in the caſe of idolatry; or when the doctrine is diſcoverable to be falſe by the light of nature; becauſe that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and no more out of flaming fire. Nevertheleſs ſome miracles of our Saviour Chriſt's ſuch alſo, as could be done only by the power of God Almighty. 708, 709

All miracles evince ſpirits; to diſbelieve which is to diſbelieve ſenſe, or unreaſonably to derogate from human teſtimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Chriſt, without miracles, this it ſelf would have been a great miracle. Page 709

The laſt extraordinary phænomenon, divination or prophecy. This alſo evinces ſpirits, (called gods by the Pagans:) and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods. 710

Two ſorts of predictions likewiſe, as of miracles. Firſt, ſuch as might proceed from the natural preſaging power of created ſpirits. Such predictions acknowledged by *Democritus*, upon account of his idols. Not ſo much contingency in human actions, by reaſon of men's liberty of will, as ſome ſuppoſe. 710, 711

Another ſort of predictions of futurē events imputable only to the ſupernatural preſcience of God Almighty. *Epicurus* his pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as ſuppoſing, or making a neceſſity. Some Theiſts alſo denying the preſcience of God Almighty, upon the ſame account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events, otherwiſe than in their cauſes. Wherefore predictions of ſuch events, as had no neceſſary antecedent cauſes, evince a God. 711, 712

That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general perſuaſion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongſt the Pagans, which evince ſpirits, as that of *Actius Navius*. Moſt of the Pagan oracles, from the natural preſaging power of demons. Nevertheleſs ſome inſtances of predictions of a higher kind amongſt them; as that of *Vectius Valens*, and the Sibyls. Thus *Balaam* divinely aſſiſted to predict our Saviour. Page 712, 713

Scriptures triumphing over Pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Chriſt, and the converſion of the Gentiles. Amongſt which that remarkable one of the ſeventy weeks. 713, 714

Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. *Daniel*'s fourth ten-horned beaſt, the Roman empire. This prophecy of *Daniel*'s carried on further in the Apocalypſe. Both of them prophetick calendars of times, to the end of the world. *ibid.*

That this phænomenon of Scripture-prophecies cannot poſſibly be imputed by Atheiſts, as ſome others, to fear, or ignorance of cauſes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but alſo the truth of Chriſtianity. To this purpoſe, of more uſe to us, who now live, than the miracles themſelves recorded in Scripture. 714, 715

Theſe five extraordinary phænomena all of them evince ſpirits to be no phancies, but ſubſtantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity. *ibid.*

Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheiſtick pretences from the idea of God, but alſo, by the way, already propoſed ſeveral ſubſtantial arguments for a Deity. The exiſtence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea. *ibid.*

True, that ſome of the ancient Theiſts themſelves declare God not to be demon-

demonſtrable. Thus *Alexander Aprodiſ. Clemens Alexand.* But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonſttated *à priori* from any antecedent neceſſary cauſe. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty, or knowledge of the exiſtence of a God ; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonſtrated *à priori* ; as, that there was ſomething or other eternal, without beginning. Whenſoever a thing is neceſſarily inferred from what is altogether undeniable, this may be called a demonſtration. Many geometrical demonſtrations ſuch ; or of the ὅτι only. Page 715, 716

A ſpecial poſition of *Carteſius* ; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions ; before we be certain of the exiſtence of a God, eſſentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheiſts, nor ſuch Theiſts, as aſſert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing ; as that two and two are four. 716, 717

However ſome appearance of piety in this aſſertion ; yet is it a foundation of eternal ſcepticiſm, both as to all other things, and the exiſtence of a God. That *Carteſius* here went round in a circle, proving the exiſtence of a God from our faculties and then the truth of our faculties from the exiſtence of a God ; and conſequently proved nothing. If it be poſſible, that our faculties might be falſe, then muſt we confeſs it poſſible, that there may be no God ; and conſequently remain for ever ſceptical about it. *ibid.*

Wherefore a neceſſity of exploding and confuting this new ſceptical hypotheſis, of the poſſibility of our faculties being ſo made, as to deceive us, in all our cleareſt perceptions. Omnipotence it ſelf cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or falſe. Truth not factitious. As to the univerſal theorems of abſtract ſcience, the meaſure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and diſtinct perception. Here whatſoever is clearly perceived, is ; the very eſſence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no falſe knowledge or underſtanding. The perception of the underſtanding never falſe, but only obſcure. Not nature, that erreth in us, but we our ſelves, in aſſenting to things not clearly perceived. Concluſion ; that omnipotence cannot create any underſtanding faculties, ſo as to have as clear and diſtinct conceptions of all falſhoods and non-entities, as of truths ; becauſe whatſoever is clearly and diſtinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity ; and omnipotence it ſelf (to ſpeak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be ſomething, or ſomething nothing. This no more, than that it cannot do things contradictious. Conception the meaſure of power. Page 717, 719

True, that ſenſe as ſuch is but phantaſtical and relative ; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and ſeeming, none abſolute. This probably the reaſon, why ſome have ſuſpected the ſame of knowledge alſo. But mind and underſtanding reaches beyond phancy and appearance, to the abſoluteneſs of things. It hath the criterion of truth within it ſelf. 719, 720

Objected ; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an abſolute certainty of any thing. Anſwer ; that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things : but no derogation from the Deity, to ſuppoſe, that he ſhould make created minds ſuch, as to have a certainty of ſomething ; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like : ſince otherwiſe they would be

be but a meer mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men ſo, as that they may poſſibly attain to ſome certainty of his own exiſtence. *Origen*, that knowledge is the only thing, that hath certainty in it. Page 720, 721

Having now ſome firm ground or footing to ſtand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reaſon; we ſhall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonſtrate the exiſtence of a God from his idea. *ibid.*

Carteſius his undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it neceſſary exiſtence. This argument hitherto not ſo ſucceſsful, it being by many concluded to be a ſophiſm. That we ſhall impartially ſet down all that we can, both for it, and againſt it; leaving others to make a judgment. 721

Firſt, againſt the Carteſian demonſtration of a God. That becauſe we can frame an idea of a neceſſarily exiſtent being, it does not at all follow, that it is; ſince we can frame ideas of things, that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impoſſible. Again, from this idea, including neceſſary exiſtence, nothing elſe inferrible, but that what hath no neceſſary exiſtence, is not perfect; and, that if there be a perfect being, its exiſtence always was, and will be neceſſary; but not abſolutely, that it doth exiſt. A fallacy, when from the neceſſity of exiſtence affirmed only hypothetically, the concluſion is made abſolutely. Though a perfect being muſt exiſt neceſſarily, yet not therefore follow, that it muſt and doth exiſt. The latter a thing indemonſtrable. 721, 723

For the Carteſian demonſtration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impoſſible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that, which hath a contingent ſcheſis to exiſtence, that it might be, or might not be; ſo from that, which hath neceſſary exiſtence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not meerly hypothetical, if there be a perfect Being, then is its exiſtence neceſſary; becauſe this ſuppoſes, that a neceſſary exiſtent being is contingent to be, or not to be: which a contradiction. The abſurdity of this will better appear, if, inſtead of neceſſary exiſtence, we put in actual. No Theiſts can otherwiſe prove, that a God, though ſuppoſed to exiſt, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheleſs God, or a perfect Being, not here demonſtrated *à priori*, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment. Page 723, 724

A progymnaſma, or præluſory attempt, towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including neceſſary exiſtence. Firſt, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows, that ſuch a thing is poſſible. And from that neceſſary exiſtence included in this idea, added to the poſſibility thereof, it further follows, that it actually is. A neceſſary exiſtent being, if poſſible, is; becauſe upon the ſuppoſition of its non-exiſtence, it would be impoſſible for it ever to have been. Not ſo in contingent things. A perfect being is either impoſſible to have been, or elſe it is. Were God poſſible, and yet not, he would not be a neceſſary, but contingent being. However, no ſtreſs laid upon this. 724, 725

Another plainer argument, for the exiſtence of a God, from his Idea. Whatſoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or elſe, if it be not, is poſſible to be. But if God be not, he is not poſſible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we

we cannot have an idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor poſſible exiſtence. Page 725

A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including neceſſary exiſtence, by certain ſteps. Firſt, certain, that ſomething or other did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatſoever did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, did ſo exiſt naturally and neceſſarily, and therefore there is a neceſſary exiſtent Being. Thirdly, nothing could exiſt of it ſelf from eternity naturally and neceſſarily, but what contained neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence in its nature. Laſtly, a perfect Being, and nothing elſe, containeth neceſſary exiſtence in its nature. Therefore it is. An appendix to this argument; that no temporary ſucceſſive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before. 725, 726

Again, the controverſy betwixt Atheiſts and Theiſts firſt clearly ſtated from the idea of God, and then ſatisfactorily decided. Premiſed; that as every thing was not made, ſo neither was every thing unmade. Atheiſts agree in both. The ſtate of the controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts; whether that, which being it ſelf unmade, was the cauſe of all other things made, were the moſt perfect, or the moſt imperfect being. A certain kind of Atheiſtick Theiſm, or Theogoniſm, which acknowledging a God, or ſoul of the world, preſiding over the whole, ſuppoſed him, notwithſtanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of ſenſeleſs matter. 726, 728

The controverſy thus ſtated eaſily decided. Certain, that leſſer perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is abſolutely perfect; but impoſſible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, ſhould riſe out of leſſer and lower. Things did not aſcend, but deſcend. That life and ſenſe may naturally riſe from the meer modification of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, as alſo reaſon and underſtanding from ſenſe; the philoſophy of the kingdom of darkneſs. The Hylozoiſts ſo ſenſible of this, that there muſt be ſome ſubſtantial unmade life and underſtanding; that atheizing, they thought it neceſſary to attribute life and underſtanding to all matter, as ſuch. This argument a demonſtration of the impoſſibility of atheiſm. Page 728, 729

The controverſy again more particularly ſtated, from the idea of God, as including mind and underſtanding in it; *viz.* whether all Mind were made or generated out of ſenſeleſs matter; or whether there were an eternal unmade mind the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theiſts, that Mind the oldeſt of all things; of Atheiſts, that it is a poſt-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings. 729

The controverſy thus ſtated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themſelves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind. 729, 730

That Atheiſts think their chief ſtrength to lie here, in their diſproving a God, from the nature of underſtanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and underſtanding the creature of ſenſibles, and a phantaſtick image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and underſtanding is not to be attributed to God, becauſe it implieth depen-

dependence upon things without; which is all one, as if he ſhould have ſaid, that ſenſeleſs matter is the more perfect of all things, and the higheſt Numen. Page 730

A compendious confutation of the premiſed Atheiſtick principles. Knowledge not the activity of ſenſibles upon the knower, and his paſſion. Senſible things themſelves not known by the paſſion, or phancy of ſenſe. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Beſides phantaſms of ſingular bodies, intelligible idea's univerſal. A late atheiſtick paradox, that univerſals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abſtract ſciences no paſſion from bodies by ſenſe, nor yet gathered by induction from many ſingulars; we at once perceiving it impoſſible, that they ſhould be otherwiſe. An ingenious obſervation of *Ariſtotle*'s, that could it be perceived by ſenſe, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be ſcience, or knowledge, properly ſo called: which is of univerſals firſt, and from thence deſcends to ſingulars. 730, 732

Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as alſo of ſuch corporeals as never did exiſt, and whoſe accuracy ſenſe could not reach to; as a perfect ſtraight line, and plain ſuperficies, an exact triangle, circle, or ſphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things, that never were nor will be, but only poſſible. 732

Inferred from hence, that human ſcience it ſelf, not the meer image and creature of ſingular ſenſibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But ſince there muſt be νοητὸν before νῦς, *intelligibles* before *intellection*; the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it ſelf, and the extent of its own power, or the poſſibilities of all things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake. Page 732, 733

Knowledge therefore, in the nature of it, ſuppoſeth the exiſtence of a perfect omnipotent Being, as its νοητὸν, or *intelligible*. This comprehending it ſelf, the firſt original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all ſenſibles, not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not Atheiſm, but Theiſm, demonſtrable from knowledge and underſtanding. Page 733, 734

This further confirmed from hence; becauſe there are eternal verities, ſuch as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a ſquare incommenſurable to the ſides, an eternal truth to *Ariſtotle*. *Juſtin Martyr*'s αἰώνια δίκαια, or *eternal morals*, geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as alſo before the world and matter itſelf. 734

Now if there be eternal verities, the ſimple reaſons and intelligible eſſences of things muſt needs be eternal likewiſe. Theſe called by *Plato* things, that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However *Ariſtotle* quarrels with *Plato*'s ideas, yet does he alſo agree with him in this, that the forms or ſpecies of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things beſides ſenſibles, the immutable objects of ſcience. Certain, that there could be no immutable ſcience, were there no other objects of the mind, but ſenſibles. The objects of geometrical ſcience no material triangles, ſquares, &c. theſe, by *Ariſtotle*, ſaid to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to *Philo*, the moſt neceſſary eſſences. 735, 736

Now if there be eternal truths, and intelligibles, whoſe exiſtence alſo is neceſſary; ſince theſe can be no where but in

in a mind; there muſt be an eternal, neceſſarily exiſting Mind, comprehending all theſe ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the Mind of a perfect, omnipotent Being, comprehending it ſelf, and all poſſibilities of things, the extent of its own power. Page 736, 737

Wherefore there can be but one only original Mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in ſeveral men; and truths indiviſibly the ſame: becauſe their minds all ſtamp'd with the ſame original ſeal. *Themiſtius*; that one man could not teach another, were there not the ſame notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together, as they do, were there not one Mind, that all partaked of. That anti-monarchical opinion, of many underſtanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only aſſerted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheiſtick pretences againſt it; but alſo, from this idea, demonſtrated his exiſtence. 737, 738

SECT. II.

A Confutation of the ſecond atheiſtick argument, againſt omnipotence and divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatſoever, be made out of nothing. In anſwer to which, three things to be inſiſted on. Firſt, that *de nihilo nihil*, *nothing out of nothing*, is in ſome ſenſe an axiom of unqueſtionable truth, but then makes nothing againſt theiſm, or divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the ſenſe of the atheiſtick objectors, *viz.* that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatſoever be brought into being, is abſolutely falſe; and that, if it were true, it would make no more againſt theiſm, than it does againſt atheiſm. Laſtly, that from this very axiom, *nothing from nothing*, in the true ſenſe thereof, the abſolute impoſſibility of atheiſm is demonſtrable. Page 738

De nihilo nihil, *nothing from nothing*, in ſome ſenſe, is a common notion of unqueſtionable truth. For firſt, certain, that nothing, which once was not, could ever of it ſelf come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of exiſtence from it ſelf; or, that nothing can be made or produced, without an efficient cauſe. From whence demonſtrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but ſomething did exiſt of itſelf from eternity unmade, or underived from any thing elſe. 738, 739

Again, certain alſo, that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at leaſt equal perfection, and a ſufficient active or productive power. That of an effect, which tranſcends the perfection of its ſuppoſed cauſe, muſt come from nothing, or be made without a cauſe. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unleſs it have alſo a ſufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other ſubſtance beſides body, which had no ſelf-moving power, there could never poſſibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a ſufficient cauſe, or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new ſubſtance, which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two fore-mentioned ſenſes reſpect the efficient cauſe. 739

Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing præ-exiſting or inexiſting. And therefore, in all natural generations (where the ſupernatural power of the Deity interpoſes not) no new real entity, or ſubſtance produced, which was not before, but only new

new-modifications of what ſubſtantially præ-exiſted. Page 739, 740

Nothing out of nothing, ſo much inſiſted on by the old phyſiologers before *Ariſtotle*, in this ſenſe, commonly miſunderſtood by modern writers, as if they deſigned thereby, to take away all divine creation out of nothing præ-exiſting. Granted, this to have been the ſenſe of the Stoicks and of *Plutarch*; he affirming, the world to have been no otherwiſe made by God, than a houſe is by a carpenter, or a garment by a taylor. *Plutarch* and the Stoicks therefore imperfect Theiſts, but nevertheleſs zealous Religioniſts. But the ancient Italick philoſophers here acted only as phyſiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphyſicians; they not directing themſelves againſt a divine creation out of nothing pre-exiſting; but only contending, that neither in natural generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before exiſted, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. 740, 741

That this was the true meaning of thoſe ancient phyſiologers, evident from the uſe, which they made of this principle, *nothing out of nothing*; which twofold. Firſt, upon this fouudation, they endeavoured to eſtabliſh a peculiar kind of phyſiology, and ſome atomology or other, either ſimilar or diſſimilar; homœomery or anomœomery. *Anaxagoras* from hence concluded, becauſe nothing could be made out of nothing præ-exiſting and inexiſting, that therefore there were in every body ſimilar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and ſecretions, all natural generations made; ſo that bone was made out of bony atoms præ-exiſting and inexiſting; fleſh out of fleſhy, and the like. This the *Anaxagorean* homœomery, or ſimilar atomology, built upon this principle, *nothing out of nothing* Page 741, 742

But the ancient Italicks, both before and after *Anaxagoras*, (whom *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Epicurus* here followed) with greater ſagacity concluded, from the ſame principle, *nothing out of nothing*, that thoſe qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, cauſing different phancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or diſſimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Thoſe ſimple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet) out of which, variouſly combined, theſe philoſophers ſpelled out, or compounded all the ſyllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, ſite, motion, reſt, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities diſtinct from theſe, and not præ-exiſting, (as *Anaxagoras* dreamed) they muſt then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impoſſible. 742, 743

Another improvement of this principle, *nothing out of nothing*, made by the Italick philoſophers; that the ſouls of animals, eſpecially human, ſince they could not poſſibly reſult from the mere modifications of matter, figure, ſite motion, *&c.* were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being ſubſtantial things, did præ- and poſt-exiſt. This ſet down as the controverſy betwixt Atheiſts and Theiſts, in *Lucretius*. Whether ſouls were generated, or inſinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to theſe Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical tranſpoſitions. That thoſe philoſophers, who aſſerted the præ-exiſtence and ingenerability of ſouls, did not therefore ſuppoſe them to have been ſelf-

ſelf-exiſtent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus *Proclus*, though maintaining the eternity of ſouls, with the world. The ingenerability of ſouls in *Plato*'s *Timæus*, no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cauſe alſo, were they called principles, in the ſame ſenſe, as matter was ſo accounted. Souls therefore, to *Plato*, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before. Page 743, 745

Saint *Auſtin* himſelf ſometime ſtaggering and ſceptical, in the point of præ-exiſtence. That we have a philoſophick certainty of no more than this, that ſouls were created by God, out of nothing præ-exiſting, ſome time or other; either in generations, or before them. That unleſs brutes be mere machines, the reaſon the ſame alſo concerning brutiſh ſouls; that the ſenot generated out of matter, but created, ſome time or other, by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was. 745

That all theſe three fore-mentioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can poſſibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general propoſition, that nothing can be cauſed by nothing; which will no way claſh with the divine omnipotence or creative power, as ſhall be ſhewed aftewards; but confirm the ſame. But thoſe ſame words, *nothing out of nothing*, may carry another ſenſe; when that ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*, is not taken cauſally, but only to ſignify the *terminus à quo, the term from which*, or *an antecedent non-exiſtence:* and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing, which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatſoever, be brought into being. And this the ſenſe of the Democritick and Epicurean objectors; *viz.* That no real entity can be made, or brought out of non-exiſtence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theiſts an impoſſibility. Page *ibid.*

Our ſecond undertakings in way of anſwer hereunto; to ſhew, that nothing out of nothing, in this ſenſe, is falſe; as alſo, that, were it true, yet it would make no more againſt theiſm, than it doth againſt atheiſm; and therefore ought not to be uſed by Atheiſts, as an argument againſt a God. If this univerſally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making, nor cauſing at all, no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But our ſelves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheiſts forced to reſtrain this propoſition to ſubſtantials only. And here ſome deceived with the equivocation, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *out of nothing*; which may be taken either cauſally, or elſe to ſignify the term from which, that is, from an antecedent non-exiſtence; they confounding both theſe together; whereof the firſt only true, the latter falſe. Again, others ſtaggered with the plauſibility of this propoſition; partly becauſe no artificial thing (as a houſe or garment) can be made by men, but out of præ-exiſting matter; and partly becauſe ancient phyſiologers maintained the ſame alſo concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or ſubſtance could be therein produced; and laſtly, becauſe it is certain, that no imperfect created being can create any new ſubſtance; they being therefore apt to meaſure all power whatſoever, by theſe ſcantlings. But as eaſy for a perfect Being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing, (in this ſenſe, that is, out of an antecedent non-exiſtence,) as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the ſun to ſend out rays. For an imperfect ſubſtance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impoſſible,

impoſſible, in any of the fore-mentioned ſenſes; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but alſo ſufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impoſſible; but nothing thus impoſſible, but what contradictious: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the ſame time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being, (which is in its nature contingent to exiſtence) after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, ſince the making of a ſubſtance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictious, nor conſequently in its own nature impoſſible; it muſt needs be an object of perfect power. Page 746, 748

Furthermore, if no real entity or ſubſtance could poſſibly be brought out of non-exiſtence into being; then muſt the reaſon hereof be, becauſe no ſubſtance can derive its whole being from another ſubſtance. But from hence, it would follow, that whatſoever is ſubſtantial, did not only exiſt from eternity, but alſo of it ſelf, independently upon any thing elſe. Whereas, firſt, the præ-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reaſon: and then, to ſuppoſe imperfect ſubſtances to have exiſted of themſelves and neceſſarily, is to ſuppoſe ſomething to come from nothing, in the impoſſible ſenſe; they having no neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence in their nature. As they, who affirm all ſubſtance to be body, and no body to be able to move it ſelf, though ſuppoſing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be cauſed by nothing. What in its nature contingently poſſible to be, or not be, could not exiſt of it ſelf; but muſt derive its being from ſomething elſe, which neceſſarily exiſteth. *Plato*'s diſtinction therefore betwixt two kinds of ſubſtances muſt needs be admitted, that, which always is, and was never made; and that, which is made, or had a beginning. Page 748, 749

Laſtly, if this true, that no ſubſtance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence, (as the Epicurean Atheiſt ſuppoſes) that matter, but alſo that all ſouls, (at leaſt human) did exiſt of themſelves, from eternity, independently upon any thing elſe; it being impoſſible, that Mind or Soul ſhould be a modification of ſenſeleſs matter, or reſult from figures, ſites, motions, and magnitudes. Human ſouls ſubſtantial, and therefore, according to this doctrine, muſt have been never made; whereas Atheiſts ſtiffly deny both their præ and poſt-exiſtence. Thoſe Pagan Theiſts, who held the eternity of human minds, ſuppoſed them, notwithſtanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cauſe. Before proved, that there can be but one underſtanding Being, ſelf-exiſtent. If human ſouls depend upon the Deity as their cauſe, then doubtleſs matter alſo. 749, 750

A common, but great miſtake, that no Pagan Theiſt ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or elſe, that God was the cauſe of any ſubſtance. *Plato*'s definition of effective power, in general, and his affirmation, that the divine efficiency is that, whereby things are made, after they had not been. Certain, that he did not underſtand this of the production of ſouls out of matter, he ſuppoſing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing præ-exiſting. All philoſophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the ſoul, aſſerted it to have been cauſed by God, either in time, or from eternity. *Plutarch*'s ſingularity here. Unqueſtionable, that the Platoniſts ſuppoſed one ſubſtance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their ſecond hypoſtaſis or ſubſtance, though eternal, from the firſt; and their third from both; and all

all inferiour ranks of beings from all three. *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Proclus*, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee Oracles; and the old Egyptian, or Hermaick theology alſo, according to *Jamblichus*. Thoſe Platoniſts, who ſuppoſed the world and ſouls eternal, conceived them to have received their being, as much from the Deity, as if made in time. Page 750, 752

Having now diſproved this propoſition, *nothing out of nothing*, in the atheiſtick ſenſe, viz. That no ſubſtance was cauſed, or derived its being from another, but whatſoever is ſubſtantial, did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear alſo, that were it true, it would no more oppoſe theiſm, than it doth atheiſm. Falſhoods (though not truths) may diſagree. *Plutarch*, the Stoicks, and others, who made God the creator of no ſubſtance, though not genuine, yet zealous Theiſts. But the ancient Atheiſts, both in *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or non-exiſtence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare ſubſtance of matter only excepted. The ſame done by the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts themſelves, the makers of this objection: though, according to the principles of their own atomick phyſiology, it is impoſſible, that life and underſtanding, ſoul and mind, ſhould be mere modifications of matter. As Theiſts give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; ſo do Atheiſts to paſſive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument againſt theiſm; it equally oppoſing atheiſm. 752, 756

An *Anacephalæoſis*; wherein obſervable, that *Cicero* makes *de nihilo fieri*, and *ſine cauſa*, *to be made out of nothing*, and *to be made without a cauſe*, one and the ſelf-ſame thing; as alſo, that he doth not confine this to the material cauſe only. Our third and laſt undertaking; to prove, that Atheiſts produce real entities out of nothing, in the firſt impoſſible ſenſe; that is, without a cauſe. Page 756, 757

A brief ſynopſis of atheiſm; that matter being the only ſubſtance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatſoever elſe is in the world, beſides the bare ſubſtance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone. 757

The firſt argument; when Atheiſts affirm matter to be the only ſubſtance, and all things to be made out of that, they ſuppoſe all to be made without an efficient cauſe; which is to bring them from nothing, in an impoſſible ſenſe. Though ſomething may be made without a material cauſe præ-exiſting; yet cannot any thing poſſibly be made without an efficient cauſe. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there muſt of neceſſity be, beſides matter, ſome other ſubſtance, as the active, efficient cauſe thereof. The atheiſtick hypotheſis ſuppoſes things to be made, without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheiſts attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only ſubſtance) a ſelf-moving power. They hereby make all the motion, that is in the world, to have been without a cauſe, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient. 758

Again, ſhould we grant theſe Atheiſts motion without a cauſe, yet could not dead and ſenſeleſs matter, together with motion, ever beget life, ſenſe, and underſtanding; becauſe this would be ſomething out of nothing, in way of cauſality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, ſite and diſpoſition of parts.

Hence alſo thoſe ſpurious Theiſts confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a houſe, (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing;) and yet ſuppoſe him to make ſouls out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of cauſality. Page 758, 759

Declared before, That the ancient Italicks and Pythagoricks proved in this manner, that ſouls could not poſſibly be generated out of matter; becauſe nothing can come from nothing, in way of cauſality. The ſubterfuge of the atheiſtick Ionicks out of *Ariſtotle*; that matter being the only ſubſtance, and life, ſenſe and underſtanding, nothing but the paſſions, affections and diſpoſitions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity. 759

Anſwer; Atheiſts taking it for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides body or matter, therefore falſely conclude life, ſenſe and underſtanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of ſubſtance incorporeal and ſelf-active. A mode that, which cannot be conceived, without the thing, whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived, without corporeal extenſion; and indeed cannot be conceived with it. 759, 760

The chief occaſion of this error, from qualities and forms; as becauſe the quality of heat, and form of fire may be generated out of matter, therefore life, cogitation, and underſtanding alſo. But the atomick Atheiſts themſelves explode qualities, as things really diſtinct from the figure, ſite, aud motion of parts, for this very reaſon, becauſe nothing can be made out of nothing cauſally. The vulgar opinion of ſuch real qualities in bodies, only from men's miſtaking their own phancies, apparitions, paſſions, affections and ſeemings, for things really exiſting without them. That in theſe qualities, which is diſtinct from the figure, ſite, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matter, but of our own ſouls. The atomick Atheiſts infinitely abſurd; when exploding qualities, becauſe nothing can come out of nothing, themſelves bring life, ſenſe and underſtanding, out of nothing, in way of cauſality. That oipnion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themſelves but mere machines, prodigious ſottiſhneſs, or intolerable impudence. Page 760, 762

Very obſervable here, that *Epicurus* himſelf, having a mind to aſſert contingent liberty, confeſſeth, that he could not do this, unleſs there were ſome ſuch thing in the principles; becauſe nothing can be made out of nothing, or cauſed by nothing: and therefore does he ridiculouſly feign a third motion of atoms, to ſolve that phænomenon of free-will. Wherefore he muſt needs be guilty of an impoſſible production, of ſomething out of nothing, when he brings ſoul and mind out of dead, ſenſeleſs atoms. Were there no ſubſtantial and eternal life and underſtanding in the univerſe, there could none have been ever produced; becauſe it muſt have come from nothing, or been made without a cauſe. That dark philoſophy, which educes, not only real qualities and ſubſtantial forms, but alſo ſouls themſelves, at leaſt ſenſitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cauſe; and ſo prepares a direct way to atheiſm. 762, 763

They, who ſuppoſe matter, otherwiſe than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce ſouls, and minds, attribute that creative power to this ſenſeleſs and unactive matter, which

which themſelves deny, to a perfect Being, as an abſolute impoſſibility. Thus have we demonſtrated the impoſſibility and nonſenſe of all atheiſm from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without ſufficient cauſe. Page 763, 764

Wherefore, if no middle betwixt theſe two, but all things muſt either ſpring from a God, or matter; then is this alſo a demonſtration of the truth of theiſm, by deduction to impoſſible: either there is a God, or elſe all things are derived from dead and ſenſeleſs matter: but this latter is impoſſible; therefore a God. Nevertheleſs, that the exiſtence of a God may be further directly proved alſo from the ſame principle, rightly underſtood, *nothing out of nothing* cauſally, or nothing cauſed by nothing, neither efficiently, nor materially. 764

By theſe ſteps; firſt, that there was never nothing, but ſomething or other did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing elſe, mathematically certain; from this principle, *nothing from nothing*. Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatſoever did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, muſt have ſo exiſted neceſſarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain therefore, that there is ſomething actually in being, whoſe exiſtence is and always was neceſſary. Now that, which exiſts neceſſarily, of it ſelf, muſt have neceſſity of exiſtence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect Being hath. Therefore there is a perfect Being; and nothing elſe beſides this did exiſt of it ſelf from eternity, but all other things whatſoever (whether ſouls or matter) were made by it. To ſuppoſe any thing to exiſt of it ſelf neceſſarily, that hath no neceſſary exiſtence in its nature, is to ſuppoſe that neceſſary exiſtence to have come from nothing. Page 764, 765

Three reaſons, why ſome Theiſts have been ſo ſtaggering and ſceptical about the neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence of matter. Firſt, from an idiotical conceit, that becauſe artificial things cannot be made by men, but out of præexiſtent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect Being, can be otherwiſe made. Secondly, becauſe ſome of them have ſuppoſed ὕλην ἀσώματον, *an incorporeal hyle*, or firſt matter unmade; an opinion older than *Ariſtotle*. Whereas this really nothing, but a metaphyſical notion of the potentiality or poſſibility of things, reſpectively to the Deity. Laſtly, becauſe ſome of them have conceived body and ſpace to be really the ſame thing; and ſpace to be poſitively infinite, eternal, and neceſſarily exiſtent. But if ſpace be not the extenſion of the Deity it ſelf, as ſome ſuppoſe; but of body, only conſidered abſtractly, from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no ſufficient ground for the poſitive infinity, or the indefinity thereof, as *Carteſius* imagined: we being certain of no more than this, that be the world and its ſpace, or extenſion, never ſo great, yet it might be ſtill greater and greater infinitely; for which very cauſe, it could never be poſitively infinite. This poſſibility of more body and ſpace, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as alſo its eternity, miſtaken, for actual ſpace and diſtance poſitively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any ſuch great abſurdity, in the finiteneſs of actual ſpace and diſtance, (according to this hypotheſis,) as ſome conceive. 765, 766

Moreover, the exiſtence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, *nothing from nothing cauſually*; not only becauſe were there no God, that idea, which we have of a

perfect Being, must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas, by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self. Page 766, 767

However, certain from this principle, *nothing from nothing*, or *nothing caused by nothing*; that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity, out of nothing præ-existing. Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves, necessarily. Thus is the second atheistick argumentation against omnipotence or divine creation, from that false principle, *nothing out of nothing*, in the atheistick sense, (which is, that nothing could be brought out of non-existence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity) abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent Being, and Creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause. 767

SECT. III.

THE six following atheistick argumentations, driving at these two things, (the disproving, first of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity) next taken all together. In way of answer to which, three things. First, to confute the atheistick argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to shew, that from the very principles of the atheistick corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that therefore the two following atheistick arguments, (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant. Page 767

Before we come to the atheistick arguments, against an incorporeal Deity, premised; that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. Thus *Plato* in his *Sophist*, writing of those, who maintained, that nature generated all things without the direction of any Mind, affirmeth, that they held body and substance to be one and the self-same thing. From whence it follows, that incorporeal substance is incorporeal body, or contradictious nonsense; and that whatsoever is not body, is nothing. He likewise addeth, that they, who asserted the soul to be a body, but had not the confidence to make prudence and other virtues bodies, (or bodily) quite overthrew the cause of atheism. *Aristotle* also representeth the atheistick hypothesis thus, That there is but one nature, matter; and this corporeal, (or endued with magnitude) the only substance; and all other things, the passions and affections thereof. 767, 769

In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those, who held a vacuum, (as *Epicurus* and *Democritus*, &c.) though taking it for granted, that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude, is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible, body; the second penetrable and intangible, space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Their argument thus; since

ſince nothing incorporeal beſides ſpace, (which can neither do nor ſuffer any thing) therefore no incorporeal Deity. The anſwer: If ſpace be a real nature, and yet not bodily; then muſt it needs be either an affection of incorporeal ſubſtance, or elſe an accident without a ſubſtance. *Gaſſendus* his officiouſneſs here to help the Atheiſts; that ſpace is neither accident, nor ſubſtance, but a middle nature, or eſſence betwixt both. But, whatſoever is, muſt either ſubſiſt by it ſelf, or elſe be an attribute, affection, or mode of ſomething, that ſubſiſteth by it ſelf. Space, either the extenſion of body, or of incorporeal ſubſtance, or of nothing: but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore ſpace, ſuppoſed not to be the extenſion of body, muſt be the extenſion of an incorporeal ſubſtance infinite, or the Deity; as ſome Theiſts aſſert. Page 769, 770

Epicurus his pretended gods, ſuch as could neither touch, nor be touched, and had not *corpus*, but *quaſi corpus* only; and therefore incorporeals diſtinct from ſpace. But granted, that he colluded or juggled in this. 770

Other Atheiſts, who denied a *vacuum*, and allowed not ſpace to be a nature, but a meer imaginary thing, the phantaſm of a body, or elſe extenſion conſidered abſtractly, argued thus: Whatſoever is extended, is body, or bodily; but whatſoever is, is extended; therefore whatſoever is, is body. 770, 771

This argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance anſwered two manner of ways; ſome aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance denying the minor, whatſoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatſoever is extended is body. Firſt, the generality of ancient Incorporealiſts really maintained, that there was ſomething un-extended, indiſtant, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, without parts, and indiviſible. *Plato*, that the ſoul is before longitude, latitude, and profundity. He alſo denies, that whatſoever is in no place, is nothing. *Ariſtotle*'s, firſt immovable mover alſo devoid of magnitude. So likewiſe is Mind, or that which underſtands, to him. He alſo denies place, and local motion to the ſoul, otherwiſe than by by accident with the body. Page 771, 773

Philo's double ſubſtance, diſtant and indiſtant. God alſo to him, both everywhere, (becauſe his powers extend to all things) and yet no-where, as in a place; place being created by him, together with bodies. *Plotinus* much concerned in this doctrine. Two books of his upon this ſubject, that one and the ſame numerical thing, (*viz.* the Deity) may be all, or the whole every where. God to him, before all things that are in a place; therefore wholly preſent to whatſoever preſent. This would he prove alſo from natural inſtincts. He affirmeth likewiſe, that the human ſoul is numerically the ſame, both in the hand, and in the foot. *Simplicius* his argument for unextended ſubſtance; that whatſoever is ſelf-moving, muſt be indiviſible and indiſtant. His affirmation, that ſouls, locally immoveable, move the body by cogitation. 773, 775

None more full and expreſs in this, than *Porphyrius*. His aſſertion, that were there ſuch an incorporeal ſpace, (as *Democritus* and *Epicurus* ſuppoſed) Mind, or God, could not be co-extended with it; but only body. The whole Deity, indiviſibly and indiſtantly preſent, to every part of diviſible and diſtant things. 775, 776

Thus *Origen* in his againſt *Celſus*. St. *Auſtin*, that the human ſoul hath no dimenſions, of length, breadth, and thickneſs, and is in it ſelf *illocabilis*. *Boëthius* reckons this amongſt the common notions, known only to wiſe men, that incorporeals are in no place. 776

This therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here,

here, and part of it there, nor menſurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, preſent to every part of the world. But becauſe many objections againſt this; we ſhall further ſhew, how theſe ancient Incorporealiſts endeavoured to quit themſelves of them. The firſt objection; that to ſuppoſe the Deity, and other incorporeal ſubſtances, un-extended, is to make them abſolute parvitudes, and ſo contemptible things. *Plotinus* his anſwer; that what is incorporeal, not ſo indiviſible as a little thing; either a phyſical minimum, or mathematical point: for thus God could not *congruere* with the whole world, nor the ſoul with the whole body. Again, God not ſo indiviſible, as the leaſt, he being the greateſt of all, not in magnitude, but power. He ſo indiviſible, as alſo infinite. This an error proceeding from ſenſe and imagination; that what unextended, therefore little Incorporeal ſubſtance, the whole of which is preſent to every part of body, therefore greater than body. *Porphyrius* to the ſame purpoſe, That God is neither to be looked upon as the leaſt, nor as the greateſt, in way of magnitude.
Page 776, 778

The ſecond Objection; that what neither great nor little, and poſſeſſes no place, a non-entity. This, according to *Plato*, *Plotinus* and *Porphyrius*, a miſtake proceeding from men's adhering to ſenſe and imagination. They grant, that an unextended Being is ἀφάντασ-ον, *unimaginable*. *Porphyrius*, that Mind and Phancy are not the ſame, as ſome maintain. That, which can neither do, or ſuffer, not nothing, though it ſwell not out into diſtance. Two kinds of ſubſtances to *Plotinus*; bulky tumours, and unbulky active powers Which latter, ſaid by *Simplicius* to have nevertheleſs a certain depth or profundity in them. Something ἀφάντασ-ον, *unimaginable*, even inbody it ſelf. We cannot poſſibly imagine the ſun of ſuch a bigneſs, as reaſon evinces it to be Urged alſo by *Plotinus*, that an unſtretched-out duration, or timeleſs eternity, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended ſubſtance; and yet muſt this needs be attributed to the Deity.
Page 778, 781

That God and human Souls no otherwiſe incorporeal, than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς *a thin* or *ſubtile* body, falſe. Becauſe the difference of groſſneſs and ſubtlety in bodies, according to true philoſophy, only from motion. That the moſt ſubtile body may poſſibly be made as groſs as lead or iron; and the groſſeſt, as ſubtile as æther. No ſpecifick difference of matter. 781

The third argument againſt unextended ſubſtance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction, and impoſſibility. This granted by *Plotinus* to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be ὁμοῦ πᾶν· but impoſſible, that what hath no parts, ſhould be a part here, and a part there. Wherefore the word ὅλον (in that, whole in the whole, and whole in every part) to be taken only in a negative ſenſe, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, *undivided*. The whole undivided Deity every where; and not a part of it here only, and a part there. 782, 783

The laſt objection is againſt the illocality and immobility of finite created ſpirits, and human ſouls only. That this not only abſurd, but alſo contrary to that generally received tradition amongſt Theiſts, of ſouls moving locally after death, into another place, called *Hades*. Two anſwers of *Plotinus* to this. Firſt, that by *Hades* may be meant only the inviſible, or the ſoul's acting without the Body. Secondly, that if by *Hades* be meant a worſer place, the ſoul may be ſaid to be there, where its idol is. But when this ſame philoſopher ſuppoſeth the ſoul (in

(in good men) to be ſeparable alſo from this idol, he departeth from the genuine Cabala of his own ſchool. That ſouls always united to ſome body or other. This aſſerted here by *Porphyrius*; That the ſoul is never quite naked of all body; and therefore may be ſaid to be there, whereſoever its body is. Page 784, 785

Some excerptions out of *Philoponus*; wherein the doctrine of the ancients, concerning the ſoul's ſpirituous or airy body, (after death) is largely declared. 785, 787

Intimated here by *Philoponus*, that, according to ſome of theſe ancients, the ſoul hath ſuch a ſpirituous body here in this life, as its interiour indument, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is ſtript off by death. An opinion of ſome, that the ſoul may, in this ſpirituous body, leave its groſſer body for ſome time, without death. True, that our ſoul doth not immediately act upon bones and fleſh; but certain thin and ſubtile ſpirits, the inſtruments of ſenſe and motion. Of which *Porphyrius* thus; 'The blood is 'the food of the ſpirit, and the ſpirit 'the vehicle of the ſoul.' 787, 788

The ſame *Philoponus* further addeth, that, according to the ancients, beſides both the terreſtrial, and this ſpirituous or airy body, there is yet a third kind of body, peculiar to ſuch as are ſouls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform, and heavenly and ætherial, and ſtar-like body. Of this *Proclus* alſo upon the *Timæus*, (who affirmeth it to be unorganized;) as likewiſe *Hierocles*. This called the thin vehicle of the ſoul, in the Chaldee Oracles, according to *Pſellus* and *Pletho*. By *Hierocles*, a ſpiritual body, in a ſenſe agreeable to that of the Scripture: by *Syneſius*, the divine body. This diſtinction of two interiour vehicles, or tunicles of the ſoul, beſides the terreſtrial body (called by *Plato* the oſtreaceous) no invention of latter *Platoniſts* ſince Chriſtianity; it being plainly inſiſted upon by *Virgil*, though commonly not underſtood. Page 788, 790

That many of theſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans ſuppoſed the ſoul, in its firſt creation, when made pure by God, to be clothed with this luciform and heavenly body; which alſo did always inſeparably adhere to it, in its after-deſcents into the aëreal and terreſtrial; though fouled and obſcured. Thus *Pletho*. And the ſame intimated by *Galen*; when he calls this the firſt vehicle of the ſoul. Hence was it, that beſides the moral and intellectual purgation of the ſoul, they recommended alſo a myſtical or teleſtick way of purifying the ætherial vehicle, by diet and catharms. This much inſiſted on by *Hierocles*. What *Pliny*'s dying by wiſdom, or the philoſophick death. 790, 792

But this not the opinion of all, that the ſame numerical ætherial body always adhereth to the ſoul; but only, that it every where either finds, or makes a body, ſuitable to it ſelf. Thus *Porphyrius*. *Plato* alſo ſeems to have been of that perſuaſion. 792, 793

This affirmed by *Hierocles*, to have been the genuine Cabala of the ancient Pythagoreans, which *Plato* afterwards followed. *Hierocles* his definition of a man, a rational ſoul together with a cognate immortal body; he declaring, this enlivened terreſtrial body to be but the idol or image of the true man, or an acceſſion to him. This therefore the anſwer of the ancient Incorporealiſts, to that objection againſt the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; that theſe being all naturally united to ſome body or other, may be thus ſaid to be in a place, and locally moved. And, that it does not follow, that becauſe

becauſe created incorporeals are unextended, they might therefore inform the whole corporeal univerſe. Page 793, 794

That it would be no impertinent digreſſion here, to compare the forementioned Pythagorick Cabala with the doctrine of Chriſtianity; and to conſider their agreement or diſagreement. Firſt therefore, a clear agreement of theſe moſt religious philoſophers with Chriſtianity in this, that the higheſt happineſs and perfection of human nature conſiſteth not in a ſeparate ſtate of ſouls un-united to any body, as ſome high-flown perſons have conceited. Thus *Plotinus*, who ſometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in ſuppoſing human ſouls to animate, not only the bodies of brutes, but alſo of plants. Thus alſo *Maimonides* amongſt the Jews; and therefore ſuſpected for denying the reſurrection. His *Iggereth Teman* written purpoſely to purge himſelf of this ſuſpicion. The allegorizers of the reſurrection, and of the life to come. 794, 795

Again, Chriſtianity correſpondeth with the philoſophick Cabala, concerning human ſouls, in this, that their happineſs conſiſteth not in conjunction with ſuch groſs terreſtrial bodies as theſe we now have; Scripture, as well as philoſophy, complaining of them, as a heavy load, and burthen to the ſoul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the reſurrection. Such a reſurrection as this called by *Plotinus*, a reſurrection to another ſleep. The difference betwixt the reſurrection-body and this preſent body in Scripture. The reſurrection-body of the juſt, (as that of the philoſophick Cabala) immortal and eternal, glorious and lucid; ſtar-like and ſpiritual; heavenly and angelical. Not this groſs fleſhly body, gilded and varniſhed over in the outſide only, but changed throughout. This the reſurrection of life, in Scripture, emphatically called the Reſurrection. Our ſouls ſtrangers and pilgrims in theſe terreſtrial bodies: Their proper home and country, the heavenly body. That the groſſeſt body, that is, according to philoſophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the fineſt æther. Page 795, 799

But whether human ſouls after death, always united to ſome body, or elſe quite naked from all body, 'till the reſurrection; not ſo explicitely determined in Chriſtianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to *Origen*, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the ſoul, to enliven a body; then not probable, that it ſhould be kept ſo long in an unnatural ſtate of ſeparation. 799, 800

Again; probable from Scripture, that wicked ſouls after death have puniſhment of ſenſe or pain, beſides remorſe of conſcience: which not eaſily conceivable, how they ſhould have, without bodies. Thus *Tertullian*. He adding, that men have the ſame ſhape, or effigies, after this life, which they had here. Though indeed he drive the buſineſs too far, ſo as to make the ſoul it ſelf to be a body, figurate and colourate. 800, 801

But *Irenæus* plainly ſuppoſed the ſoul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, ſuch as has the ſame character and figure with its body here in this life. 801, 802

Origen alſo of this perſuaſion, that ſouls after death have certain ſubtile bodies, retaining the ſame characterizing form, which their terreſtrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the Dead are from the ſouls themſelves, ſurviving in that, which is called a luciform body. As alſo, that Saint *Thomas* did not doubt, but that the body of a ſoul departed might appear every way like the

the former: only he diſbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the ſame ſolid body, which he had before death. Page 802, 804

Our Saviour telling his diſciples, that a ſpirit had no fleſh and bones, that is, no ſolid body, as himſelf then had, ſeems to imply them to have thinner bodies, which they may viſibly appear in. Thus in *Apollonius*, is touch made the ſign to diſtinguiſh a Ghoſt appearing, from a living man. Our Saviour's body after his reſurrection, according to *Origen*, in a middle ſtate betwixt this groſs or ſolid body of ours, and that of a Ghoſt. 804

A place of Scripture, which, as interpreted by the Fathers, would naturally imply, the ſoul of our Saviour after death not to have been quite naked of all body, but to have had a corporeal ſpirit. *Moſes* and *Elias* viſibly appearing to our Saviour, had therefore true bodies. 804, 805

That the regenerate here in this life have a certain earneſt of their future inheritance, (which is, their ſpiritual or heavenly body) gathered from Scripture by *Irenæus* and *Novatian*. Which prælibations of the ſpiritual body cannot ſo well conſiſt with a perfect ſeparation from all body, after death, 'till the day of judgment. 805, 806

This opinion of *Irenæus*, *Origen*, and others, ſuppoſed by them, not at all to claſh with the Chriſtian article of the reſurrection. Nothing in this point determined by us. 806

The laſt thing in the Pythagorick Cabala, that dæmons or angels, and indeed all created underſtanding beings, conſiſt, as well as men, of ſoul and body, incorporeal and corporeal, united all together. Thus *Hierocles*, univerſally of all the rational nature; and that no incorporeal ſubſtance, beſides the ſupreme Deity, is compleat, without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this ſenſe; and not a mundane, but a ſupra-mundane ſoul. Page 806, 808

Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagorick Cabala, that rational creatures are neither body, nor yet without body; but incorporeal ſubſtances, having a corporeal indument. 808, 809

Origen miſrepreſented by *Huetius*, as aſſerting angels not to have bodies, but to be bodies; whereas he plainly acknowledged the human ſoul to be incorporeal, and angels alſo to have ſouls. He proveth incorporeal creatures from the Scriptures; which, though themſelves not bodies, yet always uſe bodies. Whereas the Deity is neither body, nor yet clothed with a body, as the proper ſoul thereof. 809, 810

Some of the fathers, ſo far from ſuppoſing angels altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them altogether corporeal; that is, to be all body, and nothing elſe. The middle betwixt both theſe, the Origenick and Pythagorick hypotheſis, that they conſiſt of incorporeal and corporeal ſubſtance, ſoul and body joined together. The generality of the ancient fathers for neither of thoſe extremes. That they did not ſuppoſe angels to be perfectly unbodied ſpirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philoſophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of ſacrifices; as having their vaporous bodies, or airy vehicles, refreſhed thereby. Thus *Porphyrius*, and before him *Celſus*. Amongſt the Chriſtians, (beſides *Origen*) *Juſtin*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatianus*, *&c.* S. *Baſil*, concerning the bodies of dæmons or devils, being nouriſhed with vapours; not by organs, but throughout their whole ſubſtance. 810, 812

Several of the Fathers plainly aſſerting both devils and angels to conſiſt of ſoul and body, incorporeal and corporeal ſubſtance, joined together. Saint *Auſtin*,

Auſtin, *Claudianus*, *Mamertus*, *Fulgentius*, *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*; and *Pſellus*, who philoſophizeth much concerning this. Page 812, 814

That ſome of the ancients, when they called angels incorporeal, underſtood nothing elſe thereby, but only, that they had not groſs, but ſubtile bodies. 814, 815

The Fathers, though herein happening to agree with the philoſophick Cabala, yet ſeemed to have been led thereunto by Scripture. As from that of our Saviour, *they who ſhall obtain the reſurrection of the dead, ſhall be* ἰσάγγελοι, *equal to the Angels*; that is, according to Saint *Auſtin*, ſhall have angelical bodies. From that of Saint *Jude*, that angels ſinning loſt their own proper dwelling-houſe; that is, their heavenly body, (called οἰκητήριον by Saint *Paul*) which made them fit inhabitants of the heavenly regions; and thereupon caſt down into the lower *Tartarus*; interpreted by Saint *Auſtin* to be this caliginous air or atmoſphere of the earth. Again, from that fire ſaid to have been prepared for the devils: which being not to be taken metaphorically, therefore (as *Pſellus* concludeth) implies them to be bodied; becauſe an incorporeal ſubſtance alone, and not vitally united to any body, cannot be tormented with fire. 815, 817

Now if all created incorporeals, ſuperiour to men, be ſouls vitally united to bodies, and never quite ſeparate from all body; then probable, that human ſouls, after death, not quite naked from all body, as if they could live and act compleatly without it; a privilege ſuperiour to that of angels, and proper to the Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable, how imperfect beings could have ſenſe and imagination without bodies. *Origen contra Celſum*, 'Our ſoul in its own nature incorporeal always ſtandeth in need of a body ſuitable to the place wherein it is. And accordingly, ſometimes putteth off what it had before; and ſometimes again putteth on ſomething new.' Where the following words being vitiated, *Origen*'s genuine ſenſe reſtored. Evident, that *Origen* diſtinguiſheth the τὸ σκῆνος in St. *Paul*, (tranſlated *tabernacle*,) from the earthly houſe; he underſtanding by the former a thin ſpirituous body, which is a middle betwixt the earthly and the heavenly, and which the ſoul remaineth ſtill clothed with, after death. This opinion of *Origen*'s, that the ſoul after death, not quite ſeparate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. *Origen* not taxed by *Methodius*, for aſſerting ſouls to have bodies, but for not aſſerting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal ſubſtance, according to *Methodius*, but the Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. And the Origenick hypotheſis to be preferred before that of *Methodius*. Page 817, 820

Already obſerved, that *Origen* not ſingular, in this opinion concerning human ſouls; *Irenæus*, *Philoponus*, *Joannes Theſſalonicenſis*, *Pſellus*, and others, aſſerting the ſame. St. *Auſtin* in his *de Gen. ad Lit.* granted, that ſouls after death cannot be carried to any corporal places, nor locally moved, without a body. Himſelf ſeems to think, the puniſhment of ſouls, before the reſurrection, to be phantaſtical. But gives liberty of thinking otherwiſe. In his Book *de Civ. D.* he conceives that Origenick opinion not improbable, that ſome ſouls after death, and before the reſurrection, may ſuffer from a certain fire, for the conſuming and burning up of their droſs: which could not be without bodies. 820, 822

Hitherto ſhewed, how the ancient aſſerters of unextended incorporeals anſwered all the objections made againſt them; but eſpecially that of the illocality

lity and immobility of created incorporeals; namely, that by thoſe bodies, which they are always vitally united to, they are localized, and made capable of motion; according to that of *Origen*, the ſoul ſtands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be conſidered their reaſons for this aſſertion, of unextended and indiſtant ſubſtance, ſo repugnant to imagination. Page 822

That whatſoever arguments do evince other ſubſtance beſides body, the ſame againſt the Atheiſts demonſtrate, that there is ſomething unextended; themſelves taking it for granted, that whatſoever is extended, is body. Nevertheleſs, other arguments propounded by theſe ancients, to prove directly unextended ſubſtance. *Plotinus* his firſt, to prove the human ſoul and mind ſuch. Either every part of an extended ſoul, is ſoul; and of mind, mind; or not. If the latter, that no part of a ſoul, or mind, is by it ſelf ſoul, or mind; then cannot the whole, made up of all thoſe parts, be ſuch. But if every ſuppoſed part of a ſoul, be ſoul, and of a mind, mind; then would all but one be ſuperfluous; or every one be the whole: which cannot be in extended things. 822, 824

Again, *Plotinus* endeavours to prove, from the energies of the ſoul, that it is unextended; becauſe it is one and the ſame indiviſible thing, that perceiveth the whole ſenſible object. This further purſued; if the ſoul be extended, then muſt it either be one phyſical point, or more. Impoſſible, that it ſhould be but one phyſical point. If therefore more, then muſt every one of thoſe points, either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or elſe the whole. If the former, then can nothing perceive the whole, nor compare one part of it with another: If the latter, then would every man have innumerable perceptions of the whole object at once. A fourth ſuppoſition, that the whole extended ſoul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof; (no part of the ſoul having any perception by it ſelf) not to be made; becauſe the whole of an extended ſubſtance nothing but all the parts: and ſo if no part have any perception, the whole can have none. Moreover, to ſay the whole ſoul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is indeed to acknowledge it unextended, and to have no diſtant parts. Page 824, 826

Again, This philoſopher would prove the ſame thing from the ſympathy or homopathy, which is in animals; it being one and the ſame thing, that perceives pain in the head, and in the foot; and comprehends the whole bulk of the body. 826

Laſtly, he diſputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not underſtand, what hath no magnitude, and what is indiviſible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indiviſible to thickneſs, and of longitude as to breadth, but alſo of a mathematical point, every way indiviſible. We have notions of things alſo, that have neither magnitude nor ſite, *&c.* Again, all the abſtract eſſences of things indiviſible. We conceive extended things themſelves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thouſand miles diſtance, taking up no more room in the ſoul, than the thought of an inch, or of a mathematical point. Moreover, were that, which perceiveth in us, a magnitude, it could not be equal to every ſenſible, and alike perceive things greater and leſſer than it ſelf. 827, 828

Beſides which, they might argue thus; that we, as we can conceive extenſion without cogitation, and again cogitation without extenſion, (from whence their diſtinction and ſeparability is inferrible:) ſo can we not conceive cogitation with extenſion; nor the length, breadth, and thickneſs of a thought; nor the half, or a third, or the twentieth part thereof;

nor that it is figurate, round, or angular. Thoughts therefore muſt be non-entities, if whatſoever is unextended be nothing; as alſo metaphyſical truths, they having neither dimenſions, nor figure. So volitions and paſſions, knowledge and wiſdom it ſelf, juſtice and temperance. If the things belonging to ſoul and mind be unextended, then muſt themſelves be ſo. Again, if mind and ſoul have diſtant parts, then could none of them be one, but many ſubſtances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Laſtly, no reaſon could be given, why they might not be as well really, as intellectually diviſible. Nor could a Theiſt deny, but that divine power might cleave a thought, together with the ſoul wherein it is, into many pieces. Page 828, 829

The ſenſe of the antient Incorporealiſts therefore this; that in nature, two kinds of ſubſtances. The firſt of them paſſive bulk, or diſtant and extended ſubſtance; which is all, one thing without another; and therefore as many ſubſtances as parts, into which it can be divided. Eſſentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always ſtanding without it, and making the whole ſo much bigger. Body all outſide, having nothing within, no internal energy, nor any action beſides local motion; which it is alſo paſſive to. 829

Were there no other ſubſtance beſides this, there could be no motion, action, life, cogitation, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another ſubſtance, whoſe character Φύσις δραστήριος, *the active nature*, life, ſelf activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extenſion, it having more of entity in it. Nor are theſe two, extenſion and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame ſubſtance. A thinker a monad; or one ſingle ſubſtance. Not conceivable, how the ſeveral parts of an extended ſubſtance ſhould jointly concur to produce one and the ſame thought Page 829, 830

The energies of theſe two ſubſtances very different. The one nothing but local motion, or tranſlation from place to place; a mere outſide thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inſide of that, which thinks. Which inſide of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-ſwelling tumour; becauſe then it would be outſide again. Were a cogitative being extended, yet muſt it have, beſides this extended outſide, an unextended inſide. But one and the ſame ſubſtance cannot be extended and unextended. Wherefore in this opinion of extended incorporeals, a complication of two ſubſtances, and a confuſion of them together into one. True nevertheleſs, that all finite incorporeal ſubſtance is always naturally united with ſome extended body, as its outſide. 831

All ſummed up together. 832

Hitherto the ſenſe of the ancient aſſerters of unextended incorporeals repreſented to the beſt advantage. Nothing aſſerted by us; but that theſe, and other arguments, do demonſtrate, againſt the Atheiſts, ſome other ſubſtance beſides body: but whether or no they prove this to be indiſtant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheiſts, who deny this, muſt acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally, but alſo phyſically diviſible and ſeparable, together with the ſoul; as alſo deny internal energy; and conſequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and laſtly, hold, that no ſubſtance can co-exiſt with another ſubſtance, more inwardly than by juxta-poſition. 832, 833

This the firſt anſwer to the fore-mentioned atheiſtick argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance, made by the ancients, by denying the minor, that though whatſoever

whatſoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwiſe anſwered by ſome learned aſſerters of incorporeal ſubſtance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they aſſerting another extenſion incorporeal, which is both penetrable, and not made up of parts phyſically ſeparable from one another; to which belongeth life, ſelf-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that ſome would compound both the forementioned hypotheſes together; by ſuppoſing the Deity to be altogether unextended, and indiviſibly all every where; but ſouls, or created incorporeals, to have an unextended inſide, diffuſed, as it were, into an extended outſide. Our ſelves here only to oppoſe Atheiſts; and dogmatize no further, than to aſſert, what all Incorporealiſts agree in, that, beſides body, there is another ſubſtance, which conſiſteth not of parts really ſeparable from one another; which is penetrable of body, and ſelf-active, and hath an internal energy, diſtinct from local motion. All which is demonſtratively certain. This the full anſwer to the firſt atheiſtick Argument againſt incorporeal ſubſtance; that either there is ſomething unextended, or at leaſt extended otherwiſe than body, ſo as to be penetrable thereof, and indiſcerpibly one with it ſelf, and ſelf-active. Page 833, 834

The ſecond atheiſtick aſſault againſt incorporeal ſubſtance; by pretending the original of this miſtake to have ſprung from the ſcholaſtick eſſences, diſtinct from the things themſelves; and the abuſe of abſtract names and notions, they being made to be ſubſtances exiſting by themſelves. For, though the opinion of ghoſts and ſpirits, (whereof God is the chief) ſprung firſt from fear; yet that theſe ſhould be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men, had they not been enchanted with theſe abſtract names and ſeparate eſſences. Page 834

The firſt general reply to this, that it is all but romantick fiction. That the opinion of the Deity ſprung not from fear, and that all inviſible ghoſts are not phancies, already ſufficiently proved; as alſo the exiſtence of a God demonſtrated by reaſon. That apparitions are real phænomena; and reaſonable to think, that there may as well be inviſible aerial and ætherial, as there are viſible terreſtrial animals. Sottiſhneſs to conclude, that there is no underſtanding nature ſuperiour to man. 834, 835

The ſecond particular reply, that the opinion of ſpirits incorporeal ſprung not from the ſcholaſtick eſſences, whether conſidered concretely as univerſals only, or abſtractly. No man ſuppoſing theſe to be things really and ſubſtantially exiſting without the mind; either an univerſal man and univerſal horſe, or elſe humanity and equinity: and that theſe walk up and down in airy bodies; they being only *noëmata*, or the *intelligible eſſences* of things, as objects of the mind. Theſe eſſences of things ſaid to be eternal, as their verities. The meaning of theſe eternal eſſences, not, that they are ſo many eternal ſubſtances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade Mind, that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of. 835, 836

Again, that another atheiſtick dream, that the abſtract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made ſubſtances incorporeal; ſouls, minds, and ghoſts. Conſcious life no accident of bodies, as Atheiſts ſuppoſe; but the eſſential attribute of another ſubſtance, which incorporeal; as magnitude, or extenſion, is the eſſential attribute of body. 836

The following atheiſtick arguments

to

to be diſpatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, ſixth, ſeventh and eighth, proceed only upon this ſuppoſition, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world, beſides body or matter; and therefore ſignify nothing to the aſſerters of an incorporeal Deity. Stoicks, and the like, only concerned to anſwer them. Nevertheleſs, from the impoſſibility of theſe atheiſtick corporealiſms, contained in the fifth, and ſixth, a neceſſity of incorporeal ſubſtance will be evinced. Page 836

Here two atheiſtick corporealiſms founded upon theſe ſuppoſitions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as ſuch, is devoid of life and underſtanding. The firſt in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the Hylopathian. This the moſt ancient atheiſtick form, as we learn from *Ariſtotle*; *viz.* that bulky extenſion, the only ſubſtantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the paſſions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and deſtroyable into it. The conſequence from whence, that there is no ſubſtantial unmade life and underſtanding; and that no Mind could be a God, or Creator; it being all accidental, factitious, and creature. 836, 837

This Hylopathian atheiſm, called alſo by us Anaximandrian. Though we are not ignorant, that *Simplicius* conceives, *Anaximander* to have held an Homœomery, or ſimilar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as *Anaxagoras* afterwards; only, that he acknowledged no unmade Life or Mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of thoſe qualified atoms. (Which no improbable opinion, though not certain.) Becauſe, however, *Anaximander* ſuppoſed life and underſtanding to be at leaſt ſecondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. And not fit to multiply forms of atheiſm. 837

The ſecond atheiſtick corporealiſm, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, even life, and underſtanding, from figures, ſites, motions and magnitudes of parts. From whence it will alſo follow, that Mind is no primordial thing, but ſecondary, compounded, and derivative; creature, and no creator. This called Democritick; not becauſe *Democritus* was the firſt inventor of the the diſſimilar atomology; but becauſe he was the firſt atheizer of it, or the firſt, who made diſſimilar atoms the principles of all things whatſoever, even of life and underſtanding. Page 837

Not to be denied, but that from theſe two things granted, that all is body, and, that the firſt principles of body are devoid of life and underſtanding, it would follow unavoidably, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoicks, who were corporeal Theiſts, denied the latter; they ſuppoſing an underſtanding Fire, eternal and unmade, the maker of the whole mundane ſyſtem. Truly obſerved by *Origen*, that this corporeal god of the Stoicks was but by accident incorruptible and happy; and only becauſe wanting a deſtroyer. This no genuine theiſm. 837, 838

But an abſolute impoſſibility in both theſe atheiſtick corporealiſms; not only becauſe they ſuppoſe no active principle; but alſo, becauſe they bring life and underſtanding, that is, ſomething out of nothing; or make them without a cauſe. Where the atomick Atheiſts, of the two, moſt to be condemned, becauſe ſo groſly contradicting themſelves. From that true principle, that matter, as ſuch, is devoid of life and underſtanding, an abſolute neceſſity of another ſubſtance incorporeal, which is eſſentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot poſſibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there muſt be ſubſtantial life; and alſo ſome eternal. 838, 839

The

The truth of this underſtood and acknowledged by the Hylozoiſts; that there muſt of neceſſity be both ſubſtantial and unmade life and underſtanding; who therefore attribute the ſame to all matter, as ſuch, but without animality; which, according to them, is all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoick atheiſm alſo brings conſcious life and animality out of nothing; or makes them without a cauſe. The argument of the Epicurean Atheiſts, againſt Stratoniſm or Hylozoiſm, unanſwerable: that upon this ſuppoſition there muſt be, in every man and animal, a heap of innumerable percipients, as many as there are atoms of matter; and ſo no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoiſts, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous, and impoſſible. Page 839, 840

Thus the fifth and ſixth atheiſtick argumentations fully confuted; and from that true ſuppoſition in them, that matter, as ſuch, is devoid of life and underſtanding, incorporeal ſubſtance plainly demonſtrated: which was our ſecond undertaking. 840

The third and laſt, that there being undeniably ſubſtance incorporeal, the two following atheiſtick argumentations, (built upon the ſuppoſition of the contrary) altogether inſignificant. The ſeventh not properly directed againſt theiſm, but againſt a religious kind of atheiſm or theogoniſm; which ſuppoſed a God or ſoul of the world generated out of ſenſeleſs matter, and the offſpring of Night and Chaos. A ſober and true ſenſe of the world's animation; that there is a living, ſentient and underſtanding Nature, preſiding over the whole world. But the ſenſe of Pagan Theiſts, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being not againſt theiſm, but theogoniſm; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted, without any detriment to our cauſe. But becauſe the denying of a living underſtanding nature, preſiding over the world, is atheiſtical, the ground of this aſſertion briefly declared, that life and underſtanding are accidents of bodies, reſulting only from ſuch a compoſure of atoms, as produce fleſh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reaſon to be found any where but only in human form: which alſo confuted. A brutiſh paſſage of a modern writer, "that it is unconceivable by men, how God can underſtand "without brains." Page 840, 841

The next, (which is the eighth atheiſtick argumentation) that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that falſe ſuppoſition alſo, that all life and underſtanding reſults from a contexture of dead and ſenſeleſs atoms, and therefore is diſſolvable and annihilable. But that there is life eſſential, and ſubſtantial, which naturally immortal: as alſo a neceſſity of an eternal life, and Mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy. 841, 842.

SECT. IV.

THE Epicurean Atheiſts further endeavour to diſprove a God, from the phænomena of motion, and cogitation; in the three following argumentations, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. From motion, thus; that from this principle, *Nothing can move itſelf, but whatſoever is moved, is moved by another*, it will follow, that there can be no firſt cauſe, and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another, from eternity infinitely; becauſe nothing could move another, which was not itſelf firſt moved by ſomething elſe, 842, 843.

Anſwer:

Anſwer: The meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itſelf, as the Atheiſt ſuppoſes; he taking it for granted, that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but, that no body reſting could ever locally move it ſelf. A falſe ſuppoſition of the Atheiſts and ſome Carteſians; that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of it ſelf continue to all eternity. True, that of *Ariſtotle*; that to make an infinite progreſs in the cauſes of motion, and no firſt mover, is all one as to ſay, that there is no cauſe at all thereof; or, that all the motion in the world, is a paſſion without an agent, or comes from nothing. Clearly impoſſible, that there ſhould be any motion at all, were there nothing ſelf-moving or ſelf-active. 843

Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move it ſelf, it follows undeniably, that there is ſome other ſubſtance in the world beſides body, that hath an active power of moving body. 843, 844

Another corollary from the ſame principle; that there is another ſpecies of action, diſtinct from local motion, and which is not heterokineſy, but autokineſy. That the action, by which local motion is firſt cauſed, could not be it ſelf local motion. All local motion cauſed originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheiſtick argument from motion confuted; and from hence, that no body can move it ſelf demonſtrated, that there is ſomething incorporeal the firſt cauſe of local motion, by cogitation. *ibid.*

But the Atheiſts further pretend to prove, that cogitation it ſelf is heterokineſy, the paſſion of the thinker, and the action of ſome other external agent upon him; becauſe nothing taketh beginning from it ſelf; and no cogitation can riſe of it ſelf, without a cauſe. That therefore thinking beings themſelves are machines, and cogitation local motion. And, no underſtanding being a firſt cauſe, nor perfectly happy; becauſe dependent upon ſomething elſe. Page 844, 845

Anſwer. True, that no ſubſtance beginning from it ſelf; as alſo, that no action cauſeth it ſelf. But falſe, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwiſe, than as acted upon by ſomething elſe. Atheiſts here affirm only, what they ſhould prove, and ſo beg the queſtion. If nothing ſelf-active, then all the motion and action in the univerſe muſt come from nothing, or be made without a cauſe. 845

True alſo, that our human cogitations are frequently occaſioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantaſms often depend upon mechanick cauſes. But falſe, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no tranſition in our thoughts, which was not before in ſenſe. The human ſoul a principle of actions, and therefore alſo of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. But that there is ſuch a perfect mind, as at once comprehends all truth, and was before ſenſibles. 845, 846

This a prodigious paradox, and falſity of Atheiſts; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a correction of what we wrote before, *p.* 761. and a change of our opinion, upon further conſideration; that not only a modern writer, but alſo the ancient atheiſtick Atomiſts, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing elſe but local motion. Nevertheleſs, theſe men troubled with the phancy of cogitation; which becauſe they cannot make local motion, they would perſuade us to be no reality, or nothing. Atheiſts aware, that if there be any action beſides local motion, there muſt then be ſome other ſubſtance acknowledged beſides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to

be diſputed with, than ſenſeleſs machines. Page 846, 847

To affirm, that no underſtanding being can be happy, nor a God, becauſe dependent upon ſomething without it, all one as to affirm, that ſenſeleſs matter is the moſt perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as ſuch, ſpeaking imperfection, is but a whiffling and phantaſtick thing. But of this more afterwards. Thus the tenth atheiſtick argument confuted. 847

Another atheiſtick argument, from the nature of knowledge and underſtanding. That the world could not be made by an underſtanding being, becauſe there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are ſenſibles, which knowledge a paſſion from. Therefore all mind, as ſuch, a creature, and none a creator. *ibid.*

This already fully anſwered, page 729, and ſo forwards. Where proved, that ſingular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within it ſelf. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the exiſtence of a God demonſtrable from the nature of knowledge and underſtanding. 847, 848

That the Atheiſts can no more ſolve the phænomenon of cogitation, than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it; whereof a catalogue ſubjoined. Firſt, that all life and underſtanding, a meer accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind ſubſtantial or eſſential. This before confuted. 848

Again, that life and mind no ſimple and primitive natures, but compounded ſyllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Anſwer; that life and underſtanding are active powers, and could never reſult from meer paſſive bulk; nor can any compoſition of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, poſſibly beget life and underſtanding. Though no neceſſity, that there ſhould be any eternal unmade red or green, becauſe theſe might be made out of things not red nor green; nor that there ſhould be eternal motion, becauſe motion might be produced from a ſelf-active principle; nor that there ſhould be any eternal unmade matter, becauſe were there none, it might notwithſtanding be created, by a perfect incorporeal being: yet an abſolute neceſſity of eternal unmade life and mind; becauſe had there been once none, there could never have been any. Page 848, 849

Another Atheiſtick hallucination, that there is nothing of ſelf-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwiſe, than as it is made to act by ſomething elſe. This to bring all action from nothing, or to ſuppoſe it without a cauſe. 849, 850

Another madneſs of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. This equal ſottiſhneſs or impudence, as to affirm number to be figure, *&c.* 850

Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritick Atheiſts, that mental cogitation, as well as ſenſation, the meer paſſions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies exiſting without him; ſome of them ſuppoſing thoughts to be cauſed by certain finer images than ſenſations; others, that they are the remainders of the motions of ſenſe, formerly made. Anſwer; that ſenſation it ſelf is not a meer corporeal paſſion, but the perception of a paſſion, in a way of phancy; much leſs mental cogitations ſuch; and leaſt of all volitions. 850, 851

But conſentaneouſly hereunto, theſe Atheiſts determine, all knowledge and underſtanding to be really the ſame thing with ſenſe. From whence follow two abſurdities; *firſt*, That there can

can be no ſuch thing as error, becauſe all paſſion is true paſſion, and all ſenſe, true ſenſe; that is, true ſeeming and appearance. This abſurdity owned by *Protagoras*. *Epicurus* endeavoured to avoid this, but in vain, and contradictiouſly to his own principles. Page 851, 852

A ſecond abſurdity conſequent thereupon; that there is no abſolute truth nor falſehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewiſe by *Protagoras*. Sometimes alſo by *Democritus*. Who therefore but a blunderer neither, in the Atomick philoſophy; which plainly ſuppoſes a higher faculty of reaſon and underſtanding, that judges of ſenſe, and diſcovers the phantaſtry thereof; it reaching to abſolute truth. 852, 853

Another atheiſtick error; that ſingular bodies are the only objects of mental conception, as well as of ſenſation. This imputed by *Ariſtotle*, to *Democritus* and *Protagoras*. But ſufficiently before confuted. 853, 854

The better to maintain this paradox, added by a modern Atheiſtick writer, as his own invention; that univerſals are nothing elſe but names, by which many ſingular bodies are called; axioms or propoſitions, the addition and ſubſtraction of names; and ſyllogiſtick reaſoning, the reckoning the conſequences of them: and that therefore beſides the paſſions of ſenſe, we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the names by which it is called. Whence it would follow, that geometrical truths not the ſame in *Greek* and in *Latin*, *&c.* 854

That the Atheiſts, according to theſe premiſed principles, endeavour to depreciate knowledge and underſtanding, as that which ſpeaks no higher perfection, than is in ſenſeleſs matter. Thus the Atheiſts in *Plato* make it but a ludicrous, umbratile and evanid thing; the meer image of bodies, the only realities. Their deſign in this, to take away the ſcale, or ladder of entities. Page 855, 856

All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly, that opinion ſo much favouring Atheiſm, that there is nothing in the underſtanding, which was not before in ſenſe, out of *Boëthius*. Juſt and unjuſt greater realities in nature, than hard and ſoft, *&c.* Unqueſtionably, a ſcale or ladder of entities; and therefore certain, that the order of things muſt be in way of deſcent, from higher perfection to lower, and not of aſcent, from lower to higher. The ſteps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in it ſelf all poſſibilities of things. Mind by nature lord over all; and ſovereign king of heaven and earth. 856, 859

The reaſon, why we ſo much inſiſt upon this; becauſe Atheiſts pretend, not only to ſolve the phænomenon of cogitation without a God; but alſo from thence to demonſtrate the impoſſibility of his exiſtence. Though modern writers not ſo much aware hereof, yet is the controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts thus ſtated by *Plato*; whether Soul and Mind juniors to ſenſeleſs matter, and the offspring thereof; or elſe ſubſtantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly *Plato* confuteth Atheiſm no otherwiſe, than by proving Soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the ſame. Evident, that *Plato* by Soul here underſtood, not only the mundane Soul, but alſo that whole rank of beings, called Soul; and that no life was generated out of matter. 859, 860

Thoſe profeſſed Chriſtians, who generate rational ſouls out of ſenſeleſs matter, plain betrayers of the cauſe of Theiſm. 860, 861

Nor is the caſe much different, as to others; who, though they profeſſedly generate only ſenſitive ſouls, yet making the rational but meer blanks, which have nothing in them, but what was ſcribbled upon them by ſenſe; and ſo knowledge, in its own nature, junior to ſenſe and ſenſibles; highly gratify the Atheiſts hereby. Page 861

If any life and cogitation may be generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, then can no good reaſon be given, why all ſhould not be. Life not partly accidental, partly ſubſtantial; but either all conſcious life, accidental, generable and corruptible; or elſe none at all. *ibid.*

The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheiſm alſo. And though the atheiſtick Atomiſts explode all the other qualities, becauſe *nothing can come from nothing*; yet, contradicting themſelves again, do they make life and underſtanding real qualities, generated out of matter, or cauſed by nothing. 861, 862

There being a ſcale or ladder of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings, out of a lower; as life and cogitation, out of matter, and magnitude, is to invert the order of this ſcale, from downwards, to upwards; and ſo to lay a foundation for atheiſm. Wherefore great reaſon to maintain this poſt againſt the Atheiſts; that no ſouls can be generated out of matter 862, 863

The grand objection againſt the ſubſtantiality of ſenſitive ſouls, from that conſequence of their permanent ſubſiſtence after death. *Carteſius* ſo ſenſible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be ſenſeleſs machines, than allow them ſubſtantial ſouls; which he granted they muſt have, if thinking beings. What clearly demonſtrable by reaſon, not to be abandoned, becauſe attended with ſome difficulties, or ſeemingly offenſive conſequences. 863

The Pythagorick hypotheſis; that ſouls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the Coſmogonia. Theſe therefore firſt clothed with thin and ſubtile bodies, aërial or ætherial Ochemata, wherein they ſubſiſt, both before their ingreſs into terreſtrial bodies, and after their egreſs out of them. Thus *Boëthius* and *Proclus*. *Ammonius* his irrational Demons mortal; brutiſh ſouls, in aërial bodies. Since the firſt creation, no new ſubſtantial thing made, or deſtroyed, and therefore no life. This looked upon by *Macrobius* as a great truth. Page 863, 865

That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain ſome countenance for this hypotheſis, from the ſcripture. 865, 867

But if theſe aërial vehicles of brutiſh ſouls be exploded for a whimſey, and none but terreſtrial bodies allowed to them; though after death they will not vaniſh into nothing, yet muſt they needs remain in a ſtate of inſenſibility, and inactivity, till re-united to other terreſtrial bodies. Wherefore theſe in one ſenſe mortal, though in another immortal. Silkworms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the reſurrection by Chriſtian theologers. 867, 868

But no abſolute neceſſity, that the ſouls of brutes, though ſubſtantial, ſhould have a permanent ſubſiſtence after death, either in a ſtate of activity, or inactivity; becauſe, whatſoever created by God may poſſibly by him be annihilated. The ſubſtantiality only of the rational ſoul demonſtrable by reaſon; or that it will not of it ſelf vaniſh into nothing; but not that it is abſolutely impoſſible, for it to be annihilated; the aſſurance of this depending upon a faith in the divine goodneſs. *Porphyrius* his aſſertion, that brutiſh ſouls are reſolved into the life of the univerſe. The whole anſwer to this objection, againſt the ſubſtantiality of

brutiſh ſouls; that they may, notwithſtanding, poſſibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals, as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do ſubſiſt (without aërial vehicles,) they muſt remain in a ſtate of inactivity and inſenſibility. Page 868, 869

That this the doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that no life, or ſoul, generated out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter; proved out of *Virgil*: though ſundry other teſtimonies alſo might be added thereunto. 869, 870

The Hylozoick Atheiſts themſelves ſo ſenſible thereof, that there muſt be ſome ſubſtantial and unmade life, (from whence the lives and minds of all animals are derived) that they attribute the ſame to matter; and conclude, that though the modificated lives of animals, and men, be accidental, generated and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is ſubſtantial, and incorruptible. Theſe alſo aſſerted a knowledge before ſenſe, and underived from ſenſibles. 870, 871

This Hylozoick Atheiſm again confuted. Abſurd to ſuppoſe, knowledge and underſtanding without conſciouſneſs; as alſo, that the ſubſtantial and fundamental life of men and other animals ſhould never periſh, and yet their ſouls, and perſonalities, vaniſh into nothing. That no organization can produce conſciouſneſs. Theſe Atheiſts not able poſſibly to give an account, whence the intelligible objects and ideas, of this their knowledge of matter, ſhould ſpring. This Hylozoick atheiſm nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter. 871

Concluded, that the phænomenon of mind and underſtanding can no way poſſibly be ſolved by Atheiſts, without a God; but affordeth a ſolid demonſtration of his exiſtence. 891, 872

SECT. V.

THere now remaining only the Atheiſtick objections againſt Providence, their queries, and arguments from intereſts; their firſt objection, from the frame of the world, as faulty: or, becauſe things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed againſt the ſenſe of the ancient theologers; that God being a perfect Mind, therefore made the world after the beſt manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this, as if the perfection of the Deity conſiſted not at all in goodneſs, but in power and arbitrary will only. The controverſy betwixt theſe and Atheiſts; but whether matter fortuitouſly moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. No ground of faith in a meer arbitrarious deity. To have a will undetermined to good, no liberty, nor ſovereignty, but impotency. God to *Celſus* the head or preſident of the righteous nature. This not only the ſenſe of *Origen*, but of the ancient Chriſtians in general. *Plotinus*; the will of God eſſentially that, which ought to be. God an impartial balance weighing out heaven and earth. The Deity, not ſervilely bound to do the beſt; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheiſts able to prove, the world to be ill made. Page 872, 874.

Not to be concluded, that whatſoever we cannot find out the reaſon or uſe of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the *inteſtinum cæcum*, though ſeemingly an odd appendix, and which the generality of anatomiſts give little account of; yet that, with the valve at its entrance, both together, an artificial contrivance of nature, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces. 874, 875.

The firſt atheiſtick inſtance of the faultineſs of things; in the diſpoſition of

of the æquator and ecliptick interſecting each other in ſuch an angle, whereby the terreſtrial globe rendered not ſo habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a falſe ſuppoſition, that the torrid zone uninhabitable. But this the beſt diſpoſition; which being contrary to mechanick cauſes, therefore its continuance, together with the conſtant parallelîſm of the earth's axis, a manifeſt eviction of providence; and that the τὸ βέλτιστον, *the beſt*, is a cauſe in nature. Page 875

In the next place; the Atheiſts would prove againſt ſome Theiſts, that all things not made for the ſake of man. This at firſt but the doctrine of ſtreight-laced Stoicks only; recommended afterward by men's ſelf-love. Whereas *Plato*'s doctrine, that the whole not made for any part; but the parts for the whole. Nevertheleſs, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheiſts no judges of the well or ill-making of worlds, they having no ſtanding meaſure of good. That nature a ſtep-mother to man, but a froward ſpeech of ſome diſcontented perſons, ſeeking to revenge themſelves, by railing upon nature, that is, Providence. 875, 876

Evils in general from the neceſſity of imperfect beings, and incompoſſibility of things. 876

Men afflicted more from their own phancies, than reality of things. Pain (which a real evil of ſenſe) often link'd with pleaſure, according to the Socratick fable. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outſide only. Serviceable, to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheiſtick hypotheſis, an abſolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theiſm, only a withdrawing into the tiring-houſe, and putting off the terreſtrial cloathing. The dead live to God. Chriſtian faith gives aſſurance of a heavenly body hereafter. The Chriſtian reſurrection not the hope of worms. This the confutation of the twelfth atheiſtick argument. Page 876, 877

The thirteenth; but ſecond objection againſt Providence, as to human affairs; becauſe all things fall alike to all; and ſometimes vicious and irreligious perſons moſt proſperous. 877, 878

Granted, that this conſideration hath too much ſtaggered weak minds in all ages. Some concluding from thence, that there is no God, but that blind chance ſteereth all. Others, that though there be a God, yet he knows nothing done here below. Others, that though he do know, yet he neglecteth human affairs. 878

Unreaſonable to require, that God ſhould miraculouſly interpoſe at every turn; or to think, that every wicked perſon ſhould preſently be thunder-ſtruck. That, which ſteers the whole world, no fond and paſſionate, but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not inſtances of an extraordinary providence. Good reaſons for the ſlowneſs of divine vengeance. The notoriouſly wicked commonly met with at the long run. 878, 879

The ſometimes impunity of wicked perſons ſo far from ſtaggering good men, as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of future immortality, and judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatick poem, and God Almighty the ſkilful dramatiſt, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into coherent ſenſe. A geometrical diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments. 879, 880

That there ought to be a doubtful and cloudy ſtate of things, for the exerciſe of faith, and the more difficult part of virtue. Had there been no monſters to ſubdue, there could have been no

Hercules. Here we to live by faith, and not by ſight. Page 880

But that to make a full defence of Providence would require a large volume. The reader therefore referred to others for a ſupplement. Only ſome few conſiderations to be here propounded, not ſo much for the confutation of Atheiſts, as ſatisfaction of Theiſts, ſometimes apt to call in queſtion the divine goodneſs, though the very foundation of our Chriſtian faith. *ibid.*

Firſt; that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to conſider the parts of the world alone by themſelves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the beſt, there could have been no harmony, for want of variety. *Plotinus*, that a limner does not make all eye, nor place bright colours every-where; nor a dramatiſt introduce only kings and heroes upon the ſtage. 880, 882

Secondly; that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowneſs of vulgar opinion, which extends the univerſe but little beyond the clouds; and walls it in with a ſphere of fixed ſtars. The world uncapable of infinity of magnitude, as well as of time. Nevertheleſs, as the ſun is much bigger than we can imagine it, ſo much more may the world be. The new celeſtial phænomena widen the corporeal univerſe, and make thoſe phancied flaming walls thereof to fly away before us. Not reaſonable to think, that all this immenſe vaſtneſs ſhould be deſert and uninhabited. 882, 883

Thirdly; that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is paſt, as well as upon the preſent. That the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans ſolved many phænomena, from the τὰ προεξειωμένα, *things done in a præ-exiſtent ſtate*. Our common Chriſtianity ſuppoſeth but a kind of imputative præ-exiſtence, to ſolve the pravity of mankind, and the evils of this ſtate. The different fates and conditions of men here in this life to be reſolved into a juſt, though occult providence. Page 883

The third objection againſt Providence, or fourteenth atheiſtick argument; that it is impoſſible, for any one being to animadvert and order all things; and, if it were poſſible, that it would be diſtractious, and inconſiſtent with happineſs. Moreover, that an irreſiſtibly powerful and happy being would not concern it ſelf in the welfare of others; benevolence ariſing only from imbecility. 883, 884

The reply; that becauſe our ſelves have but a finite animadverſion, and narrow ſphere of activity; to meaſure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing, but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the ſun life, equally co-extended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in many diſtant places, without diſtraction. And innumerable notions lie together in our minds, without crouding one another, or any diſturbance to us. 884

But for the eaſing the minds of weak mortals, already ſuggeſted, that there is no neceſſity, God ſhould himſelf immediately do all things; he having miniſters under him, executioners of his Providence; as, an artificial, plaſtick nature, (for this reaſon, partly before inſiſted on;) inſtincts alſo in animals, a part of that divine fate, which is the ſervant of Providence. Above which, other knowing and underſtanding miniſters of the Deity, appointed to preſide over human affairs. But all overlooked by the watchful eye of God Almighty,

Almighty, who may himſelf extraordinarily interpoſe. Page 884, 885

Wherefore no need to confine Providence to a few greater things only, to free the Deity from diſtraction. Small things (upon which greater often depend) not neglected by it. Nevertheleſs the chief employment of divine Providence, in the œconomy of ſouls, by *Plato* reduced to this compendium; the tranſlating of them into better or worſer ſtates, according to their demeanours. Thus may the ſlow wits of mortals more eaſily conceive Providence not to be laborious and diſtractious to the Deity. 885

But that all benevolence ariſes from imbecillity, and that what is perfectly happy, would be troubled with no buſineſs, but enjoy its own eaſe; idols of the Atheiſts den. Theſe other the narrow contractedneſs of their minds, by vice and immorality. 885, 886

The atheiſtick queries next to be anſwered. The firſt query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himſelf, why would he go about to make a world? *Anſw.* The reaſon of God's making the world was from his overflowing and communicative goodneſs, that there might be other beings happy, beſides himſelf. This conſiſtent with God's making the world, for his own glory. The reaſon why *Plotinus* would explode that. True, that God did not make the world, meerly to oſtentate his ſkill and power; but to diſplay his goodneſs, which is chiefly his glory. The Atheiſts further demand; What hurt would it have been for us, never to have been made? *Anſw.* No other than this, that we could never have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happineſs. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated; the diſtance being as great from nothing to ſomething, as from ſomething to nothing. 886

The ſecond atheiſtick query: If God's goodneſs were the cauſe of his making the world, why then was it not made ſooner? This queſtion capable of a double ſenſe: Firſt, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply; This not from any defect in the divine goodneſs, but becauſe there is an impoſſibility of the thing it ſelf; the neceſſity and incapacity of ſuch an imperfect being hindering it. Our ſelves prone to think, that could the world have been from eternity, it ſhould have been ſo. Thus *Philoponus*, in his confutation of *Proclus* his arguments, for the world's eternity. And now no place left for thoſe atheiſtick cavils, againſt the novity of the creation; as if God muſt therefore have ſlept from eternity; or had contracted a ſatiety of his former ſolitude. Another ſenſe of the queſtion; Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made ſooner? *Anſ.* The world could not poſſibly have ſo been made in time, as that it ſhould not have been once, but a day old; and alſo once, no more than five or ſix thouſand years old. Page 886, 887

The third atheiſtick query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, eſpecially if incorporeal? *Anſ.* That all things being derived from the Deity, and eſſentially depending on him, they muſt needs be commandable by him, and obſequious to him. And ſince no body can move it ſelf, that, which firſt moved the matter, muſt be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. That conceit, that an incorporeal Deity could not move matter, becauſe it would run through it, abſurd; this moving not mechanically but vitally. That cogitative beings have a natural power of moving matter, evident from our own ſouls moving our bodies, not by machines

chines or engines, but merely by thought. More eaſy for the Deity, to move the whole world by will and cogitation; than for us our bodies. Page 887, 888

The laſt head of atheiſtick argumentation, from intereſt. Firſt; that it is the intereſt of particular perſons, there ſhould be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The firſt reply; wiſhing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwiſe than they are. 888

But ſecondly; this wiſh of Atheiſts founded upon a miſtaken notion of God Almighty, That he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity; Ought it ſelf willing. Nor does juſtice in God claſh with goodneſs; but is a branch, or particular modification thereof. The intereſt of none, there ſhould be no God, unleſs perhaps of ſuch as are irreclaimably wicked, and wilfully abandon their own true good. 888, 889

To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in ſenſeleſs matter. According to the atheiſtick hypotheſis, no poſſibility of happineſs, nor ſecurity of good. 889

God ſuch a Being, as, if he were not, nothing more to be wiſhed for. To believe a God, to believe the exiſtence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they ſhould be. Peccability from the neceſſity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good, and powerful. *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, however cried up ſo much of late, but infatuated Sophiſts, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind. 889, 890

The laſt atheiſtick argumentation, That theiſm or religion is inconſiſtent with the intereſt of civil ſovereigns. Their firſt pretence for this, that the civil ſovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore there muſt be no power, nor fear greater than that of the Leviathan. Page 890

In anſwer to this, the atheiſtick ethicks and politicks to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural juſtice, equity, nor charity. No publick nor common Nature in men, but all private and ſelfiſh. That every man by nature, hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That an appetite to kill and torment, by nature, gives a right. That nature hath brought men into the world, without any fetters or ſhackles of duty and obligation, the hinderances of liberty. Laſtly, that nature abſolutely diſſociates and ſegregates men from one another, by reaſon of the inconſiſtency of appetites, and private good. Every man by nature in a ſtate of war againſt every man. 890, 891

But in the next place, they add, that though this ſtate of nature, which is belluine liberty, and lawleſs freedom to every thing, be in it ſelf the beſt; yet by accident, and by reaſon of men's imbecillity, does it prove the worſt. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and ſlaſhing, they then bethought themſelves at length of helping nature by art; by ſubmitting to a leſſer evil, for the avoiding of a greater; abating their infinite right, and yielding to terms of equality with others, and ſubjection to a common power. 891

Where, theſe Atheiſts firſt ſlander human nature; and then debaſe juſtice and civil authority, making it the ignoble and baſtardly brat of fear; or a leſſer evil ſubmitted to out of neceſſity, for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheiſtick hypotheſis, no man is willingly juſt. This no new invention of the writer *De Cive*, but the old atheiſtick generation of juſtice, and of a body politick, civil ſociety, and ſovereignty;

ſovereignty; (before *Plato*'s time:) it being fully deſcribed in his ſecond book of a common-wealth. Where the philoſopher concludes, juſtice, according to theſe, to be but a middle thing betwixt the beſt and the worſt; loved, not as good in it ſelf, but only by reaſon of men's imbecility: or, that juſtice is indeed another man's good, and the evil of him that is juſt. The ſame hypotheſis alſo, concerning juſtice, as a factitious thing, that ſprung only from fear and imbecility, and was choſen but as a leſſer evil, inſiſted on by *Epicurus*. Page 891, 893

The vain attempts of our modern atheiſtick politicians, to make juſtice by art, when there is none by nature. Firſt, by renouncing and transferring men's right, by will and words. For if nothing naturally unlawful, then can no man, by will and words, make any thing unlawful to himſelf. What made by will, may be deſtroyed by will. The ridiculous conceit of theſe atheiſtick politicians, that injuſtice is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and ſuch an abſurdity in life, as is in diſputation, when a man denies a propoſition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, theſe juſtice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious juſtice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural juſtice, (as themſelves confeſs) nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. Wherefore they make another pretence alſo from certain counterfeit laws of nature, of their own deviſing, that are nothing but mere juggling equivocation; they being but the laws of fear, or their own timorous and cowardly complexion. They ridiculouſly dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of nature; and of laws of nature again, from civil laws. Their vain attempt, by art to conſociate what nature hath diſſociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. Their artificial obligation, or ligaments, by which the members of their Leviathan are held together, more ſlender than cobwebs. Page 893, 895

Theſe artificial juſtice-makers and obligation-makers ſenſible of the weakneſs of theſe attempts artificially to conſociate, what nature hath diſſociated; therefore fly at laſt from art, to force and power; making their ſovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law; that is, the command of him, who hath power to compel. If obligation to obey civil laws only from fear of puniſhment, then is no man obliged to hazard his life for the ſafety of his prince; and whoever can promiſe themſelves impunity, may juſtly diſobey. If civil ſovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would juſtify rebellion. Laſtly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not laſt long; what natural prevailing againſt what is violent. 895

Wherefore ſince civil authority and bodies politick can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there muſt be ſome natural vinculum, to hold them together, ſuch as will both oblige ſubjects to obey the commands of ſovereigns, and ſovereigns, in commanding, to ſeek the good of their ſubjects; ſomething of a common, publick and conglutinating nature; which no other than natural juſtice. The authority of God himſelf founded in juſtice; of which civil authority a participation. Sovereignty no creature of the people, and of men's wills; but hath a ſtamp of divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men, neither by art, or political enchantment, nor by mere force, could

could have made any. The whole world one city, of God and rational beings. The civil ſovereign no Leviathan; that is, no beaſt, but a God. He reigns not in mere brutiſh force and fear, but in natural juſtice and conſcience, and the authority of God himſelf. Nevertheleſs, need of force and fear too, to compel ſome to their duty; nor is the ſovereign's ſword here alone ſufficient, but he muſt reign alſo in the fear of God Almighty. Page 895, 896

The ſecond atheiſtick pretence, to make religion inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty; becauſe it limits and confines that, which in its own nature is, and ought to be infinite. The reply; That the Atheiſts infinite right and authority of civil ſovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty: but true right and authority is eſſentially founded in natural juſtice; there being no authority to command, where there is not an obligation to obey; and commands not creating obligation, but preſuppoſing it, without which they would ſignify nothing. The firſt original obligation not from will, but nature. The error of thoſe Theiſts, who derive all obligation to moral things, from the will and poſitive command of God, as threatning puniſhments, and promiſing rewards. From whence it would follow, that no man is good and juſt, but by accident only, and for the ſake of ſomething elſe. Juſtice a different ſpecies of good from that of private utility. Infinite juſtice as abſurd as an infinite rule or meaſure. If no infinite juſtice, then no infinite right and authority. God's own authority bounded by juſtice: his will ruled by juſtice, and not juſtice by his will. Atheiſts, under a pretence of giving civil ſovereigns infinite right, really diveſt them of all right and authority, leaving them nothing but brutiſh force. Proved here, that the *ſummæ poteſtates* muſt of neceſſity be ἀνυπεύθυνοι. Page 896, 898

The laſt atheiſtick pretence for the inconſiſtency of religion with civil power, becauſe conſcience is private judgment of good and evil. *Anſwer*, That not religion, but atheiſm, introduceth ſuch private judgment, as is abſolutely inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature, that tends to publick and common good, but making private appetite the only rule or meaſure of good, and utility of juſtice. The deſperate conſequence from hence, that private utility may juſtify rebellion and parricide. The Atheiſts profeſſed aſſertion, that they, who have once rebelled, may juſtly defend themſelves afterward by force. Though private perſons muſt make a judgment in conſcience for themſelves, (the Atheiſts publick conſcience being nonſenſe and contradiction;) yet is the rule of conſcience not private, but publick, except only to miſtaken fanaticks; who therefore ſometimes make a pretence of conſcience and religion, in order to ſedition and rebellion. Religion and conſcience oblige ſubjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the ſovereign powers; in unlawful, not to reſiſt. 898, 899

The concluſion of the whole Book; That all the atheiſtick grounds being fully confuted, and the impoſſibility of atheiſm demonſtrated; it is certain, that the original and head of all things is no blind and inconſcious nature, but a perfect underſtanding Being, ſelf-exiſtent; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the beſt manner, and exerciſeth a juſt providence over all. *To whom be all honour and glory, &c.* *ibid.*

The End of the Contents.

A

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

TRUE NOTION

OF THE

LORD'S SUPPER.

To which are added,

TWO SERMONS;

The First

On 1 JOHN Chap. ii. Ver. 3, 4.

The Second

On 1 CORINTH. Chap. xv. Ver. 57.

By R. CUDWORTH D. D.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

THE TRUE NOTION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The INTRODUCTION.

ALL great errors have ever been intermingled with ſome truth. And indeed, if Falſhood ſhould appear alone unto the world, in her own true ſhape and native deformity, ſhe would be ſo black and horrid, that no man would look upon her; and therefore ſhe hath always had an art to wrap up herſelf in a garment of light, by which means ſhe paſſed freely diſguiſed and undiſcerned. This was elegantly ſignified in the fable thus: Truth at firſt preſented herſelf to the world, and went about to ſeek entertainment; but when ſhe found none, being of a generous nature, that loves not to obtrude herſelf upon unworthy ſpirits, ſhe reſolved to leave earth, and take her flight for heaven: but as ſhe was going up, ſhe chanced, *Elijah*-like, to let her mantle fall; and Falſhood, waiting by for ſuch an opportunity, ſnatched it up preſently, and ever ſince goes about diſguiſed in Truth's attire.

Pure falſhood is pure non-entity, and could not ſubſiſt alone by itſelf; wherefore it always twines up together about ſome truth, παραφυάδ' εἰκὸς, as *Athenagoras* the Chriſtian philoſopher ſpeaks, like an ivy, that grows upon ſome wall, twining herſelf into it with wanton and flattering embraces, till it have at length deſtroyed and pulled down that, which held it up. There is alway ſome truth, which gives being to every error: *Eſt quædam veritatis anima, quæ corpus omnium errorum agitat & informat*; *There is ever ſome ſoul of truth, which doth ſecretly ſpirit and enliven the dead and unwieldy lump of all errors*, without which it could not move or ſtir. *In Orat. de Reſurrect. mort.*

Though

Though ſometimes it would require a very curious artiſt, in the midſt of all Error's deformities, to deſcry the defaced lineaments of that Truth, which firſt it did reſemble: as *Plutarch* ſpake ſometime of thoſe Egyptian fables of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*, that they had ἀμυδράς τινας ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, *certain weak appearances and glimmerings of truth*, but ſo as that they needed δεινοῦ ἰχνηλάτου, *ſome notable diviner*, to diſcover them.

Lib. de Iſide & Oſiride.

And this I think is the caſe of that grand error of the Papiſts, concerning the Lord's Supper being a ſacrifice; which perhaps at firſt did riſe by degeneration from a primitive truth, whereof the very obliquity of this error yet may bear ſome dark and obſcure intimation. Which will beſt appear, when we have firſt diſcovered *the true notion of the Lord's Supper*; whence we ſhall be able at once to convince the error of this Popiſh tenet, and withal to give a juſt account of the firſt riſe of it. *Rectum index ſui & obliqui.*

See *Chap.* 5.

CHAP. I.

That it was a cuſtom among the Jews and Heathens, to feaſt upon things ſacrificed; and that the cuſtom of the Chriſtians, in partaking of the body and blood of Chriſt once ſacrificed upon the croſs, in the Lord's Supper, is analogical hereunto.

THE right notion of that Chriſtian feaſt, called, *The Lord's Supper*, in which we eat and drink the body and blood of Chriſt, that was once offered up to God for us, is to be derived (if I miſtake not) from analogy to that ancient rite among the Jews, of *feaſting upon things ſacrificed*, and eating of thoſe things, which they had offered up to God.

For the better conceiving whereof, we muſt firſt conſider a little, how many kinds of Jewiſh ſacrifices there were, and the nature of them. Which, although they are very well divided, according to the received opinion, into four, עולם, שלמים, אשם, חטאת, *the burnt-offering*, *the ſin-offering*, *the treſpaſs-offering*, and *the peace-offering*; yet perhaps I may make a more notional diviſion of them, for our uſe, into theſe three ſpecies.

Firſt, Such, as were wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar: which were the *holocauſts*, or *burnt-offerings*.

Secondly, Such, wherein, beſides ſomething offered up to God upon the altar, the prieſts had alſo a part to eat of. And theſe are alſo ſubdivided into the *ſin-offerings* and the *treſpaſs-offerings*.

Concerning the difference between theſe two, ſee *Petit* in his *Variæ Lectiones.*

Thirdly, Such, as in which, beſides ſomething offered up to God, and a portion beſtowed on the prieſts, the owners themſelves had a ſhare likewiſe. And theſe were called שלמים, or *peace-offerings*, which

which contained in them, as the Jewish doctors speak, חלק לשם וחלק רבהן יחלק לבעל, *a portion for God*, and the priests and the owners also; and thence they use to give the etymon of the Hebrew word *Shelamim*. כי זרח הזבח שרום ביניהם, because these sacrifices brought peace to the altar, the priests, and the owners, in that every one of these had a share in them.

Now, for the first of these, although (perhaps to signify some special mystery concerning Christ) they were themselves wholly offered up to God, and burnt upon the altar; yet they had ever peace-offerings regularly annexed to them, when they were not קרבניה ציבור, *offerings for the whole congregation*, but for any particular person; that so the owners might at the same time, when they offered up to God, feast also upon the sacrifices.

And for the second, although the owners themselves did not eat of them, the reason was, because they were not perfectly reconciled to God, being for the present in a state of guilt, which they made atonement for in these sacrifices; yet they did it by the priests, who were their mediators unto God, and, as their proxies, did eat of the sacrifices for them.

But in the peace-offerings, because such as brought them had no uncleanness upon them, (*Levit.* vii. 20.) and so were perfectly reconciled to God, and in covenant with him, therefore they were in their own persons to eat of those sacrifices, which they had offered unto God as a federal rite between God and them; which we shall explain at large hereafter.

So then the eating of the sacrifices was a due and proper appendix unto all sacrifices, one way or other, and either by the priests, or themselves, when the person, that offered, was capable thereof. Wherefore we shall find in the Scripture, that eating of the sacrifices is brought in continually as a rite belonging to sacrifice in general. Which we will now shew in divers instances.

Exod. xxxiv. 15. God commands the Jews, that when they came into the land of *Canaan*, they should destroy the altars and images, and all the monuments of idolatry among those Heathens thus; *Lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and they go a-whoring after their gods, and one call thee, and thou EAT of his sacrifice:* Which indeed afterward came thus to pass, *Num.* xxv. 2. *They called the people to the sacrifice of their gods, and the people did EAT, and bow down to their gods*; or, as it is cited in *Psal.* cvi. 28. *They joined themselves unto Baal-peor, and ATE the sacrifice of the dead.*

When *Jethro*, *Moses*'s father in-law, came to him, *Exod.* xviii. 12. *He took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God; and Aaron came, and all the elders of Israel, TO EAT BREAD before the Lord:* by sacrifices there are meant peace-offerings, as *Aben-Ezra* and the *Targum* well expound it, which, we said before, were regularly joined with burnt-offerings.

So *Exod.* xxxii. when the Israelites worshipped the golden calf, the text saith, that *Aaron built an altar before it, and made a proclamation, saying, To-morrow is a FEAST unto the Lord:* (see how the altar and the feast were a-kin to one another:) *And they rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt-*

burnt-ofierings, and brought peace-offerings, and the people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK. Which paſſage St. *Paul* makes uſe of, being about to dehort the *Corinthians* from eating things ſacrificed to idols, 1 *Cor.* x. *Neither be ye idolaters, as ſome of them were, as it is written, The people SAT DOWN TO EAT AND DRINK:* for this was no common eating, but the eating of thoſe ſacrifices, which had been offered up to the golden calf.

The firſt of *Sam.* i. 3. it is ſaid of *Elkanah*, that *he went up out of his city yearly to worſhip, and to ſacrifice to the Lord of hoſts in Shiloh: and when the time was come, that he offered, he gave to Peninnah his wife, and to all her ſons and daughters, PORTIONS; and unto Hannah he gave a double PORTION*; that is, *portions to eat of thoſe ſacrifices, that had been offered up to God*, as *R. David Kimchi* notes. And in the ninth chapter of the ſame book, when *Saul* was ſeeking *Samuel*, going towards the city, he met ſome maidens, that told him *Samuel* was come to the city, for there was a ſacrifice for the people that day in the high place: *As ſoon*, ſay they, *as you come into the city, you ſhall find him before he go up to the high place TO EAT; for the people will not EAT until he come, becauſe he doth bleſs the ſacrifice.* Where, though the word *Bamah* properly ſignifies a high place, or place of ſacrifice, whence the Greek word Βῶμος is thought to be derived; yet it is here rendred by the *Targum*, as often elſewhere, בית אסחרותא *Domus accubitûs, a houſe of feaſting*; becauſe feaſting and ſacrificing were ſuch general concomitants of one another.

So again, in the 16th Chap. *Samuel* went to *Bethlehem* to anoint *David: I am come* (ſaith he) *to ſacrifice to the Lord; ſanctify yourſelves, and come with me to the ſacrifice.* But when he underſtood, that *Jeſſe*'s youngeſt ſon was abſent, he ſaith to *Jeſſe*, *Send and fetch him, for we will not SIT DOWN until he come.* Ver. 11.

So I underſtand that of the *Sichemites*, according to the judgment of the Jewiſh doctors, *Judg.* ix. 27. *They went into the houſe of their god, and did EAT and DRINK, and curſed Abimelech*; that is, they went into the houſe of their god to ſacrifice, and did eat and drink of the ſacrifice: which perhaps was the reaſon of the name, by which they called their god, whom they thus worſhipped, BERITH, which ſignifies a covenant, becauſe they worſhipped him by this federal rite of eating of his ſacrifices; of which more hereafter.

Thus likewiſe the Hebrew Scholiaſts expound that in the 16th chapter of the ſame book, verſe 23. concerning the *Philiſtines*, when they had put out *Sampſon*'s eyes; *They met together to offer a great ſacrifice unto Dagon their god, and to REJOICE*; that is, in feaſting upon the ſacrifices.

Hence it is, that the idolatry of the Jews, in worſhipping other gods, is ſo often deſcribed ſynecdochically under the notion of feaſting: *Iſa.* lvii. 7. *Upon a lofty and high mountain haſt thou SET THY BED, and thither wenteſt thou up to offer ſacrifice.* * For in thoſe ancient times they were not wont to ſit at feaſts, but lie down on beds or couches. *Ezek.* xxiii. *You ſent for men from far, Sabæans from the wilderneſs*, (i. e. idolatrous prieſts from *Arabia*) *and lo they came, for whom thou didſt waſh thy*

* Of *Saba*, ſee *Salmaſius in Plinianis Exercitat.* p. 497, & 500.

thyself, and sateſt upon a ſtately bed, with a table prepared before thee. Amos ii. 8. *They laid themſelves down upon clothes laid to pledge by every altar*; i. e. *laid themſelves down to eat of the ſacrifice, that was offered on the altar.* And, in *Ezek.* xviii. 11. *eating upon the mountains*, ſeems to be put for *ſacrificing upon the mountains*, becauſe it was a conſtant appendix to it. *He that hath not done any of theſe things, but hath even eaten upon the mountains*, בטוריא פלח לטעותא, i. e. *hath worſhipped idols upon the mountains*; ſo the *Targum* renders it. Laſtly, St. *Paul* makes *eating of the ſacrifice* a general appendix of the altar, *Heb.* xii. 10. *We have an altar, whereof they have no right to eat, that ſerve the tabernacle.*

I will obſerve this one thing more, becauſe it is not commonly underſtood, that all the while the Jews were in the wilderneſs, they were to eat no meat at all at their private tables, but that, whereof they had firſt ſacrificed to God at the tabernacle. For this is clearly the meaning of that place, *Levit.* xvii. 4, 5. *Whatſoever man there be of the houſe of Iſrael, that killeth a lamb, or a goat, or an ox, within the camp, or without the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle, to offer an offering to the Lord, blood ſhall be imputed to him.* And ſo *Nachmonides* there gloſſes, according to the mind of the ancient Rabbins, הנה מתחלה צוה שכל מה שהם אוכלים שלמים, i. e. *Behold, God commanded at firſt, that all, which the Iſraelites did eat, ſhould be peace-offerings.* Which command was afterward diſpenſed with, when they came into the land, and their dwellings were become remote from the tabernacle, ſo that they could not come up every day to ſacrifice. *Deut.* xii. 21. *If the place, which the Lord thy God hath choſen be too far from thee; then thou ſhalt kill of the herd and of the flock, and thou ſhalt eat within thy gates whatſoever thy ſoul luſteth after.* Only now there were, inſtead thereof, three conſtant and ſet times appointed in the year, in which every male was to come up and ſee God at his tabernacle, and eat and drink before him; and the ſacrifice, that was then offered, was wont to be called by them, עולת ראיה, *a ſacrifice of ſeeing.*

Thus I have ſufficiently declared the Jewiſh rite of joining feaſting with ſacrificing; and it will not be now amiſs, if we add, as a *mantiſſa* to that diſcourſe, ſomething of the cuſtom of the Heathens alſo in the like kind, the rather becauſe we may make ſome uſe of it afterward. And it was ſo general amongſt them in their idolatrous ſacrifices, that *Iſaac Abrabanel*, a learned Jew, obſerved it in *Piruſh Hattorah*, בזמים קדמונים כל מי שהוא עושה עבודת אלילים מזר היהעושה עליה מברך; *In thoſe ancient times, whoſoever ſacrificed to idols, made a feaſt upon the ſacrifice.* And the original of it amongſt them was ſo ancient, that it is aſcribed by their own authors to *Prometheus*, as *Salmaſius*, in his *Solino-Plinian Exercitations*, notes, P. 129. a. *Hunc ſacrificii morem à* Prometheo *originem duxiſſe volunt, quo partem hoſtiæ in ignem conjicere ſoliti ſunt, partem ad ſuum victum abuti.* Which *Prometheus*, although, according to *Euſebius* his *Chronicon*, and our ordinary Chronologers, his time would fall near about the 3028th year of the Julian period, which was long after *Noah*; yet it is certain, that he lived much ſooner, near about *Noah*'s time, in that he is made to be the ſon of *Japhet*, which was *Noah*'s ſon, from whom the Europeans deſcended, (*Gen.* x. 5.)

x. 5.) called therefore by the poet *Iâpeti genus*. For there is no great heed to be given to the chronology of human writers concerning this age of the world, which *Cenſorinus* from *Varro* calls Μυθικὸν, *the fabulous time*, or *age*. Although I rather ſubſcribe to the judgment of the learned *Voſſius*, that this *Prometheus* was no other than *Noah* himſelf, the father of *Japhet*, and not his ſon, becauſe the other things do ſo well agree to him; and we may eaſily allow the Heathens ſuch a miſtake as that is, in a matter of ſo remote antiquity: and then, if this be true, the whole world received this rite of feaſting upon ſacrifice, at firſt, together with that of ſacrifice, at the ſame time. Inſtances of this cuſtom are ſo frequent and obvious in Heathen authors, that *Homer* alone were able to furniſh us ſufficiently.

Note that אִיֵּי חַגּוֹיִם *the iſlands of the nations* is commonly uſed in Scripture as a proper name to expreſs *Europe* by. *Lib.* 1. *de Idol.*

In the ἀ of the *Iliads*, he brings in a deſcription of a hecatomb-ſacrifice, which *Agamemnon* prepared for *Apollo* by his prieſt *Chryſes*, and a feaſt, that followed immediately after it. In β′ the ſame *Agamemnon* offers up an ox to *Jupiter*, and inviteth divers of the Grecian captains to partake of it. In γ′ of the *Odyſſees*, *Neſtor* makes a magnificent ſacrifice to *Neptune* of eighty two bullocks, with a feaſt upon it, on the ſhore. In θ′ *Alcinous* offers up a bullock unto *Jupiter*, and then immediately follows,

——— Δαίυυτ' ἐρικυδέα δαῖτα
Τερπόμενοι ———

Plato, in his ſecond *De Legibus*, acknowledges theſe feaſts under the name of Ἑορταὶ μετὰ θεῖον, *feaſts after divine worſhip* offered up to the gods. Among the Latins, that of *Lycus* in *Plautus* his *Pœnulus* belongs to this purpoſe;

Convivas volo
Reperire vobis commodos, qui unà ſient,
Interibi attulerint exta.

And that of *Gelaſimus* in *Stichus*;

Jámne exta cocta ſunt? quot agnis fecerat?

After this manner he, in *Virgil*'s *Eclogues*, invites his friend,

Cùm faciam vitulâ pro frugibus, ipſe venito.

And thus *Evander* entertains *Æneas*, in the eighth *Æneid*,

Tum lecti juvenes certatim, araque ſacerdos,
Viſcera toſta ferunt taurorum ———

Plutarch ſomewhere obſerves it as a ſtrange and uncouth rite, in the worſhip of the goddeſs *Hecate*, that they which offered ſacrifice unto her, did not partake of it. And the ſame author reports of *Catiline* and his conſpirators, ὅτι καθαθύσαντες ἄνθρωπον ἐγεύσαντο τῶν σαρκῶν, *that ſacrificing a*

man

man, they did all eat somewhat of the flesh; using this religious rite as a bond to confirm them together in their treachery. But *Strabo* tells us of a strange kind of worship used by the Persians in their sacrifices, where no part of the flesh was offered up to the gods, but all eaten up by those, that brought it, and their guests; they supposing in the mean while, that whilst they did eat of the flesh, their god, which they worshipped, had the soul of the sacrifice, that was killed in honour to him. The author's own words are these in his 15th book; Μερίσαντες δὲ τὰ Μάγοι τὰ κρέα τὰ ὑφηγημένα τὴν ἱερουργίαν, ἀπιᾶσι διελόμενοι, τοῖς θεοῖς ὑδὲν ἀπονείμαντες μέρος. Τῆς γὰρ ΨΥΧΗΣ φασι τὰ ἱερεῖα δεῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν, ἄλλα δὲ ὑδενός. Ὅμως δὲ τὰ ἐπίπλα τι μικρὸν τιθέασιν, ὡς λέγουσί τινες, ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ———*Suâ quisque acceptâ abeant, nullâ parte diis relatâ; dicunt enim Deum nihil velle præter hostiæ animam: quidam tamen (ut fertur) omenti partem igni imponunt.*

From this custom of the Heathens of feasting upon sacrifices arose that famous controversy among the Christians in the primitive times, sometimes disputed in the New Testament, whether it were lawful ΕΣΘΙΕΙΝ ΕΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, *to eat things sacrificed to idols.*

These Gentile feasts upon the sacrifices were usually kept in the temple, where the sacrifice was offered; as may be gathered from that passage of *Herodotus* in *Clio*, where speaking of *Cleobus* and *Bithene*, and what happened to them after that prayer, which their mother put up to the gods for them, ὡς ἔθυσαν (saith he) καὶ εὐωχήθησαν, κατακοιμηθέντες ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἱερῷ, &c. *As soon as they had sacrificed and feasted, lying down to sleep in the same temple, they died there, and never rose more.* But it is very apparent from that of St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* viii. 10. *If any man see thee, which hast knowledge, sit at meat* ἐν εἰδωλείῳ, that is, not, as *Erasmus* translates it, *in epulo simulachrorum*, but as *Beza*, and from him our interpreters, *in the idol's temple*; for so both the Syriack metaphrast expounds it ܒܒܝܬ ܐܠܗܐ, and the Arabick في بيت الاصنام *in the house of idols.*

If any thing were left, when these feasts were ended, they were wont to carry portions of them home to their friends: so that learned scholiast upon *Aristophanes* in *Plutus* tells us, οἱ γὰρ ἐκ θυσίας ὄντες, ἔφερον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θυσίας τοῖς οἰκείοις κατὰ νόμον τινά. Whence *Petit*, in that excellent collection of Attick laws, inserted this for one, *viz. That they, that go home from a sacrifice, should carry part of it to their friends.* And that Greek comedian himself alludeth there to it in these words;

———Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κρεάδιον
Τῶν ἔνδοθέν τις εἰσενεγκάτω λαθών.

Theocritus in his *Bucoliastes* doth expres it fully;

———Καὶ τὸ δὲ θύσας
Ταῖς νύμφαις, Μόρσωνι καλὸν κρέας αὐτίκα πέμψον.

And *Plautus* in *Miles*;

———*Sacrificant?*
Dant inde partem majorem mihi quàm sibi.

Theſe portions, which they carried home, were called commonly by the Greeks μερίδες, and in the Umbrian language, as *Feſtus* tells us, *Strobula.* περὶ ἀκαιρίας. *Theophraſtus* in his *characters* uſes the word τόμοι in this ſenſe, Καὶ θύσιας καὶ ἀναλίσκουσας ἥκων Τόμων ἀπαιτήσων, i. e. *ad ſacrificantes & epula concelebrantes accedit, ut indè portionem auferat.*

And becauſe they thought they did receive ſome bleſſing from the gods with it, therefore it was ſometime called ὑγίεια, as we find in *Heſychius* upon that word ὑγίεια· ἄλφιτα οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ πεφυραμένα, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ θεῦ φερόμενον, εἴτε μύρον, εἴτε θάλλον, ἡ ὑγίεια.

But otherwiſe, if there were any thing yet remaining, it belonged to the prieſts, as we learn from that ſcholiaſt, which we have already commended, upon *Veſpæ*, νόμος ἦν, τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα τῆς θυσίας τὰς ἱερέας λαμβάνειν· i. e. *It was an ancient law among the Athenians, that the prieſts ſhould have the remainder.* Which is not only to be underſtood of the ſkin and ſuch like parts, but of the fleſh of the ſacrifice itſelf; as we learn from St. *Auſtin* in his expoſition upon *Rom.* ii. who tells us alſo, that theſe relicks were ſometimes ſold for them in the market; whence that ſpeech of St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* x. 25. *Whatſoever is ſold in the ſhambles eat, aſking no queſtion for conſcience ſake.*

I will ſhut up all with this one obſervation more, That as we ſaid of the Jews, that in the wilderneſs they did eat no meat, but of that which they had firſt ſacrificed; in like manner the Heathens were wont to ſacrifice before all their feaſts: whence it is, that *Athenæus* obſerves, feaſts among the ancient Heathens were ever accounted ſacred and religious things. And thus we muſt underſtand that ſpeech of St. *Paul* in the 27th verſe of the forenamed chapter, *If any one, that believes not, invite you, and you be diſpoſed to go; whatſoever is ſet before you eat, aſking no queſtion for conſcience ſake.* Nay, it was accounted a prophane thing amongſt them, to eat any meat at their private tables, whereof they had not firſt ſacrificed to their gods; as appeareth by the Greek proverb, ἄθυτα ἐσθίειν, uſed by *Anacreon* and others as a brand of a notorious wicked man, *viz. One, that would eat meat, whereof he had not ſacrificed.*

Now having thus ſhewn, that both amongſt the Jews under the law, and the Gentiles in their Pagan worſhip, (for Paganiſm is nothing but Judaiſm degenerate) it was ever a ſolemn rite to join feaſting with ſacrifice, and to *EAT of thoſe things, which had been offered up*; the very concinnity and harmony of the thing itſelf leads me to conceive, that that Chriſtian feaſt, under the Goſpel, called *THE LORD'S SUPPER*, is the very ſame thing, and bears the ſame notion, in reſpect of the true Chriſtian ſacrifice of Chriſt upon the croſs, that thoſe did to the Jewiſh and Heatheniſh ſacrifices; and ſo is *EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a ſacrificial feaſt*; I mean, *a feaſt upon ſacrifice*; or, *EPULUM EX OBLATIS, a feaſt upon things offered up to God.* Only this difference ariſing in the parallel, that becauſe thoſe legal ſacrifices were but types and ſhadows of the true Chriſtian ſacrifice, they were often repeated and renewed, as well as the feaſts, which were made upon them: but now the true Chriſtian ſacrifice being come, and offered up once for all, never to be repeated, we have therefore no more typical ſacrifices left amongſt us, but only the feaſts upon

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the true ſacrifice ſtill ſymbolically continued, and often repeated, in reference to that *ONE GREAT SACRIFICE*, which is always as preſent in God's ſight, and efficacious, as if it were but now offered up for us.

CHAP. II.

An Objection taken from the Paſſover anſwered. Proved, that the Paſſover was a true Sacrifice, and the Paſchal Feaſt a Feaſt upon a Sacrifice, from Scripture, and Jewiſh Authors.

Object. BUT methinks I hear it objected to me, that the true notion of the Lord's ſupper is to be derived rather from the paſſover among the Jews; it being the common opinion of divines, that the Jews had but two ſacraments, *viz.* circumciſion and the paſſover, that anſwer to thoſe two amongſt us, baptiſm and the Lord's ſupper: but the Jewiſh paſſover had no relation to a ſacrifice, being nothing elſe but a mere *FEAST*; and therefore from analogy to the Jewiſh we cannot make the Lord's ſupper to be *EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, a feaſt upon ſacrifice.*

Anſw. To which I anſwer, firſt, That I know not what warrant there is for that divinity ſo confidently impoſed upon us by ſome, that the Jews had but two ſacraments, circumciſion and the paſſover; and that it ſhould thence follow by inevitable conſequence, that the Lord's ſupper muſt ἀντιστοιχεῖν, anſwer only to the Jewiſh paſſover. Sure I am, the Jews had many more. For not to inſtance in that of St. *Paul*, *Our fathers were all BAPTIZED* 1 Cor. x. *unto* Moſes *in the cloud, and in the ſea*, like our Chriſtian baptiſm; *and did all EAT the ſame ſpiritual meat*, (*viz.* the manna) *and did all DRINK the ſame ſpiritual drink*, (*viz.* the water of the rock that followed them) like the bread and wine in the Chriſtian Lord's ſupper: nor to examine all the other ſacramental ceremonies, which they had, that were almoſt as many ſacraments as ceremonies. Theſe feaſts upon the ſacrifices, which we have all this while inſiſted on, were nothing elſe but true and proper * ſacraments joined with ſacrifices.

* See *Cloppenburg in Schola Sacrif.* and of the right Notion of the *Sacrament* ſee *Voſſius in Theſ. Theolog.*

But ſecondly, I will grant, that the Jewiſh paſſover hath a ſpecial reſemblance to the Chriſtian *LORD's SUPPER*, although upon other grounds; for I ſay, undoubtedly the paſſover was a true and proper ſacrifice, and therefore the paſchal feaſt a feaſt upon a ſacrifice: ſo that this ſhall ſtill advance and improve our former notion.

For the better conceiving whereof, we muſt underſtand, that beſides thoſe four general kinds of ſacrifices among the Jews before-mentioned, the burnt-offering, the ſin-offering, the treſpaſs-offering, and the peace-offering; there were ſome other peculiar kinds of ſacrifices, as the maſters tell us, *viz.* theſe three, בכורים ומעשר ופסח, the *Firſtlings of Cattel*, and the *Tenth*, and the *Paſſover*. And the reaſon, why theſe, in the diſtribution

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of ſacrifices, are thus diſtinguiſhed by them from all the other general kinds of ſacrifices, is thus given by the famous *Maimonides* upon the *Miſna* of the *Talmud*, in *Maſſecheth Zebachim*, the ſixth Chap. לפי שאיתן הארבע פעמים רבורת יתחייב היחיד בכל אחד מהם לפי שנוי העניינים והציבור חייבים בהם בומנים ואלו אינם כן, *Becauſe thoſe four forenamed were ſuch kind of ſacrifices, as that a private perſon was often bound to each of them in ſeveral caſes, and the whole congregation in ſeveral ſeaſons; but theſe three were not of that nature, being peculiarly reſtrained to one caſe or ſeaſon.* Now theſe three kinds of peculiar ſacrifices were in their nature all neareſt of kin to the peace-offerings, and are therefore called by the Jewiſh doctors ורמים לשלמים, *like to peace-offerings*, becauſe they were not only killed in the ſame place, being all קורשים קלים, *light holy things*, and had the אימורים, or *inward parts* thereof, to be burnt likewiſe upon the altar; but alſo, in that part of them was to be eaten by the owners. Inſomuch that the Talmudiſts, put many caſes, in which a lamb, that was ſet apart for a paſſover, and could not be offered in that notion, was to be turned into a peace-offering, as that which was near of kin to it.

But yet theſe maſters tell us, there were three preciſe differences between the *Paſcha* and the ordinary peace-offering, בסמיכה ונסכים ותנופרת חזה ושוק. Firſt, in that there was no laying on of hands upon the paſſover in the killing of it; for this was no where commanded, as in all the peace-offerings. Secondly, that there was no *Mincah* or meat-offering, nor *Libamen* or drink-offering, to be joined with it; (for ſo they uſe to include both in the word *Neſachim.*) Thirdly, that there was no waving of the breaſt and ſhoulder for the prieſts portion; the reaſon whereof was, becauſe the prieſts were bound always to have paſſover-offerings of their own, as it is expreſſed *Ezra* vi. and ſo needed not any wave-offering.

But that the paſſovers were, in other reſpects, of the ſame nature with the peace-offerings, and therefore true and proper ſacrifices, becauſe it is a thing generally not ſo well underſtood, and therefore oppoſed by divers, I ſhall labour the more fully to convince it. I ſay, that the paſſovers were always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there preſented and offered up to God by the prieſt, as all ſacrifices were; that the blood of them was there ſprinkled upon the altar, of which the Hebrew doctors well obſerve, * עקר הזבח בהויית הדם, *The very eſſence of a ſacrifice is in ſprinkling of the blood*; and alſo that the *Imurim*, (as they call them) that is, the fat and kidneys, were burnt upon the altar: all this I ſhall endeavour to demonſtrate.

* *Maimon.* in *Korban Peſach.* ch. 2.

Only firſt I muſt premiſe this, that when I ſay the paſſover was brought to the tabernacle, and offered by the prieſts, I do not mean, that the prieſts were always bound to kill the paſſovers: for I grant, that the people were wont to kill their own paſſovers; and ſo I find it expreſly in the *Miſna* of the *Talmud*, *Maſſech. Zebach*, cap. v. ſect. 6. שחט ישראל וקבל הכוהן, *All Iſrael killed the paſſover, and the prieſts received the blood.* Which Talmudical expreſſion alludes to that place, *Exod.* xii. 6. *The whole aſſembly of the congregation of Iſrael ſhall kill it in the evening*; where this ſeems to be commanded by God. And the practice conſonant hereunto, I find intimated

intimated at leaſt in Scripture, in *Hezekiah*'s paſſover, 2 *Chron.* xxx. 17. *There were many in the congregation, that were not ſanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the paſſover for every one, that was not clean, to ſanctify it unto the Lord.* Where *R. Solomon* writeth thus: אל תתמה למה לא שחטו בעלים עצמם, *Wonder not, why the owners themſelves did not kill them, for it followeth, that many in the congregation had not ſanctified themſelves; therefore the Levites were appointed in their place to ſanctify the work unto the Lord.* And R. *D. Kimchi* to the ſame purpoſe; *Though many of them did eat the paſſover in uncleanneſs, it being a caſe of neceſſity, in that they had no time to purify themſelves; yet for them to come into the court, and kill the paſſovers, this was not needful, when it might be done as well by the Levites.* And therefore the ſame is to be thought likewiſe of the prieſts and Levites killing the paſſover, *Ezra* vi. becauſe the people returning newly from captivity were not yet purified, as it is there alſo partly intimated.

But this doth not at all hinder our proceeding, or evince the paſſover not to be a ſacrifice: for it is a great miſtake in moſt of our learned writers, to think, that the killing of every ſacrifice was proper to the prieſt; whereas indeed there was no ſuch matter; but as we have already granted, that the people commonly killed their own paſſovers, ſo we will affirm, that they did the ſame concerning any of the other ſacrifices. *Levit.* i. 4, 5. it is ſaid concerning the burnt-offering, *If any man bring a burnt-offering to the Lord, he ſhall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering, AND HE SHALL KILL the bullock before the Lord, and the prieſts, Aaron's ſons, ſhall take the blood.* So concerning the peace-offerings, chap. iii. 2. *He ſhall lay his hand on the head of his offering, and KILL it at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation:* And concerning the ſin-offering, chap. iv. 24. *HE ſhall lay his hand on the head of the goat, and KILL it at the place, where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord.* We ſee then, what incompetent judges our own authors are in Jewiſh cuſtoms and antiquities. The Jewiſh doctors and antiquaries (which are ſo much contemned by ſome of our magiſterial dictators in all learning) would have taught us here another leſſon. For thus *Maimonides*, in *Biath Hammik.* ſpeaks to this point, שחוטת קורשים בשרה בורים אפילו קורשי קורשים בין קורשי יחיר ובין קורשי ציבור שנאמר ושחט את בן הבקר, that is, *the killing of the holy things may lawfully be done by ſtrangrs, yea of the moſt holy things, whether they be the holy things of a private perſon, or of the whole congregation: as it is ſaid* (Levit. i.) *And he ſhall kill the bullock; and the prieſts, Aaron's ſons, ſhall take the blood.* The ſame is avouched again afterward, by the ſame author, in *Maaſeh Korban*, chap. v.

But if any one would therefore fain know, what were properly the prieſts actions about the ſacrifice, which might not be done lawfully by any ſtranger, the ſame Jewiſh authors have a trite rule amongſt them concerning it: מקבלה ואילך מצות כהונה, *the receiving of the blood, and all the other parts, that were to be offered up, and all that followeth after that, belongeth to the prieſt's office.* And *Iſaac Abrabanel* will teach us more particularly, in his comment on *Leviticus*, that there were five things to be done by

by the owners of the ſacrifice that brought it, and five things by the prieſt that offered it. The firſt five were, laying on of hands, killing, flaying, cutting up, and waſhing of the inwards; the other five were the receiving of the blood in a veſſel, the ſprinkling of it upon the altar, the putting * of fire upon the altar, the ordering of the wood upon the fire, and the ordering of the pieces upon the wood. Hence it is, that upon the forequoted place of the *Miſna*, (which I brought to ſhew, that the people did kill the paſſovers) *Rabbi Obadiah* of *Bartenora* thus gloſſeth, שחט ישראל, אם ירצה שהשחיטה בישרה בזרום בכל הקרבנות, i. e. *The people of Iſrael might all kill the paſſovers themſelves, if they pleaſed, becauſe the KILLING OF ANY SACRIFICE might be done lawfully by ſtrangers; but the prieſts received the blood.*

* Of this *vide Magiſtrorum Placita.*

Now, I come to prove what I have undertaken. And firſt, that the paſſover was always brought to the tabernacle or the temple, and there offered unto God as the other ſacrifices were, is clear enough from *Deut.* xvi. 5. *Thou ſhalt not ſacrifice the paſſover within any of the gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee; but at the place, which the Lord thy God chuſeth to place his name there, there thou ſhalt ſacrifice.* And that this is to be underſtood not of *Jeruſalem* in general, but of the tabernacle or temple, appears, both becauſe the ſame expreſſions are uſed of the other ſacrifices, *Deut.* xii. ver. 5, 6, 11, 14. where it is clearly meant, that they were to be brought to the temple; and becauſe it is certain, that every thing, that was killed amongſt the Jews, was either to be killed at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, or elſe might be killed indifferently in any part of the whole land.

Let us now ſee, how the Jewiſh doctors comment upon this place, men better ſkilled in theſe rites than our own authors are, R. *Moſes BEN MAIMON*, in *Halachah Peſach, cap.* 1. אין שוחטין את הפסח, &c. *They kill not the paſſover but in the court, as the reſt of the holy things; yea, in the time, when high places were permitted, they ſacrificed not the paſſover in a private high place; for it is ſaid* (*Deut.* xvi.) Thou mayſt not ſacrifice the paſſover in any of thy gates: *We have learnt, that this is a prohibition to kill the paſſover in any private high place, although it be in a time, when high places are permitted.* From which excellent gloſs of theirs, it appeareth, that there was more preciſeneſs in bringing of the paſſover to the place, where God's name was put, and offering it at the tabernacle or the temple, than of any of the other ſacrifices. And this was the reaſon, as was before intimated out of *KIMCHI*, why in *Hezekiah*'s paſſover the *Levites* had the charge of killing, becauſe the paſſovers were to be killed in the court of the temple, whither the people being unclean could not enter; for otherwiſe, if it had been done without the court, they might as well have killed their own paſſovers, as have eaten them. And this may be farther confirmed, in that the paſſover is called a *Korban: Numb.* ix. 7. *When certain men were defiled by a dead body, that they could not keep the paſſover, they came to Moſes, and ſaid, Wherefore are we kept back, that we may not OFFER an OFFERING to the Lord in his appointed ſeaſon?* And again, ver. 13. *If any one be clean, and forbeareth to keep the paſſover, even that ſoul ſhall be cut off,*

off, becauſe he brought not an OFFERING *(or a* KORBAN*) to the Lord in his appointed ſeaſon.* Nothing was called an OFFERING, or a KORBAN, but that, which was brought, and offered up to God at the tabernacle or temple, where his name was put.

That the blood of the paſſovers was to be ſprinkled by the prieſt, and fat only to be burnt upon the altar, although this muſt needs follow from the former, yet I prove it more particularly thus: *Exod.* xxiii. 18. *Thou ſhalt not offer the blood of my ſacrifice with leavened bread; neither ſhall the fat of my feaſt remain until the morning.* For by the general conſent of the Jewiſh ſcholiaſts, and all thoſe Chriſtian interpreters, that I have ſeen, this place is to be underſtood only of the paſſover; and therefore *ONKELOS*, that famous Chaldee paraphraſt, for דם זבחי *the blood of my ſacrifice*, made no queſtion but to read it דם פסחי *the blood of my paſſover.* But it appears undoubtedly from a parallel place in the xxxiv. chapter of the ſame book, ver. 23, 25, 26. where thoſe 17, 18, and 19. verſes of the xxiii. chap. are again repeated; *Thrice in the year ſhall all your men-children appear before the Lord.* ——— *Thou ſhalt not offer the blood of my ſacrifice with leaven, neither ſhall the ſacrifice of the feaſt of the paſſover be left unto the morning. The firſt of the firſt-fruits of thy land thou ſhalt bring into the houſe of the Lord thy God. Thou ſhalt not ſeethe a kid in its mother's milk.* Here what was wanting in the former, is ſupplied; *Neither ſhall the ſacrifice of the feaſt of the* PASSOVER *be left unto the morning.* And I have ſet down the whole context with it, becauſe it will be needful, for the better clearing of it, to conſider its coherence with other verſes, which is the very ſame in both chapters; and *Iſaac Abrabanel* hath ſet it down excellently in this manner.

Firſt therefore, ſaith he, when God had ſpoken of the Jews appearing thrice before him every year, *viz.* at the feaſt of the paſſover or of unleavened bread, the feaſt of weeks or Pentecoſt, the feaſt of tabernacles or in-gathering, בין שהגיד שלשת החגים החם נתן בכל אחד מהם משפט מיותד, i. e. *When he had ſpoken of theſe three feaſts, he ſubjoins immediately ſome rule concerning every one of them in particular:* Firſt, for the paſſover, in thoſe words, *Thou ſhalt not offer the blood of my ſacrifice with leaven, neither ſhall the ſacrifice of the feaſt of the paſſover be left until the morning:* Secondly, for the feaſt of Pentecoſt, in thoſe; *The firſt of the firſt-fruits of the land thou ſhalt bring into the houſe of the Lord thy God:* Thirdly, for the feaſt of tabernacles or in-gathering; *Thou ſhalt not ſeethe a kid in his mother's milk*; which words, for want of this light of the context, were never yet ſufficiently explained by any of our interpreters. And the thread of this coherence alone led *Abrabanel* very near the true meaning of them, ere he was aware: היותר נראה בזה שהיה ממעשה עוברי עבורת אלילים בזמן קבוציהם לעשות כן רל לבשל הגרוים בחלב בזמן אסיפת התבואית להשבם שבזה יתרצו לאלהיהם, i. e. *It ſeems moſt probable, that this command was occaſioned from a cuſtom among the idolatrous Heathens, that at the time of their gathering in of fruits, they were wont to boil a kid in the dam's milk, thinking, that by this means they were made acceptable to their gods, and did procure a bleſſing by it.* To confirm which gloſs, he tells

us of a cuſtom ſomewhat like to this, uſed in his time in ſome parts of *Spain*.

But becauſe *Abrabanel* doth not tell his tale ſo handſomely as he ſhould, I will help him out a little from an ancient Karraite, whoſe comment I have ſeen upon the Pentateuch, MS. (for the monuments of theſe Karraite Jews were never yet printed, and are very rarely ſeen in theſe European parts.) And it is thus: *It was a cuſtom of the ancient Heathens, when they had gathered in all their fruits, to take a kid, and boil it in the dam's milk, and then* דרך בשפרה, *in a magical way, to go about and beſprinkle with it all their trees and fields, and gardens and orchards; thinking by this means they ſhould make them fructify, and bring forth fruit again more abundantly the following year.* Wherefore, God forbad his people the Jews, at the time of their in-gathering, to uſe any ſuch ſuperſtitious or idolatrous rite. And I produce this the rather, becauſe *Abrabanel*, toward the end of his comment on this place, mentions a gloſs of ſome *KARRAITISH* author upon it, although it be altogether unlike to this, which we have here related. וחכמי הקראים כתבו בטעם לא תבשל גוי שלא תתערב חפרח עם העקרים *Scribunt ſapientes KARRÆORUM, Nè coquas hœdum in lacte matris ſuæ, hoc eſt, Nè commiſceatur germen cum radicibus.*

But to return. As from the coherence of the whole context thus cleared it is manifeſt, that this verſe in both places is to be underſtood only of the paſſover; ſo it may be farther confirmed from the Talmudiſts, who ever expound it in this ſenſe, as appears by the Miſna in *Zebachin*, chapter the ſixth; השוחט את הפסח על החמץ עובר בלא תעשה, *He, that killeth the paſſover with leaven, ſinneth againſt a negative command*, (which is more amongſt the Jews, than to ſin againſt a poſitive,) *viz.* that in theſe places already quoted, *Thou ſhalt not offer the blood of my ſacrifice with leaven*; from whence they collected, as *Maimonides* tells us, that they were to put away leaven the fourteenth day, a day before the killing of the paſſover. Nay, this place cannot poſſibly be underſtood in any other ſenſe, as of ſacrifices in general, becauſe leaven was ſometimes commanded with ſacrifices, as *Levit.* vii. 13.

But that the blood of the paſſovers was ſprinkled, may be demonſtrated farther, not only from that of *Hezekiah*'s paſſover, 2 *Chron.* xxx. 16. *The prieſts ſprinkled the blood, which they received from the hand of the Levites; for there were many in the congregation, that were not ſanctified; therefore the Levites had the charge of killing the paſſovers*; but alſo from *Joſiah*'s, chap. xxxv. ver. 11. which can no ways be evaded; *They*, that is, *the Levites, killed the paſſover, and the prieſts ſprinkled the blood from their hands, and the Levites flayed them.* Now the ſprinkling of the blood is the eſſence of a ſacrifice, as before we noted from the Jewiſh Doctors. And therefore the paſſover muſt needs be a ſacrifice: ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

For a confirmation of all this, I will deſcribe punctually the whole manner of the PASCHAL SACRIFICE from the Miſna of the Jewiſh Talmud, a monument of ſuch antiquity, as cannot be diſtruſted in theſe rites. Nothing (ſay they) was killed before the morning-ſacrifice; and after the evening-ſacrifice, nothing but the paſſover.

The evening-ſacrifice was uſually killed between the eighth and ninth hour, (that is, half an hour after two, in the afternoon,) and offered between the ninth and tenth, (that is, half an hour after three.) But in the evening of the paſſover, the daily ſacrifice was killed an hour ſooner; and after that began the killing of the paſſover, which was to be done between the two evenings; whereof the firſt began at noon, from the ſun's declination towards the weſt, the ſecond at ſun-ſet. Yet the *Paſcha* might be killed before the daily ſacrifice, if there were but one to ſtir the blood, and keep it from coagulating, till the blood of the daily ſacrifice were ſprinkled; for that was always to be ſprinkled firſt. The paſſovers were always killed by three ſeveral companies. When the court was once full, they ſhut the doors, and the prieſts ſtood all in their ranks, with round veſſels in their hands to receive the blood; thoſe that were of gold, in a rank by themſelves, and thoſe that were of ſilver; all without bottoms, leſt they ſhould be ſet ſomewhere on the ground, and the blood congeal in them. And they killed the paſſovers, as the peace-offerings, in any part of the court, becauſe they were קודשים קלים, *the leſs holy things*; as the קודשי קדשים, *the holy of holies*, were always to be killed at the north-ſide of the altar. The prieſts then took the blood, and gave it from one to another, till it came to him that ſtood next the altar; and he ſprinkled it all at once toward the bottom of the altar, which was a ſquare of thirty-two cubits, ſave that the ſouth-eaſt horn had no bottom. After the blood was ſprinkled, the lamb was flay'd, and cut up, the *Imurim* or inwards taken out and laid upon the altar; then the owner took up the lamb, with the ſkin of it, and carried it to his own home. The firſt company having ended, then the ſecond came in, and afterward the third; and for every company they began a new the HALLEL, and ſang all the while the paſſovers were killing; and when they had finiſhed the *Hallel*, they ſang it over a ſecond time; and when they had gone over it a ſecond time, they began it a third time; although it was never known, that the third time they ſang out the *Hallel* quite, or came any farther than אהבתי*, before the prieſts had done.

* אהבתי *I love the Lord, &c.* is the beginning of Pſalm 116. being part of the *Hallel* or Hymn ſung at that time, which began at Pſ. 113. and reached to the end of Pſ. 118.

But becauſe, beſides theſe Talmudiſtick Jews, there is another ſect of KARRAITES, mentioned before, (that reject all Talmudical traditions, which are not grounded upon Scripture) though little known amongſt us, yet famous in the orient; I will produce one teſtimony of theirs alſo from an ancient manuſcript, that ſo it may appear we have the full conſent of all Jewiſh antiquity for this opinion. The author's name to me is uncertain, becauſe the papers have loſt both their beginning and end. But they contain in them divers large and complete diſcourſes upon ſeveral arguments in the Karraite way, as about the Jewiſh year, the ſabbath, the paſſover, *&c.* Concerning the paſſover, he divides his diſcourſe into ſeveral chapters, whereof the title of one is this, במקום הקרבת הפסח ואכילתו, *concerning the place where the paſſover was to be offered and eaten*; where he thus begins: דע שהקרבת הפסח חוא במקום המובחר בכתוב לא תיכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד שעריך ומקום שחיטתו בעזרה ושפיכת דמו אל יסוד המזבח ואימודיו היו נקטרום במובח, i. e. *Know, that the offering of the paſſover was always in the place, which God had choſen* (to put his name there,) *as it is written*, Thou ſhalt not ſacrifice the paſſover within any of thy gates; *and the place of the killing of the*

paſſover was in the court called HESRA, and the blood of it was poured out toward the bottom of the altar, and the Imurim or inward parts of it were burnt upon the altar, &c.

Hence it was, that when *Ceſtius* once demanded what the number of the Jews was that reſorted to *Jeruſalem*, at the time of their ſolemn feaſts, the prieſts made anſwer, and told him exactly how many lambs and kids were ſacrificed at the paſſover, εἰκοσίπενλε μυριάδες, πρόσδε πενλακιχίλια ἑξακόσια, *twenty five myriads, five thouſand and ſix hundred*; which they could not have done, had not they ſacrificed them at the temple.

But what need have we of any more diſpute? When the paſſover was firſt kept in *Ægypt*, were not the paſchal lambs there killed in a ſacrificial and expiatory way, when the blood thereof was to be ſprinkled upon the houſes, for God to look upon, and ſo paſs over them? It is true, they were killed in every private houſe; but the reaſon of that was, becauſe there were then prieſts in every family, *viz.* the * firſt-born, which were afterward redeemed, when the children of *Iſrael* gave up the whole tribe of *Levi* to God for his ſervice. Such prieſts as theſe were thoſe whom *Moſes* ſent to ſacrifice, *Exod.* xxiv. 5. called there *young men*; Moſes *ſent young men of the children of* Iſrael, *which offered burnt-offerings, and ſacrificed peace-offerings to the Lord*; where *Onkelos* the Chaldee paraphraſt reads it ישלח ית בוכרי, *he ſent the firſt-born:* to which agreeth the Arabick tranſlation of *R. Saadiah*, and the Perſian of *Tawaſius*, as Mr. *Selden* notes, whom I cannot without honour mention, as the glory of our nation for oriental learning.

* *Vide clariſ.* Seldenum *de Succeſ. in Pontificat. Hebræor. l.* 1. *c.* 1. & *de Succeſ. ad Leges Heb. l.* 1. *c.* 5.

And was not the killing of the paſſover a ſpecial type of the death of Chriſt, the true ſacrifice of the world? Give me leave to note one thing to this purpoſe, upon the credit of *Juſtin Martyr*, in his dialogue with *Trypho*, that in the ancient Hebrew copies of the bible, there was in the book of *Ezra* a ſpeech of his, which he made before the paſſover, expounding the myſtery thereof concerning Chriſt; which, becauſe it favoured the Chriſtians, was timely expunged by the Jews. The ſpeech was this; Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδρὰς τῷ λαῷ, τῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ καλαφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐὰν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναβῇ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινῶν ἐν σημείῳ, καὶ μελὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν, ὁ μὴ ἐρημωθῇ ὁ τόπος ὅτος εἰς τὸν ἅπανλα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πισεύσηλε αὐτῷ, μηδὲ εἰσακόσηλε τῦ κηρύγμαλός αὐτῦ, ἔσεθε ἐπίχαρμα τοῖς ἔθνεσι. i. e. *Et dixit Eſdras populo, Hoc paſcha Salvator noſter & perfugium noſtrum. Et ſi in animum induxeritis, & in cor veſtrum aſcenderit, quòd humiliaturi eum ſimus in ſigno, & poſtea ſperaturi in eum, non deſolabitur locus iſte in omne tempus, dicit Deus exercituum. Sin in eum non credideritis, neque audieritis annunciationem ejus, deridiculum eritis gentibus.* Remarkable it is, if it be true; and the author deſerves the better credit in it, becauſe he was a Samaritan, and therefore might be the better ſkilled in Jewiſh writings. But however, I am ſure the Apoſtle tells us, not only that the paſſover was a type of Chriſt, in reſpect of his death, but alſo that the proper notion of the Paſchal feaſt was to be a feaſt upon ſacrifice, in thoſe words, 1 *Cor.* v. 7, 8. *Chriſt our paſſover is ſacrificed for us; therefore let us keep the feaſt* (that is, the paſchal feaſt upon this ſacrificed Chriſt) *with the unleavened bread of ſincerity and truth.* Where alluding to that common Jewiſh cuſtom of feaſting

feasting upon sacrifices, of which we have before spoken, he implies, that the paschal supper was a feast of the same nature, a sacrificial feast.

CHAP. III.

An Answer to some Objections against the Passover's being a Sacrifice: and the Controversy about the Day, upon which the Jews *kept the Passover about the time of our Saviour's death, discussed. Proved against* Scaliger, *and others of that Opinion, that no Translations of Feasts from one* Feria *to another were then in use.*

BUT yet we will not dissemble, what there is of any moment, either in antiquity or reason, against our own opinion, ere we let this discourse pass, but subject all to an impartial view.

And first, the authority of *Philo*, who, in his third book *De vita Mosis*, speaks thus concerning the passover: ἐν ᾗ δὴ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἰδιῶται προσάγουσι τῷ βωμῷ τὰ ἱερεῖα, θύουσι δ' οἱ ἱερεῖς· ἀλλὰ νόμῳ προστάξει σύμπαν τὸ ἔθνος ἱερᾶται, τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἑκάστου τὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν θυσίας ἀναγουσῶν τότε καὶ χειρουργούντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄλλος ἅπας λεὼς ἐγεγήθει καὶ φαιδρὸς ἦν, ἑκάστου νομίζοντος ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμῆσθαι· i. e. *In qua non ut aliàs plebeii homines victimas adducunt ad altare mactandas à sacerdotibus, sed jubente lege tota gens sacrificat, dum pro se quisque mactat hostiam suis manibus. Tunc universus populus exultabat, unoquoque existimante se sacerdotii dignitate honoratum.* And again, in his book *De Decalogo*, Ἐν ᾗ θύσει πανδημεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος, τὰς ἱερεῖς αὐτῶν ἀπ ἀναμένουσες, ἱερωσύνην τῷ νόμῳ χαρισαμένῳ τῷ ἔθνει παυλὶ, μίαν ἡμέραν ἐξαίρετον ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος, εἰς αὐτουργίαν θυτιῶν· *Quando populariter singuli sacrificant, non expectatis sacerdotibus, ipsi permissu legis fungentes sacerdotio, quotannis per unum diem destinatum huic negotio.*

But to this we answer, that *Philo* doth not here deny the passover to be a sacrifice, but confirm it rather, in that he calls it often, here and elsewhere, θυσία, and saith, that they did ἀνάγειν, *bring it to the altar*, and that the people did ἱεραῶσθαι, *sacrifice*; and doth only distinguish this paschal sacrifice from all the other sacrifices in this, that here, according to his opinion, every one of the people was ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμημένος, *honoured with the priestly office*, and that the law did ἱερωσύνην παντὶ τῷ ἔθνει χαρίζεσθαι, *make every one a priest for that time, to offer up their own passover.* But moreover, it is well known, that *Philo*, though he were a Jew by nation, yet was very ignorant of Jewish customs, having been born and bred up at *Alexandria*: and we have a specimen of his mistakes here, in that he seems to make this difference between the passover and the other sacrifices, that they were only killed by the priest, but the people themselves killed their own passovers, νόμῳ προστάξει, and νόμῳ χαρισαμένῳ, *according to the law*; where he means doubtless that in *Exod.* xii. 16. *The whole assembly of the congregation of* Israel *shall kill it.* For this is that *solenne delirium* of our late authors also, which we have chastised before. But, if he mean moreover, that the people did not only kill their passovers, but do all other priestly offices concerning them, when

* *Scalig. Emendat. Temporum. Et Hug. Grotius in Matt. xxvi.* *Scalig. Elench. Tribær. cap. 25. circa finem. Item in de Cyclo Judæorum Karaim.*

when he ſays they were ἱερωσύνῃ τετιμημένοι· this, as it hath no ground from Scripture, (and, I think, will hardly find a patron now to defend it,) ſo it doth not prejudice our opinion of the paſſover's being a ſacrifice, but ſtill much confirm it.

Secondly, it may ſeem to ſome a kind of impoſſibility to conceive, how ſo many ſacrifices, as there muſt be at every paſſover, could all be offered upon one altar, ſince there were no more by the law permitted.

To which, nevertheleſs, I need not anſwer any thing but this; that there was nothing but the fat, and ſome of the inwards burnt upon the altar; and that the bigneſs of the altar was greater, than perhaps is ordinarily conceived: for under the ſecond temple, the area thereof, upon the top, was a ſquare of twenty-eight cubits, as the Talmudiſts conſtantly relate; to which *Joſephus* alſo agreeth very near, if the difference of thoſe cubits, which he uſeth, be allowed. Only they may pleaſe to learn from the inſtance of *Joſiah*'s paſſover, which was ſaid to be ſo great, that *there was no paſſover like to that, kept in* Iſrael, *from the days of* Samuel *the prophet unto that time*, that this was poſſible to be done; for it either is, or muſt be confeſſed, that then they were all offered upon the altar.

2 *Chron.* xxxv.

But laſtly, we muſt confeſs ingenuouſly, that there is one great difficulty yet behind, concerning our Saviour's laſt paſſover, which, according to the general conſent of our beſt divines, criticks and chronologers, was kept a day before the Jews kept their paſſover: Whether therefore his paſchal lamb, which he with his Apoſtles did then eat, were firſt ſacrificed at the temple; and how could that be?

Where, not to engage ourſelves any more than needs we muſt, in that nice and perplexed, but famous controverſy, concerning the time of the Jewiſh paſſover about our Saviour's death; it will not be amiſs, firſt to take notice, that the Latin church ever maintained the contrary opinion againſt the Greeks, *viz.* That the Jews kept the paſſover on the ſame night, which our Saviour did: and though it be true, that of later times moſt of our beſt-learned authors have quitted that opinion of the Latins, and cloſed altogether with the Greeks, as *Paulus Burgenſis*, *Munſter*, *Scaliger*, and *Caſaubon*; yet, notwithſtanding, our country-man Mr. *Broughton* (underſtanding, perhaps, better than they did, that the Jewiſh paſſover was a true and proper ſacrifice, and firſt, according to God's command, was to be offered up to God, before feaſted on,) eſpied a difficulty here concerning our Saviour's paſſover, (which they took no notice of,) that could not eaſily be ſolved; and therefore he thought good *ſcindere nodum*, as *Alexander* did, *to cut the knot, which he could not looſe*, and abſolutely to deny, that the Jewiſh paſſover, and our Saviour's, were then celebrated on two ſeveral nights. And he is of late ſeconded by *Johannes Cloppenburg*, a Belgick divine, [in an epiſtle, written upon this argument to *Ludovicus De Dieu*,] inſiſting upon the very ſame ground, becauſe the paſchal lamb, which Chriſt with his diſciples did eat, could not have been ſacrificed at the temple, unleſs it had been at the ſame time, when the Jewiſh paſſover was ſolemnly celebrated. His words to this purpoſe, expreſſing fully Mr. *Broughton*'s ſenſe, are theſe;

Non

Non potuit mactari agnus paſchalis extra templum Hieroſolymitanum: In templo mactari non potuit citra generalem populi conſenſum: Quare neque dies mactationis potuit anticipari. It follows, *Vel ergo dicendum Chriſtum comediſſe agnum non mactatum in templo, atque hoc facto (quod abſit) legem violâſſe; (juxta legem enim agnus privatim comedendus è templo deferendus domi erat in ædes privatas, poſt igne abſumptam in templo adipem, & ſanguinem delatum ad altare;) vel Judæos eodem tempore cum Chriſto paſcha celebrâſſe.*

But I muſt confeſs, although I am as much addicted to that hypotheſis of the paſſover's being a ſacrifice, and as tender of it, as Mr. *Broughton* could be, or any body elſe; yet I cannot but yield myſelf captive to truth, on which ſide ſoever it preſents itſelf, and though it be εἰς καθαίρεσιν τῶν ἰδίων, (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith a philoſopher ſhould do) *to the deſtruction of our own phænomena.*

And indeed thoſe two places eſpecially, brought out of S. *John*'s Goſpel, to prove, that the Jews kept their paſſover the day after our Saviour did his, ſeem to me to be unanſwerable, nor any way cured by thoſe σοφὰ φάρμακα, which are applied to them.

The firſt is chap. xix. ver. 14. where, the next day after Chriſt had kept his paſſover with his diſciples, when *Pilate* delivered him up to the Jews to be crucified, it is ſaid, that it was then παρασκευὴ τοῦ Πάσχα, *the preparation of the paſſover*; where they tell us, that by *the preparation of the paſſover* is meant *the preparation of the ſabbath, on which the ſecond day of the paſſover fell.* But, *en jecur criticum!* as *Scaliger* ſometimes cries out; and what a far-fetch'd conceit is this?

The ſecond is that in chap. xviii. ver. 28. When Jeſus was led into *Pilate*'s judgment-hall, early in the morning, it is ſaid, that *the Jews themſelves went not into the judgment-hall, leſt they ſhould be defiled, but that they might eat the paſſover.* Here we are told, that by eating the paſſover is meant the eating of the *Chagigah*, that was killed the day before with the paſſover, whereof ſomething, perhaps, remained till the day following. And this gloſs is little better than the former; for, although they appeal to that place in *Deut.* xvi. 2. to prove, that the *Chagigah* was ſometimes called by the name of *paſſover*, which indeed, if our Engliſh tranſlation were authentick, would make ſomething for them; *Thou ſhalt therefore ſacrifice the paſſover unto the Lord thy God of the flock and the herd*, as if there had been a paſſover of oxen, as well as of ſheep; yet in the Hebrew the words run thus, וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך צאן ובקר, which, according to a ſeveral punctation, and a ſeveral ſupplying of ſomething, that muſt be underſtood, may be expounded ſeveral ways; any of which is far better than that, which our Engliſh tranſlators have unhappily pitch'd upon.

Onkelos, in his paraphraſe, (which ſeldom merits that name, being indeed commonly nothing but a rigid verſion, reads it thus, ותכום פסחא קדם יהוה אלהיך מן בני ענא ונכסת קרשיא מן תורי, i. e. *And thou ſhalt ſacrifice the paſſover before the Lord thy God of the ſons of the flock, and the peace-offerings (thereof) of oxen*; which interpretation is followed by R. *Solomon* and *Aben-Ezra*, צאן לחיוב הפסח ובקר לשלמים, i. e *ſheep for the paſſover, and oxen for the peace-offerings*, or the *Chagigah*. And it may be confirmed from that of *Joſiah*'s paſſover, 2. *Chron.* xxxv. 7. *Joſiah gave to*

the

the people, of the flock, lambs and kids, all for the paſſover-offerings, to the number of thirty thouſand, and three thouſand bullocks: where the bullocks, or the herd, are divided from the paſſover-offerings, becauſe they ſerved for the peace-offerings, or the *Chagigah*, as appeareth from ver. 13. *They roaſted the paſſovers with fire, according to the ordinance*; *but the* OTHER HOLY OFFERINGS (that is, the peace-offerings, or *Chagigah*) *ſod they in pots, and cauldrons, and pans.* *Nachmanides* hath another interpretation of it to this purpoſe, יצוה בפסח והוא השה שהזכיר כבר וצאן ובקר אלים ועזים ובני בקר להוג חגיגה, i. e. *He commandeth here the paſſover, which was a lamb, as he had ſaid before*, (making the pauſe there;) *and* צאן ובקר, *the flock and the herd, or the ſheep and the kids, and the young bullocks, for the Chagigah*; giving other inſtances, in which the conjunctive particle *vau*, which he doth here ſupply, is in like manner to be underſtood.

And this expoſition is rather approved than the former, not only by *Abrabanel*, but alſo by the Karraite, which I have before commended; who, quoting one R. *Aaron* for the author of it, doth expreſs it thus; ויהיה מאמר וזבחת מושך עצמו ואחר עמו וזבחת פסח ליהוה אלהיך יזבחת צאן ובקר במו ולא למדתי חכמה ודעת קישים ארע, i. e. *The word* וזבחת (Thou ſhalt ſacrifice) *is to be repeated* ἀπὸ κοινῦ *before* THE FLOCK AND THE HERD, *thus*, And thou ſhalt ſacrifice the paſſover to the Lord thy God, and thou ſhalt ſacrifice ſheep and oxen, *or* the flock and the herd; *as in like manner* Prov. xxx. 3. *the particle* [לא *not*] *is to be repeated* ἀπὸ κοινῦ *from the former part of the verſe.* So that it cannot hence be proved, that the peace-offerings, offered with the paſſover, were ever called by the name of paſſover.

There is another place in the ſame Evangeliſt, that hath not been obſerved by any one to this purpoſe, which, if it were rightly underſtood, would be as clear a teſtimony, as any of the reſt. And it is in the xix. chapter, verſ. 31. ἦν γὰρ μεγάλη ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη τῦ Σαββάτυ, *For that ſabbath-day was a great day.* Μεγάλη ἡμέρα, in the Greek of the Helleniſts, is uſed for the firſt, or the laſt day of every ſolemn feaſt, in which there was a holy convocation to the Lord. This appeareth from *Iſa.* i. 13. *Your new-moons and ſabbaths, the calling of aſſemblies*, (which was the firſt and laſt day of the feaſt) *I cannot away with:* which the Septuagint render thus, Τὰς Νεμηνίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ Σάββαλα, καὶ τὰς μεγάλας ἡμέρας, *Your new-moons and ſabbaths, and your* GREAT DAYS. For the laſt day of the feaſt we have it uſed by our Evangeliſt, chap. vii. ver. 37. *In the laſt day, the* GREAT DAY *of the feaſt*, ἡμέρᾳ τῇ μεγάλῃ τῆς ἑορτῆς; and doubtleſs by the ſame Evangeliſt for the firſt day of the feaſt, in this place: and therefore the Jews did not eat their paſſover, till the night before, which was the ſame night our Saviour was crucified.

Which may be ſtrengthened farther by this argument; that if the Jews had celebrated their paſſover the ſame night, which our Saviour did his, it is certain, they would never have gone about immediately with ſwords and ſtaves to have apprehended him, and then have brought him to the high-prieſt's hall, and afterwards have arraigned him at *Pilate*'s judgment-ſeat, and laſtly have crucified him; all the

same day. For the first day of unleavened bread was by the law an holy convocation to the Lord, on which it was not lawful to do any work; and we know the Jews were rigid enough in observing these legal ceremonies.

If then it must be granted, that our Saviour, with his disciples, kept the passover the night before the vulgar Jews did celebrate it, our next work is to shew, how it might be probable, that our Saviour's passover was first sacrificed at the temple.

And here perhaps I might run for shelter to that story in *Suidas*, upon the word Ἰησοῦς, that *Christ* was enrolled into the number of the two and twenty legal priests, that served at the altar, from the pretended confession of an ancient Jew in *Justinian*'s time; and then he might possibly sacrifice his own passover at the temple, though the Jews had not solemnized theirs till the day after; but that I hold this to be a mere fable, and that not only ridiculous, but impious.

Or I might take up the opinion of the Greeks, that Christ did not keep a true legal passover, but a feast of unleavened bread in imitation of it; or, as the learned *Hugh* * *Grotius* (who hath lately asserted this opinion) expresseth it, not Πάσχα θύσιμον, but μνημονευτικὸν, such as the Jews at this day keep, because the temple being down, their sacrifices are all ceased. But this opinion hath been exploded by most of our late authors; and indeed I can no way satisfy my self in it, and therefore will not acquiesce in this answer.

* *In Annot. ad Matth.* cap. 26.

But before we be able to give a true account of this quære, we must search a little deeper into the true ground of this difference between our Saviour's passover and the Jews.

The common opinion is, that the Jews in our Saviour's time were wont to translate their festivals from one *Feria* to another upon several occasions; as whenever two festivals were immediately to follow one another, to join them into one; and therefore when any fell upon the sixth *Feria*, to put it over to the next *Feria* or the Sabbath, to avoid the concurrence of two Sabbaths together; in the same manner, as the Jews use to do in their calendar at this day, where they have several rules to this purpose, expressed by abbreviatures, thus, *Adu*, *Badu*, *Gahaz*, *Zabad*, *Agu*; wherof each letter is a numeral for some *Feria*. The rule for the passover is ברו, *Badu*; that is, that it should not be kept on the second, fourth, or sixth *Feria*. (There is an extract of a Rabbinical decree to this purpose, under the name of R. *Eliezer*, in *Munster* upon *Matth.* chap. xxvi.) And therefore at this time, when our Saviour was crucified, the passover falling upon the sixth *Feria*, or Friday, was, say they, by the Jews translated, according to this rule, to the next *Feria*, and kept on Saturday, or the Sabbath; but our Saviour not regarding these traditions, observed that day precisely, which was commanded in the law, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει θύεσθαι τὸ πάσχα, *Luke* xxii. 7. that is, as they expound it, *Upon which the passover OUGHT to have been killed*; which was Friday, the day before.

But, under favour, I conceive, that all these decrees, together with that *Ratiocinium* or calendar, to which they do belong, were not then in use in our Saviour's time, (although it be so confidently averred by the incom-

parable *Joseph Scaliger)* but long ſince invented by the Jews. Which I ſhall make appear;

Firſt, in that the ancient Jews, about and ſince our Saviour's time, often ſolemnized as well the paſſovers, as the other feaſts, upon the *Feria's* next before and after the Sabbaths, and thoſe other *Feria's*, which have been made rejectitious ſince by that calendar. In the Talmudical title *Succoth*, chapter the laſt, we read of יום טוב הסמוך לשבת בין לפניה בין לאחריה, that is, *a feaſt going immediately before, or following immediately after, the Sabbath.* And in *Betzah*, c. 1. יום טוב חל להיות אחר שחל להיות ערב שבת, and יום טוב חל להיות ערב שבת, *a feaſt, that falls to be on the evening of the Sabbath, or the day after the Sabbath.* In *Chagigah*, the ſecond chapter, עצרת שחל להיות בערב שבת; which is to the ſame purpoſe with the former. More particularly concerning the paſſover, *Peſachim*, chap. vii. ſect. 10. *Oſſa, nervi, & omne reſiduum agni paſchalis, cremantor ſexto decimo: ſi is dies SABBATUM, decimo ſeptimo.* From this and divers like places of the Talmud, *Aben Ezra* on *Levit.* xxiii. 4. obſerves, במשנה גם בתלמוד ראיות שהיה פסח בבבו, *There be divers inſtances in the* Miſna *and the* Gemara *of the paſſovers being kept in* BADU, that is, on thoſe days, which were made rejectitious in the late calendar, the ſecond, fourth and ſixth *Feria.* Therefore theſe tranſlations were not in uſe, when the Doctors of the *Miſna* and *Gemara* lived.

Secondly, in that the Jews ever, while the temple ſtood, obſerved their new moons and feaſts, according to the φάσις or *apparence* of the moon, and therefore had no calendar for their rule to ſanctify their feaſts by, but they were then ſanctified by the heavens, as the *Miſna* ſpeaks. This is ſo clearly delivered by R. *Moſes Ben Maimon*, in that excellent *Halachah*, entitled, KIDDUSH HACCHODESH, that I wonder ſo many learned men, that are well ſkilled in thoſe authors, ſhould miſs of it. For having ſpoken of the rules of obſerving the φάσις, he then adds, that theſe were never made uſe of ſince the *Sanhedrin* ceaſed in the land of *Iſrael*, after the deſtruction of the temple; ſince which time they have uſed a calendar, calculated according to the middle motion of the moon. ודבר זה הלכה למשה מסינו הוא שבזמן שיש סנהדרין קובעין עלפי הראייה ובזמן שאין שם סנהדרין קיבעין עלפי החשבון הזה שאנו מחשבים בו היום ואין נזקקין לראיה אלא בעמים שהיה יום שקיבעין בחשבון זה הואיום הראייה או קדם לו ביום או אחריו ביום: *Et hæc erat traditio Moſis in monte Sinai, quod omni tempore, quo duraret Sanhedrin, conſtituerent Neomenias juxta* φάσιν· *hoc verò tempore, quo jam ceſſavit Sanhedrin, conſtituerent ſecundùm calculum hunc aſtronomicum, quo nos hodie utimur: nec ullo modo jam ad* φάσιν *nos aſtringimus, cùm ſæpe contingat, ut dies legitimus ſecundùm noſtrum calculum vel concurrat cum lunari* φάσει, *vel antevortat eam unicâ die, vel etiam ſubſequatur.* And again, a little after, moſt punctually; ומאימתי התהילו כל ישראל לחשוב בחשבון זה מסוף חכמי תלמוד בעת שחרבה ארץ ישראל ולא נשאר בית דין קבוע אבל בימי חכמי משנה וכן בימי חכמי תלמוד עד ימי אביי ורבא על קבועת ארץ ישראל היו סנהדרין: *Quando primùm cœperunt omnes Iſraelitæ computare ſecundum hunc calculum? A fine doctorum Talmudicorum, quando jam deſolata erat terra Iſrael, neque erat conſiſtorium aut ſynedrium, quod determinaret: nam per omnes dies doctorum Miſnæ & doctorum Gemaræ, uſque ad Abæum & Rabbæum, acquieſcebant*

acquieſcebant omnes Judæi in ſanctione terræ Iſraelis. And thoſe rules foremention'd of not keeping the ſeveral feaſts upon ſuch and ſuch *Feria's* were made together with this calendar, as the ſame author there alſo avoucheth: אין קיבעין בהשבון זה בימי אוו לפי שהחשבון זה הוא לקבוע הירחו׳ שמש בהלובה אמצעו לא במקום אמתי לפיכך עשו יום קבועה ויום דחיה, i. e. *In this account they never conſtituted the new-moon of* Tiſri *upon* Adu, *becauſe this account was made according to the conjunction of the ſun and moon in the middle motion; therefore now they conſtituted ſome legitimate and other rejectitious days, which they could not do before, when the new-moon (and therefore all the other feaſts) was determined according to the* Φάσις.

But the *Talmud* was not completely finiſhed till about the 500 year of the Chriſtian Æra; therefore this Jewiſh calendar, and theſe rules concerning the tranſlation of feaſts, were not in being till about that time, and ſo could be no reaſon of this difference between the time, in which our Saviour ſolemnized the paſſover, and the other Jews.

For farther confirmation hereof, we may obſerve, that the *Karraites*, which have rejected the fond traditions of the Phariſees, retain ſtill the ancient cuſtom of reckoning their new-moons ἀπὸ τῆς Φάσεως, as * *Scaliger* himſelf hath well obſerved: though in this he were miſtaken, that he thought they had aſſumed it of late, merely out of hatred to the other Jews, whereas they have kept it in a conſtant ſucceſſion from antiquity, and hold it ſtill as neceſſary by divine right. אכנם הוא מהעתקה (ſaith my author) שבל ישראל מורים בה שמזמן המלבות היו מקדשים החדשים בראית הירח: ועור מהקש כח הרבור ערע הענין ממלת חדש יורע שהוא חדוש הרבר והוא חדוש ירחבבל חדש. *This is confeſſed by all Iſrael, that from the time of the kingdom they were ever wont to conſecrate the new-moons by the* Φάσις· *and the very etymon of the word* Chodeſh *implies ſo much, for it ſignifies the renewing of ſomething; ſo that it is denominated from the change of the moon, or phaſis, as the epocha and beginning of it.* And this is one of the great controverſies to this day between thoſe two ſects of the Jews, the קראם or *Karræi*, and רבנים, or *Rabbanæi*; which is grown at length to ſuch a height, that the *Karraites*, deciphering the conditions of thoſe witneſſes, whoſe teſtimonies might be accounted valid for the Φάσις, make this for one, that they ſhould no way belong to the ſect of *Rabbaniſts*: which perhaps to obſerve in the author's own words would not be unpleaſant τοῖς Φιλαρχαίοις καὶ Φιλολόγοις. התנאי השני שלא יהיה חליק ברעתו בקריש החרש מרעת חכמינו וחכה טוה הצד ראוי לקבל ערות חישמעלים מפני שהם חילבים אחרי רעת חכמיני בען ייני הראייה ובריב הזמנים אנו שוים עמהם ואין ראוי לקבל לנו ערות חרבנים מפני שהם חלוקים ממנני בוח ואע פ שאחינו ובשרנו הם אמנם בזה מרו ועצבו את רוח קרשו, i. e. *A ſecond condition is, that they be not ſuch, as hold an opinion concerning the ſanctification of the new-moon different from the opinion of our wiſe-men. And therefore in this regard we may receive the teſtimony of the Iſhmaelites, (that is, the Turks and Saracens) becauſe they follow the opinion of our wiſe-men concerning the Phaſis, and in moſt of their appointed times they agree with us. But we may not receive the teſtimony of any one, that is of the ſect of the Rabbins, becauſe they are divided from us in this; and although they be our brethren and our fleſh, yet herein they have rebelled and grieved his holy ſpirit.*

* *Emen. Temp.* p. 149, 150.

Having thus diſproved the common and received opinion, and removed the falſe ground of this difference of time between our Saviour's paſſover and the Jews, we come, in the next place, to lay down the true, which muſt be derived from that way of reckoning the months, and of determining the ראש החדש, the *head* or *beginning of the month*, which was in uſe in our Saviour's time, which (as we have ſhewed already in general) was by the φάσις· ſo it will be expedient to deſcribe the whole manner of it more particularly from authentick authors *.

* *Talmud Babyl. in Roſh Haſhanah, & Maimon. in Kidd ſh Hachod.*

In the great or outer court of the temple there was a houſe called *Beth-Jazek*, where the ſenate ſat all the thirtieth day of every month, to receive the witneſſes of the moon's apparence, and to examine them. And here they always had a feaſt provided for the entertainment of thoſe that came, to encourage men to come the more willingly. In ancient times they did admit of ſtrangers, and receive their teſtimony, if it were approved upon examination. But when the hereticks (that is, the Chriſtians) afterward grew up, by whom (they ſay) they were ſometimes deluded, they began to grow ſhy, and to admit of none but ſuch, as were approved of to be of the Jews religion. If there came approved witneſſes upon the thirtieth day of the φάσις ſeen, then the chief man of the ſenate ſtood up and pronounced MEKUDDASH, *It is ſanctified*; and the people ſtanding by caught the word from him, and cried out MEKUDDASH, MEKUDDASH. Whereupon there was notice preſently given to all the country; which was done at firſt by torches from mountain to mountain, till at length the Chriſtians (they ſay) abuſed them in that kind alſo with falſe fires; wherefore they were fain to ſend meſſengers from place to place over the whole land, to give intelligence of the new-moon. But if, when the conſiſtory had ſat all the thirtieth day, there came no approved witneſſes of the φάσις, then they made an intercalation of one day in the former month, and decreed the following one and thirtieth day to be the calends. And yet notwithſtanding, if after the fourth or fifth day there ſhould come ſome witneſſes from afar, that teſtified they had ſeen the φάσις in its due time, nay, though they came toward the end of the month (אפילו באו בסוף החדש) the ſenate, when they had uſed all means by affrighting them from that teſtimony, that ſo, if it were poſſible, they might decline a new conſecration, (after they had already made an *Emboliſm* in the former month) if the witneſſes remained conſtant, were then bound to alter the beginning of the month, and reckon it a day ſooner, to wit, from the thirtieth day.

Here we ſee the true ground of the difference of a day, that might ariſe continually about the calends of the month, and ſo conſequently about any of the other feaſts, which did all depend on them; *viz.* between the true time of the moon's φάσις, upon the thirtieth day, and that of the ſenate's decree, a day after. For ſince it appears out of their own monuments, how unwilling they were, having once made a conſecration of the *Neomenia*, to alter it again; it may be probably conceived, that, in thoſe degenerated times, the ſenate might many times refuſe to accept the teſtimony of undoubted witneſſes: and then, it ſeems, they had ſuch a canon as this,

בית

בית רין שקרשו את החורש בין שגנים בין מוטעים הנה זה מקורש וחייבין חבל לתקן המועים על היום אעפי שזח יורעשטעו, *That whatſoever time the ſenate ſhould conclude of for the calends of the month, though it were certain they were in the wrong, yet all were bound to order their feaſts according to it:* Which I cannot think was approved of by our Saviour, and the moſt pious Jews. And therefore I conceive it moſt probable, that this was the very caſe between our Saviour's paſſover and the Jews, in that he followed the true φάσις, confirmed by ſufficient and aſſured witneſſes; but the other *Jews* ſuperſtitiouſly obſerved the pertinacious decree of the ſenate of *Sanhedrin*; which was for the day after.

And now, at laſt, we are come again to the acme of the queſtion, that was firſt propounded, How our Saviour's paſſover, notwithſtanding all this, might be ſacrificed the day before thoſe of the other Jews were.

To which I anſwer, That upon this ground, not only our Saviour and his Apoſtles, but alſo divers others of the moſt religious Jews, kept the paſſover upon the fifteenth day from the true φάσις of the moon, and not from the ſenate's decree: which I may confirm from the teſtimony of *Epiphanius*, that reports there was, at this time, θόρυβον, a *tumult* and *contention*, amongſt the Jews about the paſſover; and ſo we may eaſily perſuade thoſe other Evangeliſts, that intimate Chriſt's paſſover, to have been ſolemnized, when many others kept it, to agree with S. *John*, who aſſures us, that it was alſo by divers *Jews* kept the day after. Now, it was a cuſtom among the Jews, in ſuch doubtful caſes as theſe, which oftentimes fell out, to permit the feaſts to be ſolemnized, or paſſovers killed, on two ſeveral days together. *Maimonides* affirmeth, that, in the remoter parts of the land of *Iſrael*, they always ſolemnized the feaſt of the new-moons two days together; nay, in *Jeruſalem* itſelf, where the ſenate ſate, they kept the new-moon of *Tiſri*, which was the beginning of the year, twice, leſt they ſhould be miſtaken in it. In the *Talmud* we have an inſtance of the paſſover's being kept two days together, becauſe the new-moon was doubtful, in *Gemarah Roſh Haſhanah*, *cap.* 1. Hence the *Karraites*, who ſtill keep the ancient cuſtom of obſerving the moon's φάσις, retain it as a rule to this day, לעשות שני ימים מספק, *obſervare duos dies propter dubium.* Nay, the Rabbinical Jews themſelves, ſince they have changed the *Phaſis* for the ſynod or conjunction of the moon in the middle motion, in imitation hereof ſtill obſerve to keep the paſſover two days together, *iiſdem ceremoniis*, as the learned author of the Jewiſh ſynagogue reports; and *Scaliger* himſelf, not only of that, but alſo of the other feaſts, *Judæi poſt inſtitutionem hodierni computi eandem ſolennitatem celebrant biduò, propterea quòd menſem incipiant à medio motu lunæ: itaque* מספק מחברות המארים *propter dubium conjunctionis luminarium, Paſcha celebrant* 15. *&* 16. *Niſan, Pentecoſten* 6. *&* 7. *Sivan, Scenopegia* 15. *&* 16. *Tiſri*; *idque vocant* יום טוב שני של גליות, *Feſtum ſecundum exſiliorum.*

In Panario Hær. II.

Now then we ſee, that nothing hinders, but that the paſſover might be a ſacrifice. And thus we have hitherto cleared the way.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Demonſtrated, that the Lord's Supper in the Chriſtian Church, in reference to the true Sacrifice of Chriſt, is a Parallel to the Feaſts upon Sacrifices both in the Jewiſh Religion and Heatheniſh Superſtition.

BUT leſt we ſhould ſeem all this while to ſet up fancies of our own, and then ſport with them, we come now to demonſtrate and evince, that the Lord's Supper, in the proper notion of it, is EPULUM EX OBLATIS, or a FEAST UPON SACRIFICE; in the ſame manner with the feaſts upon the Jewiſh ſacrifices under the law, and the feaſts upon Ε'ΙΔΩΛΟΘΥΤΑ, (*things offered to idols*) among the Heathens: and that from a place of Scripture, where all theſe three ſhall be compared together, and made exact parallels to one another.

1 CORINTH. Chap. X.

14. *Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry.*
15. *I ſpeak as to wiſe men, judge ye what I ſay.*
16. *The cup of bleſſing, which we bleſs, is it not the communion of the blood of Chriſt? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Chriſt?*
18. *Behold Iſrael after the fleſh; are not they, which eat of the ſacrifices, partakers of the altar?*
20. *Now I ſay, that the things, which the Gentiles ſacrifice, they ſacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, that ye ſhould have fellowſhip with devils.*
21. *Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils: ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of devils.*

Where the Apoſtle's ſcope being to convince the *Corinthians* of the unlawfulneſs of eating things ſacrificed to idols, he doth it in this manner: ſhewing, that though an idol were truly nothing, and things ſacrificed to idols were phyſically nothing, as different from other meats [as, it ſeems, they argued, and S. *Paul* confeſſes, ver. 19.] yet morally and circumſtantially, to eat of things ſacrificed to idols in the idol's temple, was to conſent with the ſacrifices, and to be guilty of them.

Which he doth illuſtrate, firſt, from a parallel rite in Chriſtian religion; where the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Chriſt, offered up to God upon the croſs for us, in the Lord's Supper, is a real communication in his death and ſacrifice: ver. 16. *The cup of bleſſing, which we bleſs, is it not the communion of the blood of Chriſt? The bread, which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Chriſt?*

Secondly, from another parallel of the ſame rite among the Jews; where always they, that ate of the ſacrifices, were accounted partakers of the altar, that

that is, of the ſacrifice offered up upon the altar, ver. 18. *Behold Iſrael after the fleſh; are not they, which eat of the ſacrifices, partakers of the altar? In veteri lege quicunque admittebantur ad edendum de hoſtiis oblatis, cenſebantur ipſius ſacrificii, tanquam pro ipſis oblati, fieri participes, & per illud ſanctificari*; as a late commentator fully expreſſes it.

Therefore, as to eat the body and blood of Chriſt in the Lord's ſupper, is to be made partaker of his ſacrifice offered up to God for us; as to eat of the Jewiſh ſacrifices under the law was to partake in the legal ſacrifices themſelves: ſo to eat of things offered up in ſacrifice to idols, was to be made partakers of the idol-ſacrifices, and therefore was unlawful.

For, *the things, which the Gentiles ſacrifice, they ſacrifice to devils*; but Chriſt's body and blood was offered up in ſacrifice unto God, and therefore they could not partake of both together, the ſacrifice of the true God, and the ſacrifice of devils. *Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and the table of devils.* St. *Paul*'s argument here muſt needs ſuppoſe a perfect analogy between theſe three, and that they are all parallels to one another; or elſe it hath no ſtrength. Wherefore I conclude from hence, that the LORD's SUPPER is the ſame among Chriſtians, in reſpect of the Chriſtian ſacrifice, that among the Jews the feaſts upon the legal ſacrifices were, and among the Gentiles the feaſts upon the idol-ſacrifices; and therefore EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, or EPULUM EX OBLATIS. Ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι.

CHAP. V.

The Reſult of the former Diſcourſe; that the Lord's Supper is not a Sacrifice, but a Feaſt upon a Sacrifice.

THUS having declared and demonſtrated the true notion of the Lord's ſupper, we ſee then how that theological controverſy, which hath coſt ſo many diſputes, whether the Lord's ſupper be a ſacrifice, is already decided: for it is not SACRIFICIUM, but EPULUM ἘΚ ΤΗΣ ΘΥΣΙΑΣ, not A SACRIFICE, but *a feaſt upon ſacrifice*; or elſe, in other words, not OBLATIO SACRIFICII, but, as *Tertullian* excellently ſpeaks, PARTICIPATIO SACRIFICII, not *the offering of ſomething up to God upon an altar*, but *the eating of ſomething which comes from God's altar*, and is ſet upon our tables. Neither was it ever known amongſt the Jews or Heathens, that thoſe tables, upon which they did eat their ſacrifices, ſhould be called by the name of altars. St. *Paul*, ſpeaking of the feaſts upon the idol-ſacrifices, calls the places upon which they were eaten, *The table of devils*, becauſe the devils m eat was eaten on them; not the altars of devils: and yet doubtleſs he ſpake according to the true propriety of ſpeech, and in thoſe technical words, that were then in uſe amongſt them. And therefore, keeping the ſame analogy, he muſt

needs call the communion-table by the name of the Lord's table, *i. e.* the table, upon which God's meat is eaten; not his altar, upon which it is offered. It is true, an altar is nothing but a table; but it is a table, upon which GOD himſelf eats, conſuming the ſacrifices by his holy fire: but when the ſame meat is given from GOD unto US to eat of, the relation being changed, the place, on which WE eat, is nothing but a table.

And becauſe it is not enough in any diſcourſe, as *Ariſtotle* well obſerveth in his *Ethicks*, to confute an error, unleſs we can alſo ſhew τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ψεύδες, *the cauſe of that error*; having thus diſcovered the true notion of the Lord's ſupper, we may eaſily diſcern from hence alſo, how that miſtake grew up, and that by the degeneration of this truth. There is a ſacrifice in the Lord's ſupper ſymbolically, but not there as offered up to God, but feaſted on by us; and ſo not a ſacrifice, but a ſacrificial feaſt; which began too ſoon to be miſunderſtood.

CHAP. VI.

The farther Improvement of that general Notion, How the Lord's Supper is a Federal Rite between God and us, at large: concluded with a memorable Story out of Maimonides *and* Nachmanides.

I Should now come to make ſome farther improvement of this general notion of the Lord's ſupper, by ſhewing what theſe feaſts upon the ſacrifices did ſignify under the law; and then applying the ſame in a more perfect manner to the Lord's ſupper under the goſpel, being warranted thereunto by that analogy, which is between them. But becauſe there may be divers gloſſes and interpretations of theſe feaſts upon the ſacrifices, which are obvious to every common underſtanding, we will decline them all, and pitch only upon one, which is not ſo vulgarly underſtood; and it is this, That the eating of God's ſacrifices was a FEDERAL RITE between God and thoſe that offered them; according to the cuſtom of the ancients, and eſpecially in thoſe oriental parts, to confirm and ratify their covenants by eating and drinking together.

Thus when *Iſaac* made a covenant with *Abimelech* the king of *Gerar*, the
Gen. xxvi. text ſaith, *He made him and thoſe that were with him a feaſt, and they did eat and drink, and roſe up betimes in the morning, and ſware to one another.*

When *Laban* made a covenant with *Jacob*, *Gen.* xxxi. 44. *Now therefore come* (ſaith *Laban*) *let us make a covenant, I and thou, and let it be for a witneſs between me and thee:* Then it follows in the text, *They took ſtones, and made a heap, and did eat there upon the heap*; *and* Laban *called it JEGAR-SAHADUTHA*, in his Chaldee tongue, *but* Jacob (in the Hebrew language) *GALEED*, i. e. *a heap of witneſs*; implying, that thoſe ſtones, upon which they had eaten and drank together, ſhould be a witneſs againſt either of them, that ſhould firſt violate that covenant. R. *Moſes Bar Nachman*, in his Comment, thus gloſſeth upon this place, אכלושם מעט לזכרון שהוא דרך באים בברית לאכול שניהם

שניהם מלחם אחד לחברה זלאהבה ואחרי ביאם בשבועה ובברית זכח ועשה להם כרה נרולה, i. e. *They did eat there a little upon the heap for a memorial; becauſe it was the manner of thoſe, that enter into covenant, to eat both together of the ſame bread, as a ſymbol of love and friendſhip.* And *Iſaac Abrabanel* much to the ſame purpoſe, היה מנהג ביניהם שהאובלים לחם על שלחן אחר יחשבו ראחים נאמנים, i. e. *It was an ancient cuſtom amongſt them, that they, which did eat bread together upon the ſame table, ſhould be accounted ever afterward as entire brethren.* And in this ſenſe he conceiveth that place, *Lamentations* v. 6. may be expounded, *We have given the hand to the Egyptians and to the Aſſyrians by fulneſs of bread,* i. e. We have made a covenant with them.

Joſhua ix. ver. 14. when the Gibeonites came to the Iſraelites, and deſired them to make a league with them, it is ſaid, *The men of Iſrael took of their victuals, and asked not counſel of the mouth of the Lord*; that is, they made a covenant with them, as *Kimchi* learnedly expounds it, לקשו מצירים ואכלו ממנו בכרות ברו שיכטחו בחם, *Acceperunt de viatico ipſorum, & comederunt cum illis per modum fœderis.* For ſo it follows afterward in the text, *And Joſhua made peace with them.*

Hence alſo was that emphatical expreſſion, *Pſalm* xli. 9. ſpoken literally by *David* of *Achitophel, mine own familiar friend, that did eat of my bread, hath lift up the heel againſt me*; but ſeeming prophetically to glance at *Judas*, that dipping with Chriſt in the ſame diſh betrayed him. The ſingular emphaſis of which ſpeech we, that are unacquainted with this cuſtom of the oriental nations, cannot eaſily perceive; neither can we any where better learn it, than from that paſſage of *Celſus* in *Origen*, who carping at that hiſtory of *Judas* his betraying Chriſt in the goſpel, as an incredible thing, made, in the mean while, an excellent comment upon this prophecy, when he little thought of it. Ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ὁ κοινωνήσας τραπέζης οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύσειεν, πολλῷ πλέον ὁ θεῷ συνευωχηθεὶς οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλος γένοιτο, i. e. *Si homini nemo inſidiaretur ejuſdem menſæ particeps, multò minùs Deo*; And *Origen*'s reply to him, which ſhews, that though this were an unuſual thing, yet it ſometimes came to paſs, is very pregnant alſo for our purpoſe: Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πολλοὶ κοινωνήσαντες ἁλῶν καὶ τραπέσης ἐπεβούλευσαν τοῖς συνεστίοις; καὶ πλήρης ἐστὶν ἡ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Βαρβάρων ἱστορία τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων. Καὶ ὀνειδίζων γε ὁ Παριος Ἰαμβοτοιὸς τὸν Λυκάμβαντα μετὰ ἅλας καὶ τράπεζαν συνθήκας ἀθετήσαντα, φησὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν, Ὅρκον δὲ ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν, ἅλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν· i. e. *Quis ignorat multos ad communionem ſalis & menſæ adhibitos inſidiatos tamen ſuis contubernalibus? Plena eſt hiſtoria tam Græcorum quàm Barbarorum exemplis ejuſmodi. Et* Parius *ille Iamborum ſcriptor, exprobrans* Lycambæ *violitum fœdus quod ſal & menſa conciliaverat, ſic eum alloquitur, ſacramentum irritaſti magnum, ſalem atque menſam.* All which makes manifeſt, what an heinous offence it was accounted anciently to be guilty of the breach of a covenant, which had been confirmed by eating and drinking together.

In the ſeventh verſe of *Obadiah*, that prophet ſpeaks to *Edom* in this manner; *All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee to the border*; *the men, that were at peace with thee, have deceived thee*; *they, that eat thy bread, have laid a wound under thee.*

In the New Teſtament, that place (*John* iv. 9.) is well obſerved by *Heinſius*, in his *Ariſtarchus*, to carry this notion, *How is it, that thou, being a Jew, aſkeſt drink of me, being a woman of* Samaria? *Suaviſſimè dictum* (ſaith that forenamed critick) *ex eorum more, qui, cum peregrini eſſent, aut alieno fuiſſent animo, animis conciliandis cibum mutuò ac potum alter alterius guſtabant.*

Wherefore I think from all theſe inſtances I may conclude, that this is the true etymon of that Hebrew word בְּרִית, which ſignifies *a covenant*, or any federal communion betwixt parties, from בָּרָה, *comedere*, becauſe it was the conſtant cuſtom of the Hebrews and Oriental nations to eſtabliſh covenants by eating and drinking together; as hath been ſhewed.

And as the Jews, ſo likewiſe did the Heathens in the ſame manner, uſe to ratify their covenants between parties, by eating together. *Lucian* in *Toxaris* reports it of the *Scythians*, that when any one was injured, and could not revenge himſelf, the manner was, that he ſhould kill an ox, and cut it into ſmall pieces; which being boiled, he was to ſit down by them with his hands behind him, (which was a geſture of earneſt ſupplication amongſt them) and then whoſoever was minded to help him, came, and did eat a piece of his fleſh, and ſo with this ceremony promiſed to aſſiſt him. And this was accounted a covenant of mutual defence between them; whence that Greek proverb, Ἐπὶ βόεσης ἐκαθέζετο, *In tergore bovis deſedit*, of which *Eraſmus* in his *Adagies*.

Herodotus reporteth of the *Perſians*, that they made their leagues and covenants at feaſts; and of the *Naſamones*, a people of *Lybia*, that they compoſed peace by ſtretching out a cup full of wine to each other, and pledging one another in it. *Alexander ab Alexandro* relates this of the *Thracians* and *Egyptians*, that *E cornibus boum (quæ veteribus poculorum loco erant) vina ſibi invicem propinantes, id firmiſſimum contracti fœderis vinculum eſſe putabant. Curtius* reporteth of the *Macedonians*, *Quòd patrio ritu fœdus, quod ſanctiſſimum vellent haberi, ſic inibant, ut panem gladio diviſum uterque libaret.*

And therefore *Alexander*, when he fell in love with *Roxana*, commanded bread forthwith to be brought before him; which when he had divided with his ſword, and they had both taſted together of, he took her preſently to himſelf as his wife. And there remaineth a cuſtom to this day, ſomething like this, at weddings in many countries, that when the bridegroom and bride are come from church, they have a piece of cake brought them, which when the bridegroom hath taſted, he gives it to the bride to taſte of likewiſe, in token of a covenant between them. The *Germans* ſtill uſe to conclude of bergains, and ratify friendſhip between parties, by drinking together, as appeareth by that phraſe which they have, den Frieden trinken, *Pacem bibere.*

In like manner, I ſay, the eating of ſacrifices, which were God's meat, was a federal rite between God and thoſe that did partake of them, and ſignified there was a covenant of friendſhip between him and them.

For the better conceiving whereof, we muſt obſerve, that ſacrifices, beſide the nature of expiation, had the notion of feaſts, which God

God himſelf did, as it were, feed upon. Which I explain thus: When God had brought the children of *Iſrael* out of *Egypt*, reſolving to manifeſt himſelf in a peculiar manner preſent among them, he thought good to dwell amongſt them in a viſible and external manner; and therefore, while they were in the wilderneſs, and ſojourned in tents, he would have a tent or tabernacle built, to ſojourn with them alſo. This myſtery of the tabernacle was fully underſtood by the learned *Nachmanides*, who in few words, but pregnant, thus expreſſeth it, עקר החפץ במשכן הוא מקום מנוחת השכינה; and again, סוד חמשכן הוא שיהוה הכביר אשר טכן על הר סיני שוכן עליו: that is, *The myſtery of the tabernacle was this, that it was to be a place for the Shechinah, or habitation of divinity to be fixed in:* and this, no doubt, as a ſpecial type of God's future dwelling in Chriſt's human nature, which was the TRUE SHECHINAH. But, when the Jews were come into their land, and had there built them houſes, God intended to have a fixed dwelling-houſe alſo; and therefore his moveable tabernacle was to be turned into a ſtanding temple. Whence, by imitation, came all thoſe temples among the Heatheos, which they apprehended as ſo many places of peculiar reſidence, or habitation, for their deities, next the heavens, to dwell in; as appears by that of *Silius*, amongſt many others,

> ———*Tarpeie Pater, qui templa ſecundam*
> *Incolis à cælo ſedem.*———

Now the tabernacle or temple being thus as a houſe for God to dwell in viſibly, to make up the notion of dwelling or habitation complete, there muſt be all things ſuitable to a houſe belonging to it. Hence, in the holy place, there muſt be a table and a candleſtick, becauſe this was the ordinary furniture of a room; as the fore-commended *Nachmanides* obſerves, סמך השלחן והמנורה שהם כל ים במוהו ויודו על ענין המשכן, i. e. *He addeth a table and a candleſtick, becauſe theſe ſuit the notion of a dwelling-houſe.* The table muſt have its diſhes, and ſpoons, and bowls, and covers, belonging to it, though they were never uſed, and always be furniſhed with bread upon it. The candleſtick muſt have its lamps continually burning.

Hence alſo there muſt be a continual fire kept in this houſe of God's upon the altar, as the *focus* of it: to which notion, I conceive, the prophet *Iſaiah* doth allude, chap. xxxi. ver. 9. אשר אור לו בציון ותנור בירושלים, which I would thus tranſlate, *qui habet ignem ſuum in Sion, & focum ſuum in Jeruſalem.*

And beſides all this, to carry the notion ſtill farther, there muſt be ſome conſtant meat and proviſion brought into this houſe, which was done in the ſacrifices, that were partly conſumed by fire upon God's own altar, and partly eaten by the prieſts, which were God's family, and therefore to be maintained by him. That, which was conſumed upon God's altar, was accounted GOD's MESS, as appeareth from the firſt chapter of *Mala-* Ver. 12.
chi, where the altar is called GOD's TABLE, and the ſacrifice upon it GOD's MEAT; *Ye ſay, the table of God is polluted, and the fruit thereof, his meat, is contemptible.* And often in the Law the ſacrifice is called God's לחם, that is, his *bread* or *food.* Whence, in that learned Hebrew

book *Cozri*, the king *Haber* objects to the Jew *Cozar* againſt his religion, that it ſeemed to place corporeity in God, in making him to feed upon the fleſh of beaſts in theſe ſacrifices. To which the Jewiſh doctor anſwers cabaliſtically in this manner; That as, in men, corporeal meat is a means to unite and continue the ſoul (which is a ſpirit) to the body; ſo, in the land of *Iſrael*, the blood of beaſts offered up in ſacrifice had an attractive power to draw down divinity, and unite it to the Jews. And methinks this may be a little farther convinced from that paſſage in the 50th *Pſalm*, *If I were hungry, I would not tell thee; for the world is mine, and the fulneſs thereof. Will I eat the fleſh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?* For though it be here denied, that God did really feed upon the ſacrifices, yet it is implied there was ſome ſuch alluſive ſignification in them.

Wherefore it is farther obſervable, that beſide the fleſh of the beaſt offered up in ſacrifice, there was a *mincah*, or *meat-offering*, made of flour and oil, and a *libamen*, or *drink-offering*, that was always joined with the daily ſacrifice, as the bread and drink, which was to go along with God's meat.

It was alſo ſtrictly commanded, that there ſhould be ſalt in every ſacrifice and oblation, becauſe all meat is unſavoury without ſalt; as R. *Moſes Bar Nachman* hath here alſo well obſerved, מפני שאינו דרך כבוד להיות לחם השם טפל מבלי מלח, i. e. *Becauſe it was not honourable, that God's meat ſhould be unſavoury, without ſalt.*

Laſtly, all theſe things were to be conſumed on the altar only by the holy fire, that came down from heaven, becauſe they were God's portion, and therefore to be eaten or conſumed by himſelf in an extraordinary manner. And this the devil ſometime imitated, in ſome ſacrifices offered up to him. For ſo I underſtand that paſſage of *Pindar* in his *Olympiacks*, Ode VII. ſpeaking of the Rhodians, That when they had prepared, and were come to offer ſacrifice to *Jupiter*, they had by chance forgotten to bring fire with them: but *Jupiter*, being conſcious of their good intentions, rained down upon them A GOLDEN SHOWER, (as I underſtand it) A SHOWER of fire; a pure imitation of the ſacred ſtory. Take it in that elegant poet's own words:

Καί τοι γὰρ αἰθέσας ἔχοντες
Σπέρμ' ἀνέβαν φλογὸς ἑᾷ,
Τεῦξαν δ' ΑΠΥΡΟΙΣ ΙΕΡΟΙΣ,
Ἅλσῳ ἐν ἀκροπόλει· κείνοισι μὲν ξανθὰν ἀγαγὼν νεφέλαν,
Πολὺν ὗσε χρυσόν.

That is, according to *Benedictus* his metaphraſe, *Etenim Rhodii aſcenderunt, quamvis non habentes ardentis ſemen ignis. Verùm dum inſtruunt ſacrificiis igni carentibus aram in arce, illis quidem flavam adducens nebulam, multum pluit* [*Jupiter*] *aurum.*

And *Solinus* reports it of the Vulcanian hill in *Sicily*, that they, which offered ſacrifice upon it, never put fire to it, but expected it ſhould be kindled from heaven. His words, according to *Salmaſius*'s edition, are theſe;

theſe; *Nec longè indè Collis Vulcanius, in quo qui divinæ rei operantur, ligna vitea ſuper aras ſtruunt; nec ignis adponitur in hanc congeriem. Cum proſicias intulerunt, ſi adeſt Deus, ſi ſacrum probatur, ſarmenta, licèt viridia, ſponte concipiunt, & nullo inflagrante halitu, ab ipſo numine ſit accendium. Ibi epulantes adludit flamma, quæ, flexuoſis excuſſibus vagabunda, quem contigerit non adurit; nec aliud eſt quàm imago nuncia perfecti ritè Voti.* The place is very remarkable; and where he ſays thus, *Epulantes adludit flamma*, he alludeth to that cuſtom of feaſting on the ſacrifices, which was before explained.

I will add to all this the words of a late learned author, that ſometime ſtumbled unawares upon this very notion, which we are now about, and yet expreſt it happily in this manner; *Deus ad ſuam cum populo Judæorum familiaritatem ſignificandam, ſibi ab illo carnes, ſanguinem atque fruges in* ALTARI *atque* MENSA *offerri votuit, ut oſtenderet ſe quaſi* COMMUNEM *in illo populo habere* MENSAM, *eſſe illius* CONVIVAM *perpetuum, atque ità familiariter cum illis habitare.*

And as it was thus among the *Hebrews*, ſo it ſeems, that ſacrifices had the notion of feaſts likewiſe among the ancient Perſians, that worſhipped the fire, of whom *Maximus Tyrius* thus relateth, Ὅτι ἐπιφερόντες πυρὶ τροφὴν ἐπιλέγουσι, Πῦρ δέσποτα, ἔσθιε, i. e. *bringing in the ſacrifices to the fire, which was their god, they were wont to ſay*, Ignis, Domine, comede.

The ſacrifices then being God's feaſts, they that did partake of them muſt needs be his CONVIVÆ, and in a manner EAT and DRINK with him. And that this did bear the notion of a federal rite in the Scripture's account, I prove from that place, *Levit.* ii. 13. *Thou ſhalt not ſuffer the SALT OF THE COVENANT of thy God to be lacking; with all thine offerings thou ſhalt offer ſalt.* Where the ſalt, that was to be caſt upon all the ſacrifices, is called THE SALT OF THE COVENANT, to ſignify, that as men did uſe to make covenants by eating and drinking together, where ſalt is a neceſſary appendix; ſo God by theſe ſacrifices, and the feaſts upon them, did ratify and confirm his covenant with thoſe, that did partake of them, inaſmuch as they did in a manner EAT and DRINK with him.

For ſalt was ever accounted amongſt the ancients a moſt neceſſary concomitant of feaſts, and condiment of all meats. בל סעורה שאין מליח בה אינה סעירה, ſaith the Jewiſh proverb in *Beracoth*, *Omne convivium, in quo non eſt ſalitum, non eſt convivium.* And therefore becauſe covenants and reconciliations were made by eating and drinking, where ſalt was always uſed, ſalt itſelf was accounted among the ancients AMICITIÆ SYMBOLUM. Ἅλες ἡ τράπεζα, *ſal & menſa*, was uſed proverbially among the Greeks to expreſs friendſhip by; Ἅλας ἡ τράπεζαν παραβαίνειν, in the words of *Origen* before quoted out of *Archilocus*, *ſal & menſam tranſgredi*, was to violate the moſt ſacred league of friendſhip. *Æſchines*, in his oration *De perperàm habitâ legatione*, hath a paſſage very pertinent to this purpoſe; Τὰς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἅλας ἡ δημοσίαν τράπεζαν περὶ πλείστου δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, *Etenim civitatis ſales & communem menſam ait ſe plurimi facere debere.* Thus I underſtand

derſtand that ſymbol of *Pythagoras*, τὸν ἅλα παρατίθεσθαι, (by *Eraſmus*'s leave) for friendſhip and hoſpitality. There is a pregnant inſtance of this very phraſe in the Scripture, *Ezra* iv. 14. where our tranſlators read it thus, *Becauſe we have maintenance from the king's palace:* but the words in the Chaldee run after this manner, בען בר- קבל טלח היכלא מלחנא. i. e. *quòd ſale palatii ſalivimus*, *Becauſe we have eaten of the king's ſalt*, [that is, becauſe we have engaged ourſelves in a covenant of friendſhip to him, by eating of his meat] *therefore it is not meet for us to ſee the king's diſhonour.* That proverb mentioned in *Tully* makes to this purpoſe, *Multos modios ſalis ſimul edendos eſſe, ut amicitiæ munus completum ſit:* which was, becauſe that federal ſymbol had been ſo often abuſed. Nay, hence there remaineth a ſuperſtitious cuſtom amongſt us and other nations to this day, to count the overturning of the ſalt upon the table ominous, as betiding ſome evil to him, towards whom it falls: *Quia amoris & amicitiæ ſymbolum.* And by this time I think I have given a ſufficient comment upon מלח הברית, the ſalt of the covenant in the text.

Only I muſt not forget, that as in God's ſacrifices there was ever ſalt to be uſed, ſo the like was generally obſerved in the Heathen ſacrifices; as that one place out of *Pliny*, amongſt many, ſhall ſufficiently teſtify: *Maxima ſalis authoritas è ſacris veterum intelligitur, apud quos nulla ſacra ſine mola ſalſa conficiebatur.* And the reaſon of it alſo is thus given by that famous ſcholiaſt upon *Iliad* ά. διότι οἱ ἅλες φιλίας σύμβολον, *becauſe ſalt is a ſymbol of friendſhip*; which is the ſame with that reaſon given by God, why he would always have ſalt in his ſacrifices, becauſe it was מלח הברית, that is, *ſal ſymbolum fœderis*, as before was ſhewn. And this phraſe, being thus explained, will clearly expound that other phraſe, about which criticks have laboured ſo much in vain, where the ſame words are uſed, but inverted, and a covenant is called *a covenant of ſalt*, as *ſalt* is here called *the ſalt of the covenant*, *Numb.* xviii. 19. and 2 *Chron.* xiii. 5. *viz.* becauſe covenants were eſtabliſhed by eating and drinking together, where ſalt was a neceſſary appendix.

Now therefore, that we may return: As the legal ſacrifices, with the feaſts upon thoſe ſacrifices, were FEDERAL RITES between God and men; in like manner, I ſay, the Lord's ſupper under the Goſpel, which we have already proved to be EPULUM SACRIFICIALE, *a feaſt upon ſacrifice*, muſt needs be EPULUM FOEDERALE, *a feaſt of amity and friendſhip* between God and men; where, by eating and drinking at God's own table, and of his meat, we are taken into a ſacred covenant, and inviolable league of friendſhip with him.

Which I will confirm from that forecommended place, whence I have already proved, that the Lord's ſupper is *a feaſt upon ſacrifice.* For there the Apoſtle thus dehorts the *Corinthians* from eating of the feaſts upon idol-ſacrifices, which are a parallel to the feaſt upon the Chriſtian ſacrifice in the Lord's ſupper, becauſe this was *to have fellowſhip* and *federal communion* with devils: *The things, that the Gentiles ſacrifice, they ſacrifice to devils, and not to God; and I would not, brethren, that ye ſhould have FELLOWSHIP (or COMMUNION,* κοινωνίαν*) with devils.* Where the comment of St. *Chryſoſtome* is excellent to our purpoſe;

Εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁλῶν καὶ τραπέζης Φιλίας ἀφορμὴ καὶ σύμβολον γίνεται, ἐγχωρεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ Δαιμόνων τοῦτο συμβῆναι· that is, *If among men to communicate of bread and salt be a token and symbol of friendship, it must carry the same notion between men and devils in the idol-feasts.* If therefore to eat the sacrifice of devils be to have federal communion with those devils, to whom it was offered; then to eat the sacrifice of Christ, once offered up to God, in the Lord's supper, is to have federal communion with God.

There is an excellent story in *Maimonides* his *Moreh Nevochim*, concerning an ancient custom of the *Zabii* of feasting together with their gods in this federal way, which will much illustrate this notion: for, going about to give the reason, why the eating of blood was forbidden in the law, he fetches it from the idolatrous use of it then in *Moses*'s time among the *Zabii*; according to his principles, who thought the reason of all the ceremonial precepts was to be fetched from some such accidental grounds, because those laws were not *primæ*, but *secundæ intentionis* in God. *Multarum legum rationes & causæ* (saith he) *mihi innotuerunt ex cognitione fidei, rituum, & cultûs Zabiorum.*

By these *Zabii* he means the ancient Chaldeans; the word in the original Arabick, according to the copy of *Joseph Scaliger*, being thus written, صابئين. *A Vento Apeliote sic dicti*, (as he * observes) *quasi dicas Orientales.* And that book, which *Maimonides* so often quoteth concerning that nation, their rites and religion, is still extant among the Mahumetan Arabians, as the same *Scaliger* avoucheth. The story then is this, according to the Hebrew translation of Rabbi *Abben Tibbon*, lib. 3. cap. 46. רע כי הדם חוא טמא מאד בעיני הצאבה ועם כל זה היו אוכלים אותו מפני שהיו חושב בם שהוא מזון השרים ובשאכל אותו מי שאכלו כבר השתתף עם ה שרים ויבואהו ויועילוהו העתידות כמו שידמו ההמון ממעשי השרים; i.e. *Licèt sanguis impurus & immundus admodum fuerit in oculis Zabiorum, tamen ab illis comestus fuerit, eò quòd existimârunt* CIBUM HUNC ESSE DÆMONUM, *& quod is, qui eum comedit, hâc ratione* COMMUNICATIONEM *aliquam cum dæmonibus haberet, ita ut familiariter cum illo conversentur, & futura ei aperiant.* But because others of them did abhor the eating of blood, as a thing repugnant unto nature, they performed this service in a little different manner. והיו שם אנשים שהיה קשה בעיניהם אכילת הדם כי הוא דבר שומאס הו טבע האדם והיו שוחטים בהמה ומקבלים דמו בכלי או בחפירה ואוכלים בשר השחוטה ההיא סביב דמה היו מדמין במעשה זה שהשרים יאכלו הדם אשר הוא מזונם והם יאכלו הבשר ובזה תהיה האהבה והאהורה והרעית בהם בעבור שאכלו כלם על שלחן אחד ובמושב אחד ויבאו להם שרום ההם לפי מחשבתם בחלום יוגידו להם העתורות ויועילו להם; i. e. *Mactantes bestiam aliquam, sanguinem in circulo sedentes comedebant; imaginantes sibi in hoc opere, ipsis* CARNEM COMEDENTIBUS, *Dæmones* ILLUM SANGUINEM COMEDERE, *& hunc esse* IPSORUM CIBUM, *hocque medio* AMICITIAM, FRATERNITATEM & FAMILIARITATEM *inter ipsos contrahi, quia omnes in una mensa edunt, uno consessu accumbunt.*

* *In Epist. 62. ad Isaacum Casaubonum.*

As for the former part of this story, I find it also in Rabbi *Moses Bar Nachman* upon *Deut.* xii. 23. where he goes about to give the reason why blood

blood was forbidden in the law, as *Maimonides* did, although, in the firſt place, he ſaith, it was becauſe blood ſerved in the ſacrifices for expiation, otherwiſe than *Maimonides*, (for there was a great controverſy between theſe two doctors about the nature of ſacrifices:) but yet, in the ſecond place alſo, he brings in this, alſo, becauſe it was uſed ſuperſtitiouſly by the Heathens in the worſhip of their idol-gods. והיתה העבודה היא באכילה מן הדם בי חיו מכנים חדם לשדים והם אובלים עלהו וממנו כאילו הם קדואים לשדים לאבול על שלחן השדום חהם ומת הברים עמהם--והנח היו מתנבאים בו ומגידים עתידות; i. e. *They performed their ſuperſtitious worſhip, by eating of blood in this manner; they gathered together blood for the devils their idol-gods, and then they came themſelves, and did eat of that blood with them, as being the devils* GUESTS, *and* INVITED *to* EAT *at the* TABLE *of devils; and ſo were* JOINED *in federal ſociety with them. And by this kind of communion with devils, they were able to propheſy, and foretel things to come.*

THE

THE FIRST SERMON: OR, A DISCOURSE

On 1 John, Chap. II. Verſ. 3, 4.

Preached before the Honourable House of Commons, at *Weſtminſter*, *March* 31. 1647.

Εὐσέβει, ὦ τέκνον· ὁ γὰρ Εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει.

To the Honourable

HOUSE of COMMONS.

THE ſcope of this Sermon, which not long ſince exerciſed your patience, Worthy Senators, was not to contend for this or that opinion, but only to perſuade men to the life of Chriſt, as the pith and kernel of all religion; without which, I may boldly ſay, all the ſeveral forms of religion, though we pleaſe ourſelves never ſo much in them, are but ſo many ſeveral dreams. And thoſe many opinions about religion, that are every where ſo eagerly contended for on all ſides, where this doth not lie at the bottom, are but ſo many ſhadows fighting with one another: ſo that I may well ſay of the true Chriſtian, that is indeed poſſeſſed of the life of Chriſtianity, in oppoſition to all thoſe that are but lightly tinctured with the opinions of it, in the language of the poet,

Ὅιος πέπυυται, τοὶ δ' ὡς σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.

Wherefore I could not think any thing elſe, either more neceſſary for Chriſtians in general, or more ſeaſonable at this time, than to ſtir them up to the real eſtabliſhment of the righteouſneſs of God in their hearts, and

that participation of the divine nature, which the Apoſtle ſpeaketh of. That ſo they might not content themſelves with mere phancies and conceits of Chriſt, without the ſpirit of Chriſt really dwelling in them, and Chriſt himſelf inwardly formed in their hearts; nor ſatisfy themſelves with the meer holding of right and orthodox opinions, as they conceive, whilſt they are utterly devoid within of that divine life, which Chriſt came to kindle in men's ſouls; and therefore are ſo apt to ſpend all their zeal upon a violent obtruding of their own opinions and apprehenſions upon others, which cannot give entertainment to them: which, beſides its repugnancy to the doctrine and example of Chriſt himſelf, is like to be the bellows, that will blow a fire of diſcord and contention in Chriſtian commonwealths; whilſt, in the mean time, theſe hungry and ſtarved opinions devour all the life and ſubſtance of religion, as the lean kine in *Pharaoh*'s dream did eat up the fat. Nor, laſtly, pleaſe themſelves only in the violent oppoſing of other men's ſuperſtitions, according to the genius of the preſent times, without ſubſtituting in the room of them an inward principle of ſpirit and life in their own ſouls. For I fear many of us, that pull down idols in churches, may ſet them up in our hearts; and whilſt we quarrel with painted glaſs, make no ſcruple at all of entertaining many foul luſts in our ſouls, and committing continual idolatry with them.

This, in general, was the deſign of this following diſcourſe, which you were pleaſed, noble Senators, not only to expreſs your good acceptance of, but alſo to give a real ſignification of your great undeſerved favour to the author of it. Who therefore cannot but, as the leaſt expreſſion of his thankfulneſs, humbly devote it to you; preſenting it here again to your eye in the ſame form, in which it was delivered to your ear. Deſirous of nothing more, than that it might be ſome way uſeful to you, to kindle in you the life and heat of that, which is endeavoured here to be deſcribed upon paper; that you may expreſs it, both in your private converſations, and likewiſe in all your publick employments for the commonwealth. That you may, by your kindly influence, effectually encourage all goodneſs; and by virtue of your power and authority (to uſe the phraſe of *Solomon*) *ſcatter away all evil with your eye*, as the ſun by his beams ſcattereth the miſts and vapours. That from you *judgment may run down like waters, and righteouſneſs like a mighty ſtream*, to refreſh this whole land, that thirſteth after them: which, whilſt you diſtribute them plentifully to others, will beſtow both ſtrength and honour to yourſelves. For juſtice and righteouſneſs are the eſtabliſhment of every throne, of all civil power and authority; and if theſe ſhould once forſake it, though there be lions to ſupport it, it could not ſtand long. Theſe, together with a good peace, well ſettled in a commonwealth, are all the outward felicity we can expect, till that happy time come, which the prophet foretelleth, and is therefore more than a Platonical idea; when *the wolf ſhall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard ſhall lie down with the kid, and the calf, and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child lead them:* When *the ſucking child ſhall play on the hole of the aſp, and the weaned child ſhall put his hand on the cockatrice den:* When *they ſhall not hurt nor deſtroy in all God's holy mountain; for the earth ſhall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the ſea.*

I have but one word more, if you pleaſe to give me leave; That after your care for the advancement of religion, and the publick good of the commonwealth, you would think it worthy of you to promote ingenuous learning, and caſt a favourable influence upon it. I mean not that only, which furniſheth the pulpit, which you ſeem to be very regardful of; but that, which is more remote from ſuch popular uſe, in the ſeveral kinds of it, which yet are all of them both very ſubſervient to religion, and uſeful to the commonwealth. There is indeed a ψευδοπαιδεία, as the philoſopher tells us, a *baſtardly kind of literature*, and a ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις, as the Apoſtle inſtructeth us, a *knowledge falſely ſo called*; which deſerve not to be pleaded for. But the noble and generous improvement of our underſtanding faculty, in the true contemplation of the wiſdom, goodneſs, and other attributes of God, in this great fabrick of the univerſe, cannot eaſily be diſparaged, without a blemiſh caſt upon the Maker of it. Doubtleſs, we may as well enjoy that, which God hath communicated of himſelf to the creatures, by this larger faculty of our underſtandings, as by thoſe narrow and low faculties of our ſenſes; and yet no body counts it to be unlawful to hear a leſſon played upon the lute, or to ſmell at a roſe. And theſe raiſed improvements of our natural underſtandings may be as well ſubſervient, and ſubordinate to a divine light in our minds, as the natural uſe of theſe outward creatures here below to the life of God in our hearts. Nay, all true knowledge doth of itſelf naturally tend to God, who is the fountain of it; and would ever be raiſing of our ſouls up upon its wings thither, did not we κατέχειν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ, *detain it*, and hold it down, *in unrighteouſneſs*, as the Apoſtle ſpeaketh. All philoſophy to a wiſe man, to a truly ſanctified mind, as he in *Plutarch* ſpeaketh, is but ὕλη τῆς Θεολογίας, *matter for divinity to work upon.* Religion is the queen of all thoſe inward endowments of the ſoul; and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and undeflowered arts and ſciences, are her handmaids, that riſe up, and call her bleſſed. I need not tell you, how much the ſkill of tongues and languages, beſides the excellent uſe of all philology in general, conduceth to the right underſtanding of the letter of ſacred writings, on which the ſpiritual notions muſt be built; for none can poſſibly be ignorant of that, which have but once heard of a tranſlation of the Bible. The Apoſtle exhorteth private Chriſtians to *whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe, to think on thoſe things:* and therefore it may well become you, noble Gentlemen in your publick ſphere, to encourage ſo noble a thing as knowledge is, which will reflect ſo much luſtre and honour back again upon yourſelves. That God would direct you in all your counſels, and ſtill bleſs you, and proſper you in all your ſincere endeavours for the publick good, is the hearty prayer of

Your moſt humble Servant,

RALPH CUDWORTH.

1 JOHN II. 3, 4.

And hereby we do know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.
He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a lyar, and the truth is not in him.

WE have much enquiry concerning knowledge in these latter times. The sons of *Adam* are now as busy as ever himself was about the tree of knowledge of good and evil, shaking the boughs of it, and scrambling for the fruit; whilst, I fear, many are too unmindful of the tree of life. And though there be now no cherubims with their flaming swords to fright men off from it; yet the way, that leads to it, seems to be so solitary and untrodden, as if there were but few, that had any mind to taste of the fruit of it. There be many, that speak of new glimpses and discoveries of truth, of dawnings of gospel-light; and no question but God hath reserved much of this for the very evening and sun-set of the world; for *in the latter days knowledge shall be increased*: but yet I wish we could in the mean time see that day to dawn, which the Apostle speaks of, and that *day-star to arise in men's hearts*. I wish, whilst we talk of light, and dispute about truth, we could walk more as *children of the light*. Whereas, if S. *John*'s rule be good here in the text, that no man truly knows Christ, but he that keepeth his commandments; it is much to be suspected, that many of us, which pretend to light, have a thick and gloomy darkness within, over-spreading our souls.

There be now many large volumes and discourses written concerning Christ, thousands of controversies discussed, infinite problems determined concerning his divinity, humanity, union of both together, and what not? so that our bookish Christians, that have all their religion in writings and papers, think they are now completely furnished with all kind of knowledge concerning Christ; and when they see all their leaves lying about them, they think they have a goodly stock of knowledge and truth, and cannot possibly miss of the way to heaven; as if religion were nothing but a little book-craft, a mere paper-skill.

But if S. *John*'s rule here be good, we must not judge of our knowing of Christ by our skill in books and papers, but by our keeping of his commandments. And that, I fear, will discover many of us (notwithstanding all this light, which we boast of round about us) to have nothing but Egyptian darkness within our hearts.

The vulgar sort think, that they know Christ enough out of their creeds and catechisms, and confessions of faith; and if they have but a little acquainted themselves with these, and like parrots conned the words of them, they doubt not, but that they are sufficiently instructed in all the mysteries

of

of the kingdom of heaven. Many of the more learned, if they can but wrangle and diſpute about Chriſt, imagine themſelves to be grown great proficients in the ſchool of Chriſt.

The greateſt part of the world, whether learned or unlearned, think, that there is no need of purging and purifying of their hearts for the right knowledge of Chriſt and his goſpel; but though their lives be never ſo wicked, their hearts never ſo foul within, yet they may know Chriſt ſufficiently out of their treatiſes and diſcourſes, out of their meer ſyſtems and bodies of divinity: which I deny not to be uſeful in a ſubordinate way; although our Saviour preſcribeth his diſciples another method to come to the right knowledge of divine truths, by doing of God's will; *He that will do my father's will*, (ſaith he) *ſhall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.* He is a true Chriſtian indeed, not he, that is only book-taught, but he, that is God-taught; he, that hath an *unction from the Holy One* (as our Apoſtle calleth it) *that teacheth him all things*; he, that hath the ſpirit of Chriſt within him, that *ſearcheth out the deep things of God: for as no man knoweth the things of a man, ſave the ſpirit of a man, which is in him*; *even ſo the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.*

Ink and paper can never make us Chriſtians, can never beget a new nature, a living principle in us; can never form Chriſt, or any true notions of ſpiritual things in our hearts. The Goſpel, that new law, which Chriſt delivered to the world, it is not merely a dead letter without us, but a quickening ſpirit within us. Cold theorems and maxims, dry and jejune diſputes, lean ſyllogiſtical reaſonings, could never yet of themſelves beget the leaſt glimpſe of true heavenly light, the leaſt ſap of ſaving knowledge in any heart. All this is but the groping of the poor dark ſpirit of man after truth, to find it out with his own endeavours, and feel it with his own cold and benumbed hands. Words and ſyllables, which are but dead things, cannot poſſibly convey the living notions of heavenly truths to us. The ſecret myſteries of a divine life, of a new nature, of Chriſt formed in our hearts, they cannot be written or ſpoken, language and expreſſions cannot reach them; neither can they be ever truly underſtood, except the ſoul itſelf be kindled from within, and awakened into the life of them. A painter, that would draw a roſe, though he may flouriſh ſome likeneſs of it in figure and colour, yet he can never paint the ſcent and fragrancy; or if he would draw a flame, he cannot put a conſtant heat into his colours; he cannot make his pencil drop a ſound, as the echo in the epigram mocks at him;

——*Si vis ſimilem pingere, pinge ſonum.*

All the ſkill of cunning artizans and mechanicks cannot put a principle of life into a ſtatue of their own making. Neither are we able to incloſe in words and letters the life, ſoul, and eſſence of any ſpiritual truths, and, as it were, to incorporate it in them.

Some philoſophers have determined, that ἀρετὴ is not διδακτὸν, *virtue cannot be taught* by any certain rules or precepts. Men and books may propound ſome directions to us, that may ſet us in ſuch a way of life and practice, as in which we ſhall at laſt find it within ourſelves, and be experimentally

tally acquainted with it; but they cannot teach it us like a mechanick art or trade. No, surely, *there is a spirit in man*; and *the inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding*. But we shall not meet with this spirit any where but in the way of obedience: the knowledge of Christ, and the keeping of his commandments, must always go together, and be mutual causes of one another.

Hereby we know, that we know him, if we keep his commandments.
He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a lyar, and the truth is not in him.

I come now unto these words themselves, which are so pregnant, that I shall not need to force out any thing at all from them: I shall therefore only take notice of some few observations which drop from them of their own accord, and then conclude with some application of them to ourselves.

I. First then, If this be the right way and method of discovering our *knowledge of Christ*, by our *keeping his commandments*; then *we may safely draw conclusions concerning our state and condition from the conformity of our lives to the will of Christ*.

Would we know, whether we know Christ aright, let us consider whether the life of Christ be in us. *Qui non habet vitam Christi, Christum non habet*; he that hath not the life of Christ in him, he hath nothing but the name, nothing but a phancy of Christ, he hath not the substance of him. He that builds his house upon this foundation, not an airy notion of Christ swimming in his brain, but Christ really dwelling and living in his heart, as our Saviour himself witnesseth, he *buildeth his house upon a rock*; and when the floods come, and the winds blow, and the rain descends, and beats upon it, it shall stand impregnably. But he that builds all his comfort upon an ungrounded persuasion, that God from all eternity hath loved him, and absolutely decreed him to life and happiness, and seeketh not for God really dwelling in his soul; he builds his house upon a quick-sand, and it shall suddenly sink and be swallowed up: *His hope shall be cut off, and his trust shall be a spider's web*; *he shall lean upon his house, but it shall not stand*; *he shall hold it fast, but it shall not endure*.

We are no where commanded to pry into these secrets, but the wholesome counsel and advice given us is this, *to make our calling and election sure*. We have no warrant in Scripture to peep into these hidden rolls and volumes of eternity, and to make it our first thing, that we do, when we come to Christ, to spell out our names in the stars, and to persuade ourselves, that we are certainly elected to everlasting happiness, before we see the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, shaped in our hearts. God's everlasting decree is too dazzling and bright an object for us at first to set our eye upon. It is far easier and safer for us to look upon the rays of his goodness and holiness, as they are reflected in our hearts, and there to read the mild and gentle characters of God's love to us, in our love to him, and our hearty compliance with his heavenly will; as it is safer for us, if we would see the sun, to look upon it here below in a pail of water, than to cast up our daring eyes upon the body of the sun itself, which is too radiant

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and ſcorching for us. The beſt aſſurance, that any one can have of his intereſt in God, is doubtleſs the conformity of his ſoul to him. Thoſe divine purpoſes, whatſoever they be, are altogether unſearchable and unknowable by us; they lie wrapt up in everlaſting darkneſs, and covered in a deep abyſs; Who is able to fathom the bottom of them?

Let us not therefore make this our firſt attempt towards God and religion, to perſuade ourſelves ſtrongly of theſe everlaſting decrees: for if at our firſt flight we aim ſo high, we ſhall haply but ſcorch our wings, and be ſtruck back with lightning, as thoſe giants of old were, that would needs attempt to aſſault heaven. And it is indeed a moſt gigantick eſſay to thruſt ourſelves ſo boldly into the lap of heaven; it is a prank of *Nimrod*, of a mighty hunter, thus rudely to deal with God, and to force heaven and happineſs before his face, whether he will or no. The way to obtain a good aſſurance indeed of our title to heaven, is not to clamber up to it by a ladder of our own ungrounded perſuaſions, but to dig as low as hell by humility and ſelf-denial in our own hearts: And though this may ſeem to be the fartheſt way about, yet it is indeed the neareſt and ſafeſt way to it. We muſt ἀναβαίνειν κάτω, and καταβαίνειν ἄνω, as the Greek epigram ſpeaks, *aſcend downward*, and *deſcend upward*, if we would indeed come to heaven, or get any true perſuaſion of our title to it.

The moſt gallant and triumphant confidence of a Chriſtian riſeth ſafely and ſurely on this low foundation, that lies deeper under ground, and there ſtands firmly and ſtedfaſtly. When our heart is once turned into a conformity with the word of God, when we feel our will perfectly to concur with his will, we ſhall then preſently perceive a ſpirit of adoption within ourſelves, teaching us to cry *Abba*, *Father*. We ſhall not then care for peeping into thoſe hidden records of eternity, to ſee whether our names be written there in golden characters; no, we ſhall find a copy of God's thoughts concerning us written in our own breaſts. There we may read the characters of his favour to us; there we may feel an inward ſenſe of his love to us, flowing out of our hearty and unfeigned love to him. And we ſhall be more undoubtedly perſuaded of it, than if any of thoſe winged watchmen above, that are privy to heaven's ſecrets, ſhould come and tell us, that they ſaw our names enrolled in thoſe volumes of eternity. Whereas, on the contrary, though we ſtrive to perſuade ourſelves never ſo confidently, that God from all eternity hath loved us, and elected us to life and happineſs; if we do yet, in the mean time, entertain any iniquity within our hearts, and willingly cloſe with any luſt; do what we can, we ſhall find many a cold qualm ever now and then ſeizing upon us at approaching dangers; and when death itſelf ſhall grimly look us in the face, we ſhall feel our hearts even to die within us, and our ſpirits quite faint away, though we ſtrive to raiſe them and recover them never ſo much with the ſtrong waters and *aqua-vitæ* of our own ungrounded preſumptions. The leaſt inward luſt willingly continued in will be like a worm, fretting the gourd of our jolly confidence and preſumptuous perſuaſion of God's love, and always gnawing at the root of it; and though we ſtrive to keep it alive, and continually beſprinkle it with ſome dews of our own, yet it will be always dying and withering in our boſoms. But a good conſcience within will be al-

ways better to a Christian, than *health to his navel, or marrow to his bones*; it will be an everlasting cordial to his heart; it will be softer to him than a bed of down, and he may sleep securely upon it in the midst of raging and tempestuous seas, when the winds bluster, and the waves beat round about him. A good conscience is the best looking-glass of heaven, in which the soul may see God's thoughts and purposes concerning it, as so many shining stars reflected to it. *Hereby we know Christ, hereby we know, that Christ loves us, if we keep his commandments.*

II. Secondly, If hereby only we know, that we know Christ, by our keeping his commandments, then *the knowledge of Christ doth not consist merely in a few barren notions, in a form of certain dry and sapless opinions.*

Christ came not into the world to fill our heads with mere speculations, to kindle a fire of wrangling and contentious dispute amongst us, and to warm our spirits against one another with nothing but angry and peevish debates; whilst in the mean time our hearts remain all ice within towards God, and have not the least spark of true heavenly fire to melt and thaw them. Christ came not to possess our brains only with some cold opinions, that send down nothing but a freezing and benumbing influence upon our hearts. Christ was *vitæ magister*, not *scholæ*: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the truest pulse towards heaven; not he, whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs.

He that endeavours really to mortify his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his conscience is convinced of, is nearer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ, than he, that believes all the vulgar articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denieth Christ in his life.

Surely the way to heaven, that Christ hath taught us, is plain and easy, if we have but honest hearts: we need not many criticisms, many school-distinctions, to come to a right understanding of it. Surely Christ came not to ensnare us and entangle us with captious niceties, or to puzzle our heads with deep speculations, and lead us through hard and craggy notions into the kingdom of heaven. I persuade myself, that no man shall ever be kept out of heaven for not comprehending mysteries, that were beyond the reach of his shallow understanding, if he had but an honest and good heart, that was ready to comply with Christ's commandments. *Say not in thy heart, who shall ascend into heaven?* that is, with high speculations, to bring down Christ from thence; or, *who shall descend into the abyss beneath?* that is, with deep searching thoughts to fetch up Christ from thence: but lo, *the word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart.*

But I wish it were not the distemper of our times, to scare and fright men only with opinions, and make men only solicitous about the entertaining of this and that speculation, which will not render them any thing the better in their lives, or the liker unto God; whilst in the mean time there is no such care taken about *keeping of Christ's commandments*, and being renewed in our minds according to the image of God in righteousness and true holiness. We say, *Lo, here is Christ*, and, *Lo, there is Christ*, in these and these opinions; whereas, in truth, Christ is neither here, nor there, nor any where, but where the spirit of Christ, where the life of Christ is.

Do we not now-a-days open and lock up heaven with the private key of this and that opinion of our own, according to our ſeveral phancies, as we pleaſe? And if any one obſerve Chriſt's commandments never ſo ſincerely, and ſerve God with faith and a pure conſcience, that yet haply ſkills not of ſome contended-for opinions, ſome darling notions, he hath not the right *Shibboleth*, he hath not the true watch-word, he muſt not paſs the guards into heaven. Do we not make this and that opinion, this and that outward form, to be the wedding-garment, and boldly ſentence thoſe to outer darkneſs, that are not inveſted therewith? Whereas every true Chriſtian finds the leaſt dram of hearty affection towards God to be more cordial and ſovereign to his ſoul, than all the ſpeculative notions and opinions in the world; and though he ſtudy alſo to inform his underſtanding aright, and free his mind from all error and miſapprehenſions, yet it is nothing but the life of Chriſt deeply rooted in his heart, which is the chymical elixir, that he feeds upon. Had he *all faith, that he could remove mountains*, (as St. *Paul* ſpeaks) had he *all knowledge, all tongues and languages*; yet he prizeth one dram of love beyond them all. He accounteth him, that feedeth upon mere notions in religion, to be but an airy and chameleon-like Chriſtian. He findeth himſelf now otherwiſe rooted and centred in God, than when he did before merely contemplate and gaze upon him; he taſteth and reliſheth God within himſelf; he hath *quendam ſaporem Dei, a certain ſavour of him*; whereas before he did but rove and gueſs at random at him. He feeleth himſelf ſafely anchored in God, and will not be diſſuaded from it, though perhaps he ſkill not many of thoſe ſubtleties, which others make the *alpha* and *omega* of their religion. Neither is he ſcared with thoſe childiſh affrightments, with which ſome would force their private conceits upon him; he is above the ſuperſtitious dreading of mere ſpecu'ative opinions, as well as the ſuperſtitious reverence of outward ceremonies; he cares not ſo much for ſubtilty, as for ſoundneſs and health of mind. And indeed, as it was well ſpoken by a noble philoſopher, ἄνευ ἀρετῆς Θεὸς ὄνομα μόνον, that *without purity and virtue, God is nothing but an empty name*; ſo it is as true here, that without obedience to Chriſt's commandments, without the life of Chriſt dwelling in us, whatſoever opinion we entertain of him, Chriſt is but only named by us, he is not known.

I ſpeak not here againſt a free and ingenuous enquiry into all truth, according to our ſeveral abilities and opportunities; I plead not for the captivating and enthralling of our judgments to the dictates of men; I do not diſparage the natural improvement of our underſtanding faculties by true knowledge, which is ſo noble and gallant a perfection of the mind: but the thing, which I aim againſt, is, the diſpiriting of the life and vigour of our religion by dry ſpeculations, and making it nothing but a mere dead ſkeleton of opinions, a few dry bones without any fleſh and ſinews tied up together, and the miſ-placing of all our zeal upon an eager proſecution of theſe, which ſhould be ſpent to better purpoſe upon other objects.

Knowledge indeed is a thing far more excellent than riches, outward pleaſures, worldly dignities, or any thing elſe in the world beſides holineſs, and the conformity of our wills to the will of God; but yet our happineſs conſiſteth.

ſteth not in it, but in a certain divine temper and conſtitution of ſoul, which is far above it.

But it is a piece of that corruption, that runneth through human nature, that we naturally prize truth more than goodneſs, knowledge more than holineſs. We think it a gallant thing to be fluttering up to heaven with our wings of knowledge and ſpeculation; whereas the higheſt myſtery of a divine life here, and of perfect happineſs hereafter, conſiſteth in nothing but mere obedience to the divine will. Happineſs is nothing but that inward ſweet delight, that will ariſe from the harmonious agreement between our wills and God's will.

There is nothing contrary to God in the whole world, nothing that fights againſt him, but ſelf-will. This is the ſtrong caſtle, that we all keep garriſon'd againſt heaven in every one of our hearts, which God continually layeth ſiege unto; and it muſt be conquered and demoliſhed, before we can conquer heaven. It was by reaſon of this ſelf-will, that *Adam* fell in paradiſe; that thoſe glorious angels, thoſe morning-ſtars, kept not their firſt ſtation, but dropt down from heaven like falling ſtars, and ſunk into this condition of bitterneſs, anxiety, and wretchedneſs, in which now they are. They all intangled themſelves with the length of their own wings, they would needs will more, and otherwiſe than God would will in them; and going about to make their wills wider, and to enlarge them into greater amplitude, the more they ſtruggled, they found themſelves the faſter pinion'd, and crouded up into narrowneſs and ſervility; inſomuch, that now they are not able to uſe any wings at all, but inheriting the ſerpent's curſe, can only creep with their bellies upon the earth. Now, our only way to recover God and happineſs again is, not to ſoar up with our underſtandings, but to deſtroy this ſelf-will of ours; and then we ſhall find our wings to grow again, our plumes fairly ſpread, and ourſelves raiſed aloft into the free air of perfect liberty, which is perfect happineſs.

There is nothing in the whole world able to do us good or hurt, but God and our own will; neither riches nor poverty, nor diſgrace nor honour, nor life nor death, nor angels nor devils; but willing or not-willing, as we ought. Should hell itſelf caſt all its fiery darts againſt us, if our will be right, if it be informed by the divine will, they can do us no hurt; we have then (if I may ſo ſpeak,) an inchanted ſhield, that is impenetrable, and will bear off all. God will not hurt us, and hell cannot hurt us, if we will nothing but what God wills. Nay, then we are acted by God himſelf, and the whole divinity floweth in upon us; and when we have caſhiered this ſelf-will of ours, which did but ſhackle and confine our ſouls, our wills ſhall then become truly free, being widened and enlarged to the extent of God's own will. *Hereby we know, that we know Chriſt indeed*, not by our ſpeculative opinions concerning him, but *by our keeping of his commandments.*

III. Thirdly, if hereby we are to judge, whether we truly *know Chriſt*, by our *keeping of his commandments*; ſo that *he, that ſaith he knoweth him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a lyar:* then, *this was not the plot and deſign of the Goſpel, to give the world an indulgence to ſin, upon what pretence ſoever.*

Though

Though we are too prone to make ſuch miſconſtructions of it; as if God had intended nothing elſe in it, but to dandle our corrupt nature, and contrive a ſmooth and eaſy way for us to come to happineſs, without the toilſome labour of ſubduing our luſts and ſinful affections: or, as if the Goſpel were nothing elſe but a declaration to the world, of God's engaging his affections from all eternity on ſome particular perſons in ſuch a manner, as that he would reſolve to love them, and dearly embrace them, though he never made them partakers of his image in righteouſneſs and true holineſs; and though they ſhould remain under the power of all their luſts, yet they ſhould ſtill continue his beloved ones, and he would notwithſtanding, at laſt, bring them undoubtedly into heaven. Which is nothing elſe but to make the God that we worſhip, the God of the New Teſtament, προσωποληπτης, an *accepter of perſons*, and one, that ſhould encourage that in the world, which is diametrically oppoſite to God's own life and being.

And indeed nothing is more ordinary than for us to ſhape out ſuch monſtrous and deformed notions of God unto ourſelves, by looking upon him through the coloured medium of our own corrupt hearts, and having the eye of our ſoul tinctured by the ſuffuſions of our own luſts. And therefore becauſe we mortals can fondly love and hate, and ſometimes hug the very vices of thoſe, to whom our affections are engaged, and kiſs their very deformities; we are ſo ready to ſhape out a Deity like unto ourſelves, and to faſhion out ſuch a God as will, in Chriſt at leaſt, hug the very wickedneſs of the world, and in thoſe, that be once his own, by I know not what fond affection, appropriated to himſelf, connive at their very ſins, ſo that they ſhall not make the leaſt breach betwixt himſelf and them. Some there are, that queſtion, whether of the two be the worſe idolatry, and of the deeper ſtain, for a man to make a God out of a *piece of wood*, and *fall down unto it and worſhip it, and ſay, Deliver me, for thou art my God*, as it is expreſſed in the prophet *Iſaiah*; or to ſet up ſuch an idol-god of our own imagination as this is, faſhioned out according to the ſimilitude of our own fondneſs and wickedneſs: and when we ſhould paint out God with the liveliеſt colours, that we can poſſibly borrow from any created being, with the pureſt perfections, that we can abſtract from them; to draw him out thus with the black coal of our own corrupt hearts, and to make the very blots and blurs of our own ſouls to be the letters, which we ſpell out his name by. Thus do we, that are children of the night, make black and ugly repreſentations of God unto ourſelves, as the Ethiopians were wont to do, copying him out according to our own likeneſs, and ſetting up that unto ourſelves for a god, which we love moſt dearly in ourſelves, that is, our luſts. But there is no ſuch god as this any where in the world, but only in ſome men's falſe imaginations, who know not all this while, that they look upon themſelves inſtead of God, and make an idol of themſelves which they worſhip and adore for him; being ſo full of themſelves, that whatſoever they ſee round about them, even God himſelf, they colour with their own tincture; like him, that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of, that whereſoever he went, and whatſoever he looked upon, he ſaw ſtill his own face, as in a glaſs, repreſented to him. And therefore it is no wonder, if men ſeem naturally more devoutly affected toward ſuch an imaginary god, as we have now deſcribed,

ſcribed, than to the true real God, clothed with his own real attributes; ſince it is nothing but an image of themſelves, which, *Narciſſus*-like, they fall in love with: no wonder if they kiſs and dandle ſuch a baby-god as this, which, like little children, they have dreſſed up out of the clouts of their own fond phancies, according to their own likeneſs, of purpoſe that they might play and ſport with it.

But God will ever dwell in ſpotleſs light, howſoever we paint him and disfigure him here below; he will ſtill be circled about with his own rays of unſtained and immaculate glory. And though the Goſpel be not God as he is in his own brightneſs, but God veiled and maſked to us, God in a ſtate of humiliation, and condeſcent, as the ſun in a rainbow; yet it is nothing elſe but a clear and unſpotted mirror of divine holineſs, goodneſs, purity; in which attributes lies the very life and eſſence of God himſelf. The Goſpel is nothing elſe but God deſcending into the world in our form, and converſing with us in our likeneſs; that he might allure and draw us up to God, and make us partakers of his divine form. Θεὸς γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος (as *Athanaſius* ſpeaks) ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεοποίηση, *God was therefore incarnated and made man, that he might deify us*; that is, (as St. *Peter* expreſſeth it) make us partakers of the divine nature. Now, I ſay, the very proper character and eſſential tincture of God himſelf is nothing elſe but goodneſs. Nay, I may be bold to add, that God is therefore God, becauſe he is the higheſt and moſt perfect good; and good is not therefore good, becauſe God out of an arbitrary will of his would have it ſo. Whatſoever God doth in the world, he doth it as ſuitable to the higheſt goodneſs; the idea and faireſt copy of which is his own eſſence.

Virtue and holineſs in creatures, as *Plato* well diſcourſeth in his *Euthyphro*, are not *therefore good, becauſe God loveth them*, and will have them be accounted ſuch; but rather *God therefore loveth them, becauſe they are in themſelves ſimply good.* Some of our own authors go a little farther yet, and tell us, that God doth not fondly love himſelf, becauſe he is himſelf, but therefore he oveth himſelf, becauſe he is the higheſt and moſt abſolute goodneſs; ſo that if there could be any thing in the world better than God, God would love that better than himſelf: but becauſe he is eſſentially the moſt perfect good, therefore he cannot but love his own goodneſs infinitely above all other things. And it is another miſtake, which ſometimes we have of God, by ſhaping him out according to the model of ourſelves, when we make him nothing but a blind, dark, impetuous ſelf-will running through the world; ſuch as we ourſelves are furiouſly acted with, that have not the ballaſt of abſolute goodneſs to poize and ſettle us.

That I may therefore come nearer to the thing in hand; God, who is abſolute goodneſs, cannot love any of his creatures, and take pleaſure in them, without beſtowing a communication of his goodneſs and likeneſs upon them. God cannot make a Goſpel to promiſe men life and happineſs hereafter, without being regenerated, and made partakers of his holineſs. As ſoon may heaven and hell be reconciled together, and lovingly ſhake hands with one another, as God can be fondly indulgent to any ſin, in whomſoever it be. As ſoon may light and darkneſs be eſpouſed together, and

and midnight be married to noon-day, as God can be joined in a league of friendſhip to any wicked ſoul.

The great deſign of God in the Goſpel is to clear up this miſt of ſin and corruption, which we are here ſurrounded with, and to bring up his creatures out of the ſhadow of death to the region of light above, the land of truth and holineſs. The great myſtery of the Goſpel is to eſtabliſh a god-like frame and diſpoſition of ſpirit, which conſiſts in righteouſneſs and true holineſs, in the hearts of men. And Chriſt, who is the great and mighty Saviour, came on purpoſe into the world, not only to ſave us from fire and brimſtone, but alſo to ſave us from our ſins. Chriſt hath therefore made an expiation of our ſins by his death upon the croſs, that we, being thus *delivered out of the hands of* theſe *our* greateſt *enemies, might ſerve God without fear, in holineſs and righteouſneſs before him all the days of our life.* This *grace of God, that bringeth ſalvation, hath* therefore *appeared unto all men,* in the Goſpel, that it might *teach us to deny ungodlineſs and worldly luſts, and that we ſhould live ſoberly, righteouſly and godlily in this preſent world; looking for that bleſſed hope, and glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, who gave himſelf for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify to himſelf a peculiar people, zealous of good works. Theſe things I write unto you,* (ſaith our Apoſtle a little before my text) *that you ſin not*; therein expreſſing the end of the whole Goſpel, which is, not only to cover ſin by ſpreading the purple robe of Chriſt's death and ſufferings over it, whilſt it ſtill remaineth in us with all its filth and noiſomeneſs unremoved; but alſo to convey a powerful and mighty ſpirit of holineſs, to cleanſe us, and free us from it. And this is a greater grace of God to us, than the former, which ſtill go both together in the Goſpel; beſides the free remiſſion and pardon of ſin in the blood of Chriſt, the delivering of us from the power of ſin, by the Spirit of Chriſt dwelling in our hearts.

Chriſt came not into the world only to caſt a mantle over us, and hide all our filthy ſores from God's avenging eye, with his merits and righteouſneſs; but he came likewiſe to be a chirurgeon and phyſician of ſouls, to free us from the filth and corruption of them; which is more grievous and burthenſome, more noiſome to a true Chriſtian, than the guilt of ſin itſelf.

Should a poor wretched and diſeaſed creature, that is full of ſores and ulcers, be covered all over with purple, or clothed with ſcarlet, he would take but little contentment in it, whilſt his ſores and wounds remain upon him; and he had much rather be arrayed in rags, ſo he might obtain but ſoundneſs and health within. The Goſpel is a true *Bethesda, a pool of grace,* where ſuch poor, lame and infirm creatures as we are, upon the moving of God's Spirit in it, may deſcend down, not only to waſh our ſkin and outſide, but alſo to be cured of our diſeaſes within. And whatever the world thinks, there is a powerful ſpirit, that moves upon theſe waters, the waters of the Goſpel, ſpreading its gentle, healing, quickening wings over our ſouls. The Goſpel is not like *Abana* and *Pharpar*, thoſe common rivers of *Damaſcus*, that could only cleanſe the outſide; but is a true *Jordan*, in which ſuch leprous *Naamans*, as we all are, may *waſh and be clean. Bleſſed* indeed *are they, whoſe iniquities are forgiven, and whoſe ſins are covered: Bleſſed is*

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the man, to whom the Lord will not impute sin: but yet rather blessed are they, whose sins are like a morning-cloud, and quite taken away from them. *Blessed*, thrice blessed *are they, that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be satisfied: blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.*

Our Saviour Christ came (as *John* the Baptist tells us) *with a fan in his hand, that he might throughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into his garner: but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.* He came (as the prophet *Malachi* speaks) *like a refiner's fire, and like fuller's soap; to sit as a refiner and purifier of silver, and to purify all the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness.*

Christ came not only to write *Holiness to the Lord* upon *Aaron*'s forehead, and to put his *Urim* and *Thummim* upon his breast-plate; but, *This is the covenant, saith the Lord, that I will make with them in those days; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts;* and then *I will be their God, and they shall be my people. They shall be all kings and priests unto me. God sent his own Son* (saith St. *Paul*) *in the likeness of sinful flesh, and by a sacrifice for sin condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit.*

The first *Adam*, as the Scripture tells us, brought in a real defilement, which, like a noisome leprosy, hath overspread all mankind; and therefore the second *Adam* must not only fill the world with a conceit of holiness, and mere imaginary righteousness; but he must really convey such an immortal seed of grace into the hearts of believers, as may prevail still more and more in them, till it have at last quite wrought out that poison of the serpent.

Christ, that was nothing but Divinity dwelling in a tabernacle of flesh, and God himself immediately acting a human nature, came into the world to kindle here that divine life amongst men, which is certainly dearer unto God, than any thing else whatsoever in the world; and to propagate this celestial fire from one heart still unto another, until the end of the world. Neither is he, nor was he, ever absent from this spark of his divinity kindled amongst men, wheresoever it be, though he seem bodily to be withdrawn from us. He is the standing, constant, inexhausted fountain of this divine light and heat, that still toucheth every soul, that is enlivened by it, with an out-stretched ray, and freely lends his beams, and dispenseth his influence to all, from the beginning of the world to the end of it. *We all receive of his fulness grace for grace*; as all the stars in heaven are said to light their candles at the sun's flame. For though his body be withdrawn from us, yet, by the lively and virtual contact of his Spirit, he is always kindling, chearing, quickening, warming and enlivening hearts. Nay, this divine life, begun and kindled in any heart, wheresoever it be, is something of God in flesh, and, in a sober and qualified sense, Divinity incarnate; and all particular Christians, that are really possessed of it, so many mystical Christs.

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And God forbid, that God's own life and nature, here in the world, ſhould be forlorn, forſaken, and abandoned of God himſelf. Certainly, where-ever it is, though never ſo little, like a ſweet, young, tender babe, once born in any heart, when it crieth unto God the father of it, with pitiful and bemoaning looks imploring his compaſſion, it cannot chuſe but move his fatherly bowels, and make them yearn, and turn towards it, and, by ſtrong ſympathy, draw his compaſſionate arm to help and relieve it. Never was any tender infant ſo dear to thoſe bowels, that begat it, as an infant new-born Chriſt, formed in the heart of any true believer, to God the father of it. Shall the *children of this world*, the ſons of darkneſs, be moved with ſuch tender affection and compaſſion towards the fruit of their bodies, their own natural off-ſpring? and ſhall God, who is the *father of lights*, the fountain of all goodneſs, be moved with no compaſſion towards his true ſpiritual off-ſpring, and have no regard to thoſe ſweet babes of light, ingendered by his own beams in men's hearts, that, in their lovely countenances, bear the reſemblance of his own face, and call him their father? Shall he ſee them lie fainting and gaſping, and dying here in the world, for want of nothing to preſerve and keep them, but an influence from him, who firſt gave them life and breath? No, hear the language of God's heart, hear the ſounding of his bowels towards them: *Is it Ephraim my dear ſon? is it that pleaſant child? Since I ſpake of him, I do earneſtly remember him; my bowels, my bowels are troubled for him; I will ſurely have mercy upon him, ſaith the Lord.* If thoſe expreſſions of goodneſs and tender affection here, among the creatures, be but drops of that full ocean, that is in God; how can we then imagine, that this father of our ſpirits ſhould have ſo little regard to his own dear off-ſpring, I do not ſay our ſouls, but that, which is the very life and ſoul of our ſouls, the life of God in us, (which is nothing elſe, but God's own ſelf communicated to us, his own Son born in our hearts) as that he ſhould ſuffer it to be cruelly murdered in its infancy by our ſins, and, like young *Hercules*, in its very cradle to be ſtrangled by thoſe filthy vipers? that he ſhould ſee him to be crucified by wicked luſts, nailed faſt to the croſs by invincible corruptions, pierced and gored on every ſide with the poiſonous ſpears of the devil's temptations, and at laſt to give up the ghoſt; and yet his tender heart not at all relent, nor be all this while impaſſionated with ſo ſad a ſpectacle? Surely, we cannot think he hath ſuch an adamantine breaſt, ſuch a flinty nature, as this is.

What then? muſt we ſay, that though indeed he be willing, yet he is not able, to reſcue his crucified and tormented ſon now bleeding upon the croſs; to *take him down* from thence, *and ſave him?* Then muſt ſin be more powerful than God; that weak, crazy and ſickly thing more ſtrong than the *rock of ages*; and the devil, the prince of darkneſs, more mighty than the God of light. No ſurely; there is a weakneſs and impotency in all evil, but a maſculine ſtrength and vigour in all goodneſs; and therefore, doubtleſs, the higheſt good, the πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν, as the philoſopher calls it, is the ſtrongeſt thing in the world. *Nil potentius ſummo Bono.* God's power, diſplayed in the world, is nothing but his goodneſs ſtrongly reaching all things from height to depth, from the higheſt heaven to the loweſt hell; and irreſiſtibly imparting

imparting itſelf to every thing, according to thoſe ſeveral degrees, in which it is capable of it.

Have the fiends of darkneſs then, thoſe poor forlorn ſpirits, that are fettered and chained up in the chains of their own wickedneſs, any ſtrength to withſtand the force of infinite goodneſs, which is infinite power? or do they not rather ſculk in holes of darkneſs, and fly, like bats and owls, before the approaching beams of this ſun of righteouſneſs? Is God powerful to kill and to deſtroy, to damn and to torment? and is he not powerful to ſave? Nay, it is the ſweeteſt flower in all the garland of his attributes, it is the richeſt diadem in his crown of glory, that he is *mighty to ſave:* and this is far more magnificent for him, than to be ſtyled *mighty to deſtroy.* For that, except it be in a way of juſtice, ſpeaks no power at all, but mere impotency; for the root of all power is goodneſs.

Or muſt we ſay, laſtly, that God indeed is able to reſcue us out of the power of ſin and ſatan, when we ſigh and groan towards him; but yet ſometimes, to exerciſe his abſolute authority, his uncontroulable dominion, he delights rather in plunging wretched ſouls down into infernal night and everlaſting darkneſs? What ſhall we then make the God of the whole world? Nothing but a cruel and dreadful *Erinnys*, with curled fiery ſnakes about his head, and firebrands in his hands, thus governing the world? Surely this will make us either ſecretly to think, that there is no God at all in the world, if he muſt needs be ſuch; or elſe to wiſh heartily there were none. But, doubtleſs, God will at laſt confute all theſe our miſapprehenſions of him; he will unmaſk our hypocritical pretences, and clearly caſt the ſhame of all our ſinful deficiencies upon ourſelves, and vindicate his own glory from receiving the leaſt ſtain or blemiſh by them. In the mean time, let us know, that the Goſpel now requireth far more of us, than ever the Law did; for it requireth a *new creature*, a *divine nature*, *Chriſt formed in us:* but yet withall it beſtoweth a *quickening ſpirit*, an enlivening power, to enable us to expreſs that, which is required of us. Whoſoever therefore truly knows Chriſt, the ſame alſo *keepeth Chriſt's commandments.* But *he, that ſaith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a lyar, and the truth is not in him.*

I have now done with the firſt part of my Diſcourſe, concerning thoſe obſervations, which ariſe naturally from the words, and offer themſelves to us. I ſhall, in the next place, proceed to make ſome general application of them all together.

Now therefore, I beſeech you, let us conſider, whether or no we know Chriſt indeed: not by our acquaintance with ſyſtems and models of divinity, not by our ſkill in books and papers; but by our keeping of Chriſt's commandments. All the books and writings, which we converſe with, they can but repreſent ſpiritual objects to our underſtandings; which yet we can never ſee in their own true figure, colour and proportion, until we have a divine light within, to irradiate and ſhine upon them. Though there be never ſuch excellent truths concerning Chriſt and his Goſpel, ſet down in words

words and letters; yet they will be but unknown characters to us, until we have a living ſpirit within us, that can decypher them; until the ſame ſpirit, by ſecret whiſpers in our hearts, do comment upon them, which did at firſt indite them. There be many, that underſtand the Greek and Hebrew of the Scripture, the original languages, in which the text was written, that never underſtood the language of the Spirit.

There is a *caro* and a *ſpiritus*, a *fleſh* and a *ſpirit*, a body and a ſoul in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the fleſh and body of divine truths, that is printed upon paper; which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking ſkeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living ſepulchres of their ſouls, do only converſe with; ſuch as never did any thing elſe, but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the ſhells of them. But there is a ſoul and ſpirit of divine truths, that could never yet be congealed into ink, that could never be blotted upon paper; which, by a ſecret traduction and conveyance, paſſeth from one ſoul unto another, being able to dwell or lodge no-where, but in a ſpiritual being, in a living thing, becauſe itſelf is nothing but life and ſpirit. Neither can it, where indeed it is, expreſs itſelf ſufficiently in words and ſounds, but it will beſt declare and ſpeak itſelf in actions; as the old manner of writing among the *Egyptians* was, not by words, but things. The life of divine truths is better expreſſed in actions, than in words, becauſe actions are more living things than words: words are nothing but dead reſemblances and pictures of thoſe truths, which live and breathe in actions; and *the kingdom of God* (as the Apoſtle ſpeaketh) *conſiſteth not in word*, but in life and power. Τὰ πρόβατα ὐ χόρτον φέροντα τοῖς ποίμεσιν ἐπιδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν (ſaith the moral philoſopher) ἀλλὰ τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέψαντα ἔριον ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα· *Sheep do not come and bring their fodder to their ſhepherd, and ſhew him how much they eat; but, inwardly concocting and digeſting it, they make it appear by the fleece, which they wear upon their backs, and by the milk, which they give.* And let not us Chriſtians affect only to talk and diſpute of Chriſt, and ſo meaſure our knowledge of him by our words; but let us ſhew ἀπὸ τῶν θεωρημάτων πεφθέντων τὰ ἔργα, our knowledge concocted into our lives and actions; and then let us really manifeſt, that we are Chriſt's ſheep indeed, that we are his diſciples, by that fleece of holineſs, which we wear, and by the fruits, that we daily yield in our lives and converſations: for *herein* (ſaith Chriſt) *is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; ſo ſhall ye be my diſciples.*

Let us not, I beſeech you, judge of our knowing Chriſt by our ungrounded perſuaſions, that Chriſt from all eternity hath loved us, and given himſelf particularly for us, without the conformity of our lives to Chriſt's commandments, without the real partaking of the image of Chriſt in our hearts. The great myſtery of the Goſpel doth not lie only in Chriſt without us, (though we muſt know alſo what he hath done for us;) but the very pith and kernel of it conſiſts in Chriſt inwardly formed in our hearts.

Nothing is truly ours but what lives in our ſpirits. Salvation itſelf cannot ſave us as long as it is only without us, no more than health can cure us, and make us ſound, when it is not within us, but ſomewhere at diſtance from us; no more than arts and ſciences, whilſt they lie only in books and pa-

pers without us, can make us learned. The Goſpel, though it be a ſovereign and medicinal thing itſelf, yet the mere knowing and believing of the hiſtory of it will do us no good: we can receive no virtue from it, till it be inwardly digeſted and concocted into our ſouls; till it be made ours, and become a living thing in our hearts. The Goſpel, if it be only without us, cannot ſave us, no more than that phyſician's bill could cure the ignorant patient of his diſeaſe, who, when it was commended to him, took the paper only, and put it up in his pocket, but never drank the potion, that was preſcribed in it.

All that Chriſt did for us in the fleſh, when he was here upon earth, from his lying in a manger, when he was born in *Bethlehem*, to his bleeding upon the croſs on *Golgotha*, it will not ſave us from our ſins, unleſs Chriſt by his Spirit dwell in us. It will not avail us to believe, that he was born of a virgin, unleſs the power of the Moſt High overſhadow our hearts, and beget him there likewiſe. It will not profit us to believe, that he died upon the croſs for us, unleſs we be baptized into his death by the mortification of all our luſts; unleſs the old man of ſin be crucified in our hearts. Chriſt indeed hath made an expiation for our ſins upon his croſs, and the blood of Chriſt is the only ſovereign balſam to free us from the guilt of them: but yet, beſides the ſprinkling of the blood of Chriſt upon us, we muſt be made partakers alſo of his Spirit. Chriſt came into the world, as well to redeem us from the power and bondage of our ſins, as to free us from the guilt of them. *You know* (ſaith St. *John*) *that he was manifeſted to take away our ſins: whoſoever therefore abideth in him, ſinneth not; whoſoever ſinneth, hath not ſeen nor known him.* Lo the end of Chriſt's coming into the world! Lo a deſign worthy of God manifeſted in the fleſh!

Chriſt did not take all thoſe pains to lay aſide his robes of glory, and come down hither into the world, to enter into a virgin's womb, to be born in our human ſhape, and be laid a poor crying infant in a manger, and having no form or comelineſs at all upon him, to take upon him the form of a ſervant, to undergo a reproachful and ignominious life, and at laſt to be abandoned to a ſhameful death, a death upon the croſs; I ſay, he did not do all this merely to bring in a notion into the world, without producing any real ſubſtantial effect at all, without the changing, mending and reforming of the world; ſo that men ſhould ſtill be as wicked as they were before, and as much under the power of the prince of darkneſs, only they ſhould not be thought ſo; they ſhould ſtill remain as full of all the filthy ſores of ſin and corruption as before, only they ſhould be accounted whole. Shall God come down from heaven, and pitch a tabernacle amongſt men? Shall he undertake ſuch a huge deſign, and make ſo great a noiſe of doing ſomething, which, when it is all ſummed up, ſhall not at laſt amount to a reality? Surely Chriſt did not undergo all this to ſo little purpoſe; he would not take all this pains for us, that he might be able at laſt to put into our hands nothing but a blank. He *was with child*, he *was in pain and travail*; and hath *he brought forth nothing but wind? hath he been delivered of the eaſt wind?* Is that great deſign, that was ſo long carried in the womb of eternity, now proved abortive, or elſe nothing but a mere windy birth? No ſurely: the end of the goſpel is life and perfection; it is a divine nature; it is a God-

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like frame and diſpoſition of ſpirit; it is to make us partakers of the image of God in righteouſneſs and true holineſs, without which ſalvation itſelf were but a notion.

Chriſt came into the world to make an expiation and atonement for our ſins; but the end of this was, that we might eſchew ſin; that we might forſake all ungodlineſs and worldly luſts. The Goſpel declares pardon of ſin to thoſe, that are heavy laden with it, and willing to be diſburdened, to this end, that it might quicken and enliven us to new obedience. Whereas otherwiſe the guilt of ſin might have detained us in horror and deſpair, and ſo have kept us ſtill more ſtrongly under the power of it, in ſad and diſmal apprehenſions of God's wrath provoked againſt us, and inevitably falling on us: but Chriſt hath now appeared like a day-ſtar, with moſt chearful beams; nay, he is the Sun of righteouſneſs himſelf, which hath riſen upon the world with his healing wings, with his exhilarating light, that he might chaſe away all thoſe black deſpairing thoughts from us. But Chriſt did not riſe, that we ſhould play and ſport, and wantonize with his light; but that we ſhould do *the work of the day* in it; that we ſhould walk εὐχημόνως (as the Apoſtle ſpeaketh) not in our night-clothes of ſinful deformity, but clad all over with the comely garments of light. The Goſpel is not big with child of a phancy, of a mere conceit of righteouſneſs without us, hanging at diſtance over us, whilſt our hearts within are nothing but cages of unclean birds, and like houſes continually haunted with devils, nay, the very rendezvous of thoſe fiends of darkneſs.

Holineſs is the beſt thing, that God himſelf can beſtow upon us, either in this world, or the world to come. True evangelical holineſs, that is, Chriſt formed in the hearts of believers, is the very cream and quinteſſence of the Goſpel. And were our hearts ſound within, were there not many thick and dark fumes, that did ariſe from thence, and cloud our underſtandings, we could not eaſily conceive the ſubſtance of heaven itſelf to be any thing elſe but holineſs, freed from thoſe encumbrances, that did ever clog it and accloy it here; neither ſhould we wiſh for any other heaven beſides this. But many of us are like thoſe children, whoſe ſtomachs are ſo vitiated by ſome diſeaſe, that they think aſhes, coal, mud-wall, or any ſuch traſh, to be more pleaſant than the moſt wholeſome food: ſuch ſickly and diſtempered appetites have we about theſe ſpiritual things, that hanker after I know not what vain ſhews of happineſs, whilſt in the mean time we neglect that, which is the only true food of our ſouls, that is able to nouriſh them up to everlaſting life.

Grace is holineſs militant, holineſs encumbred with many enemies and difficulties, which it ſtill fights againſt, and manfully quits itſelf of; and glory is nothing elſe but holineſs triumphant, holineſs with a palm of victory in her hand, and a crown upon her head: *Deus ipſe cum omni ſua bonitate, quatenus extra me eſt, non facit me beatum, ſed quatenus in me eſt: God himſelf cannot make me happy, if he be only without me, and unleſs he give in a participation of himſelf, and his own likeneſs into my ſoul.* Happineſs is nothing but the releaſing and unfettering of our ſouls from all theſe narrow, ſcant, and particular good things; and the eſpouſing of them to the higheſt and moſt univerſal good, which is not this or that particular

good, but goodneſs itſelf: and this is the ſame thing, that we call holineſs. Which, becauſe we ourſelves are ſo little acquainted with, (being for the moſt part ever courting a mere ſhadow of it,) therefore we have ſuch low, abject, and beggarly conceits thereof; whereas it is in itſelf the moſt noble, heroical and generous thing in the world. For I mean by holineſs nothing elſe but God ſtamped and printed upon the ſoul. And we may pleaſe ourſelves with what conceits we will; but ſo long as we are void of this, we do but dream of heaven, and I know not what fond paradiſe; we do but blow up and down an airy bubble of our own phancies, which riſeth out of the froth of our vain hearts; we do but court a painted heaven, and woo happineſs in a picture, whilſt in the mean time a true and real hell will ſuck in our ſouls into it, and ſoon make us ſenſible of a ſolid woe and ſuſtantial miſery.

Divine wiſdom hath ſo ordered the frame of the whole univerſe, as that every thing ſhould have a certain proper place, that ſhould be a receptacle for it. Hell is the ſink of all ſin and wickedneſs. The ſtrong magick of nature pulls and draws every thing continually to that place, which is ſuitable to it, and to which it doth belong; ſo all theſe heavy bodies preſs downwards towards the centre of our earth, being drawn in by it: in like manner hell, whereſoever it is, will by ſtrong ſympathy pull in all ſin, and magnetically draw it to itſelf: as true holineſs is always breathing upwards, and fluttering towards heaven, ſtriving to emboſom itſelf with God; and it will at laſt undoubtedly be conjoined with him; no diſmal ſhades of darkneſs can poſſibly ſtop it in its courſe, or bear it back.

Ὡς αἰεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον.

Nay, we do but deceive ourſelves with names: hell is nothing but the orb of ſin and wickedneſs, or elſe that hemiſphere of darkneſs, in which all evil moves; and heaven is the oppoſite hemiſpere of light, or elſe, if you pleaſe, the bright orb of truth, holineſs and goodneſs: and we do actually in this life inſtate ourſelves in the poſſeſſion of one, or other of them. Take ſin and diſobedience out of hell, and it will preſently clear up into light, tranquillity, ſerenity, and ſhine out into a heaven. Every true ſaint carrieth his heaven about with him in his own heart; and hell, that is without him, can have no power over him. He might ſafely wade through hell itſelf, and, like the three children, paſs through the midſt of that fiery furnace, and yet not at all be ſcorched with the flames of it: he might walk through the *valley of the ſhadow of death*, and yet *fear no evil*.

Sin is the only thing in the world, that is contrary to God. God is light, and that is darkneſs: God is beauty, and that is uglineſs and deformity. All ſin is direct rebellion againſt God; and with what notions ſoever we ſugar it, and ſweeten it, yet God can never ſmile upon it, he will never make a truce with it. God declares open war againſt ſin, and bids defiance to it; for it is a profeſſed enemy to God's own life and being. God, which is infinite goodneſs, cannot but hate ſin, which is purely evil. And though

though ſin be in itſelf but a poor, impotent and crazy thing, nothing but ſtraitneſs, poverty, and non-entity, ſo that of itſelf it is the moſt wretched and miſerable thing in the world, and needeth no farther puniſhment beſides itſelf; yet divine vengeance beats it off ſtill farther and farther from God, and, wherſoever it is, will be ſure to ſcourge it and laſh it continually. God and ſin can never agree together.

That I may therefore yet come nearer to ourſelves: *This is the meſſage, that I have now to declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkneſs at all. If we ſay, that we have fellowſhip with him, and walk in darkneſs, we lye, and do not the truth.* Chriſt and the Goſpel are light, and there is no darkneſs at all in them: if you ſay, that you know Chriſt and his Goſpel, and yet keep not Chriſt's commandments, but dearly hug your private darling corruptions, *you are lyars, and the truth is not in you*; you have no acquaintance with the God of light, nor the Goſpel of light. If any of you ſay, that you know Chriſt, and have an intereſt in him, and yet (as I fear too many do) ſtill nouriſh ambition, pride, vainglory within your breaſts, harbour malice, revengefulneſs, and cruel hatred to your neighbours in your hearts, eagerly ſcramble after this worldly pelf, and make the ſtrength of your parts and endeavours ſerve that blind Mammon, the God of this world; if you wallow and tumble in the filthy puddle of fleſhly pleaſures, or if you aim only at yourſelves in your lives, and make yourſelf the compaſs by which you ſail, and the ſtar, by which you ſteer your courſe, looking at nothing higher, or more noble than your ſelves; deceive not yourſelves, *you have neither ſeen Chriſt, nor known him:* you are deeply incorporated (if I may ſo ſpeak) with the ſpirit of this world, and have no true ſympathy with God and Chriſt, no fellowſhip at all with them.

And, I beſeech you, let us conſider; Be there not many of us, that pretend much to Chriſt, that are plainly in our lives as proud, ambitious, vainglorious as any others? Be there not many of us, that are as much under the power of unruly paſſions, as cruel, revengeful, malicious, conſorious as others? that have our minds as deeply engaged in the world, and as much envaſſalled to riches, gain, profit, thoſe great admired deities of the ſons of men, and their ſouls as much overwhelmed and ſunk with the cares of this life? Do not many of us as much give ourſelves to the pleaſures of the fleſh, and though not without regrets of conſcience, yet ever now and then ſecretly ſoak ourſelves in them? Be there not many of us, that have as deep a ſhare likewiſe in injuſtice and oppreſſion, in vexing the fatherleſs and the widows? I wiſh it may not prove ſome of our caſes at that laſt day, to uſe ſuch pleas as theſe unto Chriſt in our behalf; *Lord, I have prophefied in thy name*; I have preached many a zealous ſermon for thee; I have kept many a long faſt; I have been very active for thy cauſe in church, in ſtate; nay, I never made any queſtion, but that my name was written in thy book of life: when yet, alas! we ſhall receive no other return from Chriſt but this, *I know you not*; *depart from me, ye workers of iniquity*. I am ſure there be too many of us, that have long pretended to Chriſt, which make little or no progreſs in true Chriſtianity, that is, holineſs of life; that ever hang hovering in a twilight of grace, and never ſeriouſly

riouſly put ourſelves forward into clear day light, but eſteem that glimmering crepuſculum, which we are in, and like that faint twilight better than broad open day: whereas *the path of the juſt* (as the wiſe man ſpeaks) *is as the ſhining light, that ſhineth more and more unto the perfect day.* I am ſure there be many of us, that are perpetual dwarfs in our ſpiritual ſtature, like thoſe *ſilly women* (that St. *Paul* ſpeaks of) *laden with ſins, and led away with divers luſts*, that are *ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth*; that are not now one jot taller in Chriſtianity, than we were many years ago, but have ſtill as ſickly, crazy, and unſound a temper of ſoul as we had long before.

Indeed we ſeem to do ſomething; we are always moving and lifting at the ſtone of corruption, that lies upon our hearts, but yet we never ſtir it notwithſtanding, or at leaſt never roll it off from us. We are ſometimes a little troubled with the guilt of our ſins, and then we think we muſt thruſt our luſts out of our hearts; but afterwards we ſprinkle ourſelves over with I know not what holy-water, and ſo are contented to let them ſtill abide quietly within us. We do every day truly confeſs the ſame ſins, and pray againſt them; and yet ſtill commit them as much as ever, and lie as deeply under the power of them. We have the ſame water to pump out in every prayer, and ſtill we let the ſame leak in again upon us. We make a great deal of noiſe, and raiſe a great deal of duſt with our feet; but we do not move from off the ground, on which we ſtood, we do not go forward at all: or if we do ſometimes make a little progreſs, we quickly loſe again the ground, which we had gained; like thoſe upper planets in the heaven, which (as the aſtronomers tell us) ſometimes move forwards, ſometimes quite backwards, and ſometimes perfectly ſtand ſtill; have their ſtations and retrogradations, as well as their direct motions. As if religion were nothing elſe but a dancing up and down upon the ſame piece of ground, and making ſeveral motions and friſkings on it; and not a ſober journeying and travelling onwards toward ſome certain place. We do and undo; we do *Penelopes telam texere*; we weave ſometimes a web of holineſs, but then we let our luſts come, and undo and unravel all again. Like *Siſyphus* in the fable, we roll up a mighty ſtone with much ado, ſweating and tugging up the hill; and then we let it go, and tumble down again unto the bottom; and this is our conſtant work. Like thoſe *Danaides*, which the poets ſpeak of, we are always filling water into a ſieve, by our prayers, duties, and performances, which ſtill runs out as faſt as we pour it in.

What is it, that thus cheats us, and gulls us of our religion? that makes us thus conſtantly to tread the ſame ring and circle of duties, where we make no progreſs at all forwards, and the farther we go, are ſtill never the nearer to our journey's end? What is it, that thus ſtarves our religion, and makes it look like thoſe kine in *Pharaoh*'s dream, ill-favoured and lean-fleſhed, that it hath no colour in its face, no blood in its veins, no life nor heat at all in its members? What is it, that doth thus be-dwarf us in our Chriſtianity? What low, ſordid, unworthy principles do we act by, that thus hinder our growth, and make us ſtand at a ſtay, and keep us always at the very porch and entrance where we firſt began? Is it a ſleepy, ſluggiſh

giſh conceit, that it is enough for us, if we be but once in a ſtate of grace, if we have but once ſtepped over the threſhold; we need not take ſo great pains to travel any farther? or is it another damping, choaking, ſtifling opinion, that Chriſt hath done all for us already without us, and nothing need more to be done within us? no matter how wicked we be in ourſelves, for we have holineſs without us; no matter how ſickly and diſeaſed our ſouls be within, for they have health without them. Why may we not as well be ſatisfied and contented to have happineſs without us too to all eternity, and ſo ourſelves for ever continue miſerable? *Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteouſneſs is righteous, even as he is righteous:* but *he that committeth ſin is of the devil.* I ſhall therefore exhort you in the wholeſome words of St. *Peter*; *Give all diligence to add to your faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; to patience, godlineſs; and to godlineſs, brotherly-kindneſs; and to brotherly-kindneſs, charity: For if theſe things be in you and abound, they make you, that ye ſhall neither be barren nor unfruitful in the knowledge of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* The Apoſtle ſtill goes on, and I cannot leave him yet: *But he that lacketh theſe things is blind, and cannot ſee far off, and hath forgotten, that he was once purged from his old ſins. Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election ſure; for if ye do theſe things, ye ſhall never fall.* Let us not only talk and diſpute of Chriſt, but let us indeed *put on the Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* Having thoſe *great and precious promiſes*, which he hath given us, let us ſtrive to be made *partakers of the divine nature, eſcaping the corruption, that is in the world through luſt:* and being begotten again to a lively hope of enjoying Chriſt hereafter, *let us purify ourſelves, as he is pure.*

Let us really declare, that we know Chriſt, that we are his diſciples, by our keeping of his commandments; and amongſt the reſt, that commandment eſpecially, which our Saviour Chriſt himſelf commendeth to his diſciples in a peculiar manner; *This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you:* and again, *Theſe things I command you, that you love one another. Let us follow peace with all men, and holineſs, without which no man ſhall ſee God. Let us put on as the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindneſs, humbleneſs of mind, meekneſs, long-ſuffering, forbearing one another, and forgiving one another, if any man have a quarrel againſt any, even as Chriſt forgave us: and above all theſe things let us put on charity, which is the bond of perfectneſs. Let us in meekneſs inſtruct thoſe, that oppoſe themſelves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; that they may recover themſelves out of the ſnares of the devil, that are taken captive by him at his will. Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God, and whoſoever loveth is born of God and knoweth God.*

O divine love! the ſweet harmony of ſouls! the muſick of angels! the joy of God's own heart! the very darling of his boſom! the ſource of true happineſs! the pure quinteſſence of heaven! that which reconciles the jarring principles of the world, and makes them all chime together! that which melts men's hearts into one another! See how St. *Paul* deſcribes it, and it cannot chuſe but enamour your affections towards it: *Love envieth*

not,

not, it is not puffed up, it doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. I may add in a word, it is the best-natured thing, the best complexioned thing in the world. Let us express this sweet harmonious affection in these jarring times: that so, if it be possible, we may tune the world into better musick. Especially in matters of religion, let us strive with all meekness to instruct and convince one another. Let us endeavour to promote the Gospel of peace, the dove-like Gospel, with a dove-like Spirit. This was the way, by which the Gospel at first was propagated in the world: *Christ did not cry, nor lift up his voice in the streets; a bruised reed he did not break, and the smoking flax he did not quench*; and yet *he brought forth judgment unto victory.* He whisper'd the Gospel to us from mount *Sion*, in a still voice; and yet the sound thereof went out quickly throughout all the earth. The Gospel at first came down upon the world gently and softly, like the dew upon *Gideon*'s fleece; and yet it quickly soaked quite through it: and doubtless, this is still the most effectual way to promote it farther. Sweetness and ingenuity will more command men's minds than passion, sourness and severity; as the soft pillow sooner breaks the flint, than the hardest marble. Let us ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, *follow truth in love*; and of the two indeed, be contented rather to miss of the conveying of a speculative truth, than to part with love. When we would convince men of any error by the strength of truth, let us withal pour the sweet balm of love upon their heads. Truth and love are two the most powerful things in the world; and when they both go together, they cannot easily be withstood. The golden beams of truth, and the silken cords of love, twisted together, will draw men on with a sweet violence, whether they will or no.

Let us take heed we do not sometimes call that zeal for God and his Gospel, which is nothing else but our own tempestuous and stormy passion. True zeal is a sweet, heavenly and gentle flame, which maketh us active for God, but always within the sphere of love. It never calls for fire from heaven, to consume those, that differ a little from us in their apprehensions. It is like that kind of lightning (which the philosophers speak of) that melts the sword within, but sindgeth not the scabbard: it strives to save the soul, but hurteth not the body. True zeal is a loving thing, and makes us always active to edification, and not to destruction. If we keep the fire of zeal within the chimney, in its own proper place, it never doth any hurt; it only warmeth, quickeneth and enliveneth us: but if once we let it break out, and catch hold of the thatch of our flesh, and kindle our corrupt nature, and set the house of our body on fire, it is no longer zeal, it is no heavenly fire, it is a most destructive and devouring thing. True zeal is an *ignis lambens*, a soft and gentle flame, that will not scorch one's hand; it is no predatory or voracious thing: but carnal and fleshly zeal is like the spirit of gun-powder set on fire, that tears and blows up all, that stands before it. True zeal is like the vital heat in us, that we live upon, which we never feel to be angry or troublesome; but though it gently feed upon the radical oil within us, that sweet balsam of our natural moisture, yet it lives lovingly with it, and maintains that, by which it is fed: but that other furious and distempered zeal is nothing else but a fever in the soul. To con-

clude, we may learn what kind of zeal it is, that we ſhould make uſe of in promoting the Goſpel, by an emblem of God's own, given us in the Scripture, thoſe fiery tongues, that, upon the day of *Pentecoſt*, ſat upon the Apoſtles; which ſure were harmleſs flames; for we cannot read, that they did any hurt, or that they did ſo much as ſindge an hair of their heads.

I will therefore ſhut up this with that of the Apoſtle; *Let us keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.* Let this ſoft and ſilken knot of love tie our hearts together; though our heads and apprehenſions cannot meet, as indeed they never will, but always ſtand at ſome diſtance off from one another. Our zeal, if it be heavenly, if it be true Veſtal fire kindled from above, will not delight to tarry here below, burning up ſtraw and ſtubble, and ſuch combuſtible things, and ſending up nothing but groſs and earthy fumes to heaven; but it will riſe up, and return back pure as it came down, and will be ever ſtriving to carry up men's hearts to God along with it. It will be only occupied about the promoting of thoſe things, which are unqueſtionably good; and when it moves in the iraſcible way, it will quarrel with nothing but ſin. Here let our zeal buſy and exerciſe itſelf, every one of us beginning firſt at our own hearts. Let us be more zealous than ever we have yet been, in fighting againſt our luſts, in pulling down thoſe ſtrong holds of ſin and Satan in our hearts. Here let us exerciſe all our courage and reſolution, our manhood and magnanimity.

Let us truſt in the almighty arm of our God, and doubt not but he will as well deliver us from the power of ſin in our hearts, as preſerve us from the wrath to come. Let us go out againſt theſe uncircumciſed Philiſtines, I mean our luſts, not with ſhield or ſpear, not in any confidence of our own ſtrength, but in the name of the Lord of hoſts; and we ſhall prevail, we ſhall overcome our luſts: *for greater is he that is in us, than he that is in them. The eternal God is our refuge, and underneath are everlaſting arms; he ſhall thruſt out theſe enemies from before us; and he ſhall ſay, Deſtroy them.* We ſhall enter the true *Canaan*, the good land of promiſe, *that floweth with milk and honey*, the land of truth and holineſs. *Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that you may be able to withſtand. Let your loins be girt about with truth; have on the breaſt-plate of righteouſneſs; and let your feet be ſhod with the preparation of the goſpel of peace. Above all, take the ſhield of faith, whereby ye ſhall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked; and take the helmet of ſalvation, and the ſword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.* And laſtly, be ſure of this, that ye *be ſtrong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might.*

There be ſome, that diſhearten us in this ſpiritual warfare, and would make us let our weapons fall out of our hands, by working in us a deſpair of victory. There be ſome evil ſpies, that weaken the hands and hearts of the children of *Iſrael*, and bring an ill report upon that land, that we are to conquer, telling of nothing but ſtrange giants, the ſons of *Anak*, there, that we ſhall never be able to overcome. *The Amalekites* (ſay they) *dwell in the South, the Hittites, Jebuſites, Amorites in the mountains, and the Canaanites by the ſea-coaſt*; huge armies of tall invincible luſts: *we ſhall never be able to go againſt this people*; we ſhall never be able to prevail againſt our corruptions. Hearken not unto them, I beſeech you, but hear what *Ca-*

Ieb and *Joshua* say; *Let us go up at once and possess it, for we are able to overcome them*; not by our own strength, but by the power of the Lord of hosts. There are indeed sons of *Anak* there, there are mighty giant-like lusts, that we are to grapple with; nay, there are principalities and powers too, that we are to oppose: but the great *Michael, the Captain of the Lord's host*, is with us; he commands in chief for us, and we need not be dismayed. *Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he, which goeth before thee as a consuming fire; he shall destroy these enemies, and bring them down before thy face.* If thou wilt be faithful to him, and put thy trust in him, *as the fire consumeth the stubble, and as the flame burneth up the chaff*, so will he destroy thy lusts in thee: *their root shall be rottenness, and their blossom shall go up as the dust.*

But let us take heed, that we be not discouraged, and, before we begin to fight, despair of victory: but to believe and hope well in the power of our God and his strength, will be half a conquest. Let us not think holiness in the hearts of men here in the world is a forlorn, forsaken, and outcast thing from God, that he hath no regard of holiness; wherever it is, though never so small, if it be but hearty and sincere, it can no more be cut off, and discontinued from God, than a sun-beam here upon earth can be broken off from its intercourse with the sun, and be left alone amidst the mire and dirt of this world. The sun may as well discard its own rays, and banish them from itself into some region of darkness far remote from it, where they shall have no dependence at all upon it, as God can forsake and abandon holiness in the world, and leave it a poor orphan thing, that shall have no influence at all from him to preserve and keep it. Holiness is something of God, wherever it is; it is an efflux from him, that always hangs upon him, and lives in him: as the sun-beams, although they gild this lower world, and spread their golden wings over us, yet they are not so much here, where they shine, as in the sun, from whence they flow. God cannot draw a curtain betwixt himself and holiness, which is nothing but the splendour and shining of himself; he cannot hide his face from it, he cannot desert it in the world. He, that is once *born of God, shall overcome the world*, and the prince of this world too, by the power of God in him. Holiness is no solitary neglected thing; it hath stronger confederacies, greater alliances, than sin and wickedness. It is in league with God and the universe; the whole creation smiles upon it: there is something of God in it, and therefore it must needs be a victorious and triumphant thing.

Wickedness is a weak, cowardly and guilty thing, a fearful and trembling shadow. It is the child of ignorance and darkness; it is afraid of light, and cannot possibly withstand the power of it, nor endure the sight of its glittering armour. It is allianced to none but wretched, forlorn and apostate spirits, that do what they can to support their own weak and tottering kingdom of darkness, but are only strong in weakness and impotency. The whole polity and commonwealth of devils is not so powerful as one child of light, one babe in Christ; they are not able to quench the least smoking flax, to extinguish one spark of grace. Darkness is not able to make resistance against light, but ever, as it comes, flies before it. But if wickedness

wickedneſs invite the ſociety of devils to it, (as we learn by the ſad experience of theſe preſent times, in many examples of thoſe, that were poſſeſſed with malice, revengefulneſs and luſt) ſo that thoſe curſed fiends do moſt readily apply themſelves to it, and offer their ſervice to feed it and encourage it, becauſe it is their own life and nature, their own kingdom of darkneſs, which they ſtrive to enlarge and to ſpread the dominions of; ſhall we then think, that holineſs, which is ſo nearly allied unto God, hath no good genius at all in the world to attend upon it, to help it and encourage it? Shall not the kingdom of light be as true to its own intereſt, and as vigilant for the enlarging of itſelf, as the kingdom of darkneſs? Holineſs is never alone in the world, but God is always with it, and his loving Spirit doth ever aſſociate and join itſelf to it. He, that ſent it into the world, is with it, as Chriſt ſpeaketh of himſelf; *The Father hath not left me alone, becauſe I do always thoſe things that pleaſe him.* Holineſs is the life of God, which he cannot but feed and maintain whereſoever it is: and as devils are always active to encourage evil, ſo we cannot imagine, but that the heavenly hoſt of bleſſed angels above are buſily employ'd in the promoting of that, which they love beſt, that which is deareſt to God, whom they ſerve, the life and nature of God. *There is joy in heaven at the converſion of one ſinner*; heaven takes notice of it; there is a Choir of angels, that ſweetly ſings the epithalamium of a ſoul divorced from ſin and Satan, and eſpouſed unto Chriſt. What therefore the wiſe man ſpeaks concerning wiſdom, I ſhall apply to holineſs: *Take faſt hold of holineſs, let her not go, keep her, for ſhe is thy life: keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the iſſues of life*, and of death too. Let nothing be eſteemed of greater conſequence and concernment to thee than what thou doeſt and acteſt, how thou liveſt. Nothing without us can make us either happy or miſerable; nothing can either defile us, or hurt us, but what goeth out from us, what ſpringeth and bubbleth up out of our own hearts. We have dreadful apprehenſions of the flames of hell without us; we tremble, and are afraid, when we hear of fire and brimſtone; whilſt in the mean time we ſecurely nouriſh within our own hearts a true and living hell,

——— *& cæco carpimur igni:*

The dark fire of our luſts conſumeth our bowels within, and miſerably ſcorcheth our ſouls, and we are not troubled at it. We do not perceive, how hell ſteals upon us whilſt we live here. And as for heaven, we only gaze abroad, expecting, that it ſhould come in to us from without, but never look for the beginnings of it to ariſe within, in our own hearts.

But leſt there ſhould yet haply remain any prejudice againſt that, which I have all this while heartily commended to you, *true holineſs*, and the *keeping of Chriſt's commandments*, as if it were a legal and a ſervile thing, that would ſubject us to a ſtate of bondage; I muſt here needs add a word or two, either for the prevention, or removal of it. I do not therefore mean

by holineſs, the meer performance of outward duties of religion, coldly acted over as a taſk; nor our habitual prayings, hearings, faſtings, multiplied one upon another, (though theſe be all good, as ſubſervient to an higher end:) but I mean an inward ſoul and principle of divine life, that ſpiriteth all theſe, that enliveneth and quickeneth the dead carcaſe of all outward performances whatſoever. I do not here urge the *dead law of outward works*, which indeed, if it be alone, ſubjects us to a *ſtate of bondage*; but the inward law of the Goſpel, the *law of the ſpirit of life*, than which nothing can be more free and ingenuous: for it doth not act us by principles without us, but is an inward ſelf-moving principle living in our hearts.

The firſt, though it work us into ſome outward conformity to God's commandments, and ſo hath a good effect upon the world; yet we are all this while but like dead inſtruments of muſick, that ſound ſweetly and harmoniouſly, when they are only ſtruck and play'd upon from without by the muſician's hand, who hath the theory and law of muſick living within himſelf.

But the ſecond, the living law of the Goſpel, the *law of the ſpirit of life* within us, is as if the ſoul of muſick ſhould incorporate itſelf with the inſtrument, and live in the ſtrings, and make them of their own accord, without any touch or impulſe from without, dance up and down, and warble out their harmonies.

They, that are acted only by an outward law, are but like *Neuroſpaſts*, or thoſe little puppets, that ſkip nimbly up and down, and ſeem to be full of quick and ſprightly motion; whereas they are all the while moved artificially by certain wires and ſtrings from without, and not by any principle of motion from themſelves within: or elſe like clocks and watches, that go pretty regularly for a while, but are moved by weights and plummets, or ſome other artificial ſprings, that muſt be ever now and then wound up, or elſe they ceaſe.

But they, that are acted by the *new law of the Goſpel*, by the *law of the ſpirit*, they have an inward principle of life in them, that from the centre of itſelf puts forth itſelf freely and conſtantly into all obedience to the will of Chriſt. This *new law of the Goſpel* is a kind of muſical ſoul, informing the dead organ of our hearts, that makes them of their own accord delight to act harmoniouſly according to the rule of God's word.

The law, that I ſpeak of, is a law of love, which is the moſt powerful law in world; and yet it freeth us in a manner from all law without us, becauſe it maketh us become a law unto ourſelves. The more it prevaileth in us, the more it eateth up and devoureth all other laws without us; juſt as *Aaron*'s living rod did ſwallow up thoſe rods of the Magicians, that were made only to counterfeit a little life.

Quis legem det amantibus?
Major lex amor eſt ſibi.

Love is at once a freedom from all law, a ſtate of pureſt liberty; and yet a law too of the moſt conſtraining and indiſpenſible neceſſity.

The worſt law in the world is *the law of ſin, which is in our members*; which keeps us in a condition of moſt abſolute ſlavery, when we are wholly under

under the tyrannical commands of our luſts: this is a cruel *Pharaoh* indeed, that ſets his hard taſk-maſters over us, and maketh us wretchedly drudge in mire and clay.

The law of the letter without us ſets us in a condition of little more liberty, by reſtraining us from many outward acts of ſin; but yet it doth not diſenthral us from the power of ſin in our hearts.

But the *law of the ſpirit of life*, the *Goſpel-law of love*, it puts us into a condition of moſt pure and perfect liberty; and whoſoever really entertains this law, he hath *thruſt out Hagar* quite, he hath *caſt out the bond-woman and her children*; from henceforth *Sarah the free woman* ſhall live for ever with him, and ſhe ſhall be to him a mother of many children; her ſeed ſhall be *as the ſand of the ſea-ſhore for number*, and *as the ſtars of heaven*. Here is evangelical liberty, here is Goſpel-freedom, when *the law of the ſpirit of life in Chriſt Jeſus hath made us free from the law of ſin and death*; when we have a liberty from ſin, and not a liberty to ſin: for our dear Lord and Maſter hath told us, that *whoſoever committeth ſin, is the ſervant of it*.

He that lies under the power and vaſſalage of his baſe luſts, and yet talks of Goſpel-freedom, he is but like a poor condemned priſoner, that in his ſleep dreams of being ſet at liberty, and of walking up and down whereſoever he pleaſeth, whilſt his legs are all the while locked faſt in fetters and irons. To pleaſe ourſelves with a notion of Goſpel-liberty, whilſt we have not a Goſpel-principle of holineſs within us, to free us from the power of ſin, is nothing elſe but to gild over our bonds and fetters, and to fancy ourſelves to be in a golden cage. There is a ſtraitneſs, ſlavery and narrowneſs in ſin: ſin crouds and crumples up our ſouls, which, if they were freely ſpread abroad, would be as wide and as large as the whole univerſe.

No man is truly free, but he that hath his will enlarged to the extent of God's own will, by loving whatſoever God loves, and nothing elſe. Such a one doth not fondly hug this and that particular created good thing, and enthrall himſelf unto it; but he loveth every thing, that is lovely, beginning at God, and deſcending down to all his creatures, according to the ſeveral degrees of perfection in them. He enjoys a boundleſs liberty, and a boundleſs ſweetneſs, according to his boundleſs love. He inclaſpeth the whole world within his out-ſtretched arms; his ſoul is as wide as the whole univerſe, as big as *yeſterday*, *to-day*, *and for ever*. Whoſoever is once acquainted with this diſpoſition of ſpirit, he never deſires any thing elſe, and he loves the life of God in himſelf dearer than his own life. To conclude this therefore; if we love Chriſt, and *keep his commandments*, *his commandments will not be grievous to us*; *his yoke will be eaſy*, *and his burden light*: it will not put us into a ſtate of bondage, but of perfect liberty. For it is moſt true of evangelical obedience, what the wiſe man ſpeaketh of wiſdom, *Her ways are ways of pleaſantneſs*, *and all her paths are peace*: *She is a tree of life to thoſe that lay hold upon her*, *and happy are all they that retain her*.

I will now ſhut up all with one or two conſiderations, to perſuade you farther to the *keeping of Chriſt's commandments*.

Firſt, from the deſire, which we all have of knowledge. If we would indeed know divine truths, the only way to come to this is by *keeping of*

Chriſt's

Christ's commandments. The grossness of our apprehensions in spiritual things, and our many mistakes, that we have about them, proceed from nothing but those dull and foggy steams, which rise up from our foul hearts, and becloud our understandings. If we did but heartily comply with Christ's commandments, and purge our hearts from all gross and sensual affections, we should not then look about for truth wholly without ourselves, and enslave ourselves to the dictates of this and that teacher, and hang upon the lips of men; but we should find the great eternal God inwardly teaching our souls, and continually instructing us more and more in the mysteries of his will; and *out of our bellies should flow rivers of living waters.* Nothing puts a stop and hindrance to the passage of truth in the world, but the carnality of our hearts, the corruption of our lives.

'Tis not wrangling disputes, and syllogistical reasonings, that are the mighty pillars, that underprop truth in the world: if we would but underset it with the holiness of our hearts and lives, it should never fail. Truth is a prevailing and conquering thing, and would quickly overcome the world, did not the earthiness of our dispositions, and the darkness of our false hearts hinder it. Our Saviour Christ bids the blind man wash off the clay, that was upon his eyes in the pool of *Siloam*, and then he should see clearly; intimating this to us, that it is the earthiness of men's affections, that darkens the eye of their understandings in spiritual things. Truth is always ready and near at hand, if our eyes were not closed up with mud, that we could but open them to look upon it. Truth always waits upon our souls, and offers itself freely to us, as the sun offers its beams to every eye, that will but open, and let them shine in upon it. If we could but purge our hearts from that filth and defilement, which hangeth about them, there would be no doubt at all of truth's prevailing in the world. For *truth is great, and stronger than all things: all the earth calleth upon truth, and the heaven blesseth it; all works shake and tremble at it. The truth endureth, and is always strong; it liveth and conquereth for evermore. She is the strength, kingdom, power, and majesty of all ages. Blessed be the God of truth.*

Secondly, If we desire a true reformation, as some would bethought to do; let us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in *keeping Christ's commandments.* All outward forms and models of reformation, though they be never so good in their kind, yet they are of little worth to us without this inward reformation of the heart. Tin, or lead, or any other baser metal, if it be cast into never so good a mould, and made up into never so elegant a figure, yet is but tin or lead still; it is the same metal, that it was before. If adulterate silver, that hath much alloy or dross in it, have never so current a stamp put upon it, yet it will not pass notwithstanding, when the touchstone trieth it. We must be reformed within, with a spirit of fire, and a spirit of burning, to purge us from the dross and corruption of our hearts, and refine us as gold and silver; and then we shall be reformed truly, and not before. When this once comes to pass, then shall Christ be set upon his throne indeed, then *the glory of the Lord shall overflow the land*; then we shall be a people acceptable unto him, and as *Mount Sion*, which he dearly loved.

THE

THE SECOND SERMON: OR, A DISCOURSE

On 1 Corinth. XV. 57.

But thanks be to God, which giveth us the Victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς Θείας φύσεως μίμησις.
S. Gregory Nyssen.

CHRIST's resurrection, which the Apostle treateth of in the former part of this chapter, is one of the main and principal articles of our Christian faith: for though Christ by his death upon the cross made a propitiatory sacrifice for the world, yet it was his resurrection only, which did manifest his death to be effectual and available for that end, and did evidence its acceptation with God. For if the grave had detain'd Christ, and held him prisoner, this would have been an argument, that the debt, for which he was committed to that dark dungeon, was not yet paid, nor satisfaction made; for *if Christ be not raised* (saith the Apostle) *your faith is in vain, ye are yet in your sins.* But now death and the grave having delivered up Christ out of their custody, his resurrection is an undoubted argument, that they had no more to lay to his charge, as he was a surety and undertaker for mankind; but the debt, which was owing to the law and divine justice, was in the court of heaven fully acquitted and discharged. For *Christ was delivered from our sins, and rose again for our justification.* Verse 17. Rom. iv.

And though Christ's other miracles ought to have conciliated belief to his doctrine from the Jews; yet his resurrection from the dead, (foretold

(foretold by himſelf, and really accompliſhed) added to all the reſt, *was a moſt undoubted and unqueſtionable confirmation of his prophetical miniſtry.* For if it were ſuppoſed, (as the Jews of old, and the Talmudiſts of later times, maliciouſly calumniated our Saviour Chriſt) that a mere wizzard or magician ſhould have appeared, and not only have done many miracles by *Beelzebub* and the powers of darkneſs, but alſo have foretold, that after he had been put to death, he ſhould riſe again, and have given this as a farther ſign to confirm his prophecy, as our Saviour did, *Matth.* xii. 39. it could never be conceiv'd, that Divine Providence ſhould ſuffer ſuch an impoſtor miraculouſly to riſe again, in ſo remarkable a manner, and ſo often to appear before the eyes of ſo many ſpectators, and at laſt viſibly to aſcend up to heaven. Becauſe this would have been *tentatio invincibilis* to mankind; it being not imaginable, what greater aſſurance heaven itſelf could give, to confirm and ſeal a prophet, and perſuade the world, that what he did was by the finger of God, and not by magical impoſture, than this is. And therefore it is obſervable, that though a good while after our Saviour's time, when the Jews had now forfeited that peculiar Providence, that watched over them, a certain counterfeit Meſſias, one *David El-Roy*, was permitted to do ſeveral ſtrange and miraculous things by magick and witchcraft, if the Jewiſh relations be true; yet, when he gave this for a ſign to the Perſian king, to prove himſelf the Meſſias, that after he was beheaded by him, he ſhould riſe again, he plainly diſcovered his impoſture, to the great diſappointment of the deluded Jews, who (as *Maimonides* writes) in vain expected his reſurrection a good while after.

In Iggereth Teman.

Moreover, *If Chriſt had not riſen again after death, the world would not have had ſufficient ground to truſt and believe in him as a Saviour.* St. *Auſtin* reckoned it as great a miracle as any, that Chriſt ever did upon earth, that the world ſhould be brought off to believe in a crucified Saviour. For to worſhip תלוי, as the Jews by way of diſgrace call our Saviour, or τὸν ἀνασκολοπιζόμενον in *Lucian*'s language, *one that was hanged*, for a God, and to believe in him, could not but ſeem a monſtrous and prodigious thing, both to Jews and Gentiles; and certainly it would never have been brought to paſs, had there not been unqueſtionable aſſurance given of Chriſt's reſurrection from the dead. For who would be ſo ſottiſh, as to believe in a dead Saviour, and to expect help and aſſiſtance from him, that had not been able to help himſelf, and therefore had given no proof, that he was able to help others? nay, from him, that, to all human appearance, had now no being at all? Upon which account the Pſalmiſt upbraids the ſottiſh Heathen, that *they ate the ſacrifices of the dead.* Wherefore it is obſervable, in the Goſpel, that when Chriſt was now dead, and buried in his ſepulchre, the hope and expectation of his diſciples, who had formerly believed in him, lay, as it were, intombed in the ſame ſepulchre with him. And then the two diſciples, that went to *Emmaus*, could only ſay, *We truſted, that this had been he, which ſhould have redeemed Iſrael.* But afterwards, when they were able upon good grounds to affirm, that Κύριος ἀληθῶς ἀνέστη, *The Lord was riſen indeed*, then their faith revived a-new, and mounted up higher than ever, and grew triumphant in them.

Pſal. cvi.

Luke xxiv.

Again,

Again, there was another excellent design in Christ's resurrection from the dead, which the Apostle pursues largely also in this chapter; *viz. To give the world assurance of a life after death, and a blessed immortality to be enjoyed by all true believers and followers of Christ.* Christ, by his resurrection, hath *abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light*, as the Apostle speaks, 2 *Tim.* i. 10. or, as the Church sings in that divine anthem, *After he had overcome the sharpness of death, he opened the kingdom of heaven to all believers.* The reasons of philosophy, that prove the soul's immortality, though firm and demonstrative in themselves, yet they are so thin and subtil to vulgar apprehensions, that they glide away through them, and leave no such palpable impressions on them, as can be able sufficiently to bear up against that heavy weight of gross infidelity, that continually sinks down the minds of men to a distrust of such high things, as be above the reach of sense. Neither are these considerations any longer of force, than men can actually attend to the strength and coherence of the demonstration; and when that actual attention (which is operose and difficult) is taken off, then the truth itself, like a spectre or apparition, suddenly vanishes away, and men question with themselves afterwards, whether there were any such thing, or no. Such thin and evanid things are philosophical speculations about the high mysteries of faith and religion. But Christ his raising of the self-same body, which was laid in the sepulchre, and afterwards appearing in it often to his disciples, gave such evident assurance of the soul's immortality and life after death, as must needs strike more strongly upon vulgar minds, and make more palpable impressions on them, and be always of more present and ready use, than any philosophical reasons and demonstrations.

And the Scripture is herein very harmonious, and agreeable to itself, both in the Old and New Testament; for, as in the one, it makes the original of death's entrance into the world to be the sin and disobedience of the first *Adam*, who was ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς, χοϊκός, *of the earth, earthy*; so, in the other, it attributes the recovery of life and immortality to the meritorious obedience of the second *Adam*, that was ὁ Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπουράνιος, *the Lord from heaven, heavenly*, who by his death vanquished and destroyed death. For as *Sampson*, who was a type of our Saviour, when he was besieged by the *Philistines* in the city *Gaza* (*Judges* xvi.) rose up at midnight, and pulled up the gates of the city, and the posts, and laying them upon his shoulders, carried them up to the top of the hill; in like manner, Christ our Lord, when he was environed and encompassed by death, after he had been a while detained under the custody thereof, he ascended victoriously out of the power of the grave, and carried the gates of hell and death upon his shoulders along with him triumphantly into heaven: he slighted and dismantled that mighty garrison, whose walls were stronger than brass, and gates harder than adamant, that it should be no longer a prison, with doors and bars to shut up those, that believe in him, but an open and free passage, and a broad highway to life and immortality. He *is the resurrection and the life*, (John xi. 25.) and *he that believeth in him, though he were dead, yet shall he live.* For *he that liveth, and was dead, and is alive for evermore, even he hath the keys of hell and of death*, Rev. i. 18.

But that, which I chiefly aim at this time, concerning *Jesus* his resurrection, and ascension into heaven, is this, *That by and after it he was made Lord and Christ, King and Saviour, and Sovereign of his church.* Not but that Christ's Humanity was always hypostatically united to the Divinity; but because the oeconomical kingdom of Christ, as Mediator, according to the Scripture-calculation, seems not to commence, till after his state of humiliation was, and so begins its epocha from Christ's resurrection, or his exaltation to sit at God's right-hand in heaven. *Acts* ii. 36. *Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* Acts v. 31. *Jesus, whom ye slew and hanged on a tree, him hath God exalted on his right-hand, to be a prince and a Saviour*, &c. Philip. ii. 9. *Who humbled himself, and became obedient to the death of the cross; wherefore God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow*, &c. *and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.* And that article of our creed, concerning Christ's sitting at God's right-hand in heaven, signifies thus much unto us; that Christ, after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, hath all power given him, both in heaven and in earth, all things being made subject to him, *excepting him only,*
1 Cor. xv. 27. *that hath put all things under him.* He being, for the comfort of his church and members here upon earth, according to his humanity, made God's vicegerent, and seated in his Father's throne; and having a mediatorious
Verse 24. kingdom bestowed upon him, that shall continue, *till he hath put down all authority and power, and hath subdued all his enemies under his feet*; and then
Verse 28. hath delivered up this oeconomical kingdom to God the Father, *that God may be all in all.*

And this is an unspeakable consolation, that Christian religion affords to us, and a most gracious condescension of the All-wise God; that forasmuch as we, who dwell in these houses of clay, are so far removed from the pure and abstracted Deity, and so infinitely disproportioned unto it, that there should be such a contrivance as this set on foot, that we should have one of our own flesh and blood, that was in all things tempted, like unto us, and had experience of all our difficulties and calamities; who demonstrated his infinite love to us in laying down his life for us, and therefore we cannot doubt, but hath a most tender sympathy and fellow-feeling with us in all our infirmities; I say, that we should have such a one exalted to God's right-hand, and invested with all authority and power, both in heaven and earth, that he might administer all things for the good of his church and members, and supply them in all their wants and necessities. Which consideration must needs be far more comfortable, chearing, and reviving to every true Christian, than it was to the sons of *Jacob*, when they went down to *Egypt* to buy corn and provision for their necessities, to think, that *Joseph* their brother was made lord of all the land.

And yet, notwithstanding, this is wholly eluded and evacuated by those high-flown spiritualists of these latter times, that slight and reject the letter of the New Testament, as a mean and carnal thing, and will acknowledge no other death and resurrection of Christ, no other ascension and sitting at God's right-hand; nay, no other day of judgment, nor resurrection

rection of the body, but what is myſtical and allegorical; whereby they do not only impudently ſlur the Goſpel, according to the hiſtory and the letter, in making it no better, than a romantical legend, or a mere Æſopick fable, that contains a good ἐπιμύθιον, or moral under it; but alſo plainly defeat the counſel of God againſt themſelves and mankind, by antiquating Chriſtianity, and bringing in, inſtead thereof, old Paganiſm again, diſguiſed under a few canting phraſes of Scripture-language. For though *Moſes* had a veil over his face, though there were many obſcure umbrages and allegories in the Law, (the children of *Iſrael* being then not able to bear the brightneſs of that evangelical truth, that ſhined under them;) yet now, under the Goſpel, *we do all with open face behold, as in a glaſs, the glory of the Lord* nakedly repreſented to us, being *changed into the ſame image from glory to glory.* 2 Cor. iii.

But to let paſs theſe, and ſtill to improve our former meditation farther; let us in the next place conſider, that Chriſt, who received all this power after his reſurrection and aſcenſion, did not receive it in vain and to no purpoſe, either taking no notice of our human tranſactions here below, as having removed his pavilion too far into thoſe regions of light and glory from us; or elſe remaining, notwithſtanding, an idle ſpectator, and no way concerning or intereſting himſelf in the iſſues of our human affairs. Which will be ſo much the more improbable, if we conſider what the Scripture and experience tell us, that the devil and apoſtate ſpirits are perpetually active and buſy in promoting the concernments of the kingdom of darkneſs. And therefore doubtleſs he, whom God hath made the ſhepherd and biſhop of our ſouls, can never be ſo regardleſs of his office, nor ſo careleſs of his flock and tender lambs committed to his charge, as to ſuffer thoſe cruel wolves to prey upon them at pleaſure; and to have no pity at all for them, nor to extend his watchful providence over them, whom once he vouchſafed to redeem with his own precious blood. No certainly; he, that waded through ſo many difficulties and agonies for us in the days of his fleſh; he, that *bore our griefs, and carried our ſorrows*; he, that was *wounded for our tranſgreſſions, and bruiſed for our iniquities*; that ſwet drops of blood in the garden, and was nailed to the croſs for us in *Golgotha*; he cannot ſo eaſily forget thoſe, whom he hath ſo dearly bought, nor ſuffer all that power, which God hath inveſted him with for the good of his church, to lie by him idle and unemployed.

But to the end, that there might not be the leaſt ground of ſuſpicion, or diſtruſt, left in the minds of men concerning this particular, Chriſt, after his aſcenſion into heaven, thought good to give us a ſenſible demonſtration, both of his kingly power, and of his watchful care and providence over his church, that he would not leave them orphans, and deſtitute of all aſſiſtance, by *ſending down his Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecoſt, in a viſible and miraculous manner, upon his diſciples.* Acts ii. 32. *This Jeſus hath God raiſed up, of which we are all witneſſes: therefore, being by the right-hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promiſe of the Holy Ghoſt, he hath ſhed forth this, which ye now ſee and hear.* And verily, if there had been no news heard of our Lord and Saviour Chriſt, after he aſcended above the clouds out of his diſciples ſight, no real and viſible de-

monſtration of his exiſtence, power, and providence over his church; the diſtruſtful hearts of men would have been too prone to ſuſpect, that the pretence of an inviſible kingdom at God's right-hand above had been no better than a mere dream, an airy and phantaſtick notion; and they would have been too ready to have called in queſtion the truth of all his other miracles, his reſurrection and aſcenſion, witneſſed only by his own diſciples, and to have ſurmiſed thoſe ſeveral apparitions of his, that we read of after his death, had been nothing elſe but ſpectres, or phantaſms, like the vulgarly believed apparitions of the ghoſts of men in airy bodies. But the ſenſible and miraculous pouring out of the Holy Ghoſt upon his diſciples, after his aſcenſion into heaven, was a palpable confirmation of all Chriſt's other miracles, of the validity of his meritorious death and paſſion, of the truth of his reſurrection and aſcenſion; and gives moſt comfortable aſſurance to all believers to the world's end, that though his bodily preſence be withdrawn from them, yet he hath not left his church utterly forlorn, and deſtitute of all aſſiſtance; but that his Spirit, the Holy Comforter, continueth to be preſent amongſt them, as his vicegerent, and to aſſiſt them for all the holy purpoſes of the Goſpel, to the world's end. Now the principal effects of Chriſt's Holy Spirit, which are to be hoped for, and expected by every true believer and private Chriſtian, are compriſed by the Apoſtle under three heads here in the text, as conſiſting in a *threefold victory over a threefold enemy. The ſting of death is ſin, and the ſtrength of ſin is the law: but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.*

1. *A victory over ſin*, as that which is the cauſe of death.

2. *A victory over the law*, as that which aggravates the guilt, and exaſperates the power of ſin.

3. Laſtly, *A victory over death*, the fruit and conſequent of ſin.

Firſt therefore, *There is a victory over ſin, to be obtained in and through Chriſt.*

Some there are, that will acknowledge no other victory over ſin, but an external one; that whereby it was conquered for us by Chriſt upon the croſs, ſixteen hundred years ſince, where he *ſpoiled principalities and powers, and made a ſhew of them openly, triumphing over them in it*, Col. ii. 15. and where he *redeemed us from the curſe of the law, being made a curſe for us*, Gal. iii. 13. And doubtleſs this was one great end of Chriſt's coming into the world, to make a propitiatory ſacrifice for the ſins of mankind: not only that he might thereby put a period to thoſe continually-repeated and ineffectual ſacrifices of brute beaſts, and the offering of the blood of bulls and goats, that could not take away ſin, nor propitiate his Divine Majeſty; but alſo that he might at once give a ſenſible demonſtration, both of God's high diſpleaſure againſt ſin, and of his placableneſs and reconcileableneſs to ſinners returning to obedience; and therefore, to that end, that the deſpair of pardon might not hinder any from repentance and amendment of life, promulgate free pardon and remiſſion of ſins, through his blood, to all that ſhould repent, and believe the goſpel.

But.

But it is a very unſound and unwholeſome interpretation of this ſalutary undertaking of Chriſt's in the Goſpel, as if the ultimate end and deſign of it were to procure remiſſion of ſin, and exemption from puniſhment only, to ſome particular perſons ſtill continuing under the power of ſin, and to ſave them at laſt in their ſins, that is, with a mere outward and carnal ſalvation; it being a thing utterly impoſſible, that thoſe undefiled rewards of the heavenly kingdom ſhould be received and enjoyed by men in their unregenerate and unrenewed nature.

For what is this elſe, but to make Chriſt the grand patron of the kingdom of darkneſs, and to ſuppoſe God to be ſuch a Being as may be bribed and corrupted, by ſacrifice and interceſſion, to a partial connivance and fond indulgence of men in their ſins to all eternity? or elſe to inſinuate, that there is no other evil at all in ſin, but only in reſpect of that outward puniſhment conſequent upon it? Which is to deſtroy the nature and reality of ſin, and to make it nothing but a mere name or phancy; as if *good* and *evil*, *juſt* and *unjuſt*, (as ſome philoſophers dreamed) were not Φύσει, but Νόμῳ and Δόξᾳ only, had no reality in nature, but depended only upon arbitrary laws, enforced by outward puniſhments, or mere opinions; and ſo were only Ποιητὰ, (as *Democritus* expreſſeth it) mere factitious things, or elſe Φανταστὰ, fictitious and imaginary: either of which opinions, if they were true, then indeed remiſſion of ſin, and exemption from puniſhment, would quite take away all the evil of ſin.

But if ſin be not a mere name or phancy, but that which hath a real and intrinſecal evil in it, greater than that of outward puniſhment; then certainly it cannot be ſo tranſcendent a happineſs, as ſome men carnally conceit, to have an impunity in ſinning to all eternity, that the accompliſhment thereof ſhould be thought the only fit undertaking for the Son of God to engage in, and that which would deſervedly entitle him the Saviour of mankind. For that of *Socrates* in *Plato* muſt then needs be true, Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ διδόναι δίκην, πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν εἶναι, *That* (in thoſe, which are not incorrigible and incurable) *it is the greateſt evil, that can poſſibly befal them, to continue in wickedneſs unpuniſhed; and the greateſt kindneſs, that they can receive, by the leſſer evil of puniſhment and caſtigation, to be cured of the greater evil of ſin:* For (as the ſame philoſopher ſpeaks) Ἰατρικὴ τῆς πονηρίας δίκη, *chaſtiſement and correction is the natural remedy and cure of wickedneſs*; which our Saviour confirms, when he ſaith, *As many as I love, I rebuke and chaſten:* and ſure the remedy is not worſe than the diſeaſe. Rev. iii. 19.

Wherefore it was ſo far from being the ultimate end of Chriſt's undertaking to die for ſin, that men might ſecurely live in it, that on the contrary the death of Chriſt was particularly intended as an engine to batter down the kingdom of ſin and Satan, and to bring men effectually unto God and righteouſneſs, as the Scripture plainly witneſſeth, 1 *Pet.* ii. 24. *His own ſelf bare our ſins in his body on the tree, that we, being dead to ſin, might live to righteouſneſs.* The death of Chriſt conducing to this great end, not only as it was exemplary, and hieroglyphically inſtructed us, that we ought to *take up the croſs* likewiſe, and *follow our crucified Lord and Saviour, ſuffering in the fleſh, and ceaſing from ſin*; but alſo as it doth moſt lively demonſtrate to us God's high diſpleaſure againſt ſin, and the malignant nature of it, that 1 Pet. iv. 2.

that could not otherwiſe be expiated than by the blood of that innocent and immaculate Lamb, the only begotten Son of God; and laſtly, as the hope of pardon and free remiſſion of ſin, in the blood of Chriſt, for the truly penitent, might invite and animate men to chearful and vigorous endeavours againſt ſin.

Others there are, that tell us, there is indeed ſomething farther aimed at in the Goſpel beſides the bare *remiſſion of ſins*, but that it is nothing elſe but the *imputation of an external righteouſneſs*, or *another's inherent holineſs*, which is ſo completely made ours thereby to all intents and purpoſes, as if we ourſelves had been really and perfectly righteous; and this upon no other condition or qualification at all required in us, but only of mere faith ſcrupulouſly preſcinded from all holineſs and ſanctification, or the laying hold or apprehending only (as they uſe to phraſe it) of this external and imputed righteouſneſs; that is, the merely believing and imagining it to be ours: which kind of faith therefore is but the imagination of an imagination, or of that, which really is not, and, as *Pindar* calls man, Σκιᾶς ὄναρ, *the very dream of a ſhadow*.

For though this be pretended by ſome to be ſpoken only of juſtification as contradiſtinct from ſanctification, the latter of which they conceive muſt by no means have any conditional influence upon the former; yet it will unavoidably extend to the taking away of the neceſſity of inherent righteouſneſs and holineſs, and all obligation to it: upon which very account it is ſo highly acceptable, becauſe under a ſpecious ſhew of modeſty and humility it doth exceedingly gratify men's hypocriſy and carnality: for he, that is thus completely juſtified by the imputation of a mere external righteouſneſs, muſt needs have *ipſo facto* a right and title thereby to heaven and happineſs without holineſs; for, *Rom.* viii. 30. *Whom he juſtifieth, them he alſo glorifieth.* Neither can any thing be required inherently in them, where all inherency is perfectly ſupplied by imputation. And though it be pretended, that ſanctification will ſpontaneouſly follow after by way of gratitude; yet this is like to prove but a very ſlippery hold, where it is believed, that gratitude itſelf, as well as all other graces, is already in them by imputation. Neither can it be reaſonably thought, that true holineſs ſhould ſpring by way of gratitude or ingenuity from ſuch a principle of carnality, as makes men ſo well contented with a mere imaginary righteouſneſs.

But this opinion, as it makes God, in juſtifying, to pronounce a falſe ſentence, and to conceive of things otherwiſe than they are, and to do that, which himſelf hath declared to be abominable, *to juſtify the wicked* (in a forenſick ſenſe) and as it is irreconcilable to thoſe many Scriptures, that aſſure us *God will render to every man according to his works*; ſo it alſo takes away the neceſſity of Chriſt's meritorious and propitiatory ſacrifice for the remiſſion of ſins: for where a complete righteouſneſs is imputed, there is no ſin at all to be pardoned. And laſtly, it vainly ſuppoſes righteouſneſs and holineſs to be mere phantaſtical and imaginary things; for otherwiſe it were no more poſſible, that a wicked man ſhould be made righteous by another's righteouſneſs imputed, than that a ſick man ſhould be made whole by another's imputed health. *If a brother or ſiſter be naked and deſtitute of daily food, and one of you ſay unto them, Depart in peace, be you warmed, and be you*

Prov. xvii. 15.

you filled; *notwithſtanding you give them not thoſe things, which are needful for the body*; *what doth it profit?* James ii. 15, 16. *Even ſo, what doth it profit, my brethren, if a man ſay he hath faith* (or imputed righteouſneſs) *and have not works?* (that is, real and inherent righteouſneſs, or inward regeneration) *can ſuch a faith* (that is, imagination or imputation) *ſave him?* Certainly no more than mere words can clothe a naked man's back, or feed a hungry man's belly, or warm and thaw him, whoſe blood is frozen and congealed in his veins. Nay, it is no more poſſible for a man to be made holy, than to be made happy, by mere imputation, which latter few men would be contented withal; and, were it not for their hypocriſy, they would be as little contented with the former; and it would as little pleaſe them to be *opinione tantùm juſti*, as *opinione tantùm beati*, to uſe *Tully*'s expreſſion againſt the Epicureans. Nay, ſince it is moſt certain, that the greateſt part of our happineſs conſiſteth in righteouſneſs and holineſs, it will unavoidably follow, that if we have no other than an imputative righteouſneſs, we can have no other than an imputative happineſs, and a mere imaginary heaven, which will little pleaſe us, when we feel ourſelves to be in a true and real hell.

But it is not our intention here to quarrel about words and phraſes, as if Chriſt's meritorious ſatisfaction might not be ſaid to be imputed to thoſe, that repent and believe the Goſpel for remiſſion of ſins; much leſs to deny what the holy Scripture plainly aſſerts, true and living faith, that worketh by love, which is the very eſſence of the new creature, or regenerate nature, λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, *to be imputed*, or *accounted for righteouſneſs* under the Goſpel-diſpenſation, where God will not proceed according to legal rigour and ſeverity with his fallen creatures, but according to that equity and Ἐπιείκεια, which the philoſopher tells us is the trueſt juſtice. But our only deſign is, to caution againſt that Antinomian error, which is too often inſinuated under the notion of imputed righteouſneſs, as if there were no neceſſity of inherent righteouſneſs, and a real victory over ſin, in order to ſalvation, but that an imputed or imaginary one might ſerve the turn. Which error ſpringing up very early amongſt the Gnoſtick Chriſtians, St. *John* gives a very ſeaſonable antidote againſt it, 1 *John* iii. 7. *Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteouſneſs, is righteous, even as he is righteous:* and in chap. ii. ver. 4. *He that ſaith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a lyar, and the truth is not in him.* To which purpoſe is that alſo in his firſt chapter, ver. 5. *This is the meſſage, which we have heard of him, and declare to you, that God is light, and in him is no darkneſs at all. If we ſay, that we have fellowſhip with him, and walk in darkneſs, we lye, and do not the truth: But if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowſhip one with another, and the blood of Jeſus Chriſt his ſon cleanſeth us from all ſin.* Wherefore the ſame Apoſtle, in that epiſtle, tells us of *overcoming the wicked one*, chap. ii. 14. and of *overcoming the world*, by our faith in Chriſt, chap. v. 4. And in the *Apocalypſe* he propoundeth, from Chriſt himſelf, divers remarkable promiſes *to him that overcometh:* That *he ſhall eat of the tree of life, that is in the midſt of the paradiſe of God*, chap. ii. ver. 7. That *he ſhall not be hurt of the ſecond death*, ver. 11. That *he ſhall have the hidden manna, and a white ſtone with a new name written in it*,

it, which no man knoweth, ſaving he that receiveth it, ver. 17. That *he will give him the morning-ſtar*, ver. 28. That *he ſhall be cloathed in white raiment, and his name ſhall not be blotted out of the book of life*, chap. iii. ver. 5. That *he ſhall be a pillar in the temple of God*, ver. 12. And that *he ſhall ſit with Chriſt in his throne, as he overcame and ſat down with his Father in his throne*, ver. 21. The condition of all which promiſes being *overcoming*, we may well conclude from thence, that there is a real, and not an imaginary victory only, to be obtained over the power of ſin, as well as the guilt of it.

Nay, it is true, and very obſervable, that thoſe places, which are uſually quoted as the foundation of an imputed righteouſneſs in ſome other ſenſe than what we before mentioned, are indeed no otherwiſe to be underſtood than of a real inward righteouſneſs, that is wrought or infuſed by the Spirit of Chriſt. As that principal one, *Philip.* iii. 8. *Yea doubtleſs, and I count all things loſs for the excellency of the knowledge of Chriſt Jeſus my Lord;*——— *that I may win him, and be found in him, not having mine own righteouſneſs, which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Chriſt, the righteouſneſs which is of God by faith.* Where *Chriſt*, whom the Apoſtle deſires *to win, and to be found in*, and the *righteouſneſs, which is through the faith of Chriſt*, and *the righteouſneſs, which is of God through faith*, are no external imputed righteouſneſs, but the real inward righteouſneſs of the new creature, wrought by the Spirit of Chriſt through faith, which is oppoſed here to *our own righteouſneſs*, and *the righteouſneſs, which is of the law*; that is, the righteouſneſs of outward works done by our own natural power, according to the letter of the law, in our unregenerate ſtate: for ſo the following words explain the meaning, *That I may know him, and the power of his reſurrection, and the fellowſhip of his ſufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain to the reſurrection of the dead.* And this ſame inward and real righteouſneſs is often elſewhere called *Chriſt*, and the *new man*, that is ſaid to be *in us*, and which we are exhorted to *put on*, not by conceit or imagination only, but by real conformity to his nature, and participation of his ſpirit.

And whereas the magnifiers of *free grace* in an *Antinomian* ſenſe, and the decriers of *inherent righteouſneſs*, commonly conceive, that the *free grace* of God conſiſts in nothing but either in the *pardon of ſin and exemption from puniſhment*, or the *imputation of an external holineſs*, and accounting men *juſt* freely, without any condition but only the mere believing of this, that they are ſo accounted; and that faith is no otherwiſe conſidered in the Goſpel, than in order to the believing of this imputation; and that our own works, when they are comparatively undervalued to grace and faith, are to be taken for all inherent righteouſneſs and holineſs, even the new creature itſelf: that all theſe are errors, as it might be abundantly proved from ſundry other places of Scripture, ſo it may ſufficiently appear from that one, *Eph.* ii. 4, &c. *God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love, wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in ſins, hath quickened us together with Chriſt, (by grace ye are ſaved,) and hath raiſed us up together*———*That in the ages to come he might ſhew the exceeding riches of his grace, and his kindneſs towards us in Chriſt Jeſus. For by grace are ye ſaved through faith, and that not of yourſelves*;

yourſelves; it is the gift of God: not of works, leſt any man ſhould boaſt. For we are his workmanſhip, created in Chriſt Jeſus unto good works. For when we are here ſaid *to be ſaved by grace*, it is plain, that the Apoſtle means by *ſaved*, inwardly quickened and ſanctified: σώζεσθαι (ſaith *Grotius* well here) is *purgari à vitiis:* which inward ſanctification is here attributed to God's free grace, and denied to ourſelves and to works; the meaning whereof is, that it is not effected by our own works (whether of outward morality or legal ceremonies) done by our natural power in the unregenerate ſtate, but by the quickning and enlivening ſpirit of Chriſt inwardly creating us a-new. And laſtly, faith is plainly made the inſtrument of this inward ſanctification, that is not wrought by our own works, but the grace and ſpirit of Chriſt. Whence we may well conclude, that the true object of the Chriſtian faith is not only the blood of Chriſt ſhed upon the croſs for the remiſſion of ſin, but alſo the renewing ſpirit of Chriſt for the inward conquering and mortifying of it, and the quickning or raiſing of us to an heavenly life.

And I dare be bold to ſay, that the inward ſenſe of every true and ſincere-hearted Chriſtian in this point ſpeaks the ſame language with the Scripture. For a true Chriſtian, that hath any thing of the life of God in him, cannot but earneſtly deſire an inward healing of his ſinful maladies and diſtempers, and not an outward hiding and palliation of them only. He muſt needs paſſionately long more and more after a new life and nature, and the divine image to be more fully formed in him; inſomuch, that if he might be ſecured from the pains of hell without it, he could not be fully quieted and ſatisfied therewith. 'Tis not the effects and conſequents of ſin only, the external puniſhment due unto it, that he deſires to be freed from, but the intrinſical evil of ſin itſelf, the plague of his own heart. As he often meditates with comfort upon that outward croſs, to which his Saviour's hands and feet were nailed for his ſins; ſo he impatiently deſires alſo to feel the virtue of that inward croſs of Chriſt, by which the world may be crucified to him, and he unto the world; and the power of Chriſt's reſurrection in him ſtill to raiſe him farther unto newneſs of life. Neither will he be more eaſily perſuaded to believe, that his ſinful luſts, the malignity and violence whereof he feels within himſelf, can be conquered without him, than that an army here in *England* can be conquered in *France* or *Spain*. He is ſo deeply ſenſible of the real evil, that is in ſin itſelf, that he cannot be contented to have it only hiſtrionically triumphed over. And to fancy himſelf covered all over with a thin veil of mere external imputation, will afford little ſatisfactory comfort unto him, that hungers and thirſts after righteouſneſs, and is weary and heavy laden with the burthen of ſins, and doth not deſire to have his inward maladies hid and covered only, but healed and cured. Neither can he be willing to be put off till the hour of death for a divorce betwixt his ſoul and ſin; nor eaſily perſuaded, that though ſin ſhould rule and reign in him all his life-long, yet the laſt parting groan, that ſhall divide his ſoul and body aſunder, might have ſo great an efficacy, as in a moment alſo to ſeparate all ſin from his ſoul.

But that we may not ſeem here either to beat the air in generals and uncertainties, or by an indiſcreet zeal to countenance thoſe conceited and high-

high-flown enthuſiaſts of latter times, that, forgetting that example of
Phil. iii. 12. modeſty given us by the bleſſed Apoſtle, [*Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect*———*But this one thing I do; forgetting thoſe things which are behind, and reaching forth unto thoſe things which are before, I preſs towards the mark,*] boldly arrogate to themſelves ſuch an abſolute perfection, as would make them not to ſtand in need of any Saviour, nor to be cleanſed by the blood of the lamb, which therefore they allegorize into a myſtical ſenſe; we muſt declare, that we ſpeak not here of inherent righteouſneſs, and a victory over ſin in a legal or phariſaical ſenſe, but in ſuch an evangelical ſenſe, as yet notwithſtanding is true and real.

The firſt degree whereof is a principle of new life, infuſed into the ſoul
1 John. iii. 9 by the ſpirit of Chriſt through faith, (which the Apoſtle calls *Semen Dei, the ſeed of God)* inclining it to love God and righteouſneſs, as a thing correſpondent to its nature, and enabling it to act freely and ingenuouſly in the ways of God, out of a living law written upon the heart, and to eſchew ſin as contrary to a vital principle. For the true Goſpel-righteouſneſs, which Chriſt came to ſet up in the world, doth not conſiſt merely in outward works, whether ceremonial or moral, done by our own natural power in our unregenerate ſtate, but in an inward life and ſpirit wrought by God. Which thoſe very philoſophers ſeemed in a manner to acknowledge, that denied ἀρετὴν to be διδακτόν τι, *that virtue could be taught* by outward rules and precepts like an art or trade; and *Ariſtotle* himſelf alſo, when he inclines to think, that men are θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθοὶ, and that their being good depends upon ſome extraordinary divine influence and aſſiſtance. Which I the rather take notice of, becauſe ſome late pretenders to philoſophy have prophanely derided this doctrine after this manner, as if it made *good thoughts* and *virtuous diſpoſitions* to be *POURED* and *BLOWN into men* by God. But there is a ſecond degree of victory over ſin, which every true Chriſtian ought not only to look upon as poſſible, but alſo to endeavour after, and reſtleſly to purſue; which is *ſuch a meaſure of ſtrength in the inward man*, and ſuch a degree of mortification or crucifixion of our ſinful luſts, as that a man will not knowingly and deliberately do any thing, that his conſcience plainly tells him is a ſin, though there be never ſo great temptations to it.

Whether or no this be that evangelical perfection, which was the mark, that S. *Paul* preſſed towards, and which he ſeems myſtically to call the *reſurrection from the dead*, or any thing farther, I leave it to others to make a judgment of. But doubtleſs, they, that have attained to *ſuch a principle of new life*, and *ſuch a meaſure of inward ſtrength*, as is already mentioned, that is, to the perfection of unfeigned ſincerity, may, notwithſtanding the irregularities of the firſt motions, violent aſſaults and importunities of tentations, ſudden incurſions and obreptions, ſins of mere ignorance and inadvertency, (which are all waſh'd away in the blood of Chriſt) in a true evangelical ſenſe be ſaid to have attained to a victory over ſin.

Wherefore I demand, in the next place, *Why it ſhould be thought impoſſible by the grace of the Goſpel, and the faith of Chriſt, to attain to ſuch a victory as this is over ſin?* For ſin owes its original to nothing elſe but ignorance and darkneſs. Πᾶς ὁ πονηρὸς ἀγνοεῖ, *Every wicked man is ignorant*

And

And therefore in that ſenſe that other maxim of the Stoicks may have ſome truth alſo, that ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνουσι, *Men ſin againſt their will*; becauſe if they knew, that thoſe things were indeed ſo hurtful to them, they would never do them. Now, we all know, how eaſily light conquers darkneſs, and upon its firſt approach makes it fly before it, and, like a guilty ſhade, ſeek to hide itſelf from it, by running round about the earth. And certainly the light of God ariſing in the ſoul can with as much eaſe ſcatter away the night of ſinful ignorance before it. For truth hath a cognation with the ſoul; and falſhood, lyes, and impoſtures are no more able to make reſiſtance againſt the power of truth breaking forth, than darkneſs is able to diſpute with light. Wherefore the entrance in of light upon the ſoul is half a conqueſt over our ſinful luſts.

Again, though ſin have had a long and cuſtomary poſſeſſion in the ſoul, yet it has no juſt title, much leſs a right of inheritance in it. For ſin is but a ſtranger and foreigner in the ſoul, an uſurper and intruder into the Lord's inheritance. Sin it is no nature, as St. *Auſtin* and others of the fathers often inculcate, but an adventitious and extraneous thing; and the true and ancient nature of the ſoul of man ſuffers violence under it, and is oppreſſed by it. It is nothing elſe but the preternatural ſtate of rational beings, and therefore we have no reaſon to think it muſt needs be perpetual and unalterable. Is it a ſtrange thing, that a jarring inſtrument by the hand of a ſkilful muſician ſhould ever be ſet in tune again? Doubtleſs if an inſtrument of muſick were a living thing, it would be ſenſible of harmony as its proper ſtate, and abhor diſcord and diſſonancy as a thing preternatural to it. The ſoul of man was harmonical as God at firſt made it, till ſin, diſordering the ſtrings and faculties, put it out of tune, and marr'd the muſick of it: but doubtleſs that great *Harmoſtes*, that tunes the whole world, and makes all things keep their times and meaſures, is able to ſet this leſſer inſtrument in tune again. Sin is but a diſeaſe and dyſcraſy in the ſoul; righteouſneſs is the health and natural complexion of it; and there is a propenſion in the nature of every thing to return to its proper ſtate, and to caſt off whatever is heterogeneous to it. And ſome phyſicians tell us, that medicaments are but ſubſervient to nature, by removing obſtructions and impediments; but nature itſelf, and the inward *Archæus* releaſed and ſet at liberty, works the cure. Bodies, when they are bent out of their place, and violently forced out of the natural poſition of their parts, have a ſpring of their own, and an inward ſtrong propenſion to return to their own natural poſture, which produceth that motion of reſtitution, that philoſophers endeavour to give a reaſon of. As for example, air may be forced into much a leſſer room, than it would naturally expand itſelf into: but whilſt it is under this violence, it hath a ſpring or ſtrong *conatus* to return to its proper ſtate, (of which ſeveral ingenious obſervations have been lately publiſhed by a learned hand.) Now ſin being a violent and preternatural ſtate, and a ſinner's returning to God and righteouſneſs being *motus reſtitutionis & liberationis*, whereby the ſoul is reſtored to its true freedom and ancient nature; why ſhould there not be ſuch an *elater* or ſpring in the ſoul, (quickened and enlivened by divine grace) ſuch a natural *conatus* of returning to its proper ſtate again? Doubtleſs there is, and

the Scripture ſeems ſometimes to acknowledge it, and call it by the name of *Spirit*, when it ſpeaketh of our free acting in God's ways from an inward principle. For the ſpirit is not always to be taken for a breath or impulſe from without; but alſo for an inward propenſion of the ſoul, awakened and revived in it, to return to its proper ſtate, as it is intellectual, and then to act freely in it according to its ancient nature. For if the ſpirit were a mere external force acting upon the ſoul, without the concurrence of an innate principle, then to be acted by the ſpirit would be a ſtate of violence to the ſoul, which it could not delight always to continue under; whereas the ſtate of the ſpirit is a ſtate of freedom, and not of violence, as the Apoſtle witneſſeth, when he calls it *the freedom of the ſpirit*: it is the ſoul's acting from an inward ſpring and principle of its own intellectual nature, not by a mere outward impulſe, like a boat, that is tugged on by oars, or driven by a ſtrong blaſt of wind. Wherefore the ſoul's returning from ſin to righteouſneſs, which is its primitive nature, muſt needs have great advantages, it going on *ſecundo flumine*, according to the genuine current of its true intellectual nature, and having beſides the aſſiſtance of a gentle gale of the divine ſpirit from without to help it forwards.

Why ſhould it be thought ſo great an impoſſibility for men willingly to do that, which is agreeable to the law of goodneſs, ſince this is the genuine nature of the ſoul, when once it is freed from miſtakes and incumbrances, from that which is heterogeneous and adventitious to it, that clogs it and oppreſſes it; and every life and nature acts freely according to its own propenſions? Why ſhould it ſeem ſtrange, that the ſuperiour faculties of the ſoul ſhould become predominant, ſince they are φύσει δεσποτικαὶ, of a lordly nature, and made to rule, and the inferiour faculties of a ſervile temper, and made to be ſubject? Why ſhould it ſeem impoſſible for equity, light, and reaſon to be enthroned in the ſoul of man again, and there to command and govern thoſe exorbitant affections, that do ſo lawleſly rebel againſt them? For if ſome grave commanders and generals have been able by the majeſty of their very looks to huſh and ſilence a diſorderly and mutinous rout of ſoldiers; certainly Reaſon re-enthroned in her majeſtick ſeat, and re-inveſted with her ancient power and authority, which is natural and not uſurped, would much more eaſily be able to check and controul the tumultuous rabble of luſts and paſſions in us.

Doubtleſs God hath no other deſign upon us in religion, and the Goſpel of his Son, than what is for our good, and to reſtore us to the rectitude and perfection of our own beings: wherefore he ſeeks to redeem and call off our affections from the periſhing vanities of this world, which being ſo infinitely below us, do debaſe and pollute our ſpirits: wherefore he would not have us to addict ourſelves wholly to the gratifications of our lower faculties, which are but the brute in us, but he would have the beſt in us to be uppermoſt, the man to rule the brute, and the τὸ θεῖον, that that is of God in us, to rule our manly and rational faculties. He would not have us, *Narciſſus*-like, to be always courting our own ſhadow in the ſtream; for, according to the ancient Democritical philoſophy, this whole viſible world is nothing elſe but mere extended bulk, and hath nothing real in it but atoms or particles of a different magnitude, diverſly placed and agi-

tated

tated in a continual whirlpool. But all the colour, beauty and varniſh, all that which charms and bewitches us in theſe objects without us, is nothing but the vital ſenſations and reliſhes of our own ſouls. This gives all the paint and luſtre to thoſe beauties, which we court and fall in love withal without us, which are otherwiſe as devoid of reality and phantaſtical as the colours of the rainbow. So that this outward world is not unfitly compared to an inchanted palace, which ſeems indeed mighty pleaſing and raviſhing to our deluded ſenſe, whereas all is but imaginary and a mere preſtigious ſhow: thoſe things, which we are enamoured with, thinking them to be without us, being nothing but the vital energies of our own ſpirits. In a word, God would have man to be a living temple for himſelf to dwell in, and his faculties inſtruments to be uſed and employed by him; which need not be thought impoſſible, if that be true, which philoſophy tells us, that there is *cognatio quædam*, a certain near kindred and alliance between the ſoul and God.

Laſtly, we muſt obſerve, though this inward victory over ſin be no otherwiſe to be effected than by the ſpirit of Chriſt through faith, and by a divine operation in us, ſo that in a certain ſenſe we may be ſaid to be paſſive thereunto; yet notwithſtanding we muſt not dream any ſuch thing, as if our active co-operation and concurrence were not alſo neceſſarily required thereunto. For as there is a ſpirit of God in nature, which produceth vegetables and minerals, which human art and induſtry could never be able to effect; namely, that *ſpiritus intus alens*, which the Poet ſpeaks of, which yet notwithſtanding doth not work abſolutely, unconditionately, and omnipotently, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and diſpoſitions in the matter, which it works upon; (for unleſs the husbandman plow the ground and ſow the ſeed, the ſpirit of God in nature will not give any increaſe:) In like manner the Scripture tells us, that the divine ſpirit of grace doth not work abſolutely, unconditionately, and irreſiſtibly in the ſouls of men, but requireth certain preparations, conditions, and co-operations in us; foraſmuch as it may both be quenched, and ſtirred up or excited in us. And indeed unleſs we plow up the fallow-ground of our hearts, and ſow to ourſelves in righteouſneſs, (as the prophet ſpeaks) by our earneſt endeavours; we cannot expect, that the divine ſpirit of grace will ſhower down that heavenly increaſe upon us. Wherefore if we would attain to a victory over ſin by the ſpirit of Chriſt, we muſt endeavour to *fight a good fight*, *and run a good race*, and to *enter in at the ſtrait gate*, that ſo overcoming we may receive the crown of life. And thus much ſhall ſuffice to have ſpoken at this time concerning the firſt patticular, *The victory over ſin.*

I ſhall now proceed to ſpeak ſomething briefly to the two other victories that remain, which are attainable alſo by Chriſt over the law and death.

And the law may be conſidered two manner of ways: firſt, as an outward covenant of works that pronounceth death and condemnation to all, that do not yield abſolute and entire obedience to whatever is therein commanded; and which impoſed alſo with the ſame ſeverity a multitude of outward ceremonial obſervations, which had no intrinſical goodneſs at all in them, but kept men in a ſtate of bondage and ſervility. Now the

law, in this ſenſe, as it is an outward letter and covenant of works, is already conquered externally for us by Chriſt's death upon the croſs, *Gal.* iii. 13. *Chriſt hath redeemed us from the curſe of the law, being made a curſe for us; for it is written, Curſed is every one that hangeth on a tree; that the bleſſing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jeſus Chriſt, that we might receive the promiſe of the Spirit through faith.* And he hath thereby freed us alſo from our obligation to thoſe commandments that were not good, having *broken down the middle wall of partition, that was betwixt* Jew *and* Gentile, *aboliſhing in his fleſh the enmity, even the law of commandments,* Eph ii. 14, 15. *And blotting out the hand-writing of ordinances, that was againſt us, which was contrary to us, and taking it out of the way, nailing it to his croſs,* Col. ii. 14.

Ezek. xx. 25.

Secondly, The law is ſometimes alſo conſidered in Scripture as *an inward ſtate of mind,* wrought by the law and truth of God, whether written outwardly in the letter of the Scripture, or inwardly in the conſcience, prevailing only ſo far as to beget a conviction of men's duty, and of the wrath of God againſt ſin, but not enabling them with inward ſtrength and power to do what is commanded, willingly, out of a love of it. It is ſuch a ſtate, when men are only paſſive to God's law, and unwillingly ſubject to it (as an enemy) for fear of wrath and vengeance. And this muſt needs be a ſtate of miſerable bondage and ſervility, diſtraction and perplexity of mind; when men are at once ſtrongly convinced of the wrath of God againſt ſin, and yet under the power of their luſts haling and dragging of them to the commiſſion of it. It is that ſtate (as I conceive) which St. *Paul* deſcribes, *Rom.* vii. after this manner; *The law is ſpiritual, but I am carnal, ſold under ſin: for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not, but what I hate, that do I.* And again, *I ſee another law in my members warring againſt my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of ſin. O wretched man that I am! who ſhall deliver me from this body of death?* Now from the law in this ſenſe, that is, from the bondage and ſervility of the legal ſtate, we are not delivered, nor made conquerors, by what Chriſt did outwardly upon the croſs, as ſome imagine; as if he had there purchaſed for us an indulgence to ſin without controul; but by the inward workingof his Holy Spirit, freeing us from the power and bondage of ſin, and unbewitching us from the love of it.

Wherefore there is a double freedom from this legal ſtate to be taken notice of; a *true* and a *falſe freedom*; which I cannot better explain, than by uſing the Apoſtle's own ſimilitude in the beginning of the ſeventh chapter: *Know ye not, brethren, that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth?* (or rather, *as long as* it, that is, *the law, liveth?) For the woman, which hath an huſband, is bound by the law to her huſband ſo long as he liveth; but if her huſband be dead, ſhe is looſed from the law of the huſband. So then, if while her huſband liveth ſhe be married to another man, ſhe ſhall be called an adultereſs: but if her huſband be dead, ſhe is free from that law; ſo that ſhe is no adultereſs, though ſhe be married to another man.* Where the *law* is compared to an *huſband*; and *one, that is under the law,* or *in a legal ſtate,* to *a woman, that hath an huſband.* And as there are two ways, by which a woman may be freed from her huſband; the one, if ſhe break looſe from him

him whilſt he yet liveth, contrary to the laws of wedlock, and marry to another man; which is an undue and unlawful freedom, for then ſhe is juſtly ſtyled an *adultereſs*: another, if ſhe ſtay till her huſband be dead, and then, being free from the law of her huſband, does lawfully marry to another man: In like manner there are two ways, by which men may be freed from the *law*, as it is *an inward ſtate of bondage and ſervility.* The firſt is, when men do illegally and unlawfully break looſe from the *law*, which is their *huſband*, whilſt he is yet alive, and ought to have dominion over them, and marry themſelves to another huſband; which huſband's name is *carnal liberty*, or *licentiouſneſs*, too often miſcalled in theſe latter times by the name of *Chriſtian liberty:* and ſuch as theſe may well be ſtyled, in the Scripture-language, *adulterers* and *adultereſſes.* But there is another freedom from the law, which is a due and juſt freedom, when we do not make ourſelves free before the time, violently breaking looſe from it; but when we ſtay till the law, which is our huſband, is dead, and the compulſory power of it taken away by the mortification of our luſts and affections, and ſo marry another huſband, which is *Chriſt*, or *the Spirit of righteouſneſs*, Rom. viii. 2. *The law of the Spirit of life in Chriſt Jeſus hath made me free from the law of ſin and death.*

Wherefore there are *three general ſtates of men*, in order to God and religion, that may be here taken notice of. The firſt is of thoſe, that are *alive to ſin, and dead to the law.* This the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, *Rom.* vii. 9. *I was alive without the law once.* Theſe are thoſe, whoſe conſciences are not yet conſiderably awakened to any ſenſe of their duty, nor to the diſcrimination of good and evil, but ſin freely, without any check or controul, without any diſquieting remorſe of conſcience.

The ſecond is, when men are at once alive both to the law and ſin, to the conviction of the one, and the power and love of the other; both theſe ſtruggling together within the bowels of the ſoul, checking and controuling one another. This is a *broken*, *confounded*, and *ſhattered* ſtate; and theſe, in the Apoſtle's language, are ſaid to be *ſlain by the law. I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, ſin revived, and I died. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. For ſin taking occaſion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it ſlew me.* Here is no peace, reſt nor comfort to be had in this ſtate, men's ſouls being diſtracted and divided by an inteſtine and civil war between the *law of the mind* and the *law of the members* conflicting with one another.

Wherefore the third ſtate is, when men are *dead both to the law and ſin*, and *alive unto God and righteouſneſs; the law of the Spirit of life freeing them from the law of ſin and death.* In the firſt of theſe three ſtates, which is the moſt wretched and deplorable of all, we are *ſin's freemen*, that is, free to commit ſin without check or controul. In the ſecond, we are *bondmen to God and righteouſneſs*, and ſerve God out of a principle of fear, and according to an outward rule only; children of *Hagar* the bondmaid, and of the letter. In the third, we are *God's freemen* and ſons, and ſerve him in the newneſs of the ſpirit, out of a love to God and righteouſneſs; children of the New Teſtament, and of *Sarah* the freewoman.

Wherefore

Wherefore here are two miſtakes or errors to be taken notice of, that defeat and diſappoint the deſign of Chriſt in giving us the victory over the law. The firſt is of thoſe, that we have already mentioned, that ſeek to themſelves a freedom from the bondage of the law otherwiſe than by *Chriſt* and the *Spirit of righteouſneſs*; namely, in a way of *carnal liberty and licentiouſneſs*; whereby, inſtead of being *bondmen to God and righteouſneſs*, they become perfect *freemen to ſin and wickedneſs*, which is the moſt deplorable thraldom in the world. Wherefore theſe men, inſtead of going forward from the ſecond ſtate unto higher perfection, wheel back again unto the firſt; juſt as if the children of *Iſrael*, after they had been brought out of *Egypt*, and travelled a while in the deſert of *Arabia*, where the law was given, inſtead of entering into *Canaan*, ſhould have wheeled back into *Egypt*, and then, enjoying the garlick and onions, and fleſh-pots thereof, ſhould perſuade themſelves this was indeed the true *land of promiſe, that floweth with milk and honey*. And there is very great danger, leſt when men have been tired out by wandering a long time in the dry and barren wilderneſs of the law, where they cannot enjoy the pleaſure of ſin as formerly, and yet have not arrived to the reliſh and love of righteouſneſs, by reaſon of their impatience, they ſhould at laſt make more haſte than good ſpeed, being ſeduced by ſome falſe ſhews of freedom, that are very tempting to ſuch weary travellers, and promiſe much comfort and refreſhment to them, inviting them to ſit down under their ſhadow; ſuch as are a *Self-choſen Holineſs*, *Ceremonial Righteouſneſs*, *Opinionative Zeal*, the *Tree of Knowledge* miſtaken for the *Tree of Life*, high-flown *Enthuſiaſm* and *Seraphiciſm*, *Epicurizing Philoſophy*, *Antinomian Liberty*, under the pretence of *Free Grace* and a *Goſpel Spirit*.

The ſecond miſtake, that is here to be heeded, is, of thoſe, that would by all means perſuade themſelves, that there is no higher ſtate of Chriſtian perfection to be aimed at, or hoped for, in this life, than this legal ſtate; *That the good they would do, they do not*; *the evil they would not do, that they do*; That the *law of ſin in their members* ſtill *leads them captive from the law of their minds:* having no other ground at all for this, but a novel interpretation of one paragraph in the epiſtle to the *Romans*, contrary to other expreſs places of Scripture, and the ſenſe of all ancient interpreters; and yet with ſo much zeal, as if it were a principal part of the Goſpel-faith to believe this, (which is indeed arrant infidelity) and as if it were no leſs than preſumption or impiety to expect a *living law written upon our hearts*. But this is nothing elſe, but, inſtead of ſeeking liberty out of the bondage of the law, to fall in love with our bonds and fetters, and plainly to deny the *victory over the law* by *Chriſt*, and to affirm, that the Goſpel is but the *miniſtration of a dead and killing letter*, and not of *the Spirit* that *quickeneth* and maketh alive.

I come now, in the third and laſt place, to the *victory over death*, expreſſed by the *reſurrection of the body to life and immortality*; which, as it was meritoriouſly procured for us by Chriſt's dying upon the croſs, (his reſurrection afterward being an aſſured pledge of the ſame to us,) ſo it will

be really effected at laſt by the ſame Spirit of Chriſt, that gives us *victory over ſin* here. *Rom.* viii. 11. *If the Spirit of him, that raiſed up Jeſus, dwell in you, he, that raiſed up Chriſt from the dead, ſhall alſo quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you:* as if he ſhould have ſaid, If the Spirit of Chriſt dwell in you, regenerating and renewing your ſouls, the very ſame Spirit hereafter ſhall alſo immortalize your very bodies. *Avicen*, the Mahumetan philoſopher, in his *Almahad*, hath a conceit, that the meaning of the *reſurrection of the body* is nothing elſe but this, to perſuade vulgar people, that though they ſeem to periſh, when they die, and their bodies rot in the grave; yet, notwithſtanding, they ſhall have a real ſubſiſtence after death, by which they ſhall be made capable, either of future happineſs, or miſery. But becauſe the apprehenſions of the vulgar are ſo groſs, that the permanency and immortality of the ſoul is too ſubtile a notion for them, who commonly count their bodies for themſelves, and cannot conceive, how they ſhould have any being after death, unleſs their very bodies ſhould be raiſed up again; therefore, by way of condeſcenſion to vulgar underſtandings, the future permanency and ſubſiſtence of the ſoul, in prophetical writings, is expreſſed under this ſcheme of the *reſurrection of the body*, which yet is meant κατὰ δόξαν only, and not κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Which conceit, how well ſoever it may befit a Mahumetan philoſopher, I am ſure it no way agrees with the principles of Chriſtianity; the Scripture here and elſewhere aſſuring us, that the *reſurrection of the body* is to be underſtood plainly, and without a figure; and that the Saints, departed this life in the faith and fear of Chriſt, ſhall not be mere ſouls without bodies to all eternity, as *Avicen*, *Maimonides*, and other philoſophers dreamed, but conſiſt of ſoul and body united together. Which bodies, though, as the doctrine of the church inſtructeth us, they ſhall be both ſpecifically and numerically the ſame with what they were here; yet, notwithſtanding, the Scripture tells us they ſhall be ſo changed and altered, in reſpect of their qualities and conditions, that in that ſenſe they ſhall not be the ſame. Ver. 36, 37. *Thou fool, that, which thou ſoweſt, is not quickened, except it die: thou ſoweſt not that body, that ſhall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of ſome other grain; but God giveth it a body, as it pleaſeth him, and to every ſeed his own body.* The Apoſtle here imitating the manner of the Jews, who (as appeareth from the * *Talmud*) were wont familiarly to illuſtrate the buſineſs of the *reſurrection of the body* by the ſimilitude of *ſeed ſown into the ground, and ſpringing up again.* Accordingly he goes on, *It is ſown in corruption, it is raiſed in incorruption; ſown in diſhonour, it is raiſed in glory; ſown in weakneſs, it is raiſed in power; ſown a natural body, raiſed a ſpiritual body.* Which epithet was uſed alſo in this caſe, both by the philoſophers and the Jews; for *Hierocles* upon the Golden Verſes calls them ὀχήματα πνευματικὰ, *vehicula ſpiritualia*, ſpiritual bodies; and R. *Menachem*, from the ancient cabaliſts, התלבשות רוחנית, *the ſpiritual clothing.* Laſtly, the Apoſtle concludes thus; *Now this I ſay, brethren, that fleſh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.* For which cauſe he tells us elſewhere, that they, which do not die, muſt of neceſſity be *changed.* And indeed, if men ſhould be reſtored after death to ſuch groſs, foul and cadaverous bodies, as theſe are here upon earth, which is the very region of

* See *Gemara*, in *Chetuboth*, cap. 13. *Ein Iſrael*, num. 50.

death and mortality, without any change at all; what would this be elſe, but, as *Plotinus* the philoſopher againſt the Gnoſticks writes, ἐγείρεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, *to be raiſed up to a ſecond ſleep*, or to be entombed again in living ſepulchres? *For the corruptible body preſſeth down the ſoul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that muſeth upon many things*, Wiſdom ix. 15. Wherefore we muſt needs explode that old Jewiſh conceit, commonly entertained amongſt the Rabbinical writers to this day, That the future reſurrection is to be underſtood of ſuch groſs and corruptible bodies, as theſe are here upon earth, to eat, drink, marry, and be given in marriage, and (which muſt needs follow) afterward to die again. *Nachmanides*, in his *Shaar Haggemul*, is the only Jewiſh author, that ventures to depart from the common road here, and to abandon this popular error of the Jews, endeavouring to prove, that the bodies of the juſt, after the reſurrection, ſhall not eat and drink, but be glorified bodies: but * *Abravanel* confutes him with no other argument, than this, *That this was the doctrine and opinion of the Chriſtians.* Let us therefore now conſider, how abundantly God hath provided for us by Jeſus Chriſt, both in reſpect of our ſouls, and of our bodies; our ſouls, in freeing us by the Spirit of Chriſt (if we be not wanting to ourſelves) from the ſlavery of ſin, and bondage of the law, as it is a letter only; our bodies, in that *this corruptible ſhall put on incorruption*, and *this mortal immortality*, and that theſe *vile bodies* ſhall be made like to *Chriſt's glorious body.* In both which the complete ſalvation of man conſiſteth, the perfection and happineſs both of ſoul and body. For, though our ſalvation conſiſts chiefly in the former, in the *victory over ſin*, and in the renovation of the mind, yet without the latter, which is the *victory over death*, and the immortalizing of our bodies, it would be a very lame and imperfect thing. For righteouſneſs alone, if it ſhould *malè habitare*, dwell always in ſuch inconvenient houſes, as theſe earthly tabernacles are, however the high-flown Stoick may brag, it could not render our condition otherwiſe, than troubleſome, ſolicitous and calamitous. Wherefore the holy men in Scripture, not without cauſe, longed for this future change. *Rom.* viii. 23. *We groan within ourſelves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies.* 2 Cor. v. 2. *In this we groan earneſtly, deſiring to be clothed upon with our houſe, which is from heaven.* But there is no obtaining of this future *victory over death* and mortality, except we firſt get a *victory over ſin* here. For this is that crown of life, that Chriſt, the firſt-begotten from the dead, will ſet upon the heads of none, but thoſe, that have here fought a good fight, and overcome. For as death proceeds only from ſin and diſobedience, ſo the way to conquer death, and to arrive at life and immortality, is by ſeeking after an inward conqueſt over ſin. For *righteouſneſs is immortal*, Wiſd. i. 15. and will immortalize the entertainers of it; and, as the Chaldee oracle ſpeaks,

ἐκτείνας πυρὶ σὸν νῶν,
Ἔργον ἐπ' εὐσεβείας ῥεῦσον, καὶ σῶμα σαώσεις.

Having hitherto ſhewed, what are the great things we hope for by Chriſt, and are to endeavour after, namely, to procure *an inward and real victory over ſin* by the Spirit of Chriſt, that ſo we may hereafter attain a *victory over*

* In *Nachalath Avoth*, cap. 4. רעח חנוצרים הוא ונו׳, *This is the very ſame with the opinion of the Chriſtians, that hold, that after the reſurrection men ſhall not eat, drink, marry, or be given in marriage, or die again, but continue eternally in thoſe bodies, reſembling the heavenly bodies; and theſe they vulgarly call glorified bodies.*

over death and mortality; we cannot but take notice briefly of ſome errors of thoſe, that, either pretending the impoſſibility of this inward victory over ſin, or elſe hypocritically declining the combat, make up a certain religion to themſelves out of other things, which are either impertinent, and nothing to the purpoſe, or elſe evil and noxious.

For firſt, ſome (as was intimated before) make to themſelves a mere phantaſtical and imaginary religion, conceiting, that there is nothing at all for them to do, but confidently to believe, that all is already done for them, all imputed and accounted to them; that they are dearly beloved of God, without any conditions or qualifications to make them lovely. But ſuch a faith as this is nothing but mere phancy and carnal imagination, proceeding from that natural ſelf-love, whereby men fondly doat upon themſelves, and are apt to think, that God loves them as fondly and as partially as they love themſelves, tying his affection to their particular outward perſons, their very fleſh and blood; hereby making God a being like unto themſelves, that is, wholly acted by arbitrary ſelf-will, fondneſs, and partiality; and perverting the whole nature and deſign of religion, which is not mere phantaſtry and an hiſtorical ſhew, but a real victory over the real evil of ſin, without which God can neither take pleaſure in any man's perſon, nor can there be a poſſibility of being happy, a real turning of the ſoul from darkneſs unto light, from the power of Satan unto God.

Again, Some there are, that, inſtead of walking in the narrow way, that Chriſt commendeth to us, of ſubduing and mortifying our ſinful luſts, make to themſelves certain other narrow ways of affected ſingularity in things, that belong not to life and godlineſs, outward ſtrictneſſes and ſeverities of their own chuſing and deviſing; and then perſuade themſelves, that this is the ſtrait gate and narrow way of Chriſt, that leadeth unto life. Whereas theſe are indeed nothing elſe but ſome particular paths and narrow ſlices cut out of the broad way. For though they have an outward and ſeeming narrowneſs, yet they are ſo broad within, that camels with their burdens may eaſily paſs through them. Theſe, inſtead of taking up Chriſt's croſs upon them, make to themſelves certain croſſes of their own, and then laying them upon their ſhoudlers and carrying them, pleaſe themſelves with a conceit, that they bear the croſs of Chriſt; whereas in truth and reality they are many times too much ſtrangers to that croſs of his, by which the world ſhould be crucified to them, and they unto the world.

Some place all their religion in endleſs ſcrupuloſities about indifferent things, neglecting in the mean time the τὰ βαρύτερα τῦ νόμυ, *the more weighty things* both of Law and Goſpel, and (as our Saviour farther expreſſeth it) διϋλίζοντες τὸν κώνωπα, τὴν δὲ κάμηλον καταπίνοντες, *ſtraining at a gnat, and ſwallowing a camel*; that is, being not ſo ſcrupulous as they ought to be about the ſubſtantials of religion and a good life. For as we ought not to place the chief of our religion in the mere obſervation of outward rites and ceremonies, whilſt in the mean time we hypocritically neglect the morals and ſubſtantials; which may deſervedly be branded with the name of *ſuperſtition*: ſo we ought to know, that it is equal ſuperſtition to have ſuch an abhorrence of indifferent things, as to make it the main of our religion to abſtain from them; both of theſe arguing equal ignorance of the nature of God, as if he

were ſome moroſe, humorous, and captious Being; and of that righteouſneſs, which the kingdom of God conſiſteth in, as if theſe outward and indifferent things could either hallow or defile our ſouls, or as if ſalvation and damnation did depend upon the mere uſing or not uſing of them. The Apoſtle himſelf inſtructeth us, that the *kingdom of God* conſiſteth no more in ἀκροβυστία than in περιτομὴ, no more in *uncircumciſion* than in *circumciſion*; that is, no more in not uſing outward ceremonies and indifferent things than in uſing of them. Wherefore the negative ſuperſtition is equal to the poſitive, and both of them alike call off men's attention from the main things of religion, by engaging them over-much in ſmall and little things. But the ſober Chriſtian, that neither places all his religion in external obſervances, nor yet is ſuperſtitiouſly anti-ceremonial, as he will think himſelf obliged to have a due regard to the commands of lawful authority in adiaphorous things, and to prefer the peace and unity of the Chriſtian church, and the obſervation of the royal law of charity, before the ſatisfaction of any private humour or intereſt; ſo he will be aware of that ἀμέλεια τῆς ἀνθολκῆς, which many run into, of baniſhing away all the ſolemnity of external worſhip, the obſervation of the Lord's day, and and of the Chriſtian ſacraments, under the notion of ceremonies, quite out of the world. To conclude; unleſs there be a due and timely regard had to the commands of lawful authority in indifferent things, and to order, peace, and unity in the church, it may eaſily be foreſeen, that the reformed part of Chriſtendom will at length be brought to confuſion, by crumbling into infinite ſects and diviſion, and then to utter ruin.

Again, Many miſtake the vices of their natural complexion for ſupernatural and divine graces. Some think dull and ſtupid melancholy to be Chriſtian mortification. Others, that turbulent and fiery zeal is the vigour of the Spirit. Whereas zeal is one of thoſe things, that *Ariſtotle* calls τὰ μέσα, *of a middle nature*, neither good nor bad in itſelf, but which, as it is circumſtantiated, may indifferently become either virtue or vice. For there is a πικρὸς ζῆλος, as the Apoſtle calls it, *a bitter zeal*, which is contrary to all Chriſtian love and charity, and is nothing elſe but the vices of acerbity, envy, malice, cruelty, tinctured and gilded over with a religious ſhew. And there may be alſo a turbulent and factious zeal, when men, under a pretence of acting for the glory of God, violate juſt and lawful authority, in order to the advancement of their own private ſelf-intereſt. Indeed there was amongſt the *Jews* a certain right, called *jus zelotarum*, or the *right of zealots*; whereby private perſons, acted by a zeal for God, might do immediate execution upon ſome malefactors, without expecting the ſentence of any court of judicature. And ſome conceive, that our Saviour, by this *right of zealots*, did whip the buyers and ſellers out of the temple, and overturn the tables of the money-changers; becauſe he was never queſtioned by the *Jews* for it. But this was then a legal and regular thing, permitted by the publick laws of that nation in ſome certain caſes, yet ſo as that thoſe zealots were afterward accountable to the *Sanhedrin* for what they did. However, a little before the deſtruction of the temple, as *Joſephus* tells us, there were a crew of deſperate miſcreants, that, abuſing this right, and calling themſelves by the name of *Kannain*, i. e. *zealots*, made a pretence from hence to commit moſt villainous actions. And I wiſh ſome had not too much entertain'd this opinion,

that

that private perſons might reform publick abuſes, whether belonging to the eccleſiaſtical or the civil polity, without and againſt the conſent of the ſupreme magiſtrate, in a turbulent manner, *jure zelatorum*, *by the right of zealots*; nay, and that actions, that are otherwiſe altogether unwarrantable in themſelves, may notwithſtanding be juſtified *by zeal for God and good ends*. But God needs no man's zeal to promote an imaginary intereſt of his in the world, by doing unjuſt things for him. *Will you ſpeak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? will you accept his perſon?* 'twas the generous expoſtulation of *Job* with his friends; and he tells them in the following words, that this was nothing elſe, but *to mock God as one man mocketh another*.

True divine zeal is no Corybantick fury, but a calm and regular heat, guided and managed by light and prudence, and carried out principally neither for nor againſt indifferent rites and unneceſſary opinions, but thoſe things, that are immutably good and fundamental to Chriſtianity; always acknowledging a due ſubordination to that authority civil and eccleſiaſtical that is over us.

Laſtly, ſome there are, whoſe pretence to religion and the ſpirit is founded in nothing elſe but a faculty of rhetoricating and extemporizing with zeal and fervency, which they take to be nothing leſs than divine inſpiration, and that which the Scripture calls *praying in the Holy Ghoſt*, an undoubted character of a perſon truly regenerated. Which being a great deluſion, whereby many are hindred from ſeeking after the real effects of the Divine Spirit, by idolizing, inſtead thereof, that, which is merely natural, (if not artificial;) I think it not impertinent here to ſpeak a little of it. And certainly that, which is frequently attained to in the very height by perſons groſly hypocritical and debauched, can never be concluded to be divine inſpiration, or to proceed from any higher principle than mere natural enthuſiaſm. For there is not only a poetical enthuſiaſm, of which *Plato* diſcourſeth in his *Ion*, but, though oratory be a more ſober thing, a rhetorical enthuſiaſm alſo, that makes men very eloquent, affectionate and bewitching in their language, beyond what the power of any bare art and precepts could enable them unto; inſomuch that both theſe, poets and orators, have oftentimes conceited themſelves to be indeed divinely inſpired; as thoſe known verſes teſtify:

Eſt Deus in nobis, agitante caleſcimus illo;

And,

Sedibus æthereis Spiritus ille venit.

And concerning orators, the like might be proved, if the time would here permit, by ſundry teſtimonies: but I ſhall here inſtance only in *Ariſtides*, a famous orator, who not only ſpeaks poſitively of himſelf, as inſpired in his orations, but affirms the ſame alſo concerning rhetorick in general, when it is extraordinary, that it comes by immediate inſpiration as oracles and prophecies do, and not from art or nature. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondred at, if when men are imployed in religious and devotional exerciſes,

exercises, the same natural enthusiasm, especially having the advantage of religious melancholy, which makes men still more enthusiastical, should so wing and inspire the fancies of these religious orators, as to make them wonderfully fluent, eloquent and rapturous, so that they beget strange passions in their auditors, and conclude themselves to be divinely inspired. Whereas, notwithstanding, they may have no more of divine inspiration in all this than those poets and orators before mentioned had; that is to say, be no otherwise inspired, than by a rhetorical or hypochondriacal enthusiasm, that is merely natural. But it is far from my intention here to disparage the sincere and ardent affections of devout souls, naturally and freely breathing out their earnest desires unto God in private; although perhaps this be not without some kind of enthusiasm also. For enthusiasm, as well as zeal, and other natural things, may be well used, and, being rightly circumstantiated, and subservient to a better principle, become irreprehensible. Some have observed, that no great work of the brain, that begot much admiration in the world, was ever atchieved without some kind of enthusiasm; and the same may be affirmed of the most transcendently virtuous and heroical actions. But then the goodness of these actions is never to be estimated merely by the degree of enthusiastick heat and ardor, that is in them, but by such other laws and circumstances, as moralize human actions. Wherefore my meaning, as I said before, is only this, to caution against that vulgar and popular error of mistaking the natural and enthusiastical fervour of mens spirits, and the ebulliency of their fancy, when it is tinctur'd with religion, and idolizing of it instead of the supernatural grace of God's Holy Spirit; and of looking for the effect of God's Spirit principally in words and talk, or thinking, that God is chiefly glorified with a loud noise, and long speeches. For the true demonstration of God's Holy Spirit is no where to be look'd for but in life and action, or such earnest and affectionate breathings after a farther participation of the divine image, as are accompanied with real and unfeigned endeavours after the same; which is the true praying in the Holy Ghost, though there be no extemporaneous effusion of words. And therefore, when some *Corinthians* were puffed up, by reason of a faculty, which they had of rhetoricating religiously, S. *Paul*, like an Apostle, tells them, that he would come amongst them, and *know, not the speech of them, that were puffed up, but the power. For the kingdom of God* (saith he) *consisteth not in word, but in power and life.* Wherefore, laying aside these and such like childish mistakes, and things that are little to the purpose, let us seriously apply ourselves to the main work of our religion; that is, to mortify and vanquish our sinful lusts by the assistance of God's Holy Spirit through faith in Christ; that so being dead to sin here, we may live with God eternally hereafter.

1 Cor. iv. 19.

THE END.

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